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INTRODUCTION 
 
This thesis has the objective to develop a better understanding of the relationship between 
conflict financing and the recurrence of intra-state armed conflict. It looks at the 
availability of revenue sources, the cost of conflict and incentives to use armed force to 
explore the potentials of a conflict financing perspective in contributing to the prevention 
of conflict recurrence. The thesis follows two research questions: What is the relationship 
between conflict financing and recurrence? What can be done from the perspective of 
conflict financing to prevent the recurrence of intra-state armed conflict? 
 The thesis highlights that conflict financing is a necessary but not sufficient 
condition for conflict recurrence and should therefore be analysed within its broader 
political context. The availability of revenue sources increases the risk of conflict 
recurrence if conflict entrepreneurs are able to translate revenue sources into military 
capabilities and if the amount of revenue sources can pay for the type of armed conflict 
needed to achieve the objectives of an organised armed group. Over time, a high 
incentive to use armed force can increase the risk of conflict recurrence by contributing to 
an organised armed group finding the revenue sources required for the type of armed 
conflict needed. Policy against conflict financing should therefore go beyond cutting the 
availability of revenue sources, increase the cost to start and maintain armed conflict and 
address the expected benefits and opportunity costs of using armed force.  
 This thesis contributes to research on armed conflict by analysing conflict 
recurrence from the perspective of conflict financing; developing a better understanding 
of conflict financing through a comprehensive approach to conflict financing and a tool to 
estimate the cost of armed conflict; and elaborating a framework of analysis for the 
relationship between conflict financing and conflict dynamics. The thesis also highlights 
the role of the cost of conflict in conflict dynamics, the prominence of low intensity 
conflict as a type of armed conflict after the Cold War, and a typology of different 
methods of conflict financing and their effectiveness to finance major armed conflict. 
 The following is an introduction to this thesis. The Introduction starts by locating 
the thesis within three current areas of research on armed conflict before making 
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observations on methodology. It then provides an outlook on the findings and 
contributions and presents the individual Chapters.   
 
Conflict recurrence from the perspective of conflict financing 
 
The phenomenon of conflict recurrence has become increasingly important after the end 
of the Cold War. Various studies suggest that the risk of conflict recurrence is between 20 
and 50 percent (Suhrke and Samset 2007, 195-199).2 At the same time, increasing 
attention to peacebuilding has led to the investment of billions of Dollars into post-
conflict areas. The investment of both financial and political capital into peacebuilding 
increased the interest of governments and multilateral donors to hedge against the risk of 
conflict recurrence. While the signature of peace agreements usually indicates that an 
armed conflict is over, the risk of conflict recurrence persists. This thesis has the 
objective to foster the sustainability of peacebuilding by developing a better 
understanding of the relationship between conflict financing and recurrence.   
 The perspective of conflict financing in conflict recurrence remains so far 
unexplored. Conflict recurrence has been explained by the failure of peace agreements. 
They fail because negotiated settlements are used mainly in intractable armed conflicts 
and are, thus, more short-lived (Gartner and Bercovitch 2006). Moreover, peace 
agreements fail due to the challenge of implementation. Peace implementation is a high-
stake transition process with uncertainty, intangibles and set-backs. In these 
circumstances, it is difficult to maintain the commitment of belligerents and third parties 
to a peace process (Stedman and Rothchild 1996). Armed conflict also recurs because 
belligerents are often unable to create credible commitments to disarm and demobilise 
(Walter 1997). Conflict recurrence is also fostered by disproportionately influential 
groups which have the resolve, opportunity and capability to spoil peacebuilding 
(Stedman 1997; Greenhill and Major 2007). Finally, armed conflict is likely to recur, if 
the conditions for rebel recruitment in a post-conflict period stay the same (Walter 2004). 
                                                 
2 The variation between the risk of conflict recurrence is associated to different datasets and methodologies 
(Suhrke and Samset 2007, 198). In Chapter 1, an analysis of the Uppsala Conflict Termination Dataset 
suggests that nearly every second terminated conflict recurred at least once between 1989 and 2004.  
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By looking at conflict recurrence from the perspective of conflict financing, this thesis 
contributes a new angle to the literature on conflict recurrence and dynamics.  
 
Towards a better understanding of conflict financing 
 
The thesis also builds on the proliferation of research on the economic aspects of armed 
conflict after the end of the Cold War. This economic perspective emerged as a response 
to unsatisfactory explanations of intra-state armed conflict focusing on ethic and religious 
differences between groups. These explanations were limited because they did not 
capture the new realities of armed conflict including globalisation, weak states and the 
proliferation of non-state actors in areas of conflict. Armed conflicts were “New Wars” 
characterised by “a myriad of transnational connections so that the distinction between 
intra-state and external, between aggression (attacks from abroad) and repression (attacks 
from inside the country), or even between local and global, becomes difficult to sustain” 
(Kaldor 1999, 2). Armed conflict was no longer fought for the means of achieving 
political goals; much rather, the aim of fighting was to perpetuate conflict for economic 
reasons. As a result, intra-state armed conflict became increasingly protracted and self-
financing (Creveld 1991; Keen 1998).  
 The analysis of the economic dimensions of armed conflicts also includes debates 
on the origin and perpetuation of armed conflict (Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Arnson and 
Zartman 2005), the economic agendas in civil war (Keen 1998; Berdal and Malone 2000; 
Ballentine and Sherman); conflict economies (Jean and Rufin 1996; Pugh and Cooper 
2004), natural resources (Le Billon 2001; Renner 2002; Bannon and Collier 2003; Ross 
2004a; Ballentine and Nitschke 2005), warlords (Reno 1998; Marten 2007); development 
(Duffield 2001; Steward and Fitzgerald 2001; Cramer 2006), new actors in conflict areas 
(Singer 2001; Berdal and Serrano 2002; Wenger 2003) and a series of case studies (see 
Table 1.4).  
 This literature has become referred to as the Political Economy of Conflict. In its 
broadest sense, it is devoted to the study of the relationship between political and 
economic factors in affecting the dynamics of armed conflict as well as the relationship 
between the material environment and motivations in the organisation of the use of force.   
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 With its focus on conflict financing in conflict recurrence, this thesis contributes 
to the literature on the Political Economy of Conflict by opening a new perspective on the 
study of conflict dynamics – the initiation, maintenance, escalation and termination of 
armed conflict.  
 First, the thesis develops a better understanding of conflict financing by going 
beyond single method explanations. Instead, it advocates a comprehensive approach to 
conflict financing in which conflict economies are the combination of various methods of 
conflict financing (Wennmann 2007a; see Table 2.2).   
 Secondly, the thesis understands conflict financing not merely as the availability 
of revenue sources but in relation to the cost of armed conflict. In order to establish the 
latter, this thesis develops a tool to estimate the cost to start and maintain armed conflict 
(see Table 2.15). Knowledge on the available revenue sources only makes sense if it can 
be related to the cost of the type of armed conflict required for a specific military 
strategy. The thesis therefore starts from the premise that what matters in conflict 
financing is not the total value of revenue sources but how it relates to the cost of 
organising armed conflict. In consequence, it emphasises the “surplus” and “shortage” of 
revenue sources to finance armed conflict, barriers-to-entry and the cost of competition 
and their relationship to the conflict dynamics.   
 
A conceptual framework for the analysis of conflict dynamics 
 
In order to determine the relationship between conflict financing and recurrence, this 
thesis develops a conceptual framework (Table 0.1) which is then applied to three case 
studies: The conflicts of Angola, Abkhazia and Kosovo. The conceptual framework 
distinguishes between the propensity of an organised armed group to renew armed 
conflict and the risk of conflict recurrence. The latter is established by relating to each 
other the propensities of the organised armed groups. Concerning the propensity to renew 
armed conflict, the conceptual framework juxtaposes the material environment (the 
availability of revenue sources and the cost to start and maintain armed conflict) and the 
incentives to use armed force (the expected future benefits and opportunity costs of using 
armed force). The framework develops two sets of hypothesis: The first captures the 
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inclination of an actor – an organised armed group – to use force and restart an armed 
conflict; the second is the likelihood of an event – conflict recurrence – to occur based on 
present knowledge which is projected into the future. For an overview of the hypothesis 
please refer to Tables 2.19 and 2.20 in Chapter 2.  
 
Table 0.1: The relationship between conflict financing and recurrence 
 
 
Step 1: Propensity to renew armed conflict (per actor) 
 
 
Material environment to organise armed conflict 
 
 
Incentives to use armed force 
 
Availablility of 
revenue sources 
 
Cost to start and 
maintain conflict 
 
Expected future benefits 
of using armed force 
 
Opportunity costs  
of using armed force 
        ↓↓↓ 
         
        Surplus of revenue sources 
        Shortage of revenue sources 
 
 
←→ 
                   ↓↓↓ 
     
    High incentive to use armed force 
    Low incentive to use armed force 
               
 
 
↓↓↓ 
 
Propensity to renew armed conflict (high or low) 
 
 
Step 2: Risk of conflict recurrence 
 
 
Actor A 
 
Actor B 
 
..... 
 
Actor N 
 
 
Propensity to renew  
armed conflict  
↓↓↓ 
 
 
Propensity to renew  
armed conflict  
↓↓↓ 
 
 
..... 
 
Propensity to renew  
armed conflict  
↓↓↓ 
 
                     High  
                     Low 
 
←→          High           Low 
 
←→ High Low 
               
 
 
↓↓↓ 
 
Risk of conflict recurrence (high or low) 
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 This framework is as much a conceptualisation to understand the relationship 
between conflict financing and recurrence as well as conflict dynamics. The rationale 
behind the conceptual framework is based on a functional understanding of armed 
conflict. Armed conflict is the organised use of force for which rational conflict 
organisers need financing to realise their military, political or economic objectives. When 
considering the availability of revenue sources it is therefore important to distinguish if 
revenue sources are the means to organise armed conflict or if they are an end of armed 
conflict. The former highlights, for example, that even if ideologies and identities are part 
of the mobilisation and justification for the onset of an armed conflict, those who want to 
renew armed conflict must find the financing to start and maintain it. For the latter, 
revenue sources are part of the incentives to using armed force. 
 The conceptual framework also presents an alternative perspective on conflict 
dynamics and the economic dimensions of armed conflict. It goes beyond the Collier-
Hoeffler Model on the Onset of Civil War as a framework for case study research (Collier 
and Hoeffler 2004, Collier and Sambanis 2005) and the literature on the Political 
Economy of Conflict by: 
 
• Correcting the bias on rebel groups by focusing on “organised armed groups”; 
• Reducing material determinism by juxtaposing the material environment and the 
incentive to use armed force;  
• Broadening the understanding of conflict financing by including a comprehensive 
approach to conflict financing and going beyond individual conflict financing 
methods; 
• Including the cost of armed conflict by developing a cost estimation tool and data 
points on barriers-to-entry and the cost of competition;  
• Broadening the understanding of conflict financing by combining the availability of 
revenue sources with the cost of conflict; thus, emphasising the “surplus” or 
“shortage” of revenue sources rather than their total availability; and  
• Considering conflict financing a relational phenomenon by looking at the relative 
material position of all belligerent parties.  
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Methodology and case studies 
 
This thesis establishes the relationship between conflict financing and recurrence by 
developing a framework of analysis and applying it to three cases of Angola, the 
Abkhazia conflict and Kosovo. These cases have been selected from a family of cases of 
118 armed conflicts which occurred in the period 1989-2004 (Harbom and Wallensteen 
2005, 624). In order to identify the family of armed conflict, the thesis relied on the 
Uppsala Conflict Data Project from the Department of Peace and Conflict Research of 
Uppsala University.  
As this thesis looks at conflict recurrence, a conditioning element for the family of 
cases is that one previous armed conflict took place. Within the family of cases, 
separations could then be made between conflict which recurred and other which did not. 
Conflict recurrence is understood as renewal of armed conflict in the same location, by 
the same actors over the same incompatibility as defined by the Uppsala Database on 
Conflict Termination (see Part 1.2.). The period 1989-2004 has been selected in line with 
the thesis focus on armed conflict in the post-Cold War period.  
The thesis applies the conceptual framework to the cases of Angola, the Abkhazia 
conflict and Kosovo. In Angola, the case study looks at conflict recurrence after the 
Bicesse Accords (1992-1994) and after the Lusaka Peace Process (1995-2002). In the 
Abkhazia conflict, the case study analyses the armed conflict (1992-1994), as well as the 
periods of the so-called Frozen Conflict (1994-2003) and the Rose Revolution (2003-
2006). In Kosovo, the case study scrutinises the period of parallel governance and non-
violent resistance (1989-1995), the rise of the KLA and armed conflict (1995-1999) and 
the period under international administration (1999-2006).  
 These cases and phases have been selected to study the two conflict recurrences in 
Angola and the conflict onsets in Abkhazia and Kosovo. In this way, the case studies 
cover the dependent variable – conflict recurrence. However, the case studies also look at 
Abkhazia and Kosovo as “negative cases” according to the possibility principle: The 
choice of a case in which conflict recurrence did not occur but in which there was a 
possibility that it would recur at one moment and a surplus of revenue sources to pay for 
conflict recurrence (Mahoney and Goertz 2004, 657). The Kosovo case study therefore 
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inquires why armed conflict did not occur prior to the outbreak of armed conflict in 1998 
and after its end in 1999. In Georgia, it is questioned why armed conflict did not recur 
during the period of the Frozen Conflict and after the Rose Revolution.  
 The case studies have also been selected to provide insight into different methods 
of conflict financing. The Angola case study focuses on natural resources, the Abkhazia 
case study on parallel economies and the Kosovo case study on diaspora financing. In this 
way, the case studies identify if there is something specific to these methods of conflict 
financing in their relationship to conflict recurrence. The case study selection also ensures 
geographic diversity with one case from each Africa, Eurasia and Europe.  
 The decision to conduct three in-depth case studies instead of using a larger 
sample is related to the challenge of researching conflict financing. Data on conflict 
financing is at best vague if at all available. Moreover, data on conflict financing is often 
the result of a political process and either over- or underestimated. This reflects that data 
on conflict financing is a product of social construction and not an objectively observable 
fact. It therefore necessitates interpretation in the framework of a contextual analysis and 
discursive argumentation. The case studies show that it is possible to make estimations on 
the availability of revenue sources and the cost of conflict. Vagueness is not a judgement 
on the quality of these estimations but rather a reflection of the characteristics of data on 
conflict financing. Through analysis and interpretation in in-depth case studies, the 
estimations in this thesis become the best available figures.  
 The Abkhazia and Kosovo case studies are based on secondary literature and 
interviews. The author conducted interviews in Tbilisi (27 February – 4 March 2005), 
Sukhumi (5-11 March 2005) and Pristina (25 July – 1 August 2005) (see Appendix 1). 
The Abkhazia visit included a military patrol in the Southern Gali Security Sector. In 
Abkhazia, the Author could also draw on the experience of numerous missions to 
Georgia between 2001 and 2006 in the framework of a professional engagement, 
including an interview trip to Tbilisi (24 February-2 March 2006) and London (20-23 
February 2006). The research trip to Kosovo included a trip to Mitrovica and Prekaz on 
30 July 2005. All interviews have been indexed by topics to facilitate comparison and 
analysis. Due to financial constraints, interviews in Angola were not possible. However, 
research on conflict financing in this case was facilitated due to the wealth of empirical 
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material such as the investigative reports of the UNSC Sanctions Monitoring Mechanism 
(UNSC 2000a; UNSC 2000c; UNSC 2002b), Global Witness (1998; 2000a; 2002b) or 
Human Rights Watch (2004). In addition, the Angola conflicts attracted a wealth of 
existing research on oil and diamonds as exemplified by the work of Philippe Le Billon 
(2001b; 2005), Jackie Cilliers and Christian Dietrich (2000), Tony Hodges (2001), Assis 
Malaquias (2001; 2007) and Alex Vines (2004). 
 The inferences from three case studies are certainly limited in creating findings 
which apply to all times and places. For the purposes of this thesis, the findings should be 
understood as the outcome of three case studies which invite reflection on conflict 
financing, conflict recurrence as well as the economic dimension of armed conflict and its 
relationship to conflict dynamics. 
 
Summary of the findings and contributions 
 
Conflict financing is a necessary but not sufficient condition for conflict recurrence. The 
surplus of revenue sources is a necessary condition for conflict recurrence because 
without it armed conflict could not be started or maintained. The surplus of revenue 
sources is, however, not a sufficient condition because there have been episodes in which 
armed groups had the resources to fight, but did not. In order to understand conflict 
recurrence, conflict financing must be connected to its political context. Thus, the 
availability of revenue sources is not automatically associated to the onset and recurrence 
of armed conflict. The thesis therefore contradicts the claim that the feasibility of 
rebellion determines the onset of armed conflict (Collier 2000, 4).  
 The availability of revenue sources increases the risk of conflict recurrence if:  
 
• A conflict entrepreneur manages to translate revenue sources into military capability. 
Revenue sources increase the risk of conflict recurrence if they are captured by a 
conflict entrepreneur, managed centrally, and controlled by few stakeholders. In this 
way, potential revenue sources become effective methods of conflict financing. 
• The amount of revenue covers the expenses for the type of conflict needed to achieve 
the objectives of the belligerent party. The cost of different types of armed conflict 
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creates different barriers-to-entry for the recurrence of armed conflict. Revenue 
sources increase the risk of conflict recurrence if they generate enough to pay for the 
type of armed conflict needed by an organised armed group to achieve its objectives. 
• A high incentive to use force increases the availability of revenue sources over time. 
A high incentive to use force can lead an organised armed group to innovate and 
diversify its revenue sources thereby changing from a shortage to a surplus of revenue 
sources and increasing its propensity to renew armed conflict. 
• Conflict financing is considered as a relational phenomenon. Associating conflict 
financing to conflict recurrence only makes sense when comparing the revenue 
sources and military capabilities of all parties.  
 
 The case studies also provide evidence that the risk of conflict recurrence is 
highest if at least one organised armed group has the revenue and motivation to renew 
armed conflict. However, having the revenue does not necessitate conflict recurrence as 
the onset of armed conflict is part of a tactically informed choice to use armed force.  
 In terms of what can be done from the perspective of conflict financing to prevent 
the recurrence of intra-state armed conflict, this thesis suggests that policies targeting 
conflict financing in post-conflict settings are more effective against high intensity 
conflict than low intensity conflict. This is because the material aspects involved in 
organising high intensity conflict is bigger and therefore more easily targeted. The thesis 
also highlights that only targeting revenue sources and the cost of conflict is unlikely to 
foster the long term prevention of conflict recurrence unless the incentives to use armed 
force are addressed in a political process.  
 Ultimately, the thesis provides a better understanding of armed conflict. The 
inclusion of the cost of conflict opens a new perspective on conflict dynamics by 
establishing data points for barriers-to-entry and the cost of competition. The utility of 
parametric cost estimation is highlighted by the cost estimation tool only needing four 
data points – the cost of weapons, the cost of ammunitions, the income per soldier and the 
number of soldiers – to perform an estimation which identifies the lowest threshold to 
start and maintain armed conflict. Table 2.16 summarises a thought experiment for a low, 
medium and high cost estimate for 1,000 soldiers per year. 
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 Including the cost of conflict into the analysis of armed conflicts also provides an 
explanation for the prevalence of low intensity conflict as the main type of armed conflict 
after the end of the Cold War. Given the lower cost of low intensity conflict, most 
organised armed groups cannot cover the cost to escalate a conflict to a higher level of 
intensity. Thus, low intensity conflict occurs frequently because the barrier-to-entry and 
cost of competition are low. As low intensity conflicts become prolonged, the economic 
agendas of armed conflict generate the revenues to self-finance low intensity conflict.  
 In addition, the thesis develops a typology of different methods of conflict 
financing and their effectiveness to finance major armed conflict (see Table 7.2). The 
capacity of centralisation as well as the value and immediacy of the revenue stream 
increases the effectiveness of conflict financing. This makes oil, diamonds, drugs and 
third-party assistance more effective than taxation, parallel economies or diaspora 
financing. Taxation of humanitarian assistance, contributions of individuals, kidnapping, 
asset transfers from civilians, landing fees or revenue from portfolio investments are less 
effective strategies of conflict financing because on their own they are unlikely to finance 
a major armed conflict. Nevertheless, these methods remain important because spoilers 
only need few resources to pay for the renewal of a low intensity conflict. 
 Ultimately, the thesis also contributes to a better understanding of the economic 
dimensions in the conflicts of Angola, Abkhazia and Kosovo. In Angola, the analysis of 
oil and diamonds in combination with the cost of conflict provides a new perspective on 
the dynamics of the conflict. Diamonds did not provide sufficient revenue to UNITA to 
escalate the conflict in 1993 and 1999. The armed conflict did not end with the killing of 
Jonas Savimbi but with the capture of diamond mines which undermined UNITA as a 
military organisation. The case study on the Abkhazia conflict highlights the limitation of 
official data on smuggling and underlines the need to understand parallel economies as 
part of the instrumentalisation of the unresolved conflicts for Georgian domestic political 
purposes. In Kosovo, it is shown that the recreation of diaspora financing for a “war of 
independence” is illusionary. Diaspora financing did not generate sufficient revenue to 
maintain a high intensity conflict in 1998. In much less favourable conditions for conflict 
financing nowadays it is unlikely that the recurrence of conflict could be maintained 
through diaspora financing. 
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Thesis overview 
 
The work of this thesis is presented in six Chapters: Chapter 1 is a literature review, 
Chapter 2 elaborates the conceptual framework, Chapters 3 to 5 apply the conceptual 
framework to the conflicts of Angola, Abkhazia and Kosovo and Chapter 6 conducts an 
analysis of the case studies and explores its implication for peacebuilding. 
 Chapter 1 reviews the academic literature on the Political Economy of Armed 
Conflict, conflict recurrence and conflict financing. The review of the Political Economy 
of Armed Conflict develops a platform for the conceptual framework. It highlights that 
there is a need to correct the bias on rebel groups and material determinism, contextualise 
and broaden the analytical framework, adopt a comprehensive approach to conflict 
financing and create a better understanding of the cost of armed conflict. The review of 
conflict recurrence looks at the empirical research on conflict recurrence, the difference 
between conflict recurrence and perpetuation and various explanations for why armed 
conflicts recur. It argues for the inclusion of conflict financing in the analysis of conflict 
recurrence. The review of conflict financing explores the historical dimension of 
financing inter-state wars and insurgencies as well as conflict financing after the Cold 
War. It argues for a comprehensive approach to conflict financing which considers 
conflict economies as the combination of various methods of conflict financing. 
Chapter 2 elaborates the conceptual framework of the relationship between 
conflict financing and the recurrence of intra-state armed conflict. The first Part presents 
a comprehensive approach to conflict financing. It highlights the importance of 
identifying the potential revenue sources to finance conflict in post-conflict settings. It 
also establishes an inventory of methods of conflict financing to facilitate comparison of 
available revenue sources and methods of conflict financing (Table 2.2). The second Part 
develops a tool to estimate the cost of conflict inspired by parametric cost estimating. The 
Part discusses the conceptual and empirical aspects of the cost of conflict before 
establishing cost drivers of armed conflict. The Part then develops cost estimation 
relationships for the start-up and maintenance cost of armed conflict based on the price 
for weapons and ammunitions as well as salaries and number of soldiers. The objective is 
to identify the lowest threshold to start and maintain armed conflict. The third Part looks 
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at the incentives to use armed force and thus introduces the perspective of agency into the 
conceptual framework. It explores the expected benefits and opportunity costs of using 
armed force and their effects on conflict dynamics. The fourth Part develops hypotheses 
on the relationship between conflict financing and recurrence. 
 Chapter 3 applies the conceptual framework to the case study of Angola. The case 
study presents the background to the Angola conflict before conducting an analysis of the 
conflict recurrence after the collapse of Bicesse Accords (1992-1994) and the Lusaka 
Protocol (1995-2002). The case study highlights that conflict recurrence in Angola 
depends on the triangular relationship between money, weapons and logistics and on the 
relative availability of revenue sources between the parties to the conflict. Moreover, the 
case study points to the importance of the management of revenue sources and the 
different characteristics of natural resources as methods of conflict financing. The 
Chapter closes by exploring the risk of conflict recurrence after the end of hostilities in 
2002 and underlines the importance of security sector reform as a strategy to increase the 
barrier-to-entry into armed conflict and well as the necessity of inclusive state building to 
prevent conflict recurrence. 
 Chapter 4 applies the conceptual framework to the Abkhazia conflict. The study 
presents the background to the conflict and an analysis of conflict recurrence in three 
phases: The armed conflict in Abkhazia (1992-1994), the period of the Frozen Conflict 
(1994-2003), and the period of the Rose Revolution (2003-2006). The case study 
highlights that the mere availability of revenue sources did not lead to the outbreak of 
renewed armed conflict in Georgia in the period of the Frozen Conflict and after the Rose 
Revolution; that the risk of conflict recurrence in Georgia increased with an increasing 
centralisation of revenue sources of the Georgian Government in 2003, and that the risk 
of conflict recurrence decreased due to a high barrier-to-entry for high intensity armed 
conflict and the opportunity costs of using armed force. The case study also shows that 
economic decentralisation can prevent conflict recurrence by increasing the number of 
stakeholders in the economy; and that third-parties can prevent conflict recurrence by 
increasing the barriers-to-entry into armed conflict and the opportunity cost to use armed 
force.  
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 Chapter 5 applies the conceptual framework to the case study of Kosovo. After an 
introduction to the Kosovo conflict, the case study explores the relationship between 
conflict financing and recurrence in the periods of parallel governance and non-violent 
resistance (1989-1995), the rise of the KLA and armed conflict in Kosovo (1995-1999) 
and Kosovo under international administration (1999-2006). The case study finds that the 
availability of revenue sources is a necessary but not sufficient condition for conflict 
recurrence. In all three periods, Kosovo Albanian actors had sufficient revenue sources to 
start an armed conflict but only in the second period were they used for this purpose. 
Moreover, the study highlights that changes in the incentives to use armed force preceded 
the 1998 conflict while the availability of conflict financing remained constant. The case 
study also underlines that different methods of conflict financing influenced the risk of 
conflict recurrence. In comparison to oil and diamonds in Angola, diaspora remittances 
are a less effective methods of conflict financing because their revenue stream is more 
difficult to control. Finally, the maintenance of a high barrier-to-entry for armed conflict 
through the presence of an international peacekeeping force and administration 
contributed to the prevention of conflict recurrence.  
 Chapter 6 draws together the individual case studies in order to explore the 
relationship between conflict financing and recurrence. It looks at the implications for 
conflict recurrence from the perspective of the availability of revenue sources, the 
conditions of conflict financing, the cost of conflict and the change of conflict financing 
over time. Based on this analysis, this thesis recommends that policy against conflict 
financing in post-conflict settings must go beyond limiting the availability of revenue 
sources. It should also increase the cost to start and maintain armed conflict and reduce 
the incentives to use armed force. The latter involves reducing the expected benefits and 
increasing the opportunity costs to use armed force. 
 The thesis concludes by exploring how the findings contribute to a better 
understanding of armed conflict. The Conclusion underlines that the inclusion of the cost 
of conflict in the analysis of conflict financing opens a new perspective on conflict 
dynamics. It also sets out an explanation why low intensity conflict is the predominant 
type of armed conflict after the Cold War and develops a typology of different methods 
of conflict financing and their effectiveness of financing major armed conflict.  
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CHAPTER 1 
Exploring conflict recurrence and financing 
 
This Chapter reviews the literature on the Political Economy of Conflict and explores the 
phenomena of conflict financing and the recurrence of armed conflict. The literature on 
the Political Economy of Conflict has improved the understanding of the role of 
economic factors in conflict, especially in terms of their relationship to the initiation and 
perpetuation of armed conflict. However, while much of the literature focused on the role 
of economic factors as a motivation and opportunity for armed conflict, comparatively 
little attention has been devoted to the conflict financing as a means to conduct armed 
conflict – how armed groups obtain the financial resources to pay for the start and 
maintenance of armed conflict – and what this means for the recurrence of conflict. In 
addition, the role of economic factors for the renewal of armed conflict has so far 
remained unexplored by this literature. This thesis seeks to close these gaps.  
This Chapter develops a foundation for the conceptual framework. The first Part  
reviews the literature on the Political Economy of Armed Conflict. It highlights that there 
is a need to go beyond the Collier-Hoeffler Model on the Onset of Civil War (hereafter 
C&H model) as a framework for case study analysis (Collier and Sambanis 2005). The 
thesis suggests doing so by reducing its bias on rebel groups and material determinism, 
contextualising and broadening the analytical framework, adopting a comprehensive 
approach to conflict financing and creating a better understanding of the cost of armed 
conflict. Part 1 begins looking at the role of globalisation and weak states in armed 
conflicts after the end of the Cold War before shifting to the economic agendas in armed 
conflict. The Part also explores the “Greed and Grievance” literature and its response 
which goes “beyond Greed and Grievance” by contextualising and broadening the 
analytical framework, specifying the link between natural resources and conflict, and 
conceptualising the transition from need to creed to greed. The Part concludes by 
elaborating a platform for the relationship between conflict financing and recurrence.  
 This Chapter then explores the phenomenon of conflict recurrence. While there 
has been a lot of work on the onset of armed conflict, there has been relatively little 
emphasis on the renewal of conflict. Part 2 therefore seeks to develop a better 
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understanding of conflict recurrence by looking at the empirical research on conflict 
recurrence, the difference between conflict recurrence and perpetuation and various 
explanations for why conflicts recur. The part argues for the inclusion of conflict 
financing in the analysis of conflict recurrence. Conflict financing is an essential part of 
the conflict recurrence because the conduct of armed conflict must be paid for. It is 
therefore important to look at how organised armed groups finance themselves and what 
are their potential revenue sources in post-conflict settings. 
 Part 3 closes with an analysis of the phenomenon of conflict financing. In the 
literature, conflict financing was mainly considered in terms of the availability of natural 
resources and contributions from diaspora communities or third-party governments. Be it 
the notion of ‘Resource Wars’ (Klare 2001, Le Billion 2005), the findings of the C&H 
model or research on particular conflict goods, the presence of natural resource has been 
considered to increase the risk of armed conflict. This literature on conflict financing has 
received a lot of attention in the policy world and is a successful example of 
mainstreaming an academic debate into international policy making. Potent illustrations 
are the initiatives of the United Nations Security Council against conflict financing, the 
Kimberley Process and initiatives against terrorist financing.  
 The review of conflict financing in this Chapter provides the background for a 
better understanding of conflict financing. It explores the historical dimension of 
financing inter-state wars and insurgencies and conflict financing after the Cold War. 
Overall, the discussion on conflict financing argues for a comprehensive approach of 
conflict financing which goes beyond a focus on individual methods of conflict financing. 
Instead war economies should be considered as the combinations of various methods of 
conflict financing available to conflict entrepreneurs. 
 
1.1. The Political Economy of Conflict  
 
Since the Second World War, the occurrence of intra-state conflict has been explained in 
various ways. The reasons for armed conflicts were considered, for example, as the result 
of ideology (insurgencies), international forces (proxy wars), the denial of rights (colonial 
wars) or relative deprivation (rebellions) (Zartman 2005, 257-258). After the end of the 
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Cold War, the explanatory weight shifted to ethnic and cultural identity and “irrational 
and essentially inexplicably primordial qualities” (Pugh and Cooper 2004, 97). However, 
a focus on ethnic and religious identity as a cause of conflict did neither capture the 
implications of globalisation and weak states for armed conflict nor did they reflect the 
economic aspects of armed conflict after the end of the Cold War. The focus shifted to 
economic factors in explaining armed conflict.  
The Political Economy of Conflict is a subfield of Security Studies and is part of 
the trend to broaden and deepen this field. While traditional approaches to security 
studies focused on the security of the state and on military power a broader agenda 
includes the individual, regional and systems level and a societal, economic, 
environmental and cultural dimensions of threats (Buzan 1991, 363, 368-370). The result 
of broadening the security agenda was the proliferation of individual security literatures 
such as on human security (UNDP 1994), societal security (Wæver et al 1993), 
environmental security (Homer-Dixon 1994, Gleditsch 1998), cultural security 
(Katzenstein 1996), conflict and development (Steward and FitzGerald 2001, Duffield 
2001, Cramer 2006) and complex humanitarian emergencies (Macrae and Zwi 1994, 
Nafziger et al 2000) and, ultimately, the Political Economy of Conflict.  
Few authors have delimited the field of study of the Political Economy of 
Conflict. Le Billon defines it as “the distribution of power, wealth and destitution during 
armed conflict, in order to expose the motives and responsibility of those involved, within 
a historical context” (Le Billon 2000, 1).3 Berdal and Malone describe it as a complex 
web of motives and interactions emerging from the interplay of immediate economic 
agendas, vested interests in prolonging civil war, widespread destitution, and 
economically motivated violence (Berdal and Malone 2000, 2). Keen sees it as an 
approach to civil war that focuses on the opportunities and benefits deriving from conflict 
(Keen 1998, 11). Most broadly, then, the Political Economy of Conflict is devoted to the 
study of the relationship between political and economic spheres in affecting the 
dynamics of armed conflict as well as the relationship between the material environment 
and motivations in the organisation of the use of force.   
                                                 
3 Despite this emphasis on the historical context, there is surprisingly little coverage on the historical 
dimension of the political economy of conflict.  
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 The Political Economy of Conflict is composed of various contributions which – 
partly in parallel, partly in response to each other – developed an alternative 
understanding of the economic dimensions of armed conflict. Overall, these literatures 
included works on globalisation, weak states and armed conflict and the economic 
agendas in armed conflict. Moreover, the work on “Greed and Grievance” of Paul Collier 
and Anke Hoeffler (1998, 2001, 2004) were an important stimulus for a debate. By 
associating “greed” exclusively to the causation and maintenance of armed conflict they 
provoked a vigorous response in the academic community which ultimately created a 
body of literature which went “beyond Greed and Grievance”.  
 In a sense, the shift from identity to greed to explain armed conflict was 
countering one extreme with another which. Zartman compares to a pendulum: 
 
 “Putative explanations emerge and draw momentum of scholarship to them, 
lining up true believers and drawing fire of true doubters, until a 
counterproposition appears in turn and the pendulum swings in a new direction. 
The movement encourages exclusivist and exaggerated claims in order to draw 
attention to a new explanatory angle, and so fuels the work of debunkers. Much 
value is lost in the process, and the pendulum only comes to rest on one side or in 
the middle much later, often unnoticed as the debate moves elsewhere” (Zartman 
2005, 257). 
 
Following this image, Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler swung the pendulum of conflict 
causation from identity to greed. Various contributions then exposed the “Greed and 
Grievance” literature (Cramer 2002, Klem 2004, Ross 2004b, Fearon 2005, Nathan 2005) 
while others provided an alternative take on the economic dimensions of armed conflict. 
These included the economic agendas in civil war (Keen 1998, Berdal and Melone 2000); 
globalisation (Kaldor 1999, Duffield 2000), weak states (Holsti 1996, Krause and 
Milliken 2003), warlord politics (Reno 1998); conflict economies (Jean and Rufin 1996, 
Pugh and Cooper 2004), natural resources (Le Billon 2001, Renner 2002, Ross 2004a, 
Ballentine and Nitzschke 2005, Le Billon 2005) and conflict and development (Steward 
and FitzGerald 2001, Duffield 2001, Cramer 2006). The pendulum started balancing in 
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the middle when going “beyond greed and grievance” (Ballentine and Sherman 2003) 
and looking at the “intersection of need, creed and greed” (Arnson and Zartman 2005). 
While the pendulum of the economic dimensions of conflict came to a rest, the debate on 
civil wars moved to micro-theories of civil war (Kalyvas 2007) and the organisation of 
rebel groups (Weinstein 2007; Bøås and Dunn 2007). 
 
1.1.1. Globalisation, weak states and armed conflict after the Cold War 
 
Armed conflict remains one of the most complex and devastating phenomena of our time. 
Even though nearly three generations in North America and large parts of Europe and 
Latin America have not experienced armed conflict directly, it is a common feature in 
other parts of the world, particularly in Asia, Africa and the Middle East. Since the 
Second World War, 228 armed conflicts took place in 148 locations with about 14 to 20 
million people killed and 67 million displaced (Harbom and Wallensteen 2005, 623; 
Sarkees et al 2003, 65; Sambanis 2004, 1).4 While the number of armed conflicts 
increased up until the late 1980s they peaked in the early 1990s. The occurrence of 
conflict has since lessened by nearly half, thus, contradicting the claim that we live in a 
particularly violent era (Marshall and Gurr 2003, 12; Eriksson et al 2003, 594).  
 While armed conflict prior to the Second World War was primarily perceived as a 
contest between states, one of the characteristics of contemporary conflict is that conflict 
takes mainly place within states. Between 1989 and 2004, 118 conflicts occurred and 90 
of them were intra-state conflicts (Harbom and Wallensteen 2005, 624). However, the 
preponderance of intra-state conflicts is not exclusively related to the post-Cold War 
period as all decades after the 1950s had more civil than international wars (Sarkees et al 
2003, 61).5  
                                                 
4 The figures on the number armed conflict are based on the Uppsala Conflict Data Project (UCDP) which 
defines armed conflict as “a contested incompatibility that concern government and/or territory where the 
use of armed force between two parties, of which one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 
battle-related deaths” (Strand et al 2005, 3). However, the number of total conflicts varies according to 
database and definition of conflict. For a list of 66 databases see http://www.pcr.uu.se/UCDP/ 
conflict_dataset_ catalog/data_list.htm [27.01.2004]. 
5 Sarkees et al define civil war as “wars between or among two or more groups within the internally 
recognised territory of a state” and international wars as the combination of inter-state and extra state wars. 
The latter is “war between a territorial state and a non-sovereign entity outside the border of the state” 
(Sarkees et al 2003, 59-60). 
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 As every other social phenomenon, the conduct of armed conflicts is a reflection 
of its time and adapts to transforming realities. One of the most important transitions 
from the period of inter-state conflicts to intra-state conflicts is that the latter take place 
within the context of globalisation and weak states and no longer in a context of societal 
mass mobilisation in industrial economies reminiscent of 19th and early 20th century 
warfare. These changing realities encouraged a wave of research on the proliferation of 
non-state actors in conflict areas such as transnational organised crime networks 
(TOCNs), private military companies (PMCs), companies as well as individual conflict 
entrepreneurs (Singer 2001, Shearer 1998, Naylor 2002, Reno 1998). The following will 
explore the role of globalisation and weak states in armed conflict.  
 “Globalisation” is a phenomenon that captures the change of the global economy. 
While it has its roots in the development of the international economy, it is associated to 
technological developments in the late 1980s and 1990s which facilitated the integration 
of business, technological and financial systems, thus, stimulating a process which 
enables a freer flow of capital, commodities and services across national borders and 
economic growth (Duffield 2000, 69-70). However, globalisation also encouraged “new 
and durable forms of divisions, inequality and instability” (Duffield 1999, 22). These 
trends have been described as the interplay between globalisation and fragmentation: 
  
“Globalization (...) denotes movements in both intensity and extent of 
international interactions: in the former sense, globalization overlaps in some 
degree with related ideas of integration, interdependence, multilateralism, 
openness and interpenetration; in the latter, it points to the geographical spread of 
these tendencies and is cognate with globalism, spatial compression, 
universalisation, and homogeneity. Fragmentation is but shorthand for the 
opposite tendencies and has the same two dimensions: on the one hand it, 
suggests disintegration, autarchy, unilateralism, closure and isolation; on the 
other, the trend is towards nationalism or regionalism, spatial distension, 
separatism and heterogeneity” (Clark 1997, 1-2). 
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The relationship between globalisation and fragmentation is important to 
understand the dynamics of contemporary conflict. After the Cold War, the decline in 
external assistance forced organised armed groups to change their sources of financing. 
Following the logic of globalisation, easier access to global markets transformed war 
economies through the commercialisation of local resources in the global economy. 
Organise armed groups could therefore ensure the supply of know-how, man power and 
the material for the conduct of conflict (King 1997, 37-39 Berdal 2003, 482). In this 
process, conflict economies become increasingly integrated into criminal and informal 
economies, (Lock 1999, 31-32). At the same time, the fragmentation of political authority 
of the state became a pervasive phenomenon in developing countries and conflict areas. 
The decline of the state facilitated the growth of warring parties which establish de-facto 
control over specific areas within a state embedded in regional and global economic 
networks. The effects of globalisation and weak states on armed conflict have led to the 
notion that we are in fact looking at “post-nation state conflict” (Duffield 1999, 26-27). 
 The importance of globalisation in conflict has also been captured by the notion of 
“regional conflict complexes”. They are characterised by “the cross-border spill over of 
violence, the empowerment of borderlands as sanctuaries for combatants and nurseries 
for recruits and also as centres of shadow economic activities, and the interregional 
commercial or other connections that make for prolonged and intractable conflicts” (Pugh 
and Cooper 2004, 2). Regional conflict complexes are a combination of overlapping 
economic, military, political and social networks and a challenge to conflict management 
because they create permissive conditions for conflict (Ibid., 24-36).  
 The involvement of transnational networks became a key feature of armed 
conflict and became a central element of calling these conflicts “New Wars”. They 
involve “a myriad of transnational connections so that the distinction between internal 
and external, between aggression (attacks from abroad) and repression (attacks from 
inside the country), or even between local and global, becomes difficult to sustain” 
(Kaldor 1999, 2). Given the international and transnational linkages of areas of conflict, 
the label ‘intra-state conflict’ was said to be misleading; but nevertheless an indication 
that most of the fighting takes place within states rather than between states.   
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 Transnational networks operate within three spaces of the global economy 
including legitimate, informal and criminal economies. The legitimate economy is 
regulated and taxed by the state and its transactions are based on the rule of domestic or 
international commercial law. The informal economy is conducted in parallel markets to 
avoid taxation and exploit legal loopholes. In principle, it does not violate domestic or 
international laws because its practices and products are not illegal. However, in the 
criminal economy, economic activity contravenes domestic or international law because 
its products and practices are outlawed. The criminal economy is the fastest growing 
economic space of the global economy (Lock 1999, 31-32). 
 In reality, transnational networks are economic actors such as such as TOCNs, 
PMCs or companies. These actors link a zone of conflict to international arms, 
commodity and financial markets and facilitate the conversion of illicit and criminal 
profits into legitimate sources of revenue.  
 TOCNs are often considered as monolithic entities which challenge the rule of 
law, states and world order. However, this perception bears little resemblance to reality. 
The business of crime is the supply of goods and services which are illegal or which are 
legal but enter a market illegally. Crime becomes organised in networks because it needs 
protection from enforcement agencies and competitors (Serrano 2002, 16). Organised 
crime becomes transnational when it involves smuggling, i.e. “bringing or taking out a 
commodity without state authorization” (Andreas 2002, 38).  
 Organised crime is a network of individuals or small and medium-sized groups 
that are connected through arm-length transactions. In order to reduce the risk of 
persecution, operations take place over multiple layers of intermediation and 
specialisation with decentralised control mechanisms. This results in a large number of 
actors and also in competition between groups vying for control over business segments 
(Naylor 2002, 2-4, 21). TOCNs are cooperating with each other in view of increasing 
their geographic reach, maximising the opportunities of globalisation and reducing 
operational risk (Williams 2002, 67-72).  
TOCNs are involved in conflict zones for profit and do not tend to be involved in 
the political dimensions of an armed conflict or combat operations. They are profiting 
from supplying weapons and providing logistical services. Moreover, TOCNs are not 
  
45
necessarily violent actors because violence attracts the attention of law enforcers and can 
interrupt established business channels. For TOCNs, violence has a functional character 
to enforce contracts, settle accounts or intimidate customers and is more associated to 
marginalised criminal groups wanting to change the control structure of the criminal 
economy (Naylor 2002, 31-32, Wennmann 2004, 106-108).  
 In comparison to TOCN, PMCs are more closely related to the political dimension 
of an armed conflict as they participate in combat. PMCs are “profit-driven organizations 
that trade in professional services intricately linked to warfare,” especially providing 
implementation and command structures, advice, and training (Singer 2001, 186, 200).  
 The rise of PMCs is associated with the collapse of the military sectors in the 
former Soviet Union and South Africa leading to the cheap supply of military expertise, 
staff, and weapons. Moreover, the rise of PMCs was facilitated by a general trend of 
outsourcing in the 1990s, the reluctance of military intervention of major powers and the 
changed engagement of the superpowers from Sub-Saharan Africa and other conflict 
areas (Singer 2001, 188-198; Shearer 1998, 26-34; Nossal 2000).  
PMC are linked to conflict in a number of ways. They can give rebel groups or 
governments a military advantage by getting access to international arms markets more 
easily. Moreover, services of PMCs can be paid by futures contracts, concessions or 
royalties for resource exploitation. Thus, governments or warlords do not need to 
generate funds to pay for PMCs before the can benefit from their services (Reno 1998, 
47, 55-56, 67). The payment in the form of concessions for the exploitation of natural 
resources also explains why some PMCs are vertically integrated businesses including a 
resource extraction and logistics company (Shearer 1998, 39-55).  
 Companies are related to armed conflict by making business with the parties 
involved in a conflict which therefore receive funding to start or sustain conflict. 
Companies can range from individuals or small companies to multinational corporations.  
They are usually specialised in resource extraction, logistics or other specialised services 
useful in areas of conflict (Peleman 2000). The involvement of companies in conflict has 
received particular attention because of their potential economic and financial 
implications in conflict areas. The amounts involved are significant with about USD 150 
billions invested annually in countries with ongoing armed conflicts (Nelson 2000, 5). 
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Among companies, natural resource companies have been particularly exposed to 
conflict areas. Natural resource deposits can be located in conflict areas and a company 
wanting to explore these resources must enter into a conflict to commercialise them. 
Natural resource companies made it easier to commercialise the resources of conflict 
zones in the global economy (Duffield 2000, 72). Natural resource companies and PMCs 
often operate together – or are two parts of one and the same company – to isolate the 
exploration of natural resource from a broader conflict or to protect the exploration site 
from outside attacks. Natural resource companies can also contribute to creating the 
conditions of conflict by fostering grievances among the local population (Böge et al 
2006, 12-17). These grievances can be related to the environmental impact of resource 
exploration, the pressures for changing traditional patterns of life and the uneven 
distribution of benefits to the local population as in Bougainville (Regan 2003).  
In some business sectors, such as oil exploration or deep shaft mining, 
multinational companies may be the only actors with the technology and capital to 
commercialise economic opportunities in conflict areas. However, companies have 
become much more sensitive to consumers pressure as bad publicity on corruption and 
complicity in conflict could potentially taint a company’s image. The Publish What You 
Pay Campaign6 and the Global Compact7 have been initiatives to sensitise companies 
about their role and responsibilities in conflict areas (Böge et al 2006, 10-12).  
 TOCNs, PMCs and companies affect the dynamics of armed conflict in a similar 
way. All three actors link a zone of conflict to the global economy through the supply of 
weapons, medicine, food or other materials and the commercialisation of the resources of 
a conflict area. Conflict zones are attractive business environments for them because the 
high level of risk of operating in conflict zones means that profit margins are high. 
Moreover, their actions are outside any effective domestic or international jurisdiction 
                                                 
6 The Publish What You Pay coalition of over 300 NGOs calls for the mandatory disclosure of payments 
made by oil, gas and mining companies’ to all governments for the extraction of natural resources. The 
Publish What You Pay campaign aims to help citizens of resource-rich developing countries hold their 
governments accountable for the management of revenues from the oil, gas and mining industries. See 
http://www.publishwhatyoupay.org/english/ [10.05.2006]. 
7 The Global Compact brings together companies with UN agencies, labour and civil society to support 
universal environmental and social principles. It is a voluntary process and seeks to promote responsible 
corporate citizenship so that business can be part of the solution to the challenges of globalisation. See 
http://www.unglobalcompact.org/AboutTheGC/index.html [10.05.2006]. 
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and markets can be controlled easily through coercion and corruption. As a consequence, 
TOCNs, PMCs and companies have a vested interest in the perpetuation armed conflict 
because the conditions of insecurity are the enabling environment for their business. 
However, TOCNs, PMCs and companies can also shorten conflicts if they increase the 
power of one party of over another (Ross 2002, 11-17, 31-36). Moreover, they can 
shorten conflicts by avoiding that the adversaries commercialise economic opportunities 
thus limiting their funding  (Reno 1998, 47, 55-56, 67). 
 The linkages of conflict zones to the international economy are, alas, not the only 
defining features of contemporary conflict. Another element is the fragmentation of 
political authority. A characteristic of weak states is that state institutions fail to perform 
key state functions such as the provision of security, representation and welfare (Krause 
and Milliken 2003, 753). In the worst case, continued erosion of state institutions leads to 
state collapse; however, these cases are rare. The phenomenon of state failure is more 
common (Krause and Milliken 2003, 753-756).  
 The weakness of states is understood as their capacity to ensure territorial control, 
to extract resources, to disarm the public, to apply the law throughout the entire territory, 
to deliver government and social services and to ensure the legitimacy of the government 
in the eyes of the population (Holsti, 1996, 104-108). The literature on weak states 
emphasises that the state is an evolving entity which “has always been a work in 
progress. (…) From the outset, the modern state (…) represented an ideal of sovereign 
territoriality to which rulers aspired, but which they seldom achieved” (Krause and 
Milliken 2003, 753, 755). 
Different manifestations of weak states include the quasi, rentier or warlord state. 
In quasi states, international juridical recognition is the key determinant for sovereignty. 
This recognition allows a government to act internationally as a sovereign state even if it 
lacks key empirical aspects of statehood such as institutional capacity and effective 
control over territory and population. A quasi state is weakened if the creation of the state 
was a result of external imposition rather than a domestic process of state formation, thus 
lacking an organic relationship between state and society (Jackson 1990, 5, 26).  
A rentier state is characterised by an economy which is dependent on an external 
rent. A rent is a reward which accrues to a state by virtue of having natural resources in 
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its territory or a geo-strategic location. It stands in contrast to earned income from 
production and is exemplified by the states in the Middle East which have received a 
windfall wealth through petrol exports in the 1970s. Other forms of rents include external 
military, political or development aid as well as workers remittances (Beblawi 1987, 60-
61). Rents usually accrue to the government elite and a rentier class which becomes 
disproportionately powerful. As a result, public goods are a function of personal favours 
of a ruler which blur the relationship between state and society. The state become 
involved in redistributing wealth, thus, contributing to the emergence of rentier classes, 
vested interests in protecting the rent and a rentier mentality which breaks work-reward 
mechanisms, and ultimately to a little productive economy (Ibid, 49-53).  
Warlord states distinguish themselves from weak states by the degree to which 
policy outcomes are determined by informal political networks, how far the objectives of 
the state are similar to the private interests of the ruler, and how far these interests are 
pursued by violent means (Reno 1998, 3; Clapham 1996, 252-255). Warlord states are a 
form of regime innovation emphasising the control of markets and areas of resource 
exploitation without relying on state institutions while at the same time assuring support 
from international financial institutions (IFIs) (Reno 1998, 4, 8, 21-22, 72). Warlords 
“control an area by their capacity to wage war, and are able to organise a war economy, 
often including external economic activities, to sustain themselves and keep (weak) 
central authorities at bay” (Le Billon 2000, 4).  
Weak states are related to the armed conflict in a number of ways. Based on the 
notion of the state of Max Weber, one of the primary duties of the state is to provide 
security to its citizens though the monopoly of the legitimate use of armed force within 
the territory of the state. In weak states, the monopoly of the use of armed force is 
incomplete which makes it possible for insurgents to exploit power vacuums in the areas 
outside government control and establish zones of influence. This is particularly the case 
in quasi and rentier states which are internally weak as the relationship between state and 
society is distorted and territorial control is partially established. In this context, intra-
state armed conflict has been explained by the lack of institutional and military capacity 
of weak states to enforce the monopoly to use force (Herbst 2000, 281-286). Moreover, 
state weakness is further accentuated if insurgents have access to resources and therefore 
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the means to challenge the state (Fearon and Laitin 2003, 80-81; Hironaka 2005, 69-70; 
Ballentine 2003, 264-266). In addition, weak states lower the threshold to use force given 
the lack of effective law enforcement which fosters impunity (Keen 1996, 34, 43, 52).  
 The emphasis on globalisation and weak states emphasises once more the 
complexity of armed conflict and conflict economies. Not only are conflict economies 
embedded in regional and global networks but also occur in the overlapping spaces of the 
legal, illicit and criminal markets and well as of de jure and de facto political authority. In 
view of making sense of armed conflict for the study of conflict financing and recurrence, 
this complexity needs to be untangled.  
 The main relationship of globalisation and armed conflict is that it had provided 
organised armed groups with a permissive opportunity structure, first, to do business with 
those actors interested in the goods and services emanating from the area of their control; 
and second, to acquire weapons, materiel and know-how needed to conduct armed 
conflict. At the same time, the persistence of weak states in areas of conflict shaped a 
permissive opportunity structure to carve out areas which are outside the de facto control 
of the state. Thus, globalisation and weak states provided a background for organised 
armed groups to acquire the means to conduct armed conflict and for shaping the ends for 
which to start and maintain armed conflict. To varying degrees, both means and ends 
have become a focal point for the discussion on the economic agendas in armed conflict 
 
1.1.2. Economic agendas in armed conflict 
 
The work on the economic agendas in armed conflict developed in recognition of the 
increasingly important role of economic factors in maintaining and motivating organised 
armed groups. Overall, the literature looked at the economic functions of armed conflict 
and whether greed or grievance was a better explanation for the onset of civil war. 
However, the literature on the economic agendas in civil war is distinct from what 
became known as the “Greed and Grievance” literature:  The former is concerned with 
explaining armed conflict after the end of the Cold War; the latter is insensitive to the 
nature of intra-state conflict between 1960 and 1999. In this way, the literature on the 
economic functions of civil war understands predation and loot-seekers within the context 
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of the end of the Cold War; however, the findings of the “Greed and Grievance” literature 
are unrelated to time and location (Herbst 2000, 274).  
 In addition, the literature differs in their conception of armed conflict. Rather then 
depicting civil wars as ‘chaos’8, the economic agendas literature considers armed conflict 
as part of a process of social transformation in which people adapt their behaviour in 
order to survive, minimise risk and maximise opportunities. In these circumstances, 
belligerents benefit from the absence of legal authorities and the accumulation of 
economic rewards can become the end goal of fighting (Keen 2000, 19). 
The literature on the economic agendas in armed conflict illustrates that 
contemporary intra-state conflict departs from Clausewitzean notions of war as a contest 
between two armies in which war is the means to achieve political goals. Much rather, 
conflict has become an end in itself (Creveld 1991, 57-62, 217). The main aim of fighting 
is no longer to win, but to perpetuate a conflict for economic reasons. As a result, intra-
state conflicts become protracted and increasingly self-financing: “(…) war has 
increasingly become the continuation of economics by other means. War is not simply a 
breakdown of a particular system, but a way of creating an alternative system of profit, 
power and even protection” (Keen 1998, 11). In consequence, formally opposed 
belligerents have been found to cooperate in Bosnia Herzegovina and the DRC and 
spoilers disproportionately influential (Keen 1996, 17-18).  
The self-financing nature of armed conflict has been used to counter the so-called 
‘give war a chance’ argument which holds that “too many wars nowadays become 
endemic conflicts that never end because the transformative effects of both decisive 
victory and exhaustion are blocked by outside intervention” (Luttwak 1999, 44). In the 
absence of intervention, wars would be “allowed to run their natural course” as the 
belligerents would exhaust their military force (Ibid., 36). However, if armed conflict are 
and belligerents are conducting armed conflict mainly for economic objectives, the 
                                                 
8 The ‘chaos’ approach shows that civil war does not fit established visions of seeing the world: 
“Disciplines like economics and political science usually focus on a restricted area that is ordered and 
predictable; and when messy phenomena like contemporary civil war do not fall easily within the orbit of 
these systems of analysis, the temptation to wheel out the label of chaos is very great” (Keen 2000, 22). 
‘Chaos’ may also be an excuse for in-action thus reflecting the vested interests of political actors (Keen 
2000, 22). Finally, ‘chaos’ may be a sign of not knowing or understanding (Duffield 2000, 82). 
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economic agendas literature suggest that waiting for the military exhaustion “may be like 
waiting for Godot” (Cooper 2002, 943-944).   
A key to understanding armed conflict is to look at the functions of the use of 
force including a political, economic or psychological dimension (Table 1.1). On the 
political level, the use of force checks opposition groups leading to ‘top-down’ use of 
force by political leaders or conflict entrepreneurs (Keen 1998, 12). On the economic 
level, the use of force controls state resources, companies, labour or high military 
budgets. It can be part of a struggle to gain or maintain control of the state or to protect 
the benefits derived from the use of force leading to the phenomenon of ‘peace spoilers’. 
These actors create “zones of insecurity” in which the use of force creates a good 
business environment for illicit commerce (Cooper 2002, 941-942; Billingsley 2001). 
The psychological level is associated with ‘bottom-up’ use of force by the population or 
low level soldiers (Keen 1998, 12). At this level, the use of force is a function of status, 
profit, impunity, excitement or self-aggrandisement.  
 
Table 1.1: The functions of the use of force in contemporary civil wars 
(Based on Le Billon 2000; Keen 1996, 12, 24, 46; Keen 2000, 23) 
 
Political functions Economic functions Psychological functions 
 
Maintain state power 
Access to state power 
Create a power base 
Reign in or occupy opposing 
clients or populations 
Achieve or prevent changes in the 
law 
 
 
Gain or retain control of state 
resources 
Ensure higher military budgets 
and remuneration 
Allow illegal or immoral 
activities (pillage, extortion, 
trafficking) 
Justify protection money 
Maintain control of trade, often 
through monopoly 
Control labour and resources 
 
Increase personal status through 
bearing arms and commanding 
others 
Impunity 
Justification for killing and abuse 
Self-aggrandisement 
Revenge 
Excitement 
 
 
 A crucial distinction between the three levels is that the political and economic 
use of force is the result of rational actors while the psychological level sees the use of 
force rooted in the psyche of human beings. This distinction is important because it 
ultimately legitimises policy recommendations. If violence is something natural and 
inherent in every human being, policy recommendations may make little sense and it is 
perceived as something pathological. However, if it is constructed and functionalised, 
countermeasures can be levied against it.  
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 The distinction between understandings of the use of force as an inalienable 
human attribute rooted in the psyche of every human being or as a function to achieve 
political, economic or social objectives is an important contribution to the study of armed 
conflict. This distinction is at the root of understanding armed conflict as an expression of 
primordial hatreds as part of a military strategy. In this context, ‘force’ is distinguished 
between ‘the use of force’ and ‘violence’: “The critical distinction is between the use of 
force and (military) violence, with force signifying the coercive feature of military 
means, whereas violence is what is unleashed by the use of such instruments” (Jütersonke 
2005, 11).9 Thus, considered in this way, the literature on the economic agendas in 
conflict highlights the strategy in which weapons are used to coerce rather than the effects 
of the use of weapons. It is the former which needs financing and, hence, the emphasis on 
the functional and instrumental nature of ‘the use of force’ in this thesis. 
 
1.1.3. “Greed and Grievance”  
 
In contrast to the economic agendas in armed conflict, the “Greed and Grievance” 
literature emphasising that greed rather than grievance explains armed conflict. The work 
on “Greed and Grievance” was spearheaded by Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler and a 
series of articles published in the framework of the World Bank project Economics of 
Political and Criminal Violence.10 In 1998, Collier and Hoeffler published a widely cited 
article on the economic causes of armed conflict. This article came to the conclusion that 
economic motivations are more important than grievance to explain the occurrence of 
civil war (Collier and Hoeffler 1998, 571-572). The work subsequently evolved from 
emphasising the motives of rebels in causing armed conflict to highlighting the 
opportunities which make armed conflict feasible (Collier and Hoeffler 2001, Ballentine 
and Sherman 2003, 4). Ultimately, Collier and Hoeffler’s research culminated in a 
revised econometric model which predicts the outbreak of civil conflict (Collier and 
Hoeffler 2004). The policy implications were elaborated in a World Bank publication of 
                                                 
9 In his work, Keen refers to “violence” and thus elaborates the “functions of violence”. However, bases on 
the distinction between the “use of force” and “violence”, the author considers “the use of force” as the 
more adequate reference because of its instrumental nature.  
10 See the database of the project: http://www.worldbank.org/research/conflict/index.htm [20.05.2005] 
  
53
Breaking the Conflict Trap and a study on natural resources and armed conflict (Collier et 
al 2003, Bannon and Collier 2003). At a later stage, a series of case studies were 
conducted partly to expand the C&H model, partly as a response to its critics (Collier and 
Sambanis 2005, Sambanis 2004). 
 These studies conceptualise armed conflict not as a process of social 
transformation – as the literature on the economic agendas in armed conflict – but as a 
developmental problem. Since armed conflict is mainly located in developing countries it 
has “not been a useful force for social change, but has been development in reverse” 
(Collier et al 2003, 32). Armed conflict was conceptualised as an economic problem 
which legitimised the use of economic methods to explain the occurrence, duration, and 
consequences of civil war: “If poor economic conditions cause civil wars, then we may 
be able to design economic policy interventions that reduce their occurrence, mitigating 
the human suffering that they cause” (Collier and Sambanis 2005, xiii). 
 
The Collier-Hoeffler Model on Civil War Onset 
 
The C&H model is concerned with the factors conducive to predicting the onset of civil 
war. It explains rebellion in terms of opportunity – the circumstances in which people are 
able to rebel. It stands in contrast to political science approaches which explain rebellion 
through motives – the circumstances in which people want to rebel (Collier and Hoeffler 
2004, 563). The C&H model constructs relationships that predict the risk of civil war 
based on a cross-section analysis of 750 five-year episodes between 1960 and 1999.  
 The C&H model is based on economic theory of armed conflict which considers 
rebellion in terms of rational choice theory and as  “an industry that generates profits 
from looting (…) Such rebellions are motivated by greed, which is presumably 
sufficiently common that profitable opportunities will not be passed up. Hence, the 
incidence of rebellion is not explained by motive, but by the atypical circumstances that 
generate profitable opportunities” (Ibid., 564). This approach to armed conflict assumes 
that the mere existence of opportunities leads rebels to exploit them.   
 The econometric analysis is conducted through quantitative indicators which 
proxy opportunity and grievance. The opportunity to finance rebellion is based on the 
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extortion of natural resources, diaspora donations and third-party government support. 
These methods of conflict financing are proxied by the ratio of primary commodity 
exports to GDP, emigrants living in the United States, and the Cold War. Opportunities 
arising from the low cost of rebellion are associated with low foregone income of rebels, 
cheap conflict specific capital (weapons), atypically low government military capability 
and social cohesion. These factors are proxied by the mean income per capita, male 
secondary schooling and the rate of economic growth, the time since the previous 
conflict, the proportion of a countries forested and mountainous terrain and ethno-linguist 
fractionalisation. Grievance is measured by ethnic and religious hatred, political 
repression, political exclusion and economic inequality. These factors are proxied by 
ethnic fractionalisation, the Polity III dataset, ethnic dominance as well as by the income 
and land inequality (Collier and Hoeffler 2004, 565-572; see Table 1.2).  
 The main finding of the C&H model is that the opportunity to start a rebellion is a 
more important predictor for civil war than objective grievances (Ibid., 587-588). This 
conclusion mirrors previous arguments that “rebellion is unrelated to objective grievances 
while being caused by the feasibility of predation” (Collier 2000b, 4) and that 
explanations for civil war based on grievance were “seriously wrong” (Collier 2000a, 
96). The specific findings of the regression are analysis are summarised in Table 1.3. 
 
Table 1.2: Overview of quantitative indicators for opportunity and grievance 
(Collier and Hoeffler 2004, 565-572).   
 
 
Opportunity 
 
Opportunity to finance rebellion 
• Natural resources: Ratio of primary commodity 
exports to GDP. 
• Diaspora donations: Emigrants living in the 
United States. 
• Third-party government support: The Cold War. 
 
Opportunities arising from low cost of rebellion 
• Foregone income of rebels: Mean of income per 
capita, male secondary schooling and GDP per 
capita growth. 
• Cheap conflict specific capital: Time since the 
previous conflict. 
• Government military capability: Forest cover, 
mountainous terrain, population density, 
population in urban areas. 
• Social cohesion: Ethnic and religious 
fractionalisation.  
 
Grievance 
 
• Ethnic/religious hatred: Ethnic and religious 
fractionalisation. 
• Political repression: Democracy (Polity III). 
• Political exclusion: Ethnic dominance.  
• Economic inequality: Income inequality, land 
inequality.   
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Table 1.3: Summary of the findings of the Collier-Hoeffler model 
(Collier and Hoeffler 2004, 587-589).   
 
 
• Primary commodity exports substantially increase 
the risk of armed conflict because they provide 
opportunities for extortion making rebellion 
feasible and sometimes even attractive.  
• Diasporas substantially increase the risk of 
conflict renewal because they provide sources of 
financing. 
• Low forgone earnings increase the risk of armed 
conflict because they reduce the cost of armed 
conflict.  
• High male secondary enrolment, per capita 
income and GDP growth reduce the risk of 
conflict because they increase the forgone income 
and cost of armed conflict.  
• Low population density increases the risk of 
conflict. 
 
• Inequality, political rights, ethnic polarisation 
and religious fractionalisation were insignificant 
in predicting the onset of armed conflict.  
• Societies characterised by ethnic and religious 
diversity have a lower risk of armed conflict 
because it makes rebel cohesion more costly.  
• Societies characterised by ethnic and religious 
diversity in which one groups is dominant have a 
higher risk of armed conflict because it makes 
rebel cohesion less costly. 
• The longer the period after a previous conflict 
the lower the risk if conflict renewal because the 
value of rebellion specific capital decrease – 
increasing the cost of conflict – and the gradual 
erosion of hatred. 
 
 Elsewhere, Collier explains the findings as public actions problems (Collier 
2000a). Justice, revenge and relief from grievance can be considered as public goods and 
should therefore be expected to be subject to free riding.11 Collier also explains that 
highly ethnic fractionalised societies are more difficult to mobilise on ethnic grounds than 
ethnically homogenous societies because rebellions of small ethnic groups are not viable 
and face coordination and time consistency problems.12 In the cases of greed based 
rebellions, however, Collier suggests that there are no public action problems: There is no 
(1) free rider problem because benefits of rebellion accrue directly to rebel groups; (2)  no 
coordination problem because the rebellion does not need to be big if the aim is resource 
extraction and predatory behaviour, and (3) no time inconsistency problem because 
recruits can be rewarded with the rebellion’s profits (Ibid., 98-100). 
 Moreover, Collier explains the common reference to grievance as an explanation 
for armed conflict by pointing out that rebel groups use a discourse of grievance to cloak 
                                                 
11 If someone is consumed by grievance, this person should prefer rebellion over the status quo. However, 
the overthrow of the government does not depend on this person joining the rebellion. Hence, the preferred 
choice of this person would be that others fight the rebellion and the person enjoys the results of the 
rebellion. This free rider problem limits the role of grievance in civil war onset (Collier 2000a, 98-99) 
12 The public action problems are associated with coordination problems (how to overcome the risks 
associated to small rebellions up to the point when they scale up to a large one) and time consistency 
problems (how to overcome the doubt of supporters of rebellion that the leader will deliver what he 
promised after victory) (Collier 2000a, 98-100).  
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their primary motivation of greed. It is therefore difficult to find out the real motivation 
of a rebel group. Over time, the discourse becomes part of the rebel’s identity which 
limits identifying the real motivations behind the onset of civil war (Ibid., 92). 
 
Achievements and limitations  
 
Had the C&H model been simply an academic exercise on the onset of conflict, the 
findings and interpretations may have received little attention except of a few economists, 
econometricians and other interested academics. However, given that it was a policy 
project of the World Bank, the findings had important implications for how to engage and 
manage armed conflicts. The statistical methodology of the C&H model provided a basis 
to present the findings as objective and apolitical. World Bank ownership gave the results 
authority and visibility. The findings vindicated World Bank policy on economic 
diversification, the reduction of military spending, growth and trade led economic 
development and external intervention (Collier et al 2003, 147-148, 153-154, 158). 
 As a result, the “main finding and the authors’ interpretation of it may be the most 
widely reported results of any cross-national study of civil conflict, ever” (Fearon 2005, 
484, emphasis in original). The findings of the Collier and Hoeffler model were allegedly 
proving that the availability of natural resources is sufficient condition for armed conflict 
(Herbst 2000, 274-275). The findings gave an additional political momentum to efforts at 
the United Nations to expose and undermine the financing of rebel groups in Angola, 
Sierra Leone, Liberia, and the DRC through diamonds, timber and other natural resources 
(UNSC 2001b, UNSC 2001e, UNSC 2000b, UNSC 2000c). The Dutch Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs even commissioned a study to explore if the report “Breaking the 
Conflict Trap” should be used for Dutch foreign policy (Klem 2004). 
As a result of – or perhaps because of – its significance, the “Greed and 
Grievance” literature stimulated much debate and critique. Overall, the C&H model was 
recognised to have made an important contribution to changing the understanding of civil 
war. By providing an economic account of the onset of civil war, the C&H model 
provided an alternative to theories focussing on ethnic or religious identity (Berdal 2005, 
688). In addition, the C&H model for the first time clearly specified opportunity 
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structures for rebellion (Fearon 2005, 485). Moreover, the polarising feature of “Greed 
versus Grievance” provoked the academic community and stimulated debate and research 
agendas (Ibid., 484). As a result, the C&H model contributed to a wave of interest in 
economic dimensions of conflict; thus, providing an alternative understanding of conflict 
beyond the political and military dimensions (Klem 2004, 18).  
Despite these achievements, the C&H model has been widely debated. A major 
source of criticism was the methodological orientation of the study. The “Greed and 
Grievance” methodology has been criticised in principle mirroring a broader discussion 
between quantitative and qualitative approaches to the Social Sciences and between 
various epistemological positions to International Relations (Hollis 1994, 15-20; Smith 
1996, 18-28). In this context, the emphasis on economic reductionism, the creation of 
“truths” and methodological individualism led to claims that the “Greed and Grievance” 
literature has inadequate to capture structural and relational change over time (Cramer 
2002; 1850; Herbst 2000, 274). 
The trust of the critique was, however, was not aimed at the principle of 
conducting quantitative research in the Social Sciences but rather at its execution. Nathan 
argues that the C&H model “is filled with empirical, methodological and theoretical 
problems that lead to unreliable results and unjustified conclusions” (Nathan 2005, 2). 
Klem purports that “the methodology is weak because indicators are subjective and 
inadequate. The analysis is flawed because the jump from correlation to causation is 
large” (Klem 2004, 5). Moreover, the “macro level statistical analysis and policy 
simulations are ill suited to serve as a basis for policy” (Ibid., 19). A report evaluating 
World Bank research also criticised the work for its “lack of an appropriate conceptual 
and empirical framework. As a result, the regression analysis of these studies [on civil 
war] cannot be used to support the conclusions they ostensibly reach (…) An important 
and promising topic was marred by poor execution” (Banerjee et al 2006, 64). 
A key issue was the data on conflict areas (Humphreys 2003, 2, n.11; Kelm 2004, 
15). For example, 34 cases – mainly anti-colonial insurgencies – out of 113 were omitted 
in Collier’s model, thus, compromising the general validity of the findings (Fearon and 
Laitin 2003, 76, n.2). In the revised 2004 C&H model, 27 out of 79 civil war starts were 
not used in the analysis due to missing data (Fearon 2005, 485).  
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Concerning the proxies, Nathan concludes that they are arbitrary and spurious, the 
meaning assigned to them too restrictive and much of what the C&H model seeks to 
measure is not in fact measured by the proxy in question and one cannot be sure what the 
proxies are actually capturing (Nathan 2005, 6). In more general terms, Cramer argues 
that “the use of conceptually and empirically vague proxies is an instance of the more 
general problem of empirical weakness, arbitrary prioritization of particular variables, 
and manipulation of technique over and above the search for ‘truth’ in econometrics” 
(Cramer 2002, 1854). Mack adds that the proxies for grievance do not capture the rage, 
humiliation or despair that drive people to the use of force (Mack 2002, 521).  
The criticisms on proxies also applies to one of the main findings of the C&H 
model that “primary commodity exports substantially increase the risk of conflict” 
(Collier and Hoeffler 2004, 588).13 This finding is central in establishing a causal link 
between natural resources and armed conflict (Herbst 2000, 276). However, there are 
various problems with the proxy to allow such a far-reaching conclusion. Fearon shows 
that minor changes in the sample framing and the recovery of missing data undermine the 
statistical correlation (Fearon 2005, 485). Moreover, there is little reason to think that 
data on cash crops and oil exports – the data used by C&H model to establish the 
correlation – are good measures of the availability of the financing of rebel groups. While 
they may contribute to revenue through extortion, in most cases cash crops and oil – and 
in fact looting as a strategy – are not part of a strategy to finance the start-up cost for 
rebel groups (Ross 2004b, 62). Overall, the focus on primary commodity exports is too 
broad and does not capture the multitude of resources, their individual attributes and their 
application to different kind of wars. Thus, “the claim that primary commodities are 
linked to civil war appears fragile and should be treated with caution” (Ross 2004a, 342).  
The C&H model also concludes that “diasporas substantially increase the risk of 
conflict renewal” (Collier and Hoeffler 2004, 588). This conclusion has been drawn from 
the positive correlation between renewed civil war and the proportion of a country’s 
population living in the United States. Nathan argues that Collier and Hoeffler “infer 
causality from correlation and confuse the cause of war with the means by which it is 
financed” (Nathan 2005, 7). By looking at the effect of time, the cost of rebel soldiers and 
                                                 
13 For a comment on each proxy see Nathan (2005, 3-5). 
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the grievance variable, Nathan highlights that Collier and Hoeffler’s explanations are 
“speculative, based on conjecture rather than evidence, and they do not demonstrate the 
validity of their conclusions” (Ibid., 12).  
 In addition to these critiques focusing on the execution and methodology of the 
C&H model, the “Greed and Grievance” literature was also criticised on how it linked 
poverty and armed conflict. The starting assumption of the C&H model – that poverty 
leads to armed conflict which in turn leads to more poverty and conflict – contributed to 
the notion that poverty is dangerous. The creation of this notion was attributed to a 
strategy aiming at the internalisation of the causes of conflict. In this way, the 
responsibility for armed conflict shifted to local rather than external actors and 
conditions. In consequence, external actors could justify an interventionist agenda for 
economic development and state building (Duffield 2001, 28, 38). 
In addition, the argument of the “Conflict Trap” – once armed conflict has started, 
the conditions it creates promotes further conflict – is based on an implicit assumption 
that there is a trajectory of development success. This agenda promotes the notion of 
open markets, export led growth, economic diversification and macroeconomic stability 
as reified by the recommendations of the C&H model (Pugh 2005, 38). 
 In addition, the “Greed and Grievance” literature does not provide a 
comprehensive approach to armed conflict because it exclusively looks at rebel groups 
and not governments. This omission has given the “Greed and Grievance” literature a 
bias against rebel groups (Humphreys 2003, 4). Governments use similar methods of 
conflict financing and should therefore be included in the analysis of conflict financing.  
 
The case study project on civil war onset 
 
In response to their critiques, Collier and Hoeffler shifted the emphasis of earlier work 
from motivation to opportunity structures. Rebellions depend more on the right mix of 
opportunity structures rather than the motivation of a belligerent. Moreover, Collier 
reduced the economic determinism of earlier work acknowledging that even if rebels are 
motivated by greed, they usually have political agendas, too (Collier et al 2003, 89-90).  
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 When applying the C&H model to case studies, much of the initial distinction 
between greed and grievance was dropped with the intention to “lay to rest the ‘greed 
versus grievance’ caricature. (…) Greed and grievance should not be seen as competing 
explanations of conflict – they are often shades of the same problem” (Bannon 2005, xi). 
Instead, the case study volume applied a “new, innovative design that blends quantitative 
and qualitative analysis” and adds “context and texture to the basic insights of the C&H 
model” (Collier et al 2005, 1).  
 Many of the case study conclusions directly refute the findings of the C&H 
model. The case studies, for example, showed that primary commodity exports did not 
influence the decisions to start armed conflict: “Civil wars in resource dependent 
countries have often nothing to do with natural resources” (Sambanis 2004, 265). The 
case studies suggest rather than primary commodity exports, high-value lootable 
resources are linked to armed conflict (Sambanis 2005, 305). Moreover, rather than 
diasporas living in the United States – the proxy of the C&H model – the presence of 
migrants in neighbouring states increase the risk of conflict renewal. Diasporas also 
influence a conflict through the foreign policy of their host country (Ibid, 308). 
 The case studies also highlight that the C&H model is unclear if resource 
predation is a motive for rebellion and cannot distinguish between predation as a motive 
or a means to sustain rebellion (Ibid, 304-305). Furthermore, the C&H model is 
weakened because it does not capture different forms of violence and the effect of 
difference forms of political institutions (Ibid, 309-314; Sambanis 2004, 269).  
 By applying the C&H model to case studies, some of its initial limitations have 
been identified. However, Collier and Sambanis do not go as far as presenting an 
alternative framework to understand the economic dimension of armed conflict. After 
looking at the literature which goes beyond “Greed and Grievance”, this thesis presents 
various elements for a framework of analysis which can be applied to case studies. 
 
1.1.4. Beyond “Greed and Grievance” 
 
By conducting a case study project, the authors of the C&H model have themselves gone 
beyond “Greed and Grievance”. However, prior to these case studies, other contributions 
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emphasised the need to go “beyond” the greed and grievance dichotomy. The literature 
includes works which contextualised and broadened the analytical framework, developed 
a better understanding of the link between natural resources and armed conflict and 
conceptualised the transition from need to creed to greed during armed conflict. Table 1.4 
collects case studies on the political economy of conflict in selected conflicts. 
 
Contextualising and broadening the analytical framework 
 
Karen Ballentine and Jake Sherman’s work at the International Peace Academy looks at 
six case studies of the political economy of conflict – Colombia, Nepal, Bougainville, 
Kosovo, Sri Lanka, Burma – in view of developing a better understanding of the 
economic incentives and opportunities shaping the dynamics of conflict and to identify 
entry points for policy.  
 Ballentine and Sherman begin their analysis from the recognition that 
“conceptualising explanations of armed conflict in terms of greed and grievance has 
imposed an unnecessarily limiting dichotomy on what is, in reality, a highly diverse, 
complex set of incentive and opportunity structures that vary across time and location” 
(Ballentine and Sherman 2003, 6). By looking at qualitative case studies instead of using 
quantitative methods, their analysis seeks “to ascertain the causal impact on specific 
conflicts of economic factors relative to and in combination with other potentially 
significant political, ideological, ethnic or security factors” (Ibid.). In addition, the 
analytical framework is broadened to consider a greater variety of economic factors and 
actors, to contextualise the economic dimensions historically, geographically and in terms 
of state capacity, to place armed conflict in its global and regional perspective and to 
diversity the case study selection beyond Africa (Ibid., 7-10). 
 By contextualising and broadening the analysis, the findings are different those 
produced by the C&H model. The analysis of the case studies suggests that  
 
 “very few contemporary conflicts can be adequately captured as pure instances of 
‘resource wars’ or conflict caused by ‘loot seeking’ (…). Economic incentives 
and opportunities have not been the only or even the primary cause of these 
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armed conflicts; rather, to varying degrees, they interacted with socioeconomic 
and political grievances, interethnic disputes, and security dilemmas in triggering 
the outbreak of warfare. However, (…) combatant access to economic resources 
has been a salient factor shaping a permissive opportunity structure for sustaining 
hostilities and has had important effects on the duration, intensity and character of 
conflict” (Ballentine 2003, 259-260). 
 
An analysis of the case studies produces a range of conclusions which differ from the 
C&H model. Rather than being associated to the onset of conflict, access to resources 
made conflicts longer by providing opportunities for spoiling peace, creating 
disincentives for good faith negotiations and paying for the continuation of armed 
conflict (Ibid., 267). Rather than being caused by ‘loot-seekers’, the motivation of 
belligerents was found to mutate from being primarily political to situations in which 
economic benefits predominate political agendas.  
 Moreover, access to resources can also contribute to leadership fragmentation. 
The presence of lootable resources makes it more difficult for belligerents to unite the 
leadership. Non-lootable resources reduce leadership friction because they require a 
greater degree of coordination. Furthermore, resources influence the level of violence 
against civilians increasing with the degree of lootability because less cooperation from 
civilians is needed to extract them (Ibid., 270-271).  
 In addition, the relative strength of the state being challenged influences the 
opportunity for rebellion: a weak state lowers the opportunity cost for rebellion and 
increases the prospects of a successful rebellion. If the state is unable to manage areas of 
resource wealth this may increase the opportunity for rebellion (Ibid, 265). 
 Finally, Ballentine also challenges the proposition of the C&H model that 
diasporas increase the risk of armed conflict. The relationship between diasporas is not a 
reflection of the percentage of any given ethnic group living in the United States – as 
proxied by the C&H model – but rather their disposition towards their homeland, the 
circumstances under which emigration took place, the relative size of the Diaspora, the 
geographic concentration, its socioeconomic status as well as the citizenship policies of 
host states (Ibid. 263-264). 
  
63
 Table 1.4: Selected case studies on the political economy of conflict 
 
AFRICA  
Algeria ICG 2001 
Angola Global Witness 1999, Global Witness 1998, Le Billon 2001b, Cilliers and 
Dietrich 2000, Global Witness 2002b, Douma 2003, Le Billion 2005, Cramer 
2006 
Democratic Republic of 
Congo 
Reno 1998, Macgaffey and Bazenguissa-Ganga 2000, Mwanasali 2000, Emizet 
2000, Dietrich 2002, EED 2002, IPIS 2002, Jackson 2003, Kennes 2005 
Ivory Coast   Mikala 2003 
Liberia Montclos 1996, Atkinson, 1997, Reno 1998, Reno 2000b, Global Witness 2001, 
Global Witness 2002a, CIJ 2005 
Mozambique Weissman 1996, Brück 2001, Chingono 2001,  
Rwanda Mueller 2000, Uvin 2000 
Casamance Evans 2003 
Sierra Leone Reno 1998, Reno 2000, Smillie et al 2000, Davies 2000, Keen 2001, Gberie 
2002, Richards 2003, Douma 2003, Fanthrope 2003, Kandeh 2005, Pugh et al 
2004, Silberfein 2005. 
Somalia Auvinen and Kivimäki 2000, Little 2003, Gundel 2003, Menkhaus 2004 & 2007 
Sudan Prunier 1996, Amnesty International 2000, Christian Aid 2001,Duffield 2001,  
Keen 2001, Simmons 2006 
Uganda Matuvo and Steward 2001 
AMERICAS  
Colombia Labrousse 1996a, Labrousse 1996b, Douma 2003, Guáqueta 2003, ICG 2003, 
Chernick 2005, Dunning and Wirpsa 2005, Sánches et al 2005 
El Salvador Pastor 2000 
Guatemala Joras 2006 
Peru McClintock 2005 
ASIA  
Afghanistan Dorronsoro 1996, Rubin 2000, Goodhand 2000, Marsden and Samman 2001, Di 
Pietro 2002, Bhatia and Goodhand 2003, Pugh et al 2004, Schetter 2004, 
Newberg 2005 
Burma/Myanmar Sherman 2003 
Cambodia Lechervy 1996, Global Witness 1999, Global Witness 2002a, Global Witness 
2000, Le Billon and Bakker 2000 
Indonesia (Aceh),  Reno 2005 
Nepal  Bray et al 2003 
Papua New Guinea 
(Bougainville) 
Regan 2003 
Sri Lanka Angoustures and Pascal 1996, Rajasingham-Senanayake 1999, Kelegama 1999, 
O’Sullivan 2001, Douma 2003 Gunaratna 2003, Korf 2005 
EUROPE  
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
Woodward 1995, Bougarel 1996, Bojicic and Kaldor 1997, Kaldor 1999, Pugh 
2002, Donais 2003, Ehrke 2003, Pugh 2003, Pugh et al 2004, Andreas 2004, 
Kalyvas and Sambanis 2005 
Georgia 
(Abkhazia/South 
Ossetia) 
King 2001a, Demetriou 2002a, Kukhianidze 2003, Chiaberishvili and Tvavdze 
2004, Chkhartishvili et al 2004, Wennmann 2004, Zürcher 2005, Zürcher et al 
2005, Wennmann 2006, 
Kosovo Yannis 2001,Yannis 2003 
Northern Ireland Woodwell 2005 
Chechenya Baev et al 2002, Zürcher et al 2005 
MIDDLE EAST  
Lebanon Picard 1996, Enders 2003, Piccard 2005, Makdisi and Sadaka 2005 
Kurdistan Bozarslan 1996; Hickok 2003 
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The work of Pugh and Cooper added another dimension to going “beyond” greed 
and grievance by considering the regional dimensions of war economies and thus leaving 
the “fixation on factors occurring within conflict prone states” (Pugh and Cooper 2004, 
1). In this way, they emphasise the importance of regional linkages in affecting conflict 
dynamics as well as the importance of external actors in influence armed conflict. The 
latter underlines the importance not only to consider an armed conflict of the outcome of 
indigenous factors but rather as an interaction between external and domestic actors 
(Ibid., 2).  
 By contextualising and broadening the analytical framework, Ballentine and 
Sherman and Pugh and Cooper took the economic dimensions of armed conflict out of 
the dichotomy of “Greed and Grievance”. By doing so, they produce findings which 
provide an alternative assessment on the role of economic factors in the causation and 
maintenance of armed conflict.  
 
Natural resources and armed conflict 
 
The analysis of the relationship between natural resources and armed conflict has also 
become more sophisticated in response to the propositions of the C&H model that 
“primary commodity exports substantially increase the risk of armed conflict” (Collier 
and Hoeffler 2004, 588). While the focus on primary commodities was distorting, the 
category of natural resources was too broad. Both categories did not capture the multitude 
of resources, their individual attributes and their effects on different types of civil wars 
(Ross 2004a, 338, 340). A literature, which developed partly in parallel partly in 
response, looked at individual commodities such as oil, diamonds, drugs, and timber 
(Smillie et al 2000; Le Billon 2001b, Global Witness 2002a) and more generally at 
“conflict goods” (Cooper 2001a).14 On the multilateral level, the issue of natural 
                                                 
14 Conflict goods are “non-military materials, knowledge, animals or humans whose trade, taxation or 
protection is exploited to finance or otherwise maintain the war economies of contemporary conflicts. 
Trade can take place by direct import or export from the conflict zone or on behalf of military factions 
(both government and non-government) by outside supporters. Conflict goods do not include arms, military 
aid or the services of mercenaries, although these may be paid for in kind with goods or concessions in 
trade in products which would then become conflict goods” (Cooper 2001a, 27). 
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resources gained prominence through the detailed reports of the United Nations Security 
Council Sanctions Monitoring Mechanism on Angola, the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo and Sierra Leone (UNSC 2003, 2002a, 2002b, 2001a, 2001b, 2001c, 2001d, 
2000a, 2000b, 2000c).  
However, much of this literature remained in the perspective of resource 
abundance, i.e. that the availability of natural resources increases the risk of conflict. This 
approach emphasizes the role of pull factors (economic opportunities, greed) over push 
factors (migration, overcrowding, grievance) (Feirhead 2000, 151). Thus, the argument 
that armed conflict is likely to occur in regions with a high concentration of natural 
resources (Klare 2001, 142, 215-217). As a result, the presence of natural resources has 
been considered a curse rather than a blessing (Ross 1999). However, resource abundance 
and scarcity are neither a necessary nor sufficient criteria for conflict. There are resource 
abundant countries (Botswana, Norway, Australia) or resource scarce countries (Japan) 
that develop without experiencing armed conflict. Thus, what matters is not whether 
natural resources are simply present, but how they are managed. 
 Le Billon further improved the understanding of the role of natural resources and 
armed conflict by developing a typology of resource conflicts15 with the following 
propositions:  
 
• Concentrated but proximate resources are associated with competition over state 
control because they are easily monopolized and their exploitation is capital intensive.  
• Concentrated but distant resources are associated with secessions because only de-
facto control of territory is required.  
• Diffuse but distant resources are associated with Warlordism because they can be 
exploited with little technology and capital once de-facto control over the territory is 
established.  
• Diffuse but proximate resources are associated with rebellions as people living off the 
land protest in the capital (Le Billon 2001a, 572-575).  
 
                                                 
15 The typology is based on four geographic characteristics (resources are concentrated/ diffuse or 
proximate/distant to the capital) and four types of armed conflict (competition for state control, secession, 
rebellion and Warlordism). See Le Billon 2001a, 573. 
  
66 
Ross adds the dimension of lootable and obstructable resources and argues that lootable 
resources are more likely to start non-separatist conflicts while unlootable resources are 
more likely to produce separatist conflicts.16 Elsewhere, Ross provides a summary of the 
current state of research on the relationship between natural resources and the dynamics 
of armed conflict:  
 
• Oil dependence appears to be linked to the initiation of conflict but not to its duration. 
Oil dependence seems to be more strongly associated with separatist conflicts.  
• Gemstones, opium, coca and cannabis do not seem to be linked to the initiation of 
conflict but do increase the duration of pre-existing wars.  
• Agriculture seems to have no link to either the initiation or duration of civil war. 
• The claim that primary commodities are associated with the onset and duration of 
civil war does not appear to be robust (Ross, 2004a). 
 
 These relationships between natural resources and armed conflict are particularly 
relevant if considered in the context of weak states. Access to resources provides 
insurgents the means to challenge the state; the state’s lack of functional institutional and 
military capabilities provide an incentive to try (Herbst 2004, 367).  
 Concerning the effects of economic endowments of insurgents on recruitment 
strategies, Jeremy Weinstein points out that a better initial economic situation fosters 
recruitment of more opportunistically minded soldiers, but reduces group cohesion in the 
long term. Resource poor endowment lead to recruitment based on ideology, identities 
and beliefs, takes longer, but leads to greater group cohesion. A richly endowed 
insurgency is also associated with more coercive strategies of controlling populations and 
conducting armed conflict because they are less dependent on popular support as a 
military organisation (Weinstein 2007, 107, 125, 171-172). 
 
 
                                                 
16 Lootability refers to the ease with which resources can be extracted and transported by individuals or 
gangs (diamonds, drugs). Obstructability refers to the ease with which the transportation of a resource can 
be blocked (oil, gas, deep-shaft minerals). See Ross 2003, 54, 64-67. 
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The intersection of need, creed and greed 
 
Arnson and Zartman add another perspective by focusing on the relationship between 
basic needs, identity and resources and armed conflict. They respond directly to the 
“Greed and Grievance” literature and express their unease with single factor explanations 
for the incidence of armed conflict:  
 
“One does not have to be a Marxist or an economist to recognise that all conflicts 
are about resources. But one does not have to be a pastor or a psychologist to also 
recognise that all conflicts are about identity. Nor does one have to be a humanist 
or a political scientist to see that all conflicts are about human needs. Thus to 
claim that conflicts are a matter of greed, or rights, or grievances is profoundly 
uninteresting. If the claim is exclusionary, it is simply wrong; if the claim is 
contributory it is banal. The interesting questions are how these factors relate to 
each other in causing and sustaining conflict, and how, not weather, conflict is 
related to these three factors (Zartman 2005, 256-257).  
 
In order to go beyond these single factor explanations, Zartman sets out to a framework 
to better understand the transformations of the motivations for conflicts from grievances, 
rights and greed. He identifies basic needs, identity and resources as the stakes of conflict 
while he considers grievances, rights and greed as motivations for conflict (Ibid, 262).  
However, the conditions of need, creed and greed are necessary but not a 
sufficient condition for the emergence of conflict. There also must be a political 
entrepreneur who crystallises the subjective reactions into objective conditions and thus 
shifts a pre-conflict to a conflict situation (Ibid., 266). This means, for example, that 
grievances alone are not enough to start and maintain conflict. The general salience of 
grievances within a society may not even matter much if the conditions are right for a 
political entrepreneur to organise an insurgency (Fearon and Laitin 2003, 88).  
 Based on the analysis of seven cases studies – Lebanon, Peru, Sierra Leone, 
Angola, Democratic Republic of Congo, Colombia and Afghanistan – Zartman 
conceptualises the transition from need to creed to greed. In a first stage, the neglect of a 
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state of its populations, at a time of rising expectations of the latter into the state, 
produces a sense of deprivation and grievance. In a second phase, these feelings are 
mobilised by a conflict entrepreneur who uses identity as a device for mobilisation. In a 
third phase, the conflict entrepreneur seeks to secure the means for conflict which are 
then deployed in armed conflict. They can lead to victory or defeat, or the protraction of 
conflict. In the latter case, the need to keep the conflict going contributes to pressures in 
which greed replaces the initial motivation of grievances or rights (Ibid., 267-270). 
 Sequencing need, creed and greed in such a way underlines that armed conflict 
are subjects to transformations including the conflict dynamics, the actors taking part in 
them as well as their motivation. It also highlights a general tenor of the literature of the 
Political Economy of Conflict that resources are central for the duration and intensity of 
conflict but that grievances and identity remain central in understanding the initiation and 
the belligerents’ objectives (Arnson 2005, 11-12). It therefore opens an intellectual space 
for the Political Economy of Conflict to consider material explanations of conflict in 
relation to political, social and historical issues.  
 
1.1.5. Elements for an alternative model  
 
The review of this Part demonstrates that much has been achieved in going “beyond” 
greed and grievance. Indeed, the individual contributions have established a sophisticated 
understanding of the economic dimensions of armed conflict which has evolved from and 
developed in contrast to the findings of the C&H model. After all, the confluence of this 
work leaves behind a “crude and unhelpful juxtaposition” and puts to rest “the deeply 
flawed notion that civil wars are caused by rebel greed alone” (Berdal 2005, 689). 
Nevertheless, the literature on “Greed and Grievance” made important 
contribution to the study of the economic dimensions of armed conflict. It managed 
putting conflict financing and the relationship between natural resources and armed 
conflict on academic and policy agendas. Moreover, by producing provocative findings 
through the C&H model, it stimulated a vibrant debate in the academic world the results 
of which have created a better understanding of the political economy of armed conflict.  
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 However, when considering the severity of the criticisms concerning the 
execution of research and the justification of the findings, one may indeed wonder if the 
literature on “Greed and Grievance” – and the findings of the C&H model in particular – 
have not been discredited. What must be distinguished clearly in looking at the criticisms 
is the difference between reservations concerning the positivist methodology of the C&H 
model – mirroring an ontological dispute – and those focusing on the execution of the 
C&H model. In this sense, the criticism is not detrimental to the C&H model because of 
its ontological foundation – the diversity of research methods is welcome in the Social 
Sciences – but rather because its execution was problematic.  
 The latter observation does of course not imply that the Research Group at the 
World Bank did not know their craft, but rather highlights the difficulty of applying an 
econometric model to as complex and murky a phenomenon as armed conflict. 
Econometric models must be fed with data to produce outcomes, however, data on civil 
wars is notoriously incomplete, vague or not available. Scholarship on counting battle 
deaths is a reminder of the problems of data collection in conflict areas (SAS 2005, 229-
265). Resorting to alternative quantitative indicators to bridge the data gap and an 
application to case studies blurred the findings and ultimately rocked the C&H model.  
 The discussion of the C&H model and the response to it are instructive in 
identifying elements for a framework of analysis for the relationship between conflict 
financing and recurrence. This framework needs to address the following issues:  
 
• The bias on rebel groups should be eliminated to capture to wide array of actors 
involved in armed conflict as belligerents including governments, rebel groups, 
warlords, PMCs or other groups using force.  
• The framework should reduce the material determinism in order to consider factors 
emanating from both structure and agency.  
• The framework should take account of the various methods of conflict financing and 
not focus exclusively on primary commodity exports or diasporas.  
• An alternative framework should estimate the real, monetary cost of conflict. C&H 
never specify in their work what the cost of conflict actually means in monetary 
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terms. They just find that “rebel groups more than cover their costs during the 
conflict” (Collier and Hoeffler 2004, 564). 
 
 The discussion of the response to the “Greed and Grievance” literature further 
underlines the importance to develop a more comprehensive approach to conflict 
financing. While the literature on natural resources and armed conflict became 
increasingly sophisticated it still has an inbuilt bias that the availability of revenue 
sources is sufficient to finance conflict. For example, Hegre argues that “there is an 
emerging consensus that oil increases the risk of the outbreak of conflict, and that conflict 
are longer where there exists natural resources” (Hegre 2004, 246-247). The role of 
globalisation and weak states in armed conflict further illustrated that a framework of 
analysis should include additional methods of conflict financing. 
 Moreover, the response to the “Greed and Grievance” literature highlights the 
problems of econometric research into armed conflict. Instead, contributions like 
Ballentine and Sherman (2003) and Arnson and Zartman (2005) include a series of case 
studies which use the narratives on the conflicts and contextual analysis in finding out the 
economic dimensions of armed conflict. Based on the difficulty of finding reliable data 
on armed conflict and the importance to consider economic aspects of armed conflict in 
relation to political, military and social dimensions of conflict, this thesis follows the case 
study approach  
 In broader terms, the discussion on the contributions to the Political Economy of 
Conflict provides the basis for the development of an intellectual platform for this thesis. 
Certainly, the literature is heterogeneous in its endeavour to explain and understand 
armed conflict and distinct in methodological terms and institutional origin. Nevertheless, 
the following paragraphs elaborate six features on the literature on the Political Economy 
of Conflict which emerge as a lowest common denominator:  
 
(1) The interaction of the dynamics of conflict with globalisation and weak states: The 
literature on the Political Economy of Conflict looks primarily at the internal 
dynamics of armed conflict – the initiation, perpetuation and termination of conflict – 
and their interaction with the processes of globalisation and weak states. In this way, 
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it redresses a Cold War bias of international and geopolitical approaches to conflict 
(Rufin 1996, 32).  
(2) Focus on the material explanations of armed conflict: The literature on the Political 
Economy of Conflict is concerned with material explanations of armed conflict. This 
thesis follows the material orientation of this literature but recognises that material 
explanations of conflict are insufficient to develop an understanding of armed conflict 
and should be considered within broader contexts. 
(3) An emphasis on the functional understanding of use of the use of force: The use of 
force is not understood as an inalienable human attribute rooted in human beings but 
rather as a function to achieve political, economic or social objectives. In order to 
understand the relationship between conflict financing and recurrence it is important 
to consider armed conflict in terms of the weapons which are used to coerce, rather 
than the effects that these weapons produce. It is the former which needs financing 
and, hence, the emphasis on the strategy rather then the effects of armed conflict. 
(4) Armed conflict is understood as the organisation of the use of force on a large scale: 
Armed conflict is dependent on conflict organisers who translate subjective reactions 
into objective conditions and thus mobilising segments of a society or external actors 
for armed conflict (Zartman 2005, 266). This approach highlights that the existence 
of objective grievances alone is not a predictor of conflict unless there is a conflict 
organiser to mobilise an insurgency (Fearon and Laitin 2003, 88). Such an approach 
highlights the implications of resource mobilisation for the composition and strategies 
of armed groups (Weinstein 2007, 7, 20-21, 45-50). 
(5) An intellectual foundation in notions taken from rational choice theory: The literature 
on the Political Economy of Conflict is founded in notions taken from rational choice 
theory. These include rational choice approaches which consider decision makers as 
utility maximisers wanting to maximise choices through comparing options and cost-
benefit calculations (Bueno de Mesquita 1981, 30).17 Rational conduct is “efficient 
conduct in the sense of the actors most effectively pursuing their wants” (Nicholson 
                                                 
17 Rational choice theory, for example, is based on five assumptions: (1) A decision maker is able to rank-
order preferences and compare outcomes; (2) Preferences need to be transitive; (3) A decision maker needs 
to be aware of the expected utility of their choices; (4) A decision maker thinks in terms of the probabilities 
associated with the expected outcome of a choice; (5) Decision maker is expected to choose the option with 
the highest expected utility (Geller and Singer 1998, 42-43).  
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1992, 48). However, an important element is to acknowledge the relative – and not 
absolute – characteristic of rationality. This thesis considers rationality in 
instrumental terms as “behaviour motivated by a conscious calculation of advantages, 
a calculation that in turn is based on an explicit and internally consistent value 
system” (Schelling 1980, 4, emphasis added). This conception of rationality allows 
various rationalities to exist at the same time and emphasises that rationality is 
ultimately a relative concept. 
(6) The structure-agency problem: The structure-agency problem18 is reflected in the 
Political Economy of Conflict in the sense that it looked at the motives of rational 
actors to start a war (greed-grievance, economic agendas) and their opportunity 
structure for rebellion (availability of resources). Arnson and Zartman develop a 
middle ground and mirror the assessment of Cramer that “agency is involved in the 
origins of conflict, choices are made, and economic functions do matter, as do 
individuals. But they are influenced by and operate very much within specific 
conditions and social and historical change” (Cramer 2002, 1857, emphasis in the 
original).  
 
1.2. The recurrence of conflict 
 
This Part explores the phenomenon of conflict recurrence. It first conducts an empirical 
analysis of conflict recurrence, then looks at the differences between conflict recurrence 
and perpetuation and finally explores various explanations of conflict recurrence. It 
argues for the inclusion of conflict financing in the analysis of conflict recurrence. 
 
1.2.1. Empirical analysis of conflict recurrence 
 
The empirical analysis of conflict recurrence is based on the Uppsala Conflict Data 
Project (UCDP) which is one of the biggest efforts to date to collect data on armed 
                                                 
18 The structure-agency problem is concerned with the “extent we as actors have the ability to shape our 
destiny as against the extent to which our lives are structured in ways out of our control (…). Agency refers 
to individual or group abilities (intentional otherwise) to affect their environment. Structure usually refers 
to context; the material conditions which define the range of actions available to actors” (McAnulla 2002, 
271). 
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conflict for the period 1946-2004. It focuses on conflicts in which at least one party to a 
conflict is a state as reflected in its definition of armed conflict: “An armed conflict is a 
contested incompatibility that concern government and/or territory where the use of 
armed force between two parties, of which one is the government of a state, results in at 
least 25 battle-related deaths” (Strand et al 2005, 3).19 The UCPD differentiates between 
minor armed conflict (25 battle-related deaths per year), intermediate armed conflict 
(more than 25 battle-related deaths per year) and war (at least 1,000 battle-related deaths 
per year) (Ibid., 10).  
 Despite this refinement of the definition of armed conflict, the UCDP remains 
state-based and thus insensitive to armed conflicts taking place between non-state actors. 
This shortcoming is addressed in a database for non-state conflicts which records 
conflicts in which none of the warring parties is a government and the conflict intensity is 
at last 25 battle-related deaths per year (Mack 2005, 66-76). However, this database is in 
its initial stage only covering the years 2002 and 2003 and thus not yet broad enough to 
be included in this thesis.  
One of the key challenges of the UCDP is to control the quality of data emanating 
out of conflict zones. The UCPD bridges this gap by computer assisted analysis of the 
Factiva News database which collects information from 9,000 news outlets (Mack 2005, 
20). Nevertheless, a general note of caution should apply to data from conflict zones. 
Data collection on battle-related deaths, for example, is hampered by political objectives 
to exaggerate or cover-up battle deaths, formal restrictions to access conflict zones, a high 
personal risk of data collection, the remoteness of conflict zones and relying on second-
hand sources (SAS 2005, 233-241). This leads to wide ranges of estimations making the 
establishment of cut-off points for the intensity of armed conflict more difficult. In this 
sense, the empirical analysis of armed conflict is to remain an inexact science. 
The Uppsala Conflict Termination Dataset (UCTD) for the period 1989-2004 is 
part of a larger project of generating data on armed conflict (Wallensteen et al 2005).20 It 
is the only database so far to include variables on conflict recurrence. An armed conflict 
                                                 
19 This definition has evolved from previous definitions of armed conflict in which armed conflict related to 
a minimum conflict intensity of 1,000 battle-related deaths (Richardson 1960). Lowering the conflict 
intensity to 25 battle-related conflict deaths allowed the inclusion of low-intensity conflicts. 
20 See http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/UCDP/our_data1.htm [20.05.2004]. 
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recurs when after at least one year of non-activity the same conflict reaches the level of 
25 battle-related deaths in a year (Wallensteen et al 2005, 5). The database reveals the 
following characteristics of conflict recurrence between 1989 and 2004:  
 
• Armed conflict recurred in 69 incidences in 52 armed conflicts (Table 1.5). This 
means that 44 percent of the 118 armed conflicts taking place between 1989 and 2004 
recurred (Harbom and Wallensteen 2005, 623). In other words: Between 1989 and 
2004, nearly every second conflict recurred at least once after termination. 
• 28 incidences of conflict recurrence occurred in 18 conflicts in Africa, 26 incidences 
in 22 conflicts in Asia, 5 incidences in 5 conflicts in Europe, 6 incidences in 4 
conflicts in the Middle East and 4 incidences in 3 conflicts in the Americas (Table 
1.5). 
• A comparison between conflict recurrence in the period 1989-2004 and 1946-1988 
reveals that all 52 armed conflicts recurred at least once prior to 1989 (Table 1.6).  
• The intensity of conflict recurrence was in more than half of all conflicts at the level 
of minor armed conflict and in one third at the level of intermediate armed conflict 
(Table 1.7).  
• Armed conflict recurred in most incidences with the same intensity as in the 
preceding episode. 6 incidences recurred with a higher intensity and 5 recurred with a 
lower intensity (Table 1.8).  
• Most armed conflict recurred within the first five years after the end of the previous 
episode (Table 1.9). 
• More than half of the armed conflicts recurred after a period of no activity while one 
third recurred after a peace agreement (Table 1.10).  
 
Table 1.5: Conflict recurrence 1989-2004 
 
No. of 
recurrences 
Europe Middle 
East 
Asia Africa America No. of 
incidences 
No. of 
conflicts 
1 5 2 18 12 2 39 39 
2  2 4 4 1 22 11 
3        
4    2  8 2 
Incidences 5 6 26 28 4 69 52 
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Table 1.6: Conflict recurrence 1946-2004 
 
No. of 
recurrences 
Europe Middle 
East 
Asia Africa America No. of 
conflicts 
No. of 
incidences 
1        
2 5  11 9 2 27 54 
3  1 6 6 1 14 42 
4   4 1  5 20 
5  1  2  3 15 
6  2    2 12 
7   1   1 7 
Conflicts      52 150 
 
Table 1.7: Intensity of armed conflict and conflict recurrence 
 
Intensity Europe Middle 
East 
Asia Africa America No. of 
incidences 
% of total 
Minor 3  15 19 3 40 58% 
Intermediate 1 5 11 7 1 25 36% 
War 1 1  2  4 6% 
Incidences 5 6 26 28 4 69 100% 
 
Table 1.8: Change of conflict intensity between episodes 
 
Intensity 
between 
episodes 
Europe Middle 
East 
Asia Africa America No. of 
incidences 
% of total 
Equal 5 5 21 23 4 58 84% 
Higher  1 1 4  6 9% 
Lower   4 1  5 7% 
Incidences 5 6 26 28 4 69 100% 
 
Table 1.9: Time after termination and conflict recurrence 
 
Time after 
termination 
Europe Middle 
East 
Asia Africa America No. of 
incidences 
% of total 
> 5 years 3 5 22 23 3 56 81% 
< 5 years 1 1 4 5  11 16% 
< 10 years 1    1 2 3% 
Incidences 5 6 26 28 4 69 100% 
 
Table 1.10: Type of termination and conflict recurrence 
 
Type of 
termination 
Europe Middle 
East 
Asia Africa America No. of 
incidences 
% of total 
Agreement 3  8 8 1 20 29% 
Victory 1  2 1 2 6 9% 
No activity 1 6 15 15 1 38 55% 
Other   1 4  5 7% 
Incidences 5 6 26 28 4 69 100% 
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 The figure of nearly 50 percent of all armed conflict recurring between 1989 and 
2004 has also been promulgated by Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler (2002) and World 
Bank research on the Conflict Trap (Collier et al 2003). However, Suhrke and Samset 
caution against an uncritical adoption of this figure. They highlight that different 
methodologies and data sets used for the establishment of risk analysis produce high 
variations ranging from 20 to 50 percent (Suhrke and Samset 2007, 195). Moreover, they 
expose the lack of clarity in the risk estimations on what they express:  
 
• The risk of civil war in countries which had a previous civil war in relation to other 
countries which did not; 
• The risk of conflict recurrence in a group of civil wars; 
• The risk of civil war of a sub-set of states within a group of civil wars; or  
• The average risk of conflict recurrence within a group of civil wars for a specific 
period (Ibid., 197). 
 
In addition, statistical studies do not specify if they differentiate between incompatibility 
and actors in various conflicts. Conflict can occur in the same location but involve 
different issues and actors and is thus not the recurrence of a conflict but the beginning of 
a new armed conflict (Ibid, 201). Suhrke and Samset present a strong reminder of the 
limits of statistical research on armed conflict and that “research findings are unstable and 
must be treated with great caution” (Ibid., 199). This thesis proceeds with the analysis of 
conflict recurrence having this appeal in mind. 
 
1.2.2. Conflict recurrence and perpetuation 
 
Conflict recurrence is conceptually different from the perpetuation of conflict in terms of 
the intensity of conflict over time. In conflicts which are perpetuated, intensity can vary 
over time but the armed conflict does never stop entirely. If conflicts recur, they stop and 
then restart. Conflict recurrence is about the recurrence of a new conflict episode in 
which the same actors fight over the same incompatibility as in previous episodes.  
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 It is not always easy to clearly distinguish the two dimensions. If conflicts last 
long, their intensity is never constant, but changes. If a prolonged conflict shifts from 
high to low and then back to high intensity this mirrors the dynamics of conflict 
recurrence with the difference being that the conflict never entirely stops. However, this 
difference can be thin. For example, one or two events with more than 25 battle death 
may qualify a conflict for another year, even though the rest of the year there was no 
activity. Another point indicating the difficulty to distinguish between perpetuation and 
recurrence is the assessment what constitutes the end of a conflict. Armed conflicts do not 
end simply with the termination of fighting. Even if there is a period with no activity, this 
may not indicate that the underlying incompatibility has been settled (King 1997, 21). In 
the best of cases, it may indicate that the warring parties agreed to settle the dispute 
through a negotiated settlement. Another difficulty is to assess the transformation of a 
conflict. In prolonged or recurring conflicts, actors or motivations change and what may 
seem as the continuation of the previous conflict is in fact a new conflict. 
Table 1.11: Changes of conflict intensity in prolonged conflicts 
 
 Conflict Period of observation Dynamic pattern 
1 India (Kashmir) 1993-1999 3-2-2-2-2-2-3 
2 Philippines 1989-1991 3-2-3 
3 Burundi 1998-2000 3-2-3 
4 Liberia 1990-1992 3-2-3 
5 Rwanda 1998-2001 3-2-2-3 
6 Sudan (Southern Sudan) 1992-1995 3-2-2-3 
7 Colombia 1990-1992 3-2-3 
8 Colombia 1993-1998 3-2-2-2-2-3 
9 Colombia 2002-2004 3-2-3 
Note: 3= High intensity conflict (yearly average); 2= intermediate armed conflict (yearly average) 
 
Thus, there is a fine line between conflict recurrence and perpetuation. The UCTD 
suggests that the empirical evidence of prolonged conflicts that have a similar conflict 
dynamic to conflict recurrence is relatively weak. The UCTD includes 45 conflict 
episodes that last 5 years or longer for the period 1989-2004. Out of these episodes of 
prolonged conflict, there are no instances with the dynamic pattern 3-1-3 but 9 with the 
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pattern 3-2-3 (see Table 1.11).21 Theoretically, this means that if we were only to look at 
the recurrence of war, 9 instances of conflict recurrence should be added to the count of 
conflict recurrence.  
However, they have been omitted fro the following reasons. The crude range of 
from 25 to 1,000 battle-related deaths of intermediate armed conflict is not conducive to 
gain a more precise understanding of the dynamics of prolonged conflicts. Moreover, it 
makes a difference if a conflict stops for one year or if it lingers on. The difference lies in 
the quality of third-party involvement in an area of conflict and its potential effect on the 
transition from armed conflict to peace. This involvement can take many forms such as, 
in an initial phase, the deployment of United Nations peacekeepers, diplomatic initiatives 
or, in a later stage, multilateral, bilateral or non-governmental relief, development 
assistance or peacebuilding. When conflicts do not stop, the quality and quantity of this 
support is limited because the lack of security prevents its mobilisation.   
The perpetuation of insecurity can be part of a short-term strategy of belligerents 
to attain or maintain political and economic objectives. These can for example include the 
maintenance of control over resource rich areas, trade, labour and high military budgets 
or allow for illegal appropriation activities (pillage, extortion or trafficking) to continue 
(Keen 1996, 12, 24, 46; see above).  
In contrast, when a conflict stops, there is a potential to strengthen the lobby for 
peace and change the opportunity structure of the parties involved. The empirical results 
above underline the importance of the period after armed conflict because most armed 
conflicts were found to recur within the first five years after the end of the previous 
episode. Moreover, most conflicts recurred when there was no activity before and one 
third recurs after a peace agreement.  
These findings emphasize that there is a real risk that armed conflict may recur 
even if it is thought to have ended. Thus, a period with no armed activities when a 
conflict ends could be exploited to promote opportunities for peace and increase the 
opportunity cost of renewed conflict. The topic of conflict recurrence has therefore direct 
implications for the implementation of peace agreements and peacebuilding.  
                                                 
21 3-1-3 is the conflict dynamic from war (coded as 3) to minor armed conflict (coded as 1) and back to war 
(3). 3-2-3 is the conflict dynamic from or from war (3) to intermediate armed conflict (coded as 2) and back 
to war (3). 
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1.2.3. Explaining conflict recurrence 
 
The phenomenon of conflict recurrence has received little attention in the academic 
literature. The literature dealing directly with conflict recurrence is small particularly in 
comparison to the literature on the duration of armed conflict (Keen 1998, Fearon 2004, 
Ross 2004, Hironaka 2005). Overall, one can separate three types of literatures: The first 
relates conflict recurrence to the legacies of previous episodes of armed conflict, the 
second considers conflict recurrence in terms of the post-conflict period, and the third 
looks at the failure of peace agreements. 
 
The legacies from previous armed conflict 
  
When looking at the legacies of armed conflict, one of the explanations for conflict 
recurrence relates to the causes of the armed conflict which have not been resolved 
(Walter 2004, 372). In identity conflicts, for example, the conduct of war increases 
societal or ethnic polarisation which makes conflict more difficult to resolve and more 
likely to recur (Kaufman 1996). These conflicts recur because the original grievances 
were not resolved as evidenced in Georgia (South Ossetia), Russia (Chechnya), Iran 
(Kurdistan), Iraq (Kurdistan), or Sri Lanka (Eelam). These are all separatist conflicts in 
which identity is a differentiation element between the parties.  
The legacy of conflict economies can be important for conflict recurrence. The 
World Bank literature on the ‘Conflict Trap’ considers the conflict recurrence as a 
reflection of a post-conflict political economy, low levels of economic development and 
conflict profiteering (Collier et al 2003). A great danger is the “continuance of [criminal] 
networks and their ability to support power competitors. The maintenance of these 
alternative resource bases hinders central power consolidation and the development of a 
national revenue base (…), while allowing warlords to co-opt emerging social 
movements (…)” (Bhatia 2005, 208). In enduring conflicts, soldiers have few alternative 
skills to war making. Child soldiers, for instance, may have seen nothing else in life than 
war and consider war making as more profitable than demobilisation (Landow 2006).  
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The psychological scars of conflict can also be an element in conflict recurrence. 
These include the desire for revenge or barriers for trust and reconciliation. However, the 
legacies of conflict can also contribute to conflict not recurring. If a conflict has been 
particularly devastating and long, soldiers may be weary to get back to armed conflict as 
evidenced in Angola and Mozambique (Walter 2004, 373).  
Another literature seeks to explain conflict recurrence in relation to how the 
previous conflict ended. Decisive military victories “tend to end wars once and for all” 
(CHD 2007, 13). Luttwack argues that this is so because decisive outcomes create more 
information about the adversary’s strength and may therefore prevent the recurrence of 
armed conflict (Luttwak 199, 36). Moreover, in cases that the victors establish control 
over the instruments of the state, it allows them to consolidate their power and act against 
conflict recurrence (Walter 2004, 374). Kaufman concurs that armed conflict ending in 
partition produce more stable solutions to identity conflicts (Kaufman 1996).  
These explanation, however, have important shortcomings. The literature on the 
political economy of conflict has clearly established that winning a war is not necessarily 
the objective of fighting anymore because the self-financing nature of contemporary 
conflict and the economic agendas of belligerents lead to a vested interest in conflict 
perpetuation (Cooper 2002, 943-944; Creveld 1991, 221). In addition, establishing 
control over the state in war zone may not increase the capability to project power 
because the weakness of state institutions. Many post-conflict states do not possess the 
functional capacity to establish effective control over territory or the capital. Weak states 
have even been associated with being a key factor in the onset and perpetuation of armed 
conflict (Herbst 2000, Hironaka 2005). The control of markets can be more important 
than the control over institutions (Reno 1998). On the stability of partition, the Horn of 
Africa provides an important counterfactual in which an intra-state conflict simply 
recurred as an inter-state conflict between Eritrea and Ethiopia.  
 
The post-conflict period 
 
Another set of explanations of conflict recurrence looks at the post-conflict period. 
Walter argues that the conditions affecting rebel recruitment “will be at least as important 
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in determining where war will recur as factors associated with the previous war. (…) 
Civilians are not going to transform themselves from shopkeepers back into soldiers 
unless the conditions that exist at any given point in time encourage these 
transformations” (Walter 2004, 374, emphasis in the original). These conditions include 
individual hardship and dissatisfaction as well as the absence of any visions to bring 
about change by non-violent means (Ibid.).  
 While the conditions for rebel recruitment are important, Walter does not consider 
that soldiers have to be demobilised first and then turned into shopkeepers before the 
reverse development is possible. Particularly in long-lasting conflicts, demobilisation is 
difficult because belligerents have few alternative skills to war making. If there are no 
visions for a different livelihood and a professional future, continuous violence seem an 
obvious choice to get thought, settle disputes and earn a living.  
Another explanation of conflict recurrence is associated to the management of 
post-conflict peace building. If the post-conflict period is managed inadequately by third 
parties, the risk of conflict recurrence persists. Paris argues, for example, that 
“international agencies have prescribed market democracy as a remedy for civil conflict 
without adequately anticipating, or taking action to limit the inherent destabilising side 
effects of this remedy” (Paris 1997, 56-57). The case of Iraq shows that the imposition of 
a constitution process fostered existing divisions rather than being a unifying element for 
the various factions (Ottaway 2005, 7). Moreover, the experience from the former Soviet 
Union and West Africa suggests that privatisation of state industries without the 
necessary business and legal infrastructure contributes to the emergence of powerful 
economic stakeholders and the entrenchment of organised crime networks. These actors 
develop vested interests which could delay or prevent the implementation of a peace 
agreement and limit the success of peacebuilding (Woodward 2002, 193). 
The management of the post-conflict economy is essential to create new 
employment opportunities for demobilised soldiers (Fedi 2006). In most cases, economic 
conditions worsen after conflicts before the absence of fighting can be translated into an 
economic revival of sorts. Post-conflict economies are particularly vulnerable because the 
economic inequalities and hardship after a conflict can contribute to the use of force as an 
expression of crime or social unrest (Woodward 2002, 184). In the absence of private 
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investment, the bulk of investment comes from external actors and public expenditures. 
These expenditures go towards building the functions of a state so it can deliver security, 
welfare and participation (see above). However, a policy of macroeconomic restraint and 
low public expenditures can undermine the stabilisation in an initial period because the 
state cannot expand, include demobilised soldiers in its administration and generate the 
tax base for state building and economic recovery (Woodward 2002, 193).  
Another explanation is the commitment of external parties to the implementation 
of peacebuilding. Short-term objectives of external actors are related to creating a success 
by stopping the fighting and signing a peace agreement. However, the real challenge is 
long term financing of peacebuilding. In many cases, there is a gap between the good 
intentions of third parties to secure peace and the material support over time to assure that 
a peacebuilding is implemented. The lack of commitment of external actors can therefore 
create a power vacuum which is exploited by spoilers with an interest in insecurity and 
even conflict recurrence. To counteract these developments the United Nations 
Peacebuilding Commission aims at garnering long term support, coordination and 
assistance to post-conflict areas (UNGA-UNSC 2007). 
 
The failure of peace agreements 
 
Various studies highlight that there is a greater likelihood for conflicts to recur if they 
ended through a negotiated settlement. In the 1990s, 43% of conflicts recurred within the 
first 5 years after a peace agreement. The long term trend (1946-1999) holds that 29% of 
armed conflicts recurred after a peace agreement (CHD 2007, 13). These empirical 
observations are explained by negotiated settlement being applied mainly to protracted 
armed conflicts (Gartner and Bercovitch 2006, 816). In addition, peace agreements fail 
because the conflict has not reached the right level of ripeness which facilitates conflict 
resolution, for example, after a mutually hurting stalemate (Zartman 1995). Parties are 
locked into a mutually hurting stalemate when they lose faith in winning by using force 
and look for opportunities to cut losses by and alternative ways of accommodation. 
(Zartman 1985, 232-236). 
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 In addition, Walter agues that the major problem in peace agreements is the 
inability of warring parties to create a credible commitment to disarm and demobilise. In 
these circumstances third parties play a crucial role to ensure that groups are protected, 
the terms of an agreement fulfilled and promises kept (Walter 1997, 335-336, 360). A 
third-party security guarantee is defined as “any implicit or explicit promise given by an 
outside power to protect adversaries during the treaty implementation period” (Ibid., 
345). However, Stedman and Rothchild argue that real security guarantees in which third 
parties pledge to use force to protect, deter and compel are empirically very rare 
(Stedman and Rothchild 1996, 22). In successful peace agreements (South Africa, 
Zimbabwe, Namibia, Guatemala and El Salvador) security guarantees were not even a 
decisive element (Stedman 2002, 11, Peceny and Stanley 2001, 150).  
 Stedman and Rothchild argue that peace agreement succeed or fail depending on 
the commitment of the belligerents to a peace process. If both parties agree to end their 
war and commit to a detailed framework, peace treaties are more likely to succeed. If not, 
the risk of conflict recurrence increases (Stedman and Rothchild 1996, 18). Moreover, 
there are practical limitations to the implementation of peace agreements. They include, 
for example, that the preferences of the warring parties as well as their sincerity, 
command and control are little known. Peace negotiations and implementation are slso 
rife with strategic deception and the meaning of “cheating” is sometimes unclear. The 
low reliability of information in post-conflict areas make it very difficult to attribute 
clearly who cheats (Ibid., 20-22; Stedman 2002, 12). The management of spoilers is 
another aspect to consider. A peace treaty is at risk of failure if there is one group insider 
or outside the negotiation room which has the resolve, opportunity and capability to spoil 
(Stedman 1997, 7; Stedman 2002, 14; Greenhill and Major 2007, 36-37).   
In situations of uncertainty, deception and spoiling, third parties can have a 
decisive impact in their role as custodians of the peace process (Stedman 1997, 6). It is 
important how successful they are to deal with spoilers and to signal commitment though 
long term assistance for the implementation of the peace process (Stedman 1997, 12-14; 
Stedman 2002, 3). When third parties signal little commitment, the opportunity to cheat 
and spoil increases and a peace agreement – even if formally signed – may just be a pause 
of fighting to regain military strength and renew the conflict at a later stage.  
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1.2.4. Conflict recurrence and financing    
 
The previous paragraphs reviewed a number of explanations for the recurrence of armed 
conflict. Of course, they do not provide the magic formula for conflict recurrence for 
every place and time but offer perspectives to develop a better understanding of conflict 
recurrence. In view of adding an additional perspective, this thesis explores the 
relationship between conflict financing and recurrence which so far remains unexplored.   
Increasing attention to post-conflict peacebuiding after the Cold War has led to 
the investment of billions of Dollars into countries that are emerging from conflict. While 
images of jubilant populations give the impression that a conflict is over and the road to 
reconstruction free, the risk that conflict recurs persists. The empirical findings discussed 
above established that conflict recurrence is an important phenomenon of contemporary 
conflict, particularly if they end though a negotiated settlement.  
Conflict financing is an essential part of conflict recurrence because the 
organisation and conduct of armed conflict must be paid for. It is therefore important to 
look at the economic opportunities which could be a potential source to finance conflict 
and explore how the management of the post-conflict economy could reduce access to 
revenue sources for spoilers and support a viable peace.   
This approach should be of interest to governments and multilateral donors to 
hedge against the risk of conflict recurrence. As most conflicts recurred within the first 
five years after termination, the management of this period is important to ensuring that a 
conflict does not recur. Considering economic opportunities in post-conflict areas as 
potential methods of conflict financing opens a new perspective on conflict prevention 
and the sustainability of peacebuilding.  
 
1.3. The financing of conflict 
 
The previous Part underlined the role of conflict financing in the recurrence of conflict. 
This Part develops a better understanding of what is behind the phenomenon of conflict 
financing. The Section first looks at the historical dimension of financing state warfare 
and then shifts to insurgencies and conflict economies after the end of the Cold War.  
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1.3.1. Historical aspects of conflict financing 
 
Conflict financing is a recurring theme in historical work on armed conflict (Finley 1985, 
Lachaux 2000, Howard 1976, Kindleberger 1993). Living of the land of the conquered or 
the area of transit was an essential component to nourish and supply armies up until the 
beginning of the 20th century (Finley 1985, 176; Howard 1976, 85, 98). Sources of 
financing war included booty, indemnities, taxes, loans, credits, the reduction of 
consumption or the depreciation of foreign assets (Finley 1985, 55; Tilly 1992, 85; 
Kindleberger 1993, 284). In the 16th and 17th century, another form of conflict financing 
was the debasement of coins (Kindleberger 1993, 28-30).  
The cost of maintaining armies were so extensive that the mercenary armies of the 
16th century or the professional armies of the 18th century were mostly defensive as 
evidenced by sieges and the avoidance of battle being the prevailing military strategy 
(Howard 1976, 27, 71-72; Bean 1973, 209).  
The development of taxation systems was a reaction to these rising cost and part 
of the emergence of states in Europe between the 16th and 19th century. Charles Tilly 
(1992, 74-76) considers European state making along the four main activity of states:  
 
• state making: attacking and checking challengers within the state; 
• war making: attacking and checking challengers outside the state; 
• protection: attacking and checking the rivals of the rulers’ principle allies inside of 
outside the state; and  
• extraction: acquiring the resources for state making, war making and protection. 
 
The interaction of these activities contributed to the development of the state in 
Europe along the following lines. Warfare between competing lords increased the control 
over territory. The population within these territories were then subjected to extraction by 
the state in order to contribute to cost of war. The increasing cost of war contributed to an 
ever greater need to expand and regularise the extractive infrastructure of the state. The 
latter led to the creation of national taxation systems.  
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The consolidation of the tax base in turn affected state making as state authorities 
engaged in co-opting or eliminating domestic rivals and establishing the monopoly of 
extraction and the use of force. The growth of the military establishment in the 18th and 
19th centuries fostered the bureaucratisation of the armed forces, war industries and mass 
education. When taxation no longer sufficed to cover the cost of war, the state formed 
alliances with social classes to obtain loans and manpower for which the latter received 
protection against external rivals (Tilly 1992, 74-76, 96; Kindleberger 1993, 7). 
 This narrative of the evolution of the state in Europe shows that the origin of state 
institutions is closely linked to the preparation for war before taking on a life of their 
own. The rising cost of war fostered extractive systems which in turn led to institutions to 
maximise extraction. States provided protection to the population in return for which it 
extracted rents. These were then used for state making, war making and protection. 
 Rasler and Thompson take Tilly’s framework a step further emphasising the 
importance of resistance, coalition building and the geo-political and economic context. 
Resistance affects the level of extraction and thereby also indirectly state making and war 
making. However, its effect depends on how many people resist, who is resisting, the 
nature of their claim and if the state needs them to attain its goal. If the state does need 
the support of social groups for extraction, state making and war making, the state builds 
coalitions with particular social groups by offering exclusive protection from domestic or 
external rivals of that group. This implies that protection does not apply equally to all 
subjects within a state. Geo-political and economic considerations emphasise that war 
may not be the only variable important for state making. In this view, Western Europe 
was predisposed to develop states due to its geographic limitations to expand. The 
competition between state entities over territory and economic opportunities reinforced 
the development of states (Rasler and Thompson 1989, 18-19, 210). 
 In addition, Rasler and Thomson point out that Tilly’s framework does not take 
account of different types of wars and states. They focus on global wars and great powers 
and highlight – based on Otto Hintze (1975) and Michael Mann (1986) – that sea powers 
and land powers are differently structured. Given their reliance on trade, sea powers were 
better at creating wealth and developing a commercialised economy which facilitated 
taxation. Moreover, sea powers were more concerned with fighting off external rivals. 
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this fostered a slimmer state, a smaller capacity to deal with domestic rivals, the 
dominance of trading interests in state policy and a greater emphasis on technology and 
capital. In the cases such as Venice and the United Provinces of the Netherlands, the 
control of the state by merchants led to a lower protection and overhead cost of the state. 
In contrast, land powers were characterised by their large population and ability to 
mobilise man power. The size of the army and the territorial reach of the state led to a 
bigger state administration and the maintenance of a feudal system to ensure domestic 
order. Overall, conservative players ensured their dominance in policy. Thus, in the case 
of France and Russia, the control of the state by bureaucrats contributed to a high cost of 
protection and state overheads to maximise salaries and other benefits (Rasler and 
Thompson 1989, 7, 23, 208).   
 This discussion of state making underlines the centrality of extraction. How 
successful extraction was depended on the control over territory or trade flows, the 
commercialisation of the economy, the ability of the state to forge coalitions and the level 
of resistance of the population. Those states that were able to organise their extraction 
successfully – and spent it wisely – persisted, others – such as the Kingdom of Burgundy 
which did not – disappeared (Keegan 1993, 329). War in all ages presented such an 
enormous strain on the resources of rulers that it fostered financial innovation to the 
extent that “financial history cannot escape dealing with war” (Kindleberger 1993, 7). 
With the rising cost of war, rulers had to improve and maximise their means of extraction 
such as tributes (arbitrary payments levied upon individuals, groups or localities), rents 
(direct payments for land, goods or services), payment on flows (excise, customs, tolls, 
transaction charges), payment on stocks (land and property taxes) and income taxes 
(taxation on salaries and other monetary income) (Tilly 1992, 85-87).  
The existence of taxation systems was also a central element for to the 
development of credit systems the emergence of debt financing. The collection of taxes 
enabled a ruler to establish a continuous revenue base that could be projected into the 
future. While credit systems existed before the 16th century, it was in the Habsburg 
Netherlands between 1515 and 1565 that the future revenue of whole provinces was 
mobilised for present needs. Given that expenditure for war came in surges, the ability to 
incur debts made it possible to generate large sums of money quickly. This prospect of 
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immediate revenue could even result in a military advantage through faster mobilisation 
(Tracy 1985, 218, 221; Tilly 1992, 85).  
Taxes and credits were mutually reinforcing. As states became increasingly 
indebted, they needed to enact more effective extraction systems, which in turn increased 
the confidence in the future revenue of the state leading to further credits (Tilly 1992, 85-
88). However, winning a war did not automatically imply national prosperity because the 
victors became increasingly indebted and in the case of global wars had to bear the cost 
of maintaining the international system (Rasler and Thompson 1989, 175-176). 
The relationship between debt and taxes as a means of war finance was a central 
concern for economists. The main contention was if war should be financed by the 
present generation through taxation or by future generations through debt (Crowther 
1940, 5). Adam Smith argued that England’s war against France in 1793-1815 should be 
financed through taxation. David Ricardo concurred that financing a war through taxes 
may make governments more sensitive to the economic effects of war while borrowing 
may produce carelessness. In contrast, John Maynard Keynes advocated borrowing to 
finance the Second World War because a soldier could not be expected to fight and be a 
taxpayer at the same time (Lachaux 2000, 207).  
In the 20th century, war ultimately became so expensive that taxation alone would 
not be enough to finance it. A combination of taxes and debts was needed to finance war 
(Crowther 1940, 26). The financing of war found its apogee in the First and Second 
World War leading to an unprecedented level of indebtedness and to the near bankruptcy 
of major powers (Howard 1976, 96, 112; Kindleberger 1993 288; Rasler and Thompson 
1989, 93-115). In the First World War, both German and French political elites acted on 
the assumption that the war would be short and that the enemy could be made to pay once 
defeated. Moreover, financing war through borrowing was thought to be sound as long as 
the interest on debt and the annual amortisation were included in the budget. However, 
the German Minister of Finance, Karl Helfferich, failed to recognise that increasing 
indebtedness would no longer satisfy assumptions of a partial equilibrium. In 
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consequence, he did not enact measures to balance the general equilibrium of the German 
economy contributing to the hyperinflation of the 1920s (Kindleberger 1993, 285).22  
The total wars of the 20th century were marked by the mobilisation of entire 
populations and economies as well as the development of nationalism, social movements 
and industrialisation (Crowther 1939, 5). Based on these factors, the availability of 
financial resources was deemed secondary. The central aspect was the mobilisation of 
resources by means of nationalism: “The [Second World War] (…) is fought with men 
and materials. Money can neither create nor destroy them” (Crowther 1940, 4). 
Nevertheless, nationalist fever alone could not maintain the wars leading the explosion of 
debt. For example, France increased in public debt from 413 billion French Francs in 
1938 to 1,800 billion French Francs in 1944 (Rasler and Thompson 1989, 96, 106). 
This discussion of the historical aspects of conflict financing underlines that the 
financing of conflict is nothing new. Over centuries, political leaders were preoccupied 
with how to raise money for war. War became so expensive that it contributed to the 
development of taxation systems and state institutions to resource and administer armed 
forces. However, not only states are fighting wars, but also those who challenge the state. 
The next Section looks at these actors and the economy of insurgencies.  
 
1.3.2. The economy of insurgencies 
 
An insurgency is a strategy of military conflict characterised by small groups practicing 
guerrilla warfare from rural base areas. Insurgents are in principle weaker then the 
government they are fighting against. Its numerical and material weakness implies that 
they need to hide from government forces (Fearon and Laitin 2003, 79; Becket 2001).  
 The economies of insurgencies can be separated into a closed and open conflict 
economy. The notion of a closed insurgency economy is based on Mao’s and Che 
Guevara’s work on guerrilla warfare. As guerrilla forces are weaker then regular forces 
they are dependent on local populations for protection and resources. Guerrilla 
                                                 
22 In a partial equilibrium, it is assumed that budget decision have no repercussion on the economic system 
as a whole. A general equilibrium includes the effects of budget decisions rolling through the economy and 
financial structure (Bannock et al 1998, 174, 314).  
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movements should therefore form a symbiosis with the local population and its natural 
environment. However, except for China and Cuba, closed insurgency economies were 
rarely viable. In most cases, they were not efficient to mobilise sufficient resources to 
maintain guerrilla activities (Rufin 1996, 21-23).23  
An open insurgency economy reduces the dependence on local populations by 
extending the resource base to a military or humanitarian sanctuary. A military sanctuary 
is a support base in a neighbouring country which is used as a hide-out and a channel for 
third-party assistance (Rufin 1996, 24-26). A humanitarian sanctuary is a safe-haven for 
refugees supplied and protected by the international community. It is located in a 
neighbouring country or is a clearly demarcated zone within a country. Humanitarian 
sanctuaries can help insurgents by ensuring direct access to resources (basic necessities, 
medical aid, cars, etc.), increasing the protection of rebels (rebel fighters and civilians are 
not easily distinguished), reducing the risk of attacks (attacks on humanitarian sanctuaries 
are internationally condemned), and fostering rebel groups international recognition 
(through the distribution of aid in rebel held territory) (Rufin 1996, 29). The role of 
humanitarian sanctuaries became less important after the Cold War when the 
international patronage waned and control over natural resources and other methods of 
financing increased the degree of self-financing of rebel groups (Rufin 1996, 32-34).  
Military and humanitarian sanctuaries can affect the dynamics of armed conflict.  
A military sanctuary makes guerrillas more powerful as it allows a better supply of their 
activities. However, this is likely to increase the intensity of fighting leading to greater 
population flight and thus reducing the cover for guerrilla operations (Rufin 1996, 24-26). 
Humanitarian sanctuaries can also increase the intensity of fighting by strengthening 
guerrillas. With increasing guerrilla activity more refugees come into sanctuaries. This is 
likely to trigger more international aid which in turn increases the guerrilla’s capacity to 
launch offensives (Rufin 1996, 31).  
Another conceptualisation of insurgency economies have been developed by 
Thomas Naylor (2002). Naylor presents a model of insurgency economies based on the 
                                                 
23 Mao’s success in China was based on never staying long enough to become dependent on local 
populations and before they could turn against him out of fear of repression. In Cuba, Che Guevara’s 
success was primarily based on the weakness of the Batista regime (Rufin 1996, 23).  
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interaction of the type of conflict economy (predation, parasite, extraction) and military 
strategy of insurgents (contention, expansion, control). He distinguishes three stages:  
 
(1) Predation-Contention: The conflict economy is predatory and the military strategy is 
based on contention with government forces. Insurgents operate in areas formally 
under state control. To destabilise the state and raise funds, insurgents conduct hit and 
run attacks such as killings, kidnappings, burglaries, or bank robberies. Expenditure 
requirement at this stage are small as the rebel group itself is small.  
(2) Parasite-Expansion: Insurgent activities mature and its funding become increasingly 
parasitical. Its operations become rooted in a particular geographic area in which 
insurgents expand their control. The nature of violence shifts from hit and run attacks 
to low intensity warfare and economic strategies to weaken the government. As the 
formal economy declines, the guerrilla becomes increasingly involved in the parallel 
economy. In this way, the government looses fiscal revenues while the guerrilla is 
strengthened through the revenues from the parallel economy.  
(3) Extraction-Territorial Control: Insurgents establish control over an area from which 
the state is excluded. In this area, the guerrilla becomes the de-facto government 
including the provision of social services, arbitration and a taxation system. The latter 
generates funding to continue military activities.  
 
Guerrilla groups to which this dynamism applied included the Shining Path in Peru, the 
National People’s Army in the Philippines, the Bougainville rebels in Papua New Guinea, 
the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia, the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka, UNITA in Angola, the 
Maoist rebels in Nepal and the FARC in Colombia (Naylor 2002, 45-47, 53-54).  
Naylor’s model on insurgency economies has important parallels to Tilly’s model 
on state making. Similarly to Tilly, the model contends that as control over territory and 
population is established, institutions are created to enhance extraction. The difference is 
the absence of external recognition even if the territory and institutions created by an 
insurgent group may be similar to state institutions. Thus, looking at the empirical aspects 
of statehood, the distinction between the conflict financing of states and insurgents may 
become blurred as they use similar strategies. 
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Naylor’s conceptualisation could be expanded to include a fourth category: the de 
facto state. De facto states exist  
 
“where there is an organized political leadership which has risen to power 
through some degree of indigenous capability; receives popular support; and has 
achieved sufficient capacity to provide governmental services to a population in a 
specific territorial area, over which effective control is maintained for a 
significant period of time. The de facto state views itself as capable of entering 
into relations with other states and it seeks full constitutional independence and 
widespread international recognition as a sovereign state. It is, however, unable to 
achieve any degree of substantive recognition and therefore remains illegitimate 
in the eyes of international society” (Pegg 1998, 26).  
 
Understanding de facto states requires a differentiation between empirical and juridical 
sovereignty. Empirical sovereignty is associated to the principles of statehood identified 
in the 1933 Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States: a permanent 
population, a defined territory, a government and the capacity to enter into relations with 
other state (see Malanczuk 1997, 75-81). While de facto states may have empirical 
aspects of sovereignty, they lack juridical sovereignty associated with international 
recognition as their territory already part of an existing and recognised state.  
 The key difference for de facto states, thus is that it has internal sovereignty – the 
supreme authority in a given territory but not external sovereignty – recognition by other 
states of the international system (Lynch 2004, 16). Examples of de-facto states include 
Eritrea before independence, Taiwan, Northern Cyprus, Somaliland, Tamil Eelam, 
Republica Srpska, Kosovo, Transnistria, Chechnya, Abkhazia, Palestine and Bougainville 
(Pegg 1998, Bahcheli et a 2004).24 
                                                 
24 The Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization (UNPO) is forum where non-recognised entities 
are represented. The UNPO is a democratic, international membership organization. Its members are 
indigenous peoples, occupied nations, minorities and independent states or territories who have joined 
together to protect their human and cultural rights, preserve their environments, and to find non-violent 
solutions to conflicts which affect them. See http://www.unpo.org.  
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 In terms of conflict financing, de facto states are an evolution of the extraction-
territorial control segment of Naylor’s model in which state institutions become 
formalised and the political leadership controls the main economic opportunities in its 
territory. The leadership extracts resources from the population by taxing economic 
activity and is often directly involved in the commercialisation of whatever economic 
assets available in the territory it controls.  
 However, de facto states are distinct from Warlordism. Warlords “control an area 
by their capacity to wage war, and are able to organise a war economy, often including 
external economic activities, to sustain themselves and keep (weak) central authorities at 
bay” (Le Billon 2000, 4). Thus, warlords have no relations between state and society. The 
control over resources and the economy is more important than the control over the 
population.  
 This brief discussion of the economy of insurgencies highlights that the 
characteristics of conflict financing of insurgents and states can be similar. While in the 
initial stages of an insurgency, rebel groups use different methods of conflict financing, 
the methods become similar with the increasing degree of control over territory and 
populations. As insurgencies become bigger and increase their operational space, costs of 
maintaining insurgencies increase and lead to pressures of institution building and 
diversification of conflict financing.  
 
1.3.3. Conflict financing after the end of the Cold War  
 
The dynamic nature of conflict financing has been emphasised in the transitions of 
conflict economies after the Cold War from patronage to self-financing strategies. 
However, the widely accepted claim that natural resources replaced declining support 
from Cold War patrons should be qualified in a number of ways.  
 Patronage payments during the Cold War tended to be a feature of Western power 
politics rather than a general phenomenon. Western powers were more involved in 
supporting guerrilla movements in comparison to the Soviet Union and China (Naylor 
2002, 80-81). Moreover, even during the Cold War, guerrilla groups were able to rely to 
some extent on natural resource extraction and the taxation as well as the operation of 
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economic activity. Examples include guerrilla groups in Lebanon, the Philippines, 
Burma, Cambodia and Angola (Ibid., 58, 65-70; Picard 1996, 76-84; Dietrich 2000c, 276; 
Le Billon 2001, 6). Furthermore, it is misleading to assume that third party support 
stopped after the Cold War as the civil war Bosnia and Herzegovina illustrates (Bojicic 
and Kaldor 1997, 141, 159; Kaldor 1999, 33, 46-48; see also Section 2.1.3.). Finally, 
patronage payments were not only reduced for rebel groups but also for state armies. This 
contributed to the weakening of states which increased the relative strength of guerilla 
groups and the incentives for them to renew armed conflict (Herbst 2000, 27).   
 After the Cold War, some studies of conflict economies emphasized the multitude 
of methods available to insurgencies to finance conflict. These included taxation, 
extortion, diaspora funding, kidnapping or natural resources exploitation (Jean and Rufin 
1996, Kaldor 1999). However, with the increasing importance of natural resources in 
African conflicts, the literature focused on the relationship between natural resources and 
conflict (see Section 1.1.4.). The focus on natural resources contributed to a literature on 
individual commodities such as oil, diamonds, drugs, and timber (Smillie et al 2000; Le 
Billon 2001b, Global Witness 2002a) and more generally conflict goods (Cooper 2001a).  
 On the multilateral level, the issue of natural resources gained prominence 
through the detailed reports of the United Nations Security Council Sanctions Monitoring 
Mechanism on Angola, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Sierra Leone 
(UNSC 2003, 2002a, 2002b, 2001a, 2001c, 2001d, 2001e, 2000a, 2000b, 2000c). 
 Particularly the role of so-called “conflict diamonds” in the financing of African 
Conflicts became a central element in multilateral conflict management strategies. These 
efforts culminated in a multi-stakeholder initiative, the Kimberley Process. Non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) took a leading role to create pressure on business 
and governments by exposing the link between diamonds and armed conflict in Angola 
and Sierra Leone. The NGO campaign changed the diamond industry’s reaction from 
denial to engagements and contributed to a much tougher treatment of conflict diamonds 
in the United Nations Security Council. However, once the link was exposed, the multi-
stakeholder coalition which negotiated the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme was 
mainly motivated by commercial concerns (Smillie 2005, 53-60; see also Section 2.1.2.). 
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 In terms of conflict management, critical voices argued that the Kimberley 
Process was part of partisan approach to change the conflict dynamics is the countries 
concerned by weakening the weaker and strengthen the stronger belligerent:  
 
 “the almost exclusive focus of some policy makers on curtailing the smuggling of 
diamonds in Sierra Leone and Angola has allowed attention to be diverted from 
the fact that demanding such sanctions is an implicit call for the military defeat of 
the rebels by the government. As calls for military victory appear to be politically 
incorrect in the current age, the vocabulary of victory and defeat has been 
transferred to the more neutral and technocratic language of sanctions and 
restraints on the trade of natural resources” (Herbst 2000, 271). 
 
 Despite the recent attention to natural resources, it is worth highlighting previous 
scrutiny. Examples include Marxist theories of imperialism (Anderton 2002), resource 
mobilisation theory (McCarthy and Zald 1977, Jenkins 1983), the resource war literature 
during the Cold War (Shafer 1982, Finlayson and Haglund 1987), and the debate on 
environmental scarcity and conflict (Homer-Dixon 1994, Gleditsch 1998).  
More recently, much of the Political Economy of Conflict literature approaches 
the relationship between natural resources and armed conflict from the perspective of 
resource abundance, i.e. that the availability of natural resources increases the risk of 
conflict. This approach emphasizes the role of pull factors (economic opportunities, 
greed) over push factors (migration, overcrowding, grievance) (Feirhead 2000, 151). 
Thus, the argument that armed conflict occurs in regions with a high concentration of 
natural resources (Klare 2001, 142, 215-217). Collier argues that dependence on primary 
commodity exports increases the risk of civil war by four times in comparison to a 
country without primary commodity exports (Collier 2000a, 96; see Section 1.1.4.). 
However, resource abundance and scarcity are neither a necessary nor sufficient criteria 
for conflict. There are resource abundant countries (Botswana, Norway, Australia) or 
resource scarce countries (Japan) that develop without experiencing armed conflict. Thus, 
what matters is not whether natural resources are present, but how they are managed. 
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The literature on the Political Economy of Conflict developed a sophisticated 
understanding of the role of natural resources. The key elements of this literature have 
already been described above; however, it is important to emphasise again that this 
literature has gone beyond the simple argument that a high concentration of natural 
resources in a specific territory increases the risk of armed conflict. Counterarguments 
make reference to the characteristics of individual resources, their location within a 
country and the way they are governed. Natural resources and commercial activities 
related to natural resource extraction are indeed important methods of conflict financing 
in some conflicts. However, an overemphasis on natural resources  in conflict financing  
should not blind the analyst of policy maker that armed groups finance conflict though 
multiple strategies; thus calling for a comprehensive approach to conflict financing.  
 
1.3.4 Towards a comprehensive approach of conflict financing 
 
This brief review indicates that the relationship between natural resources and armed 
conflict deserves a nuanced understanding. A note of caution should apply when natural 
resources are construed as the most important factor for the motivation and financing of 
contemporary conflict and link between natural resources and conflict is portrayed as 
automatic. While natural resources are important for the financing of some conflicts, they 
are ultimately just one way of financing conflict. Thus, to explore the phenomenon of 
conflict financing, it is necessary to go beyond natural resources and reconnect to earlier, 
more comprehensive work on conflict financing (Jean and Rufin 1996, Kaldor 1999).  
 This thesis takes conceptualise conflict economies as a combination of individual 
methods of conflict financing. The core premise is that conflict economies are the sum of 
different methods of conflict financing. Such an approach, thus, goes beyond individual 
methods of conflict financing by looking at the combination of various financing methods 
available to armed groups. As the Political Economy of Conflict literature has shown, 
conflict management is often about dealing with rational conflict organizers who seek 
financing to conduct armed conflict. When attempting to cut their financing, focusing on 
one method misses the point as conflict organizers are likely to diversify their portfolio 
and shift from one source of financing to another if they are targeted by policy.  
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1.4. Conclusion 
 
This Chapter reviewed the literature on the Political Economy of Conflict, explored the 
phenomena of conflict recurrence and financing and elaborated the conceptual 
underpinnings for the relationship between conflict recurrence and financing. The 
Chapter looked at the role of globalisation and weak states in armed conflict as well as 
the debates on the economic agendas in civil wars, “Greed and Grievance” and its 
response. The review highlights that the literature developed a sophisticated 
understanding of the economic dimensions of armed conflict, conflict dynamics and the 
actors involved in war zones. Overall, the Political Economy of Conflict provides an 
alternative understanding armed conflict and departs from single factor explanations 
associated to ethnic or religious antagonism.  
 Based on the review of the literature, the Chapter identified elements to analyse 
the relationship between conflict financing and recurrence. Such a framework should 
eliminate the bias on rebel groups, reduce material determinism, develop a 
comprehensive approach to conflict financing and estimate the cost of conflict. Moreover, 
the review identified an intellectual platform with the following elements: 
 
(1) A focus on the interaction of the internal dynamics of conflict with globalisation and 
weak states and the material dimension of armed conflict;  
(2) An emphasis on the functional and instrumental understanding of the use of the use of 
force. The literature therefore has a tendency to look at the strategy rather then the 
effect of armed conflict. 
(3) Armed conflict is understood as the organisation of the use of force on a large scale 
with rational conflict organisers seeking financing to conduct armed conflict.  
(4) An intellectual foundation in notions taken from rational choice theory (utility 
maximisation, transitive preferences, rational conduct). Rationality is understood as a 
relative concept which is based on explicit and internally consistent value systems. 
(5) The structure-agency problem as reflected in a focus on opportunity structure for 
rebellion and the motivation to start armed conflict. 
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 The Chapter also looked at the phenomenon of conflict recurrence. It reviewed the 
empirical research on conflict recurrence, the difference between conflict recurrence and 
perpetuation and various explanations for conflict recurrence. The empirical analysis 
indicates that conflict recurrence is an important phenomenon of armed conflict after the 
end of the Cold War. However, existing explanations of conflict recurrence have not yet 
looked at the role of conflict financing in the renewal of armed conflict. It was argued 
that conflict financing is important for conflict recurrence because the organisation and 
conduct of conflict recurrence must be paid for. Considering sources of revenue in post-
conflict areas as potential methods of conflict financing underlines the importance of 
managing the economy for conflict prevention. If and how curtailing conflict financing 
can contribute to preventing conflict recurrence is the task of this thesis. 
 The Chapter then explored the phenomenon of conflict financing including the 
historical dimension of financing inter-state wars and insurgencies as well as conflict 
financing after the Cold War. This Part argued that it is necessary to go beyond natural 
resources to understanding conflict financing and advocated a comprehensive approach 
of conflict financing which conceptualises conflict economies as a combination of 
individual methods of conflict financing. 
 With the analysis of the Political Economy of Conflict, the renewal of conflict and 
conflict financing, the foundation for a framework of analysis has been completed. The 
Chapter highlighted that a framework should eliminate a bias on rebel groups, reduce 
material determinism, develop a more comprehensive approach to conflict financing and 
estimate the cost to start and maintain armed conflict. The framework is based on an 
understanding of armed conflict as actions of rational conflict organisers who use force in 
an instrumental and functional way. In this context, rationality is relative and rooted in 
the particular preference structure and value systems of a conflict entrepreneur.  
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CHAPTER 2 
The relationship between conflict financing and recurrence 
 
This Chapter elaborates the conceptual framework of the relationship between conflict 
financing and the recurrence of intra-state conflict. The conceptual framework is 
structured along two pillars: the material environment to organise conflict and the 
incentives to using armed force (see Table 2.1.). The rationale behind this division is 
based on a structure-agency framework: Armed groups act within a material environment 
and according to incentives to using armed force.  
 Concerning the material environment, an armed group must have an 
understanding of the availability of revenue sources to finance conflict before actually 
starting an armed conflict. This estimate is then compared to the costs of organising 
conflict recurrence including the start-up costs and the cost of maintaining armed conflict. 
This comparison leads to two situations: The armed group has a surplus of revenue 
sources to finance the renewal of conflict or it has a lack a revenue sources.  
 However, whether there is enough financing, or not, is in itself insufficient for 
conflicts to recur. An armed group must also have an incentive to use armed force. These 
incentives manifest themselves in the form of expected future benefits and opportunity 
costs of using armed force. The combination of the costs and benefits leads to a high or 
low incentive to using armed force. 
 In order to find out the relationship between conflict financing and the recurrence 
of conflict, two steps are needed: First, the conditions of the material environment and 
incentives to using armed force are combined to establish the propensity of a belligerent 
to renew armed conflict. Secondly, the propensities to renew armed conflict of the 
various belligerents are related to each other in order to establish the risk of conflict 
recurrence.25  
 The framework develops two sets of hypothesis including hypotheses on the 
propensity of an armed group to renew armed conflict and hypotheses on the risk of 
conflict recurrence. These hypothesis capture two different dimensions of conflict 
                                                 
25 According to the English Oxford Dictionary, propensity relates to the disposition of a person or group to 
behave in a particular way or an object to move in a particular direction. Risk is the possibility that 
something – in this case the recurrence of armed conflict – will happen. 
  
100
recurrence: The first is the inclination of an actor – an organised armed group – to use 
force and restart an armed conflict; the second is the likelihood of an event – conflict 
recurrence – to occur based on present knowledge which is projected into the future. The 
hypotheses are tested in the case studies of Angola, Georgia and Kosovo. 
 
Table 2.1: The relationship between conflict financing and recurrence 
 
 
Step 1: Propensity to renew armed conflict (per actor) 
 
 
Material environment to organise armed conflict 
 
 
Incentives to use armed force 
 
Availablility of 
revenue sources 
 
Cost to start and 
maintain conflict 
 
Expected future benefits 
of using armed force 
 
Opportunity costs  
of using armed force 
        ↓↓↓ 
         
        Surplus of revenue sources 
        Shortage of revenue sources 
 
 
←→ 
                   ↓↓↓ 
     
    High incentive to use armed force 
    Low incentive to use armed force 
               
 
 
↓↓↓ 
 
Propensity to renew armed conflict (high or low) 
 
 
Step 2: Risk of conflict recurrence 
 
 
Actor A 
 
Actor B 
 
..... 
 
Actor N 
 
 
Propensity to renew  
armed conflict  
↓↓↓ 
 
 
Propensity to renew  
armed conflict  
↓↓↓ 
 
 
..... 
 
Propensity to renew  
armed conflict  
↓↓↓ 
 
                     High  
                     Low 
 
←→          High           Low 
 
←→ High Low 
               
 
 
↓↓↓ 
 
Risk of conflict recurrence (high or low) 
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The rationale behind this framework is based on a functional understanding of 
armed conflict (see section 1.1.5.). Armed conflict is the use of force for which rational 
conflict entrepreneurs seek financing to further their military, political or economic 
objectives. When considering the availability of revenue sources, it is therefore important 
to distinguish if revenue sources are merely the means to organise armed conflict or if 
they are an end of armed conflict.  
 Understanding the relationship between conflict financing and recurrence in the 
context of agency and structure is an important element for policy recommendations 
against the recurrence of conflict. In this way, it can be explored if policy should target 
the material environment of conflict entrepreneurs, their incentive structure to use force, 
or be a mixture of both strategies. Understanding the conditions in which conflict 
organisers shift from a shortage to a surplus of revenue sources and from a low to a high 
incentive to use armed force are important to making peacebuilding more sustainable. 
 The conceptual framework also presents an alternative platform from which to 
understand conflict dynamics, analyse individual case studies and understand the 
economic dimensions of armed conflict. The framework has been inspired and developed 
in contrast to the Collier Hoeffler Model on the Onset of Civil War (Collier and Hoeffler 
2004) and its application to case studies (Collier and Sambanis 2005).  
 The framework goes beyond existing frameworks in the following ways:  
 
(1) A focus on conflict financing to analyse the recurrence of conflict has so far remained 
unexplored and therefore closes a gap in the conflict recurrence literature. 
(2) The framework reduces bias on rebel groups by focusing on organised armed groups 
which include governments, rebel groups, warlords or other groups using armed force 
to achieve military, political or economic objectives.  
(3) The framework includes considerations from both structure and agency by 
juxtaposing the material environment and incentives to use armed force and thereby 
reducing the material determinism.  
(4) The model goes beyond a focus on individual methods of conflict financing by 
including a comprehensive approach to conflict financing. 
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(5) The framework creates data point for the “cost of armed conflict”. The C&H model 
never specifies what the “cost of conflict” actually means in monetary terms and says 
nothing except that “rebel groups more than cover their costs during the conflict” 
(Collier and Hoeffler 2004, 564). By developing a cost-estimating tool, this thesis 
develops an understanding about the barriers-to-entry into armed conflict (how much 
money you need before starting armed conflict) as well as the cost of competition 
(how much money is needed to maintain armed conflict).  
(6) The framework goes beyond considering the availability of revenue sources as an 
indicator for the material environment in which conflict organisers operate. It starts 
from the premise that the availability of revenue sources and the cost of conflict must 
be considered together in order to understand the material environment of a conflict 
organiser. The emphasis is therefore on the “surplus” or “shortage” of revenue 
sources rather than only on the availability of revenue sources.  
(7) The framework also recognises that conflict financing is a relational phenomenon. 
Even if an armed group may have a surplus of revenue sources, if conflict financing 
is not understood in relation to the material situation of its adversary, it does not 
contribute to better understanding conflict recurrence.  
 
This Chapter presents the conceptual framework in four Parts. The first Part looks 
at the availability of potential revenue sources for an organised armed group by looking 
at various methods to finance conflict. It considers a comprehensive approach to conflict 
financing in which conflict economies are conceptualised as the combination of various 
methods of conflict financing. The second Part explores the cost to start and maintain 
armed conflict and develops a tool to estimate the cost of conflict inspired by parametric 
cost-estimating. The tool highlights that the cost to start armed conflict can sometimes be 
low; however, the cost to maintain conflict is disproportionately higher because the cost 
of conflict changes with an increasing intensity of conflict. The third Part considers the 
incentive to using armed force. It looks at the role of agency in conflict recurrence before 
reviewing the expected benefits and opportunity costs of using armed force. The Part 
develops hypotheses on the relationship between conflict financing and recurrence. 
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2.1. Potential revenue sources to finance armed conflict 
 
This Part looks at the potential revenue sources available to finance armed conflict. It 
connects to the background on conflict financing developed in Chapter 1 and is based on 
a comprehensive approach to conflict financing. This comprehensive approach 
conceptualises conflict economies as a combination of individual methods of conflict 
financing (Table 2.2). The core premise is that conflict economies are the sum of 
different methods of conflict financing. A comprehensive approach, thus, goes beyond 
focusing on individual methods of conflict financing by looking at the combination of 
various financing methods available to organized armed groups (Wennmann 2007a). 
  
  
 This comprehensive approach connects to the literature on the organisation of 
conflict which considers conflict financing as on of the elements of organisation in the 
context of overcoming the problems associated to recruitment, control, governance, the 
use of force and group resilience (Weinstein 2007, 39-45). Conflict financing is also 
important in the different phases of the formation of organised armed groups – 
articulation, mobilisation, insurgency and war – underlining that they have different 
Table 2.2: Methods of Conflict Financing 
 
 
• Centralized war economy 
 Taxation 
 Defence budgets 
               Parallel accounting  
               Domestic and international borrowing  
• Conflict goods 
 Exploitation and marketing 
              Taxation of traders or exploiters   
              Futures contracts 
• External assistance 
        Third-party government assistance 
               Military assistance  
               Financial assistance  
        Diaspora finance 
 Financial support 
 Regular remittances 
              Blackmail 
 
 
       
 External assistance (cont.) 
       Humanitarian assistance 
               Taxation 
               Predation 
        Companies 
                Military assistance 
                Commercial complicity 
                Embezzlement 
                Corruption 
        Contributions from wealthy individuals 
• Other methods 
        Kidnapping  
        Asset transfers from civilians 
        Printing or forging money 
        Landing fees 
        Revenue from portfolio investments  
        Profits from legitimate business 
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organisational and financial requirements at different stages (Zartman 1995, 13-16; 
Naylor 2002, 45-47; see also Section 1.3.2.).  
The comprehensive approach also connects to the literature by opening a 
perspective on the potential strategies to finance armed conflict. In this way, it helps the 
analysis of economic endowments in which organised armed groups form and operate 
(Weinstein 2007, 47-48). In relation to conflict recurrence, the identification of potential 
revenue sources is important because they can provide the material bases for the 
organisation of conflict and thus facilitate conflict recurrence. Considering economic 
opportunities in post-conflict areas as potential methods of conflict financing or as an 
economic prize which motivates some actors to renew armed conflict may therefore 
contribute to preventing the recurrence of armed conflict and ensuring the long-term 
viability of peace building.  
Among the key methods of conflict financing are centralized war economies, 
conflict goods, external assistance and asset transfers from civilians. Other methods 
include the printing and forging of money, protection rackets, landing fees, kidnapping 
and revenue from portfolio investments and legitimate business ventures. The following 
Sections briefly review each method of conflict financing before emphasising the 
implications of conflict financing in post-conflict settings.  
 
2.1.1. Centralized war economy 
 
A centralized war economy is located at the nexus of control over territory, the capacity 
to extract resources and armed conflict reminiscent of Tilly’s model of state making 
(Tilly 1992; see Section 1.3.1.). This model described how states made war which in turn 
contributed to the evolution of the state in Europe between the 16th and 19th century. The 
ability to extract resources from a population through the formalisation of taxation 
systems were particularly important to pay for state making, war making and protection. 
The collected revues are filtered through a state budget which includes a budget of 
defence. In the case of armed conflict, a government can draw on the defence budget to 
finance war or project the cost of war into the future and finance it though credits. These 
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credits are translated into debts which are held against the future revenue of the state 
which is generated through taxation (Tracy 1985, 218).   
 However, the use of a centralised war economy does not only apply to recognised 
states but also extend to de facto states (see Section 1.3.2.). Very similar to recognised 
states, de facto states have military budgets and extract resources from the population 
under their control. In Sri Lanka, for example, the LTTE supplements its income from 
Diaspora transfers by drawing on the citizens and economic activity in the territory under 
its control. The LTTE taxed traders and civilians, charged a monthly percentage on 
salaries, sought extra donations from rich business men, and levied taxes for every family 
member living abroad. In order to target its fundraising, the LTTE maintained a 
sophisticated database with details on every family reminiscent of secret service practices 
of totalitarian regimes (Rajasingham-Senanayake 1999, 61; Gunaratna 2003, 210).  
 In cases where regular defence budgets are not sufficient, parallel means of 
accounting can be used to supplement the defence budget. In the case of Uganda it was 
shown that the defence budget was insufficient to conduct the government’s military 
campaign in the Democratic Republic of Congo and that it was supplemented with the 
profits of natural resource exploitation (UNSC 2001a, para. 115-117). Parallel accounting 
can also be used to bypass the conditionality of International Financial Institutions that 
military expenditures should never be higher than 2% of GDP.  
 Statehood in itself can also be a means of conflict financing. Statehood facilitates 
borrowing from domestic or international capital markets which can be diverted for short 
term military priorities. Moreover, statehood facilitates third party military assistance for 
security sector reform, including the modernisation of weapons systems, training or 
financial aid. Statehood also provides a framework for attracting international 
investments which open avenues for corruption and increasing the taxation base.  
 
2.1.2. Conflict goods 
 
With declining assistance from foreign patrons, rebel groups and governments have relied 
increasingly on the commercialization of the resources under their control. Conflict goods 
are tradable commodities that originate in areas controlled by an organised armed group 
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and that are sold or exchanged on international markets with the intention to finance the 
initiation, maintenance or perpetuation of armed conflict (Cooper 2001; Cooper 2002, 
936; see Section 1.1.4.).  
 The debate on ‘conflict diamonds’ brought increasing attention to the issue of 
conflict goods. The link between the horrors of war and diamonds as a symbol of love 
and eternity was taken up in campaigns from non-governmental organisation, such as 
Global Witness (1998, 2000), Amnesty International, or Partnership Africa Canada 
(Smillie et al 2000), and was widely debated in the print media.26 A number of 
investigative reports by the United Nations Security Council documented in great detail 
the link between diamonds and the financing of war in Angola, Sierra Leone and the 
DRC (UNSC, 2000c, 2000b, 2001d; see Section 1.3.3.). 
 However, diamonds are by far not the only conflict good. The revenues from oil 
are a major source in the conflicts in Sudan, Angola, Algeria, Nigeria, Indonesia (Aceh), 
and Morocco (Western Sahara) (Amnesty International 2000, Christian Aid 2001, Cilliers 
and Dietrich 2000, Global Witness 1999, Le Billon 2001, ICG 2001, Essential Action and 
Global Exchange 2000, Nugent 2001, Afrol News 2002). Timber is an important source 
of revenue in Liberia, Cambodia, and for some armed groups in the DRC (Global 
Witness 2000, 2001a, UNSC 2001a, paras.48-55). Drugs are central to the wars in 
Afghanistan and Colombia (UNDCP 2001a, Economist 2001a, 2001b). Copper, cobalt, 
gold, coltan, coffee, niobium, and cassiterite are resource which helped finance various 
actors in the war in the DRC (UNSC 2001d). Table 2.3 shows examples of key resources 
involved in wars during the 1990s.  
Conflict goods have become tools for financing conflict in multiple ways. The 
first is the direct involvement of an organized armed group in the commercialization of a 
resource. This has been the case in Angola with diamonds and oil. UNITA is said to have 
made between USD 3-4 billion between 1992 and 2000. On the other side, the 
government was heavily involved in the exploitation of petrol in collaboration with 
Western petrol companies (Le Billon 2001, 62, 69; Cilliers and Dietrich 2000). In the 
                                                 
26 For a broad selection of articles on conflict diamonds of the press and other related documents see 
Globalpolicy: http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/diamond [21.10.2005]. 
 
  
107
DRC various armed groups have been involved in the exploitation of copper, cobalt, 
diamonds, gold, coltan, coffee, timber, niobium and cassiterite (UNSC 2001e).  
 
Table 2.3: Examples of key resources involved in wars during the 1990s 
(Le Billon 2000b, 24; *UNSC 2001d, paras. 94-108, **Afrol News 2002) 
 
Country Integrated resources Prospective resources 
Afghanistan Opium, heroin, emeralds Natural gas, oil route 
Algeria Oil  
Angola Oil, diamonds, timber, ivory Oil, uranium 
Burma/Myanmar Rubies, timber, heroin Oil 
Cambodia Timber, rubies, sculptures Oil 
Chad Oil Oil, uranium 
Chechnya  Oil route 
Colombia Oil, heroin, cocaine, gold, coal, emeralds Oil 
Republic of Congo Oil  
DRC Copper, cobalt, diamonds, gold, coltan*, 
coffee*, timber*, niobium*, cassiterite* 
Uranium, oil, minerals 
East Timor  Oil 
Indonesia/Aceh Oil  
Iraq/Kuwait Oil Oil 
Lebanon Hashish, heroin  
Liberia Iron, diamonds, timber, rubber, rugs  
Mozambique Hydropower, shrimps, ivory, timber Gas 
Papua New Guinea 
(Bouganville) 
Copper  
Peru Cocaine  
Philippines Timber, marijuana  
Senegal (Casamance) Marijuana  
Sierra Leone Diamonds, rutile, bauxite Diamonds 
Somalia Bananas, camels  
Sudan Oil, cattle, timber Oil, gold 
Turkey/Kurdistan Heroin  
Western Sahara Phosphates, oil**  
West Papua/Irian Jaya 
(Indonesia) 
Copper, timber Oil, hydropower 
 
Another way is to taxation of resource exploitation. The Taliban in Afghanistan, 
for example, were mainly associated to profit from the drugs trade through taxation and 
not through production or transportation. The prerequisite for taxation as a source of 
revenue for the Taliban in 1999 was the control of 97% of the territory in which opium 
was produced and the major transport routes. It is estimated that taxation of opium 
generated USD 45 million in 1999 and USD 27 million in 2000 – very modest amounts 
profits if compared to the potential profits involved in the drugs trade (Rubin 2000, 1795-
1796; UNODCCP 2001, 41). 
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 Futures contract is another tool to finance conflict through natural resources. 
These so called “booty futures” refer to “the sale or trade of future rights to natural 
resources that are not yet under the sellers control – resources that the seller hopes to 
capture in battle” (Ross 2005, 7 emphasis in the original). This strategy of fundraising has 
been used in the Congo Republic, Sierra Leone, Angola, the Democratic Republic of 
Congo, Liberia and Equatorial Guinea. Overall, booty futures fund weaker rebel groups – 
to cover their start-up financing – or government forces which are on the verge of defeat. 
In this way, futures contract can have an important effect on the initiation and 
perpetuation of conflict because they immediate revenues in times of desperation (Ross 
2005, 26-27).  
 
2.1.3. External assistance 
 
Most of the aforementioned methods of conflict financing are rooted in the control over 
territory and are hence domestic sources of financing. However, most of these domestic 
sources cannot be commercialized without the partnership of foreign actors. This 
partnership is based on commercial interests, profiteering or political aims and is 
associated with governments, Diasporas, humanitarian organizations and foreign 
companies.  
 The role of government funding was crucial during the Cold War (see Section 
1.3.3). The United States, for example, covertly supplied USD 3 billion to the Afghan 
Mujahideen and paid salary between USD 100 and 400 to about 80,000 and 150,000 
fighters (Naylor 2002, 52; Napolioni 2004, 109-110). In Nicaragua, the Reagan 
Administration supported a 2,000 strong insurgency force – the Contras – at the cost of 
USD 24 million (Napolioni 2004, 30). 
 However, the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina was a reminder that third party 
assistance is not exclusively related to the Cold War. The Croatian Defence Council, for 
example, received political and military aid from Germany, Italy, Austria and Hungary. 
The Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina received military and financial assistance from the 
United States and Saudi Arabia and Turkey (Kaldor 1999, 33, 46-48). 
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Another source of third-party funding is the support of Diasporas. While in most 
cases Diasporas are a source for good, individual members of a Diaspora can be a 
powerful force that sustains and encourages conflict in some cases. Diasporas often 
nurture a romanticized attachment to their country of origin. The material and financial 
support of diasporas tends to be more ideologically and politically extreme because they 
do not directly experience the effects of political instability and armed conflict (Collier et 
al 2003, 84-85). Examples of such Diasporas include the Lebanese Diaspora in West 
Africa which supported the Amal Militia in the Lebanese civil war and the Tamil 
Diaspora in Western Europe and Canada (Angoustures and Pascal 1996, 498-506; 
Gunaratna 2003).  
However, the role of Diaspora remittances in financing conflict must be qualified. 
The disposition of Diasporas towards their homeland differs from community to 
community depending on the circumstances under which emigration took place, the 
relative size of the Diaspora, the geographic concentration, its socioeconomic status and 
the citizenship policies of the host state. Moreover, Diaspora remittances can have an 
ambivalent effect on opportunity structures depending on who controls them (Ballentine 
2003, 263-264, 279).  
Humanitarian organizations can also contribute to conflict financing if the 
delivery of aid is taxed by those controlling a territory or if the goods provided are simply 
stolen and then re-sold by organized armed groups. In conflict situations, humanitarian 
aid is a valuable asset. Warlords and those in control of conflict may use humanitarian aid 
to supply their supporters at the expense of the enemy. They may also simply steal food 
aid, blankets, tents, communication equipment and cars and use it for their military 
objectives (Anderson 1999, 39). Based on the control of territory and populations, 
organised armed groups can generate revenue by requesting an access fee from 
humanitarian organisations. Moreover, organised armed groups may benefits from the 
presence of humanitarian organisations by using humanitarian sanctuaries to increase 
their protection, gain international recognition and facilitate access to resources (Rufin 
1996, 29; see Section 1.3.2.). Overall, aid has contributed to prolonging armed conflicts 
by enriching warlords, polarising existing enemies, distorting local economies, and 
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having distributional impacts. This led to a call to reconsider the provision of aid to 
conflict areas with the least possible level of harm (Anderson 1999, 37-53). 
Companies inject external financing by doing business in areas of conflicts. This 
may include bribing local governments or Warlords to exploit resources or gain access to 
markets. This may also imply paying for security by contracting a private military 
company or a rebel group to secure an area of exploitation (See Section 1.1.1.). 
Companies operate in a competitive market and the loss of an important area of current or 
future exploitation may preclude their ability to enter into the market after a conflict ends 
while rivals with fewer scruples can improve their market position. When De Beers 
retreated from Angola in 1999 in fear of a consumer backlash after the conflict diamond 
debate, its competitor Lev Leviev entered the market. This move gave Lev Leviev 
prospective control over Angola’s diamond reserves which had been estimated to be 10% 
of world diamond reserves and valued at USD 800 million Parker et al 2000; Roche 
2001).  
These competitive pressures make resource companies vulnerable to corruption 
which is exploited by organised armed groups who control areas of resource wealth. They 
can play off various companies against each other and secure the highest margin of rents 
with little consideration of sustainability. On the other hand, if companies are already 
present and have invested into a commercial infrastructure to extract resources, they are 
trapped in areas of conflict (Wennmann 2007b, 86). 
 
2.1.4. Other methods 
 
Finally, there is an amalgam of other methods of conflict financing including kidnapping, 
asset transfers from civilians, printing and forging money, landing fees, revenue from 
portfolio investments and profits from legitimate business. Ultimately, there is no limit to 
human ingenuity and viciousness and other methods of conflict financing may exist in 
individual cases.  
 Kidnapping has become increasingly important to conflict financing due to the 
increase in number of foreign actors involved in areas of conflict since the end of the 
Cold War. However, local people can also be affected. A virtual kidnapping industry has 
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emerged in Colombia with different groups specializing in the identification of funds 
potentially available from a family to pay ransom, the execution of the kidnapping event 
and the negotiation of the ransom. The groups specialized in kidnapping treat the hostage 
like a commodity that they can sell to the highest bidder who then recapitalizes by 
negotiating the ransom (McDermott 2003a).  
 Kidnapping has also contributed to the financing of insurgents in Iraq. One of the 
main targets have been foreign contractors from Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, Egypt and 
China as well as Iraqi middle classes. They have been more vulnerable to abduction 
because they could not afford protection. Abductions from Western European and 
American citizens are less frequent despite the wide media coverage. Kidnapping 
operations are conducted with a high level of organisation with criminal groups being 
subcontracted by insurgents. Each kidnap group includes about 20-30 people specialised 
in various aspects of kidnapping: target identification, planning, execution of abduction, 
guarding, and negotiation (Aaron 2005). 
 Also in Chechnya, Kidnapping has been a major source of conflict financing with 
an estimated total income of USD 200 million (Tishkov 2004, 114). The pervasiveness of 
kidnapping has been associated to the erosion of moral values in Chechnya, the 
increasing desperation with the ongoing war as well as a pre-existing culture of 
kidnapping (Ibid., 107-126). 
 To protect themselves against kidnapping, some companies and international 
organizations resort to purchasing ransom insurance for staff posted in countries with 
high rates of kidnapping (Collier et al 2003, 77-78). However, ransom insurance can be 
enormously counterproductive. If an organized armed group knows that its target is 
insured, this may further encourage kidnapping. Having the situation in Iraq and 
Afghanistan in mind, this is a rather undesirable prospect.  
 Asset transfers from civilians encompass looting, robbery, extortion, pillage and 
ransom payments. These methods can be an important way to reward, pay and motivate 
soldiers or be a part of a larger strategy for depopulating areas in order to more easily 
extract resources or establish ethnic homogeneity. Predation on civilians has been a major 
feature in Mozambique. In isolated regions, army commanders considered the area under 
their control as their private fiefdom and preyed on civilians. Soldiers engaged in mass 
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scale looting and the weapons became a means to securing a material life style which 
would have been impossible in a demilitarised environment (Weissman 1996, 332). 
Violent appropriation can also be part of the early stages of insurgency as well as provide 
start-up capital. Bank robberies, for example, provided important funding for the PLO in 
Palestine and the LTTE in Sri Lanka in their initial stages (Naylor 2002, 59).  
 Printing or forging money is yet another source of conflict financing. Colombia is 
reportedly the origin of 43% of the world’s counterfeit US Dollars with an estimated 
value of USD 10 million per month. Forgers operate in FARC controlled territory to 
avoid detection by the police. Counterfeit US Dollars are smuggled into the United States 
together with heroine (McDermott 2003b).   
 Landing fees are another source of conflict financing and affect all external actors 
who want to operate in an area that is controlled by anyone with authority. UNITA 
charged a landing fee of USD 2,000 to USD 5,000 per plane in the territory under its 
control and generated approximately USD 5 million from these fees between 1996 and 
1997 (UNSC 2000c). 
 Organized armed groups can also be involved in asset management, portfolio 
investment or legal business ventures. In the 1980s, the PLO was said to have made USD 
1 billion from direct investments in factories, real estate holdings, stocks and bonds 
(Naylor 2002, 78-79). In Sri Lanka, the LTTE increasingly invested in legitimate 
business in Asia after 2003 in order to reduce its dependence on the diaspora (Gunaratna 
2003, 210). This was a reaction to the increasing difficulty to mobilise resources though 
Diaspora after tighter anti-terrorist legislation in the United States and the United 
Kingdom (Samarasinghe 2003, 96-97). 
 
2.1.5. Potential revenue sources in post-conflict areas 
 
The previous paragraphs presented an inventory of various methods to finance conflict. In 
view of identifying the relationship between conflict financing and recurrence, the 
conceptual framework considers how these methods of conflict financing translate into 
post-conflict areas. When looking at a post-conflict setting, therefore, it is important to 
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identify the available revenue sources and compare them with the inventory of methods 
of conflict financing.  
The war in Angola illustrates how the control of revenue sources has been 
essential to renew the pre-existing conflict between the MPLA and UNITA. As both 
parties controlling independent sources of financing – UNITA  controlled the diamond 
producing areas in north-eastern Angola and MPLA the mainly off-shore oil reserves – 
initiatives to end the conflict have been trapped in a security dilemma in which the 
warring parties “have a strong incentive to seek resolution through a military defeat of the 
other” (Cilliers 2000b, 350-351). This dilemma contributed to the collapse of the 1991 
Bicesse Peace Accords and led to another 10 years of conflict with about 300,000 deaths, 
1,5 million IDPs and the erosion of state capacity (Le Billion 2005, 115). 
Understanding economic opportunities in post-conflict settings as potential 
methods of conflict financing provides a new perspective on supporting peacebuilding. 
Elements include, for example, the mapping of post-conflict economies according to 
economic opportunities and who controls them. However, controlling economic 
opportunities is not in itself an indicator of increased risk of conflict recurrence. What is 
important is who exerts control and if this actor has an incentive to use force to achieve a 
political, military or economic objective (Zartman 2005, 266, see also Section 1.1.4.).  
 
2.2. The cost to start and maintain armed conflict 
 
The brief review on the history of conflict financing in Chapter 1 established that the 
financing of conflict has been one of the primary concerns of states and rebel groups. The 
cost of the organisation and conduct of armed conflict contributed to the evolution of 
states in Europe and emphasised the development of institutions to administer the armed 
forces. Also for rebel groups, the cost of conflict is an important factor in relation to 
enlarging the rebel movement and expanding the territorial reach of combat activities. 
This section discusses the conceptual and empirical aspects of the cost of conflict before 
attempting to estimate the cost of conflict.    
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2.2.1. Conceptual and empirical aspects of the cost of armed conflict  
 
The ‘cost of conflict’ is commonly used to describe two different aspects of armed 
conflict. The first understanding of ‘cost of conflict’ makes reference to the cost of the 
effects of conflict; the second to the cost of organising the use of force. The former is 
concerned with the collateral economic impact of conflict including the economic 
consequences of a war, its effect on civilians and belligerents and the implications for 
local, regional or international economies (Steward and FitzGerald 2001). The latter is 
concerned with the cost to mobilise and maintain a military force or – in other words – 
the financial aspects of organising the use of armed force including budgeting and 
fundraising. This thesis is concerned with the latter understanding of the ‘cost of 
conflict’.  
 The separation between the cost of the effects of conflict and the cost of 
organising the use of force is not always made explicitly. For example, in the context of a 
comparison of the cost of conflict prevention and cost of peacekeeping after conflict, 
Brown and Rosecrance consider the ‘cost of conflict’ as the costly effects of conflicts 
which are born by foreign actors (Brown and Rosecrance 1999, 17-20). In contrast, in the 
context of a study of the incentive structures of insurgents, Collier considers the ‘cost of 
conflict’ as the cost of maintaining a military force (Collier et al 2003, 72-73).  
Looking at the cost of conflict from the perspective of organising the use of force, 
one must distinguish between yet another two dimensions: The cost to start and the cost 
to maintain armed conflict. The cost to start armed conflict means to have a battle ready 
military force with weapons, ammunition and other equipment, the logistics to deploy 
them to the battle field and – in the case of larger formations – an administration. The 
second dimension captures the cost of sustaining active combat including paying, 
supplying or replacing soldiers, weapons, ammunition and other materiel during combat.  
The main difference between these two dimensions is that the costs to start a 
conflict are relatively predictable while the cost to maintain a conflict are dynamic 
depending on the conflict intensity, the rate of replacement for soldiers and materiel and 
the development of prices for weapons, ammunition and other items during armed 
conflict. In this way, the cost to maintain armed conflict is disproportionately higher than 
  
115
the cost to start a conflict. In Kosovo, for example, the cost for an AK-47 increased 16.25 
times between spring 1997 and autumn 1998 (SAS 2002, 69; see Table 2.6). 
 The cost of the war in Iraq exemplifies the disproportionate cost of the 
maintenance of combat. Costs for the United States rose from USD 52 billion 
(2002/2003) to USD 77 billion (2003/2004) to USD 87 billion (2004/2005) to an 
supplemental budget of USD 102 billion (2005/2006) leading to a cumulative expenditure 
of about USD 320 billion USD (2002-2006) or the equivalent of the Gross Domestic 
Product of Belgium in 2005.27 The continued operations are expected to cost at least 
another USD 300 billion until the complete withdrawal of US troop. The occupation of 
Iraq and the global war on terror have been estimated to cost between USD 179 billion 
and USD 392 billion for the period 2005-2014 (CBO 2004, 12). If future cost for war 
veterans are added, the cost of the war in Iraq may even be between USD 750 and 1,270 
billion (NZZ 2006). 
 The costs for the war in Iraq are by all means extraordinary and exceptional. The 
high costs are driven by United States’ reliance on high-tech equipment and materiel and 
are occurring in the context of a long-term transformation of the military to create more 
flexible ground forces and expand the Marine Corps (IISS 2005, 37-38). Overall, 
however, the war in Iraq is an example that the maintenance of armed conflict can be a 
bottomless pit which is even difficult to finance for the richest country in the world.  
 In contrast to the maintenance of major conventional armed conflict like the one 
in Iraq, the maintenance of terrorist activities or asymmetric warfare is relatively 
inexpensive. The cost of the terror attacks in New York, Madrid and London illustrate 
this fact: The 9/11 attacks cost about USD 500,000, the Madrid train bombings about 
USD 10,000 (Buchanan 2006). The 7/7 London attacks were estimated by the official 
inquiry to amount about USD 15,000 (GBP 8,000) with the main cost elements being 
overseas trips, bomb making equipment, rent, car hire and travel within the United 
Kingdom (House of Commons 2006, 23).  
 However, one should not underestimate the cost of terrorism because the training 
and education of suicide bombers, for example, may be relatively small for each 
individual, but in order to have one successful suicide bomber one may need to train 
                                                 
27 See CIA World Factbook http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/be.html#Econ [07.06.2006]. 
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multiple individuals. Thus for each attack, the cost of all trained potential suicide 
attackers must be considered which increases the cost of terrorism.28 
 
2.2.2. Establishing cost drivers 
 
When attempting to understand the cost of conflict, it is important to consider the main 
cost drivers of organising the cost of conflict. National and insurgent defence budgets 
provide a reference point for the identification of cost drivers and the following 
paragraphs look at the defence budgets of the United States, Germany, the Kosovo 
Protection Force (KPC) and Forças Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC). 
While there is a tendency in the indices of defence budgets to only capture single digit 
figures without specifying line items, increasing transparency in budgeting facilitate 
identifying cost drivers. 
For the United States National Defence budget, the main expenditures are for 
personnel, operations and maintenance, procurement and research, development, training 
and education. Table 2.4 highlights that for the financial years 2004 and 2005, the biggest 
cost drivers were operations and maintenance with 40.3% and 37.0% respectively of the 
total defence budget, military personnel costs 24.7% and 25.1%, procurement 17.6% and 
20.0%, and research, development, and training 13.7% and 14.2%.  
  Table 2.4: Budget of United States Department of Defence, 2004-2005 
(IISS 2005, 37; IISS 2007, 19) 
 
Position 2004 
US million 
2004 
% of total 
2005 
US million 
2005 
% of total 
Military personnel 116,111 24.7 121,279 25.1 
Operations and maintenance 189,763 40.3 179,210 37.0 
Procurement 83,072 17.6 96,613 20.0 
Research, development, 
training & education 
64,641 13.7 68,826 14.2 
Military construction 6,137 1.3 7,260 1.5 
Family housing 3,829 0.8 4,106 0.8 
Revolving and management 
fund 
7,978 1.7 n/a n/a 
Other -521  6,637 1.4 
Total 471,011  483,926  
 
                                                 
28 The author is thanks Dr. Ranan Kuperman (Professor, School of Political Science, University of Haifa) 
for bringing this point to his attention. 
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Table 2.5: Estimated cost of the occupation of Iraq and the global war on terrorism 
for Fiscal Year 2005, USD billions (CBO 2004, 4) 
 
 Noble 
Eagle 
Enduring 
Freedom 
Iraqi 
Freedom 
Undistributed Total % of total 
Personnel 2.8 0.8 8.3 5.1 17.0 30.3 
Personnel support 0.6 0.3 2.0 2.3 5.2 9.3 
Operations support 0.4 2.6 21.2 0.2 24.4 43.5 
Transportation 0 0.9 3.6 0 4.5 8.0 
Classified and 
coalition support 
0 n/a n/a 5.0 5.0 8.9 
Total 3.8 4.6 35.1 12.7 56.1 100.0 
 
Notes:  Noble Eagle refers to domestic homely security 
missions undertaken by the Department of Defence after 
the events of 11 September 2001.  
Enduring Freedom includes military operations in and 
around Afghanistan.  
Iraqi Freedom includes operations in and around Iraq.  
Undistributed includes cost of mobilising reservists 
supporting various operations from the United States and 
the cost of maintaining the number of active-duty troops 
above current authorised levels.  
Personnel includes pay for reserve personnel, hazardous 
duty special payments and subsistence. 
Personnel support includes clothing, personal items and 
medical support.  
Operations support includes all incremental costs related 
to the operation and maintenance of air, land and sea 
forces (fuel, repair parts, equipment, communication, 
intelligence, replacement of munitions stocks and 
damaged equipment, depot maintenance for aircraft, tanks 
and ships).  
Transportation includes cost of moving personnel and 
equipment.  
N/A means not enough information to conduct estimation.  
% of total calculated by the author based on provided 
figures. 
 
Estimates of the cost of the Iraq war and the global war on terrorism underline the 
costliness of personnel and operations and maintenance (Table 2.5). For the financial year 
2005, the Congressional Budget Office estimated that the occupation of Iraq and the 
global war on terrorism would cost an additional USD 56.1 billion. USD 17 billion 
(30.3%) would be spent on personnel and USD 24.4 billion (43.5%) on operations 
support (CBO 2004, 2-4). 
 The defence budget of Germany highlights the cost drivers of personnel, 
administration and acquisitions. Out of an overall defence budget of USD 34.1 billion 
(EUR 26.6 billion) in 2005, USD 20.1 billion (EUR 15.7 billion – 58.9%) are spent on 
salaries, USD 3.6 billion (EUR 2.8 billion – 10.6%) on administration  and USD 10.4 
billion (EUR 8.1 billion – 30.5%) for defence acquisitions.29 USD 1,182.4 million (EUR 
925.1 million – 3.5%) and USD 259.4 million (EUR 203.0 million – 0.8%) respectively 
were earmarked for the maintenance of the air force and navy in 2005.30  
                                                 
29 See http://www.bundesfinanzministerium.de/bundeshaushalt2005/pdf/vorsp/zxubquea.pdf [07.06.2006]. 
30 For air force sees: http://www.bundesfinanzministerium.de/bundeshaushalt2005/pdf/epl14/s1419abs.pdf. 
For navy see: http://www.bundesfinanzministerium.de/bundeshaushalt2005/pdf/epl14/s1418abs.pdf 
[07.06.2006]. 
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 When looking at a smaller armed formation, the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC) 
also underlines the importance of personnel and operations budget. Out of the USD 50.1 
million (EUR 39.9 million) in 2003, USD 25.1 million (EUR 19.9 million – 50.0%) were 
earmarked for wages and salaries and USD 16.6 million (EUR 13.3 million – 33.1%) for 
goods and services.  
 The expenses for insurgency are more difficult to estimate because rebel groups 
usually do not publish their military budgets. One of the few armed groups where 
estimates on the cost of conflict exist is the FARC in Colombia. According to estimates 
of the Government of Colombia for the FARC’s annual income and expenditure in 2003, 
most expenses related to the production of cocaine and the maintenance of its armed 
conflict. These two positions amount to 38.6% and 36.5% respectively of total 
expenditure (McDermott 2005, 16). Other line items include weapons purchases, bribes 
and infiltration, alimentation weapons seizures, the quartermaster’s supply, petrol, 
desertions, and communication (see Table 2.6).  
 
Table 2.6: Selected annual expenditure and income of the FARC 
(McDermott 2005, 16) 
 
Expenditure USD million % of total 
Chemical precursors 108.9 38.6 
Elements expended during operations 100.0 36.5 
Weapons purchase 14.7 5.2 
Bribes and infiltration 12.2 4.3 
Alimentation 11.5 4.1 
Weapon seizures 7.2 2.5 
Quartermaster’s supply 5.1 1.8 
Petrol (for use in cocaine production) 4.5 1.6 
Desertion 3.9 1.4 
Communication 3.0 1.1 
Total 282.0  
  
 This brief review suggests that three cost drivers are particularly important: 
Personnel, operations and maintenance and procurement. Table 2.7 compares the main 
cost driver of the in military budgets of the United States, Germany, the KPC and the 
FARC. The centrality of personnel and operating cost is corroborated in an analysis of 
developing country defence budgets. In 20 developing country defence budgets operating 
and personnel costs dominate as cost drivers (see Table 2.8) (Ball 1988, 111).  
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Table 2.7: 
Main cost drivers in military budgets of the United States, Germany, the KPC and FARC 
(in percentages of the respective total budget) 
 
 USA (2004) 
(%) 
Germany (2005) 
(%) 
KPC (2003) 
(%) 
FARC (2003) 
(%) 
Personnel 24.7 58.9 50.0 n/a 
Operations and 
maintenance 
40.3 n/a 33.1 36.5 
Procurement 17.6 30.5 11.9 5.3 
 
Table 2.8: Preponderance of operating costs in security budgets  
in Brazil, Liberia and Sri Lanka, 1975-1977, % of total security expenditure 
(Ball 1988, 396-402) 
 
  1975 1976 1977 
Operating cost 84.3 83.5 84.1 Brazil 
Personnel cost 65.4 60.9 61.7 
Operating cost 92.1 91.8 95.1 Liberia 
Personnel cost 79.1 77.3 45.3 
Operating cost 84.9 92.2 90.9 Sri Lanka 
Personnel cost 55.8 59.2 60.5 
Note: Operating costs are composed of personnel costs and operations and maintenance costs.  
 
 As part of the cost driver of operations and maintenance, one cost factor should be 
particularly highlighted: The logistical cost of moving troops and equipment. These costs 
have become more pronounced considering the global reach of operations such as the war 
in Iraq or Afghanistan or United Nations peacekeeping. For the war in Iraq, the Pentagon 
awarded about USD 1 billion in 2004 to each North American Airlines and Federal 
Express to manage the transport for the military (Hartung and Berrian 2005). During the 
Afghanistan war in the 1980s, the United States paid USD 1.5 million per month to ship 
and store goods, equipment, clothes and food (Napolioni 2004, 109-110).  
 The logistical requirement for global military operations has led some countries to 
invest in strategic lift capabilities. The Ministry of National Defence of Canada, for 
example, announced in June 2006 that it would acquire 17 new tactical lift aircraft at an 
estimated cost of USD 8.3 billion (National Defence of Canada 2006). The cost of 
strategic lifts is also exemplified by an estimate that a strategic lift of 3000 troops with 
materiel within 24 hours cost at least USD 10 million. Due to the lack of transport planes 
in Europe, national armies resort to chartering commercial airplanes for their troop 
deployment. Prices increase when commercial carriers demand a risk premium to fly in 
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conflict areas.31 The centrality of strategic lifts is also exemplified by the United States 
operation in Afghanistan. The strategic lift implied was implied a landing frequency of 
one plane every ten minutes 24/7 for 6 weeks in one military base in Turkey.32 However, 
much money can be saved with pre-positioning troops to locations closer to the area of 
operation (Ghanmi and Shaw 2006). 
 When considering which cost drivers make conflict expensive, the evidence 
suggests that it is the salary of soldiers, the maintenance of operations and procurement. 
The following Section seeks to include these cost drivers into a tool to estimate the cost 
of conflict.  
  
2.2.3. Estimating the cost of armed conflict 
 
The previous Section suggests that the start and maintenance cost of armed conflict 
increases during combat and that there are a number of cost drivers in military budgets 
responsible for the greatest share within a military budget, including personnel, 
operations and maintenance, procurement and logistics. However, what should be borne 
in mind is that the level of accuracy of the figures or estimations is limited. The cost of 
armed conflict is difficult to estimate because data is sensitive, concealed or simply not 
publicly available. These problems of quantification give the rationale for using 
estimation techniques to develop an approximate understanding of the cost of armed 
conflict.  
 What follows is an attempt to estimate the cost of conflict based on cost 
estimating relationships (CERs). CERs are formulas that estimate the cost of an item or 
activity of one or more cost drivers. CERs are commonly used in project budget 
estimations and are part of parametric estimating techniques (DOD 1999). Overall, the 
CERs are inspired by parametric estimating techniques in the sense that they seek to 
estimate the overall cost of armed conflict, by factoring in different costs elements into 
one available data point.   
                                                 
31 Informal comment of conference participant Post-Conflict Peacebuilding: Towards a Comprehensive 
Approach in State and Institution Building, International Peace Academy, Diplomatic Academy Vienna, 
and Austrian National Defence Academy, Vienna 28-31 May 2006.  
32 Informal comment of Soldier of the United States Army, 4 January 2006. This frequency would imply 
864 landings in 6 weeks. 
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The objective of the estimation is to establish a minimum threshold to set up and 
maintain an organised armed group of about 1,000 soldiers for one year. The estimate 
focuses on an armed group which is only equipped with firearms because this type of 
organised armed group is the most common in contemporary conflict. The identification 
of a minimum threshold is important because it affects the incentive structure of an 
organised armed group to use armed force. The estimation of the cost of conflict therefore 
only includes conflict drivers which are an absolute necessity for an armed group: Men, 
weapons and ammunition. Costs of a conventional capability can be added by using 
estimates from arms deals or other prices for conventional equipment.  
 The estimation of the cost of armed conflict is separated into five CERs. The first 
two CERs estimate the start-up cost of conflict by using the price of small arms and 
ammunition to estimate the cost for weapons and ammunition. Start-up costs capture the 
cost of equipping an armed group at one point in time. Maintenance costs capture the 
expenses for the conduct of armed conflict over time. In case an armed group also has a 
conventional capability, data from secondary sources can be used to add estimates.  
 Three CERs estimate the cost of maintaining an armed conflict. Personnel cost are 
proxied by data for annual average male income compiled by the UNDP Human 
Development Report. Other costs like logistics, alimentation, medication and cloths are 
considered to be included in the estimation for salary. Essentially, the estimation for 
salaries captures how much a conflict organiser needs to spend per year to keep one 
soldier committed to fight by paying a salary as well as food, shelter and clothes. The 
CER for weapons during conflict is captured by the rate of weapons replacement and the 
price of small arms. The CER for ammunition in conflict is related to the Daily 
Ammunition Expenditure Rate (DAER) and the price of ammunition during conflict. The 
estimation of maintenance cost is separated into the cost for low, medium and high 
intensity conflict.33 
 Overall, the estimation on the cost of conflict will tend towards overestimations to 
account for expenses which go beyond the cost of firearms, ammunition and salaries (see 
Table 2.9). Table 2.15 provides an overview of all estimation formulas. 
                                                 
33 Conflict intensity refers to the intensity of fighting. For this thesis, the difference between conflict 
intensities is not measured by direct conflict deaths (like in the Uppsala Conflict Database) but by the rate 
of replacement for weapons and DAERs. See explanations on CER4 and CER5 below. 
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Table 2.9: Cost drivers of armed conflict 
 
Start-up cost Maintenance cost 
Cost driver Indicator Cost driver Indicator 
CER 1: Weapons Price of firearms CER 3: Personnel Average annual male 
salary 
CER 2: Ammunition Price of ammunition CER 4: Weapons Rate of replacement  
Price of firearms 
  CER 5: Ammunition Daily ammunition 
expenditure rate 
Price of ammunition 
 
CER 1: Weapons for the start-up of conflict 
 
The CER of weapons for the start-up of armed conflict depends on two aspects. The first 
is the quantities of firearms needed per person. In an organised armed group, never all 
members are active full time. Out of 910,000 active insurgents in 1999, about ¼ were 
active full-time while ¾ were active part-time as occasional fighters, support troops or 
militias (SAS 2001, 79-81). If active troops have two firearms and part time troops only 
one, this distribution of full-time and part-time insurgents result in a ratio of 1.25 firearms 
per soldier. This ratio rises to 1.5, if 75 light weapons (mortars, shoulder-fired weapons) 
per 1,000 insurgents are added.34 Light weapons are counted as three firearms due to their 
greater expense.35 This is a calculation for an insurgent group with a high soldier/weapon 
ratio. Experience from Mali and Uganda suggests that the soldier/weapons ratio can be 
about 10 to 1 or even 100/1 (Interview Pézard). 
Second, the CER for firearms depends on the price of a firearm. Most firearms in 
insurgencies are second hand with few new ones in circulation. They are usually firearms 
which remained from previous conflicts or firearms coming from other conflict areas 
(SAS 2002, 65-66). However, prices for the same firearm can vary very much depending 
on local conditions, tastes and market forces. For example the price of an AK-47 can be 
10 USD in Afghanistan, 100 USD in Nicaragua, 400 USD in Siberia, 1,200 USD in 
Bangladesh and 3,000 USD in the West Bank. The same is true if insurgents seek another 
                                                 
34 These figure are based on the following calcualtion for 1,000 insurgents: 500 firearms for 250 active 
troops + 750 firearms for 750 troops + the equivalent of 225 firearms calculated for 75 light weappons = 
1,475 firearms for 1,000 troops. Thus, a ratio of about 1,5 per soldier. This calcualtion is based on the 
estimation of small arms stocks of insurgent groups by the Small Arms Survey (SAS 2001, 80-81). 
35 Based on the average price of a AK-47 of 300 USD and an RPG7 of 800 USD (SAS 2003, 66,71). 
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firearm. An M16 starts at 100 USD in Somalia, but cost 2,000 USD in Saõ Paolo and 
even 10,000 USD in the Palestinian Territories (SAS 2002, 66-67). Thus, the price of a 
firearm depends largely on what type is used in combat and where it is purchased. In 
consequence, the cost range of firearms can vary very much. 
 Based on the ratio of firearms per person, the CER for firearms at the start of 
armed conflict can be established as follows: 
 
CER 1: Weapons = 1.5 firearms (F)  
           x Price per firearms (PF) 
           x Number of fighters (N)  =>  CER 1 = 1.5 F x PF x N 
 
      => CER 1 = 1.5 x PF x N 
 
This CER of the cost of firearms must be qualified in the sense that in conflict 
zones not all arms are acquired through legal or black markets. Weapons can also be 
acquired for free if they are supplied by a foreign sponsor. Moreover, an insurgency 
group can invest to buy some fireams and use them to steal additional firearms from 
military weapons storage facilities. This reduces the cost for weapons acquisition.. 
Weapon raids are a recurring feature in the early stages of an insurgency when attacks on 
weapons depots and bank robberies are part of a strategy to increase the military strength 
of an armed group (Naylor 2002, 45-47).  
 Bearing these limitations in mind, the cost of equipping 1,000 insurgents with an 
AK-47 can vary from 15,000 USD in Afghanistan to 4,5 USD million in the West Bank. 
If they were to chose an M16, cost rise to 150.000 USD in Somalia, 3 USD million in Saõ 
Paolo or 15 USD million in the Palestinian Territories. These figures lead to a simple 
conclusion: when weapons are expensive, the cost to start armed conflict is higher.  
 
CER 2: Ammunition for the start-up of conflict 
 
Another cost driver of armed conflict is the cost of ammunition. Ammunition is an 
essential part to conduct conflict: A firearm without ammunition is obsolete. Entire finds 
of weapons cachets have been abandoned during armed conflicts because of a lack of 
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ammunition. There are no estimates on global ammunition stocks but there are believed 
to be billions or trillions of individual rounds. Ukraine alone stores 2.5 million tonnes of 
ammunition and Russia designated 140 million rounds for destruction between 2002 and 
2005 (SAS 2005, 9). 
Similar to the CER of firearms, the CER of ammunition for the start-up of armed 
conflict depends on the quantities of firearms need and the price of firearms.  
Ammunition stockpiles of regular armed forces are related to the number of firearms and 
are not related to the amount of soldiers. Stockpiles estimates are usually confidential and 
relate to the constitutional mandate of the military, the force structure, the strategic 
concept of deployment and equipment levels (Greene 2006, 3). Thus, data varies from 
force to force. A US Marine, for example, uses about 950 rounds per year for training 
purposes and a gunner with a Squad Automatic Weapon uses 600 rounds per year 
(Cargile 2001, 27-28).  
For insurgent groups the picture is equally unclear. Combatants in Mali went into 
battle with 300 rounds per machine gun and 150 rounds per assault rifle. In Burundi, 
combatants used between 100 and 150 rounds per assault rifle (Pézard 2006, 136). Based 
on this data, the CER will assume a lower estimate of each firearm needing 100 rounds to 
start an armed conflict.  
As with firearms, prices for ammunition depend on demand and supply. Overall, 
prices for ammunition vary from a few US cents to several US dollars per round. Despite 
these minimal figures per round, the business of ammunition is substantial considering 
the total production of 13 billion rounds per year (Anders and Weidacher 2006, 52). The 
total export of the 28 largest ammunition exporters totals USD 620 million per year with 
the five top exporters being United States (USD 152 million), Italy (USD 48 million), 
Brazil (USD 39 million), Belgium (USD 38 million), and the United Kingdom (USD 37 
million) (Glatz 2006, 77-79).36  
Trends in prices for weapons and ammunitions tend not to be the same: 
Ammunition for the cheapest weapon is the most expensive (Bourne and Berkol 2006, 
108). But similar to firearm prices, the cost of ammunition varies from place to place. For 
                                                 
36 This data is used on COMTRADE statistics and uses the categories 939621 and 930630. All figures are 
annual averages for the period 1999-2003 (Glatz 2006, 72). 
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example, the price for ammunition for an assault rifle in the DRC 0.21 USD and in 
Burundi 0.29 USD in 2005. On a market in Mogadishu in Somalia, ammunition for a G3 
was 0.46 USD and for a M16 1.30 USD in March 2005. In Gaza, ammunition for an AK-
47 was 3.00 USD between late 2003 and early 2004 (Ibid., 108, 110). 
 Based on this discussion and on the ratio of firearms per person develop above, 
the CER for ammunition is as follows:  
 
CER 2:  Ammunition = 1.5 firearms (F)  
   x 100 rounds of ammunition (A)   
x Price per ammunition (PA) 
x Number of fighters (N)        =>  CER 2 = 1.5 F x 100A x PA x N  
 
    =>  CER 2 = 150 x PA x N 
 
Feeding the above figures on ammunition prices into this formula leads to suggest that 
the cost to equip a 1,000 men strong armed groups with ammunition to start an armed 
conflict is USD 31,500 in the DRC, USD 43,500 in Burundi, USD 69,000 for G3 
ammunition and USD 195,000 for M16 ammunition in Somalia, and USD 450,000 for 
AK-47 ammunition in Gaza.  
 
CER 3: Salaries for the maintenance of conflict 
 
Just having soldiers equipped and ready to attack at one point in time does not yet capture 
the cost of actually going into battle over time. In order to fight battles soldiers need to be 
paid. A proxy for the annual wages of soldiers is estimated by the figures of earned 
annual income produced by the UNDP’s Gender Related Development Index (GDI). The 
index includes estimations on earned annual incomes to identify the income differences 
between female and male incomes and in terms of purchasing power parities (PPP) in US 
Dollars. The estimation indicates a person’s capacity to earn income and is based on data 
of the ratio of female non-agricultural wage to male non-agricultural wage, male and 
female shares of the economically active population, total female and male population 
and GDP per capita (PPP USD) (UNDP 2006, 399). Estimates  on earned annual income 
have been included in the GDI since the Human Development Report (HDR) 2001.  
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Table 2.10: Estimated annual income for Angola, Georgia and Kosovo, 1999-2004 
 
Year Estimated earned annual income (PPP USD) 
 Angola Georgia Kosovo (Albania) 
 Female Male Female Male Female Male 
1999 … … … … 2,248 4,088 
2000 … … … … 2,487 4,488 
2001 … … 1,507 3,712 2,608 4,705 
2002 1,627 2,626 1,325 3,283 3,442 6,185 
2003 1,797 2,897 1,566 3,715 3,266 5,836 
2004 1,670 2,706 1,561 4,273 3,487 6,492 
Annual average  
2002-2004 1,698 2,743 1,484 3,757 3,398 6,171 
Source: UNDP 2001, 210-213; UNDP 2002, 222-225, UNDP 2003, 310-313; UNDP 2004a, 217-220; 
UNDP 2005a, 299-302; UNDP 2006, 363-366.  
 
 Figures for Angola have been available since 2002 and for Georgia since 2001. 
The HDR has no specific entry for Kosovo and figures for Albania have been taken.37 
Table 2.10 provides an overview of the estimated earned annual income for Angola, 
Georgia and Kosovo for 1999-2004. 
 Based on the HDR index for average annual male income the CER for salaries is 
as follows:  
 
CER 3: Salaries       =  Average annual male income (I)  
           x Number of fighters (N)              =>       CER 3 = I x N 
 
An important consideration to keep in mind when estimating the salary of belligerents is 
whether the leadership makes provisions to actually pay its fighters or if they externalise 
these costs by way of allowing soldiers to “earn” their salary through plundering 
civilians, extortion, racketeering or extracting lootable natural resources. Moreover, in 
ideologically based armed groups, fighters may even offer their services to fight for free 
given their belief in the cause of the fighting.  
 Nevertheless, even if soldiers fight for free, a conflict organiser will have a certain 
level of expenditure to keep each soldier fit to fight. These cost factors can include the 
                                                 
37 Other country proxies for Kosovo include Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia. However, 
Albania has the only range of figures without gaps. Bosnia and Herzegovina only has figures for 2003 and 
2004 and Macedonia for 2002, 2003 and 2004. Estimates for 2004 are slightly higher than those of Albania: 
Macedonia USD 4,286 (female), USD 8,943 (male); Bosnia and Herzegovina USD 5,568 (female), USD 
8,582 (male) (UNDP 2006, 363-366). Given the low economic development of Kosovo, the Author chose 
to include the lower estimate of Albania. The HDR has no figure Serbia.  
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provision of food, medication, shelter as well as clothes. In this sense the CER for 
salaries captures the expenses of a conflict organiser which must be made to keep one 
soldier ready to fight. This can include a salary which the soldier receives as a regular pay 
for services rendered or the cost of alimentation, medical care or other expenses.  
 
CER 4: Weapons for the maintenance of conflict 
 
Similar to the start-up cost for weapons, the CER of weapons for the maintenance of 
armed conflict depends on two aspects. The first is the rate of replacement of weapons 
which varies with levels of conflict intensity. Over time, weapons must be replaced 
because they suffer breakage or frame cracks from heavy use or deteriorate in quality 
through improper storage or maintenance. In order to take account of the need for 
weapons replacement during conflict the estimation of conflict assumes that if active full-
time insurgents in a low intensity conflict need one new firearm every year and part-time 
insurgents one new firearm every 10 years the ratio of firearm replacement per year is 
0.33.38  
 The rate of replacement rises with increasing conflict intensity. Thus, for an 
intermediate armed conflict, full-time insurgents may need 1.5 new firearms every year 
while part-time insurgents stay the same with one new firearm every 10 years. This leads 
to an annual replacement ratio of 0.45.39 For war, full-time insurgents may need two new 
firearms every year and part-time insurgent one new firearm ever 5 years, thus leading to 
an annual replacement ratio of 0.65.40  
 These ratios for weapon replacement are assumptions. Should case study material 
bring to light evidence on the real replacement rate of armed groups, the ratios can be 
adjusted to account for the reality in each specific theatre.  
                                                 
38 This ratio is based on 250 replacement firearms for full-time insurgents per year + 75 replacement 
firearms for part-time insurgents per year = 325 replacement firearms for 1,000 insurgents per year.  
39 The levels of conflict intensity are based on the Uppsala Conflict Data Project (Strand et al 2005, 10). 
The calculation for intermediate armed conflict is based on 375 replacement firearms for full-time 
insurgents (1.5 per insurgent) + 75 replacement firearms for part-time insurgents (0.1 per insurgent) = 450 
replacement firearms per year for 1,000 insurgents. 
40 The calculation for war is based on 500 replacement firearms for full-time insurgents (2 per insurgent) + 
150 replacement firearms for part-time insurgents (0.2 per insurgent) = 650 replacement firearms per year 
for 1,000 insurgents. 
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 The second aspect to consider establishing the cost of weapon for the maintenance 
of armed conflict is the price for weapons during armed conflict. In general, there are 
bottom prices for used firearms (between 35 USD and 40 USD per weapon for a used 
AK-47) as well as an average price in civilian markets (between 230 USD and 400 USD) 
(SAS 2002, 67). Research in the price development of weapons in armed conflicts 
suggests that prices rise sharply once a conflict starts (SAS 2002, 67-68). Prices are 
related to supply and demand but can be distorted through embargoes, high risk of 
transactions and corruption. The volatility of small arms prices is also reflected at the end 
of armed conflict when weapons lose their value (SAS 2002, 65).  
 
Table 2.11: Development of black market prices for AK-47 in Albania, 1997-1999 
(SAS 2002, 69) 
Period Price in USD Change to first period 
Spring 1997 40  
Winter 1997/1998 150 3.75 
Spring 1998 300 7.50 
Autumn 1998 650 16.25 
Autumn 1999 125 3.13 
  
The price development for an AK-47 in Albania is a potent example of the volatility of 
weapons prices (Table 2.11). The state collapse in Albania and the subsequent opening of 
weapons cachets led to relatively low prices around 40 USD. However, strong demand 
for weapons due to the conflict in Kosovo rapidly exhausted this large supply. In 
consequence, black market prices for an AK-47 in Albania increased from 40 USD to 300 
USD between spring 1997 and spring 1998, then peaked at 650 USD in autumn 1998 and 
decreased to 125 USD a year later when the Kosovo conflict terminated (SAS 2002, 69). 
This example shows that weapons prices increase multiple times in one year. In this 
specific case prices for an AK-47 increased 7.5 times in the first year of the conflict and 
peaked at 16.25 times. It also leads to suggest that the increase of prices is related to 
changes in the intensity of the conflict (SAS 2002, 69). 
 While these price developments include price peaks such as the one in Autumn 
1998, price developments suggests that prices for firearms increase during conflict. In 
order to establish CER of firearms for the maintenance of conflict, this thesis departs 
from the notion that prices not only increase because more materiel is needed with rising 
intensity but also because unit prices increase.  
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For the CER of firearms, it will be assumed that prices remain unchanged in the 
base year, but increase 1.5 times for medium intensity armed conflict and 3 times for high 
intensity conflict. These figures are based on the calculation of an average price of 
firearms of 250 USD which could potentially increase up to 750 USD in case of high 
intensity conflict. Taking this average base price, the CER seeks to avoid generalising 
price peaks. AK-47 prices, for example, can be as high as 2,400 USD in Kashmir or 
3,000 USD in Colombia and the Palestinian Territories. However, these prices derive 
from extreme supply constraint and thus the orientation around the average price (SAS 
2002, 66). 
These considerations lead to the following three CERs of firearms during low, 
medium and high intensity conflicts:41  
 
CERL 4: Weapons   =  0.33 firearms (F)  
                    x 1 x Price per firearms (PF) 
                      x Number of insurgents (N)    => CERL 4 = 0.33 F x (1 x PF) x N 
 
               => CERL 4 = 0.33 x PF x N 
 
CERM 4: Weapons   = 0.45 firearms (F)  
                     x 1.5 x Price per firearms (PF) 
                     x Number of insurgents (N)   => CERM 4 = 0.45 F x (1.5 x PF) x N 
 
               => CERM 4 = 0.675 x PF x N 
 
CERH 4: Weapons   = 0.65 firearms (F)  
                    x 3 x Price per firearms (PF) 
                    x Number of insurgents (N)    => CERH 4 = 0.65 F x (3 x PF) x N 
 
               => CERH 4 = 1.95 x PF x N 
 
Feeding price figures in these formulas, the CER for weapons for 1,000 soldiers 
during one year based on various prices of an AK-47 can range from 13,300 USD to 
990,000 USD in a low intensity conflict and 78,000 USD to USD 5.9 million in high 
intensity conflicts  (Table 2.12). 
 
                                                 
41 PF is the price of a firearm before the conflict started and the same as in the CER for the start of conflict.  
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Table 2.12: CER for weapons for one year conflict maintenance for 1,000 soldiers 
(SAS 2002, 66) 
 
 AK-47 prices in USD 
Intensity 40 
(Cambodia) 
250 
(Pakistan) 
1,200 
(Bangladesh) 
3,000 
(Colombia, West Bank) 
Low 13,300 82,500 396,000 990,000 
Medium  27,000 168,750 810,000 2,025,000 
High 78,000 487,500 2,340,000 5,850,000 
 
CER 5: Ammunition for the maintenance of conflict 
 
The equation for the CER of ammunition changes for the maintenance of armed conflict 
because more ammunition is need over time and for various levels of conflict intensity. In 
addition, prices increase with increasing demand for ammunition. During armed conflict 
ammunition is needed in great quantities to sustain armed conflict. The potentially rapid 
use of ammunition can lead to a shortage of ammunition supply which can result in a 
difficult strategic situation for an armed force. This is why ammunition is a valuable asset 
in combat leading in some cases to rationed distribution per combatant, training of most 
efficient use of ammunition and punishment in case of wastage (SAS 2005, 19).  
Ammunition shortages have contributed to changes in strategy by insurgency 
forces. In Liberia, for example, fighting de-escalated in late June 2003 when the rebel 
movement Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) was running out 
of ammunition. When it was re-supplied, fighting resumed on a higher level of intensity 
(Pézard 2006, 147). Engagements of the United States in Afghanistan and Iraq have 
contributed to the increase of ammunition demand from 730 million rounds in 2000 to 1.8 
billion in 2005 (Ibid., 138). 
 Concerning the rate of use of ammunition during combat, the little data that is 
available relates to regular armed forces. National ammunition stockpiles are calculated 
on the Daily Ammunition Expenditure Rate (DAER). A  DAER is “the amount of 
ammunition that a single equipment (…) will use in one day of combat at a certain 
intensity” (Wilkinson 2006, 237). Table 2.13 is an example of a DAER inspired by the 
British Military.  
 Table 2.13 leads to suggest that DAER is not calculated by year but by the 
number of combat days. Thus, a CER of ammunition needs to take note that combat is 
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not a constant feature. Thus, for the calculation of maintaining adequate levels of 
ammunition for one year, DAER for 30 days will used. Moreover, based on the above 
DAER, the amount of ammunition needed for intermediate armed conflict can be 
assumed to be 3 times higher in comparison to low intensity conflict and 6 times higher 
in the case of war.42 
 
Table 2.13: Example of Daily Ammunition Expenditure Rate calculation 
(Wilkinson 2006, 238) 
 
Equipment DAER No. of 
soldiers 
Days of 
combat 
Sustainability requirement 
 PSO GW/L GW/H   PSO GW/L GW/H 
Assault rifle 
(5.45 mm) 
20 60 120 600 30 360,000 1,080,000 2,160,000 
RPG 7 1 10 20 100 30 3,000 12,000 60,000 
PSO=Peace Support Operations. GW/L=General War Low Intensity. GW/H=General War High Intensity 
 
Prices for ammunition during conflict are as unclear as prices for firearms (see 
discussion of CER4). The price dynamics are believed to be similar to those of firearms 
in the sense that prices will be volatile during conflict, third parties can supply 
ammunition for free and the control of a smaller stock of ammunition can be used to 
appropriate more ammunition though the attack on government stockpiles.  
There is very little data on price development of ammunition during conflict. In 
Mogadishu in Somalia a 50 percent change in G3 ammunition was observed only in one 
month: Between May and June 2005 price rose from 0.45 USD to 0.64 USD. From 
March 2005 and March 2006 G3 ammunition prices changed from 0.46 USD to 0.82 
USD (Bourne and Berkol 2006, 108).  
Concerning the change of the unit price for ammunition, with in intensity, there is 
no data. The CER for ammunition will therefore use the same factors as the price 
development for weapons. Thus, the price of ammunitions remains unchanged for low 
intensity conflict and increases 1.5 times for medium intensity conflict and 3 times for 
high intensity conflict. Moreover, the consideration of the DAER per year needs to 
                                                 
42 This assumprions equates the three intensity levels with the three dimensions of the Uppsala Conflict 
Data Project (see Wallensteen et al 2005). 
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consider that different intensity levels also means increasing number of days of combat. 
For the calculation, the CER will consider one combat every four days (90 days).43  
 Thus, based on the above discussion the CER for ammunition during armed 
conflict is as follows:  
 
CERL 5: Ammunition = 1.5 firearms (F)  
  x 20 rounds of ammunition (A) 
 x 90 days of combat 
 x Price per round (PA) 
 x Number of insurgents (N) => CERL 5 = 1.5 F x 20A x 90 x PA x N 
 
     => CERL 5 = 2700 x PA x N 
 
CERM 5: Ammunition = 1.5 firearms (F)  
 x 60 rounds of ammunition (A) 
 x 90 days of combat 
 x 1.5 x Price per round (PA) 
 x Number of insurgents (N) => CERM 5 = 1.5 F x 60A x 90 x (1.5 x PA) x N 
 
     => CERM 5 = 12,150 x PA x N 
 
CERH 5: Ammunition = 1.5 firearms (F)  
 x 120 rounds of ammunition (A) 
 x 90 days of combat 
 x 3 x Price per round (PA) 
 x Number of insurgents (N) => CERH 5 = 1.5 F x 120 A x 90 x (3 x PA) x N 
 
     => CERH 5 = 48,600 x PA x N 
 
Using base figures for pre-war prices for ammunition of 0.2 USD, 0.5 USD and 
1.00 USD, the prices for ammunition are between USD 540,000 to USD 2.7 million for a 
low intensity conflict and between to USD 9.7 million and USD 48.6 million in a high 
intensity conflict (see Table 2.14).  
 These figures of the CER of ammunition illustrate that the cost of conflict 
increases exponentially during conflict because the ammunition needed for higher levels 
of intensity increases and at the same time the price increases with higher levels of 
conflict intensity. Thus, there is a twofold increase: One concerning the number of rounds 
needed, the other concerning the development of the price.  
                                                 
43 365 days :4 = 91.25 days rounded down to 90 days. 
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Table 2.14: CER for ammunition for one year conflict maintenance,  
various ammunitions prices in USD 
 
 USD USD USD 
Price per round 0.2 0.5 1.0 
CERL Ammunition 540,000 1,350,000 2,700,000 
CERM Ammunition 2,430,000 6,075,000 12,150,000 
CERH Ammunition 9,720,000 24,300,000 48,600,000 
 
2.2.4. Possibilities and limitations 
 
Table 2.15 presents an overview of CER formulas developed above. The possibilities 
with cost estimation based on CERs lie in providing for a rough estimate of what is the 
financial barrier-to-entry into an armed conflict as well as the cost of competition. In this 
way, the cost of conflict is part of the incentive structure of an organised armed group. If 
the cost to start-up and maintain a conflict are higher than what an organised group has in 
the war kitty, the cost of conflict can be an important disincentive to renew and armed 
conflict because it cannot afford to wage war.  
 Moreover, the CERs allow an estimate with relatively few data points. In order to 
develop estimations the data points needed are the price per firearms and round of 
ammunition and the average annual income to measure the maintenance cost per soldier. 
While the data emanating from conflict and post-conflict areas are usually unreliable, 
these data points can be collected through field research or specialised publications such 
as the Small Arms Survey for small arms prices or the HDR for annual average income.  
  The estimation technique is particularly relevant when estimating the cost of 
spoilers wanting to renew armed conflict. The framework can be adapted by changing the 
value of some of the parameters such as ratio of weapons per soldier, the rate of weapons 
replacement, the DAER, battle days, changes in weapons and ammunitions prices during 
armed conflict and the number of belligerents. In addition, it must be considered if 
spoilers need to buy all weapons or if they can be obtained for free from existing 
stockpiles or external support. Overall, the framework can produce bottom line 
estimations on the cost of spoiling which can then be compared with the estimated of 
available revenue sources. Should the spoiler also include a conventional military 
capability, the estimates can be amended with from secondary sources on the weapons 
imports or even the value of specific weapons deals.  
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Table 2.15: Overview of estimating the cost of conflict 
 
 CERs Composites Formula 
CER 1:  
Weapons 
1.5 firearms (F)  
x Price per firearm (PF)  
x Number of fighters (N) 
 
CER 1 = 1.5 x PF x N 
 
St
ar
t-u
p 
co
st
 
CER 2:   
Ammunition 
1.5 firearms (F)  
x 100 rounds of ammunition (A) 
x Price per ammunition (PA) 
x Number of fighters (N) 
 
CER 2 = 150 x PA x N 
 
CER 3:  
Salaries 
Annual male income (I) 
x Number of fighters (N) 
 
CER 3 = I x N 
CERL 4:  
Weapons 
 
0.33 firearms (F)  
x 1 x Price per firearm (PF) 
x Number of insurgents (N) 
 
CERL 4 = 0.33 x PF x N 
 
Lo
w
  i
nt
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CERL 5:  
Ammunition 
1.5 firearms (F)  
x 20 rounds of ammunition (A) 
x 90 days of combat 
x Price per round (PA) 
x Number of insurgents (N) 
 
CERL 5 = 2700 x PA x N 
 
CERM 4: 
Weapons 
 
0.45 firearms (F)  
x 1.5 x Price per firearm (PF) 
x Number of insurgents (N) 
 
CERM 4 = 0.675 x PF x N 
 
M
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m
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CERM 5: 
Ammunition 
1.5 firearms (F)  
x 120 rounds of ammunition (A) 
x 90 days of combat 
x 1.5 x Price per round (PA) 
x Number of insurgents (N) 
 
CERM 5 = 12,150 x PA x N 
 
CERH 4:  
Weapons 
0.65 firearms (F) 
x 3 x Price per firearm (PF) 
x Number of insurgents (N) 
 
CERH 4 = 1.95 x PF x N 
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CERH 5:  
Ammunition 
1.5 firearms (F)  
x 60 rounds of ammunition (A) 
x 90 days of combat 
x 3 x Price per round (PA) 
x Number of insurgents (N) 
 
CERH 5 = 48,600 x PA x N 
 
  
The next paragraphs conducts a thought experiment for low, medium and high cost 
estimations of conflict for the start-up and maintenance of armed conflict for an organised 
armed group of 1000 soldiers for 1 year. The experiment is based on cost factors for 
weapons, ammunition and salaries. For the low cost estimation the price per weapon is 40 
USD, the price per round of ammunition 0.05 USD and the annual salary 2,000 USD 
(167 USD per month or 5.5 USD per day). For the low medium cost estimation the price 
per weapon is 100 USD, the price per round of ammunition 0.1 USD and the annual 
salary 5,000 USD (417 USD per month or 13.7 USD per day). For the high cost 
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estimation the price per weapon is 250 USD, the price per round of ammunition 0.5 USD 
and the annual salary 10,000 USD (833 USD per month or 27.4 USD per day). 
 When feeding these cost factors through the formulas, various results on the start-
up and maintenance costs emerge (see Table 2.16). The figures for the start up cost 
highlight that it is relatively cheap to equip 1000 men with firearms and ammunition. 
Start-up costs have a lower bound of 67,500 USD and a high bound of 450,000 USD. 
These figures show that the barrier-to-entry to start an armed conflict can be low.  
 However, the cost of armed conflict increases when the first bullets are fired. The 
though experiment shows that the maintenance of an armed conflict has a lower bound of 
USD 2.1 million and a higher bound of USD 11.4 million. The maintenance of a medium 
intensity conflict has a lower bound of USD 2.6 million and a higher bound of 16.2 
million. The maintenance of a high intensity conflict has a lower bound of USD 4.5 
million and a higher bound of 34.8 million (see Table 2.16).  
 These estimates underline that the cost of maintaining armed conflict is 
disproportionately higher than to start an armed conflict. If considering the maintenance 
cost in the total cost of conflict, the barrier-to-entry to an armed conflict increases. These 
characteristics of the cost of conflict are validated by the rising defence expenditure for 
the war in Iraq (see Section 2.2.1.) and also – as the case study on Angola and Kosovo 
will show – for rebel groups which either overstretch their budgets through a 
conventional capability or face a stronger adversary. 
 The though experiment also shows that an increase in conflict intensity increases 
the cost of competition. In the low cost estimate the difference between the low and high 
intensity conflict USD 2.4 million; in the high cost estimate about USD 23.4 million. 
These figures indicate the potential of conflict escalation as a part of a strategy to increase 
the cost of conflict. The objective of the strategy is to increase the cost of competition to 
a level at which the adversary can no longer maintain operations.  
 The thought experiment also highlights that one of the most important cost driver 
is the cost of ammunition. This is because both quantities and prices of ammunitions 
increase during armed conflict. When focusing on the difference in the cost of 
competition related to ammunition prices, the figures show that a three-fold increase in 
the price of ammunition increases the cost of maintaining armed conflict by about one-
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third.44 In comparison, Table 2.16 shows that weapons only represent a much smaller part 
in the overall cost of conflict. Thus, raising the cost of competition by increasing 
ammunitions prices opens new opportunities for policy which seeks to reduce the supply 
of ammunition to areas of armed conflict.  
 In addition, paying salaries to soldiers is an important fix cost which raises the 
cost of competition. For low intensity conflicts it can be as high as 90 percent, for high 
intensity conflict about 35 percent of the total cost of conflict. The costs of standing 
armed forces are, therefore, an important barrier to entry. 
Certainly, the figures presented in Table 2.16 must be understood in the context of 
the assumptions built into the CERs and explained in detail in the previous Section. These 
assumptions include the following:  
 
• A ratio of 1.5 weapons per soldier; 
• A ratio of 100 ammunitions per soldier; 
• The armed group has no previous arms or 
ammunition stockpiles  
• The armed group does not receive arms or 
ammunition from external backers before 
the armed conflict; 
• Average annual earned income equals the 
salary and maintenance cost per soldier; 
• The rates of weapons replacements are 0.33 
for low, 0.45 for medium and 0.65 for high 
intensity armed conflict;  
• Weapons prices rise 1.5 times from a base 
period for medium and 3 times for high 
intensity armed conflict; 
 
• During one year, 90 days of combat 
activity take place; 
• No soldier dies in combat;  
• The DAER is 20 rounds per day per soldier 
for low, 60 for medium and 120 for high 
intensity armed conflict; 
• Ammunitions prices rise 1.5 times from a 
base period for medium and 3 times for 
high intensity armed conflict; and 
• Armed groups do not capture weapons and 
ammunition from the adversary or receive 
them from third parties for free during 
armed conflict.  
 
 
It is important to specify these assumptions because they can be changed should the 
information from a specific case suggest other ratios or price developments. In this way, 
the formulas remain flexible to better information should it become available.  
 Overall, however, one also has to consider the limits of the CERs and underline 
that they are merely rough estimations. Due to the lack of data, some key variables are 
                                                 
44 This figure has been calculated based on Table 2.16. The figure captures the difference in high intensity 
conflict between the cost of conflict if ammunition prices stay constant and if ammunition prices increase 3 
times. For the low cost estimate the difference in the maintenance cost is USD 1.6 million or 36% and for 
the high cost estimate USD 14.2 million or 41%. 
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difficult to generalise. The factor for the price development for firearms during armed 
conflict, for example, is inspired by the price development of firearms during the Kosovo 
conflict. The factor for the variations in number of ammunition needed in different levels 
of conflict intensity is based on the DAER inspired by the British Military. Should 
information on these issues in other conflict areas become available the formulas can be 
adapted. 
 Moreover, it is extremely difficult to forecast the price development of weapons 
and ammunition during armed conflict because it depends on many exogenous factors 
such as embargoes, external support, characteristics of terrain, or cross border 
sanctuaries. This is why a high variation remains likely.  
 These limitations, however, are part of the ambiguities of gathering information 
and data from areas of armed conflict. Data flows from conflict areas will always remain 
imprecise as they are usually generated as part of a political process or propaganda (see 
Introduction). In this context it is even more important to use data in areas where 
important data advances have been made over the last few years and seek to explore how 
this new data can be used to estimate the cost of conflict.  
This tool developed above suggests CERs to provide estimates of a minimum 
threshold to start-up and maintain an organised armed group of about 1,000 soldiers for 
one year. The formulas can be adjusted to the specific conditions of each conflict theatre 
and other line items, such as heavy weapons or logistics, can be added in individual cases 
and if they are part of the military operations and if data is available. The objective of the 
method is not to provide a precise estimation but to have a basic understanding of the 
financial requirements of an armed group to pay for the organisation of conflict. 
 The costs of conflict and the availability of revenue sources define the material 
environment of a conflict organiser. These two dimensions are the platform from which 
to assess if an organised armed group has enough money to pay for the type of armed 
conflict which it considers necessary to achieve its military, political or economic 
agendas. However, the material environment is just one aspect of making armed conflict 
recur. The incentives to use armed force – the expected benefits and opportunity costs of 
using armed force – also need to be considered to explore the risk of conflict recurrence.
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Table 2.16: Though experiment for low, medium and high cost estimates for armed conflict per 1000 soldiers and year 
 
   Low cost estimate, USD Medium cost estimate, USD High cost estimate, USD 
 Weapons  40 100 250 
 Ammunition  0.05 0.1 0.5 
 Income per soldier  2,000 5,000 10,000 
CER 1:  
Weapons 
1.5 firearms (F)  
x Price per firearm (PF)  
x Number of fighters (N) 
 
60,000 
 
150,000 
 
375,000 
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CER 2:   
Ammunition 
1.5 firearms (F)  
x 100 rounds of ammunition (A) 
x Price per ammunition (PA) 
x Number of fighters (N) 
 
7,500 
 
Total start-up 
cost 
 
67,500 
 
15,000 
 
Total start-up 
cost 
 
165,000 
 
75,000 
 
Total start-up 
cost 
 
450,000 
CER 3:  
Salaries 
Annual male income (I) 
x Number of fighters (N) 
 
2,000,000 
  
5,000,000 
  
10,000,000 
 
CERL 4:  
Weapons 
 
0.33 firearms (F)  
x 1 x Price per firearm (PF) 
x Number of insurgents (N) 
 
13,200 
 
33,000 
 
82,500 
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CERL 5:  
Ammunition 
 
1.5 firearms (F)  
x 20 rounds of ammunition (A) 
x 90 days of combat 
x Price per round (PA) 
x Number of insurgents (N) 
 
135,000 
 
Total 
maintenance 
(low intensity)* 
 
2,148,200 
 
270,000 
 
Total 
maintenance 
(low intensity)* 
 
5,303,000 
 
1,350,000 
 
Total 
maintenance 
(low intensity)* 
 
11,432,500 
CERM 4:  
Weapons 
0.45 firearms (F)  
x 1.5 x Price per firearm (PF) 
x Number of insurgents (N) 
 
27,000 
 
67,500 
 
168,750 
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CERM 5: 
Ammunition 
 
1.5 firearms (F)  
x 60 rounds of ammunition (A) 
x 90 days of combat 
x 1.5 x Price per round (PA) 
x Number of insurgents (N) 
 
607,500 
 
Total 
maintenance 
(medium intensity)* 
 
2,634,500 
 
1,215,000 
 
Total 
maintenance 
(medium intensity)* 
 
6,282,500 
 
6,075,000 
 
Total 
maintenance 
(medium intensity)* 
 
16,243,750 
CERH 4:  
Weapons 
 
0.65 firearms (F) 
x 3 x Price per firearm (PF) 
x Number of insurgents (N) 
 
78,000 
 
195,000 
 
487,500 
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CERH 5:  
Ammunition 
1.5 firearms (F)  
x 120 rounds of ammunition (A) 
x 90 days of combat 
x 3 x Price per round (PA) 
x Number of insurgents (N) 
 
2,430,000 
 
Total 
maintenance 
(high intensity)* 
 
4,508,000 
 
4,860,000 
 
Total 
maintenance 
(high intensity)* 
 
10,055,000 
 
24,300,000 
 
Total 
maintenance 
(high intensity)* 
 
34,787,500 
* Includes CER 3: Salaries 
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2.3. Expected future benefits and opportunity costs of using armed force 
 
The expected future benefits and opportunity costs of organised armed groups are the 
agency dimension of the conceptual framework to establish the relationship between 
conflict financing and recurrence. The previous two Parts elaborated the cost to start and 
maintain conflict and the available revenue sources to finance conflict. These two issues 
are concerned with the material environment of a conflict organiser to finance conflict. 
They establish the balance between resources needed and resources available to start and 
maintain armed conflict. This Part develops the incentives to using armed force by 
looking at the expected future benefits and opportunity costs of an organised armed group 
of using armed force. The Part will first look at the role of agency in conflict recurrence 
before exploring the expected future benefits and opportunity costs of using armed force 
and considering issues related to researchability.  
 
2.3.1 Agency and the recurrence of armed conflict 
 
A favourable material environment does not automatically lead to the origin of armed 
conflict. In a broader sense, the existence of objective conditions which increase the risk 
of armed conflict (weak states, parallel economies, poverty, grievances, etc.) are not in 
themselves enough to start conflict. It takes a conflict organiser to profit from the 
conditions and mobilise segments of a population or a small armed group to start a 
conflict. In the words of Zartman:  
 
 “[Poverty and state incapacity] are necessary but insufficient components in the 
 emergence of internal conflict. What is needed is some additional element that 
 pulls conflict cases out of pre-conflict conditions, a trigger that sets off the 
 reaction (…). Frequently the search for such an element has turned to aspects of 
 existing conditions, such as depth of poverty, or critical mass, or population 
 concentration. But these are merely dimensions of the basic conditions (…). 
 What is needed is some exogenous variable (…). One such an element is the 
 political entrepreneur. (…) It  takes a leadership agent to crystallize the subjective 
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 reactions to objective  conditions into conflict. It takes a pyromaniac to throw a 
 match into the social tinder heap (Zartman 2005, 266-267).”  
 
 The important aspect with agency is that leadership actors can affect the initiation, 
perpetuation and termination of armed conflict. In Sierra Leone, for example, the 
Liberian President Charles Taylor played a pivotal role in the initiation and perpetuation 
of the conflict. For Taylor, the war in Sierra Leone had three functions: To finance his 
own war machine with diamond proceeds from Sierra Leone, to shift excess NPFL 
fighter – who could have put his power in Liberia in jeopardy – to the diamond fields of 
Sierra Leone, and to use the RUF as an auxiliary armed force (Kandeh 2005, 100-101).  
 In Peru, Abimael Guzmán was the political entrepreneur behind the civil war. In 
the early stages of the conflict, he rallied a first generation of university students from 
rural areas behind a Marxist ideology and exploited the discontent in Peru’s rural areas 
after failed land reforms and a lack of credit opportunities and public investment into 
agriculture. During the insurgency, he became the central figure if the Shining Path and 
was perceived as a cult figure by his followers. His importance was underlined at the end 
of the conflict. When he was captured the insurgency rapidly disintegrated being left 
without its leader. A key element in the fight against the broad public appeal of Guzman 
was a targeted media campaign to tarnish his image as an infallible leader and demoralise 
his followers (Mc Clintock 2005, 56-58, 69-70).  
 In Angola, Jonas Savimbi was a political entrepreneur par excellence. His 
entrepreneurship was a talent to exploit opportunistic relationships. The failure of the 
MPLA to reach out to the Ovimbundu people gave Savimbi a core group of supporters 
which he mobilised by emphasising group grievances. Savimbi was key in the renewal of 
the conflict in 1992 when – after having secretly rearmed UNITA – he reneged on the 
1991 Bicesse Accord and started another decade of conflict which was to last until his 
death in 2002. The assassination of Jonas Savimbi was a key factor in the termination of 
the conflict because the organisational structure of UNITA was centralised. With the 
elimination of its leader, the organisation – which had already been weakened though 
government troops advances in the diamond fields – ultimately disintegrated (Le Billon 
2005, 125, 138). 
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 These examples highlight the capacity of leadership agents to affect the dynamics 
of armed conflict. With regard to the relationship between conflict financing and 
recurrence, one of the key issue is therefore weather the resolve of a leader is able to 
change the odds of an armed group over time: can the resolve and commitment of a group 
contribute to finding the resources to renew armed conflict over time? And are rich and 
committed rebel groups bound to continue fighting?  
 
2.3.2 Expected future benefits  
 
The expected future benefit of using armed force is particularly important for the 
recurrence of conflict. With the end of an armed conflict, incentive structures to use 
armed force change: A conflict organiser faces the decision if he wishes to participate in a 
peace process or return to conflict. In Angola, for example, Savimbi was offered the post 
of Minister for Mines and Natural Resources in the context of including him into the 
peace process as stipulated by the 1991 Bicesse Accords. A post-conflict situation can 
also include the “no war no peace” phenomenon in which the actors formally agreed to a 
cease-fire but the causes of the conflict remain unresolved like in Abkhazia, South 
Ossetia or Nagorno Karabakh. The literature on the Political Economy of Conflict has 
also highlighted that many conflicts are perpetuated for economic reasons. Conflict 
economies create vested interests which outlive the end of conflict and contribute to the 
persistent violent modes of appropriation and making business (see Section 1.1.2.).  
 Conflict organisers who decide to get back to conflict spoil a peace process. The 
spoiler problem is a reflection of a group having only a limited interest and commitment 
to a peace agreement because their benefit from using force is higher then participating in 
a peace process. Understanding the expected benefit from using armed force is, therefore, 
essential to work with spoilers for them to refrain from using force and either participate 
in a peace process or – at least – be content with an in-limbo situation in which 
alternative political solutions to a conflict can be explored.  
 The expected benefit of using armed force is related to a functional understanding 
of armed force. It highlights the instrumental and functional use of force and understands 
armed conflict as the organisation of the use of force on a larger scale. The use of armed 
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force is the result of rational actors who use force purposefully and according to political, 
economic or psychological functions (see Section 1.1.2.). The expected benefits of using 
armed force manifest themselves according to these functions (see Table 2.17). 
 
Table 2.17: Expected political, economic and psychological benefits of using armed force 
 
Political benefits Economic benefits Psychological benefits 
 
Exclusive control over territory 
Security of a defined social group 
Control/defence of the state 
Win against the enemy 
Gain recognition 
 
Capturing resources 
Maintaining livelihoods 
Corruption 
 
Revenge 
Personal aggrandizement  
Excitement  
 
 In political terms, the expected benefits of using armed force relate, for example, 
to establishing exclusive control over territory, ensuring the security of a defined social 
group, gaining or defending the control of the state or, ultimately, defeating the 
adversary. Using armed force can also be part of a strategy to gain recognition as a state 
or a distinct ethnic group by controlling territory and a population which may ultimately 
contribute to process of making states by making war (Tilly 1991). The use of armed 
force is therefore understood as the extension of politics by other means. A conflict 
organiser uses armed force as a strategy to achieve a political goal (Creveld 1991).  
 In economic terms, the expected benefit of using armed force relates to capturing 
resources by using armed force. Resource capture mainly relates to natural resources as 
their occurrence is geographically fixed. Section 1.1.4. highlighted that concentrated 
natural resources which are distant from the capital are particularly prone to capture by 
insurgent forces. However, also the capture of the state can have an economic rational if 
considering the availability of administrative resources, sovereign credits and loans as 
well as opportunities for corruption. Moreover, the expected benefit of using violence can 
be related to maintaining a life style which produces private profits. Conflict economies 
are often accompanied by a process in which armed force is used to appropriate resources 
through looting, extortion or pillage and the gun becomes a means of ensuring a 
livelihood. Thus, in economic terms, the expected benefit of using armed force is the 
continuation of economics by other means (Keen 1998, 11). 
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 In psychological terms, the expected benefit of using armed force is related to 
revenging previous killings or mistreatment or redressing perceived injustices. 
Particularly for conflict recurrence, the psychological dimension is important due to the 
legacies of previous conflict. In individual terms, the expected benefits of using armed 
force is related to a short-term perspective of seeking immediate restitution of injustice or 
seeking personal aggrandisement or excitement through heroism, torture or rape. In a 
broader social context, the psychological legacies of conflict can also be a ground on 
which to mobilise a society or group for renew armed conflict in the context of other 
political or economic objectives.  
 A key aspect of expected future benefits is that they are based on the perception of 
a conflict organiser or an organised armed group of their security and economic 
environment. It is thus important to understand if an organised armed group considers 
pursuing its objectives based on its understanding of the likelihood of success. This 
element of perception has an important implication for policy because it opens avenues 
for engaging actors by lowering the benefits from using armed force and increasing the 
opportunity cost of using armed force. 
 
2.3.3 Opportunity costs 
 
Opportunity cost is a concept derived from trade economics capturing the resources 
which have to be given up in order to produce more in the sector of comparative 
advantage (Pugal and Lindert 2000, 40). In terms of conflict recurrence, opportunity costs 
denote what a conflict organiser loses if he was to renew armed conflict.  
 In political terms, for example, the opportunity cost of using armed force can 
mean that a rebel group will never be recognised as a political movement. For instance, 
the PLO’s participation in the Oslo Peace Accords transformed the organisation from a 
terrorist group to a recognised political organisation. Other opportunity costs also include 
the inclusion of a former political entrepreneur in a power sharing agreement or gaining 
prestige through a governmental position. If the main actor is a state, other opportunity 
costs can be related to broader political agendas such as NATO or EU accession. The 
former played a particularly important role in Georgia as the case study shows.  
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 In economic terms, the opportunity cost of using armed force includes the forgone 
revenue from legitimate economic activities or foreign investment or the possibility to 
profit from development assistance. Opting for conflict recurrence also means that a 
conflict organiser cannot benefit from a potential pay-off when accepting a peace plan. 
 Opportunity costs in psychological terms are the consideration to be killed when 
conflict recurs, particularly if the renewal of conflict is fought at a higher level of 
intensity and with more sophisticated weaponry. It can also include the lost opportunity 
to receive an amnesty in the framework of a peace agreement (see Table 2.18).  
 
Table 2.18: Political and economic opportunity costs of using armed force 
 
Political opportunity cost Economic opportunity cost Psychological opportunity cost 
 
Recognition of rebel movement 
Prospect of NATO or EU 
accession 
Inclusion into power sharing 
arrangement 
Political posts in government 
 
Revenue from legitimate 
economic activities 
Foreign investment 
Development assistance 
Pay off for accepting peace 
agreement 
 
Death 
No amnesty 
 
  
 An important element with to regard to conflict recurrence is whether opportunity 
cost to using armed force can change the incentive structure of an conflict organiser with 
sufficient resources to start and maintain conflict to refrain from using force and seek its 
benefits in a post-conflict society. Similarly, it is important to understand if the lack of 
opportunity costs can encourage a conflict organiser maximise his expected benefits of 
using armed force.  
 
2.3.4 Researchability 
 
 Establishing the expected benefits of the opportunity costs of using armed force in 
real life is vague and problematic. In relation to the greed and grievance debate, Collier 
argued, for example, that leaders or rebel groups use a discourse of grievance to cloak 
their primary motivation of greed. If a researcher wants to find out the motivation of a 
rebel leader, the latter is unlikely to admit that he is motivated by greed because this 
would be counterproductive in terms of public relations and troop morale. Over time, the 
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discourse of grievance may even become part of a rebel leader’s identity and therefore 
make it even more difficult to identify the real motivation behind the recurrence of 
conflict (Collier 2000a, 92).  
 However, the difficulty to research the expected benefits and opportunity costs of 
using armed force should not prevent this aspect of conflict recurrence to be considered. 
Conflict organisers and spoilers are important actors in post-conflict zones which have to 
be reckoned and worked with as a peace agreement is designed, negotiated and 
implemented. The inherent difficulties of researching this aspect of the conceptual 
framework is therefore a reminder that armed conflict occurs in a context of imperfect 
information, uncertainty and deception and is often dependent on actors whose belief 
systems are marked by years of armed conflict. Understanding the motivation of those 
who were driving conflict in the past – and may have an interest to renew conflict in the 
future – is therefore an essential parallel to the material considerations of the cost to start 
and maintain armed conflict and the available revenues sources to start and maintain 
armed conflict.  
 
2.4. Hypotheses 
 
This Part establishes 16 hypotheses on the relationship between conflict financing and 
recurrence. The hypotheses are separated into two groups: The first specifies the 
hypotheses related to the propensity of armed groups to renew armed conflict; the second 
to the risk of conflict recurrence. This separation takes note of two different dimensions 
of conflict recurrence: The first is the inclination of an actor – an organised armed group 
– to use force and restart an armed conflict; the second is the likelihood of an event – 
conflict recurrence – to occur. 
 The hypotheses on the propensity of armed groups to renew armed conflict are 
structured by the relationship between the material environment of a conflict organiser 
(the comparison of the availability of revenue sources to finance armed conflict and the 
cost to start and maintain armed conflict) and the incentive of a conflict organiser to using 
armed force (the comparison of expected future benefits and the opportunity costs of 
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using armed force). Please refer to the explanations and Table 2.1. at the beginning of this 
Chapter for a complete overview of the conceptual framework. 
 Concerning the material environment, an armed group has either a surplus or 
shortage of revenue sources. In specific terms this means the following:  
 
• Surplus of revenue sources: The availability of revenue sources (RS) to finance 
conflict is higher than the cost to start and maintain armed conflict (C) (RS > C). 
• Shortage of revenue sources: The availability of revenue sources (RS) to finance 
conflict is lower than the cost to start and maintain armed conflict (C) (RS < C). 
  
The incentive of a conflict organiser to use armed force is based on the comparison 
between the expected future benefits and the opportunity costs of using armed force. This 
comparison leads to the following two situations: 
  
• High incentive to use armed force: The expected benefits (EB) are higher than the 
opportunity costs (OC) of using armed force (EB > OC). 
• Low incentive to use armed force: The expected benefits are lower than the 
opportunity costs of using armed force (EB < OC). 
 
 Relating the material enabling environment to organise armed conflict to the 
incentive to use armed force leads to the hypotheses on the propensity of an organised 
armed group to renew armed conflict summarised in Table 2.19.  
 
Table 2.19: Hypotheses on the propensity to renew armed conflict 
 
Material environment  
to organise armed conflict 
Incentive to use  
armed force 
Propensity  
to renew armed conflict 
1. Surplus of revenue sources (RS>C) High (EB>OC) High 
2. Surplus of revenue sources (RS>C) High (EB>OC) Low 
3. Surplus of revenue sources (RS>C) Low (EB<OC) High 
4. Surplus of revenue sources (RS>C) Low (EB<OC) Low 
5. Shortage of revenue sources (RS<C) High (EB>OC) High 
6. Shortage of revenue sources (RS<C) High (EB>OC) Low 
7. Shortage of revenue sources (RS<C) Low (EB<OC) High 
8. Shortage of revenue sources (RS<C) Low (EB<OC) Low 
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 These hypotheses are based on the assumption that the propensity of an organised 
armed group to renew armed conflict is located in the continuum between the 
combination of the surplus of revenue sources and high incentive to use armed force 
(highest propensity to renew armed conflict – Hypotheses 1) and the combination of a 
shortage of revenue sources and low incentive to use armed force (lowest propensity to 
renew armed conflict – Hypotheses 8). In this sense, Hypotheses 1 and 8 are 
straightforward scenarios. Hypothesis 2 and 7 are counter claims of Hypotheses 1 and 8 
and explore if the respective high and low propensity to renew armed conflict should 
really be taken for granted even if they are somewhat counterintuitive. 
 In between Hypotheses 1 and 8, there are various gradations of higher or lower 
propensity to renew armed conflict. However, the relationship between the material 
environment to organise armed conflict and the incentive to use armed force becomes 
ambivalent. For Hypotheses 3 and 4, for example, the key issue what factor determines 
the propensity to renew armed conflict. In Hypothesis 3, the surplus of revenue sources 
determines the propensity of conflict renewal, thus overriding the low incentive to use 
armed force. In Hypothesis 4, it is the low incentive to use armed force which determines 
the propensity to renew armed conflict and thus overrides the surplus of revenue sources 
as a determining factor. A similar rationale applies to Hypothesis 5 and 6 where the issue 
is whether the high incentive to use armed force overrides the shortage of revenue source 
– thus, leading to a higher propensity to renew armed conflict (Hypothesis 5) – or 
whether the shortage of revenue sources overrides the low incentive to use armed force 
leading to a lower propensity to renew armed conflict (Hypothesis 6). 
 These hypotheses lead to the overall question to be explored in the case studies:  
 
• Does the availability of revenue sources alone increase the propensity to renew armed 
conflict? Or, does the incentive to use force alone increase the propensity to renew 
armed conflict?  
• If it is a mixture of both, does the availability of revenue sources follow the incentive 
to use armed force? Or, does the incentive to use armed force follow the availability 
of revenue sources? In other words: Will a group that wants to wage war, find the 
money to do so? Or, if an organised armed group has enough money, will it 
automatically wage war? 
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 The risk of conflict recurrence is related to the propensities of different organised 
armed groups to renew armed conflict. Relating the high or low propensities of two 
belligerents to each other, the hypotheses summarised in Table 2.20 emerge.45 These 
hypotheses are separated into three groups. The first group is Hypotheses 9 and 10 in 
which both belligerents have a high propensity to renew armed conflict. However, it 
needs to be tested if this combination leads to a high or low risk of conflict recurrence.  
The second group is Hypotheses 11 to 14. Hypotheses 11 and 13 and 12 and 14 are 
essentially the same because they represent situation in which only one party has a high 
propensity to renew conflict which leads to either a high or low risk of conflict 
recurrence. The third group is Hypotheses 15 and 16 in which both belligerents have a 
low propensity to renew armed conflict. However, it needs to be tested if this 
combination leads to a high or low risk of conflict recurrence. 
 These hypotheses therefore lead to the following questions in the case studies: 
 
• Is conflict recurrence inevitable if both belligerents have a high propensity to renew 
armed conflict?  
• Is it enough that one party has a high propensity to renew armed conflict to increase 
the risk of conflict recurrence? 
• Do conflicts not recur if both belligerents have a low propensity to renew armed 
conflict? 
 
Table 2.20: Hypotheses on the risk of conflict recurrence 
 
 Actor A: Propensity  
to renew armed conflict 
Actor B: Propensity  
to renew armed conflict 
Risk 
of conflict recurrence  
9. High High High 
10. High High Low 
11. High Low High 
12. High Low Low 
13. Low High High 
14. Low High Low 
15. Low  Low High 
16 Low Low Low 
                                                 
45 The hypotheses are numbered as a continuation to the hypothesis of the propensity to renew armed 
conflict. This is to avoid confusion between the hypotheses. The choice of two belligerents was made 
because all case studies analysed in this thesis have only two principle belligerents. If more belligerents are 
added, the number of hypothesis increases.  
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2.5 Conclusion 
 
This Chapter elaborated the conceptual framework of the relationship between conflict 
financing and recurrence. The framework relates the material environment to organise 
armed conflict and the incentives of using armed force to each other. The material 
environment is defined by the availability of revenue sources to pay for the organisation 
of armed conflict and the cost to start and maintain armed conflict. In elaborating the 
material environment, the Chapter developed a comprehensive approach to conflict 
financing and a tool to estimate the cost of conflict. The incentive to using armed force is 
defined by the expected future benefits and opportunity costs of using armed force. The 
consideration of the propensity of conflict renewal of various actors leads to the high or 
low risk of conflict recurrence (see Table 2.1). Based on this conceptual framework, the 
Chapters presented 16 hypotheses on the propensity of an organised armed group to 
renew armed conflict and the risk of conflict recurrence. The conceptual framework 
highlights the importance of the functional use of armed force and understands armed 
conflict as the organisation of the use of force.  
 The conceptual framework is an novel approach to understanding the relationship 
between conflict financing and recurrence as well as conflict dynamics. It has been 
inspired by and developed in contrast to the C&H model and reduces rebel group bias and 
material determinism, broadens the notion of conflict financing, and includes the cost of 
armed conflict. The framework embeds a comprehensive approach to conflict financing, 
the cost of conflict and incentives of using armed force. This perspective also allows the 
consideration of barriers-to-entry and the cost of competition in conflict dynamics.  
 The conceptual framework also seeks to prepare the ground for policy 
considerations in post-conflict situations and helps identify effective policies to counter 
conflict financing. Potential ways of engagement point to strategies aiming at decreasing 
the availability of revenue sources and expected benefits of using armed force as well as 
increasing the cost of conflict and opportunity costs of using armed force (see Chapter 6). 
However, before further exploring policy implications, the conceptual framework must 
first be put to the test in the case studies on Angola, the Abkhazia conflict and Kosovo.  
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CHAPTER 3 
Angola 
 
This case study looks at the relationship between conflict financing and recurrence in the 
civil wars taking place in Angola from 1992 to 1994 and 1998 to 2002. Angola has 
experienced armed conflict since the resistance against colonial Portugal in 1961. Armed 
conflict continued beyond independence in 1975 between the main liberation movements 
and transformed into a Cold War proxy conflict of the superpowers, opposing the 
Movimento Popular de Libertaçao de Angola (MPLA) and União Nacional Para a 
Independência Total de Angola (UNITA). With the end of the Cold War, there was hope 
that Angola would benefit from a peace dividend after three decades of armed conflict. 
However, this hope was elusive as the antagonism between the two belligerents and their 
quest to control the state. What followed was another decade of armed conflict.  
 Conflict recurrence in Angola tragically highlights the consequences of renewed 
armed conflict and the failure of peace processes. The renewal of conflict in 1992 cost at 
least 300,000 deaths killing – nearly again the number of people who lost their lives since 
1975 (Hodges 2001, 15). Thus, rather then benefiting of its economic potentials including 
oil and diamonds, fertile agricultural lands, and rich fish stocks, the people of Angola 
were yet again drawn into armed conflict and saw Angola’s riches dissipate.  
 The case of Angola is insightful for the analysis of conflict financing and 
recurrence because both parties controlled an exclusive source of revenue:  MPLA 
financed itself through oil, UNITA through diamonds. In contrast to the next case studies 
on the Abkhazia and Kosovo conflict, this case study focuses on the role of natural 
resources in conflict recurrence as opposed to parallel economies in Abkhazia and 
diaspora financing in Kosovo. In addition, Angola is a case in which armed conflict 
recurred twice in the 1990s. Together with the onset of the war in Kosovo, the Angola 
case study develops a better understanding of the role of conflict financing from the 
perspective of actual conflict recurrence. In contrast, the Abkhazia case study and the 
post-conflict period in Kosovo look at the conflict financing/recurrence nexus in 
situations in which armed conflict did not recur.  
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 The case study on Angola highlights that the ability at various stages of the 
conflicts of either MPLA or UNITA to finance the escalation of conflict contributed to 
conflict recurrence. In addition, MPLA was able on two occasions – in 1993 and in 1999 
– to escalate the conflict to such an extent that UNITA could no longer cover the cost of 
competition. Moreover, the case study points out that conflict recurrence in Angola was 
dependent on the triangular relationship between money, weapons and logistics as well as 
the relative availability of revenue sources of MPLA and UNITA. Furthermore, the case 
study underlines that the relationship between conflict financing and recurrence varies 
depending on the management of revenue sources by organised armed groups during 
armed conflict. The natural characteristics of oil and diamonds gave MPLA a strategic 
advantage: Oil provided higher revenue sources and was geographically isolated and thus 
not vulnerable to attack; diamonds were scattered over large areas and difficult to control 
for UNITA.  
 The analysis of this Chapter is presented in four Parts. The first Part provides a 
brief overview of the background to the Angola conflict. It looks at the colonial war 
(1961-1974), the civil war during the Cold War (1975-1991), the conflict renewals of 
1992 and 1998, the post-war developments in Angola since 2002 and an overview of the 
role of oil and diamonds in Angola’s wars. The second Part analyses the relationship 
between conflict financing and recurrence for the conflict renewal of 1992 and the third 
Part does likewise for the conflict recurrence in 1998. Both parts apply the conceptual 
framework developed in Chapter 2 and look at the available revenue sources, the cost of 
conflict and the expected benefits and opportunity costs of UNITA and MPLA. The last 
Part looks at post-conflict Angola and seeks to identify the risk of conflict recurrence. It 
highlights the need for Security Sector Reform for the Government of Angola to establish 
control over the entire territory, establish a monopoly of violence and increase the start-
up cost for spoilers seeking to challenge the state. 
 
3.1. Background 
 
Angola is located on the Western coast of Southern Africa and borders the Democratic 
Republic of Congo (DRC) to the North and North-West, Zambia to the West, Namibia to 
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the South and the Atlantic Ocean to the East. Angola’s territory also includes the enclave 
of Cabinda which is north of the Congo River and surrounded by Congo-Brazzaville and 
the DRC. The overall territory of Angola is equal to that of France. Geographically, 
Angola is separated into a sparsely watered coastal plain which rises towards a central 
plateau. North-Western Angola and Cabinda are equatorial jungles and the Southern 
plains and coastal areas semi-arid. Angola’s ethnic structure is composed of three main 
groups: the Ovimbundu (37% living in the South Eastern Angola’s highland), the 
Kimbundu (25% living in the coastal areas and Luanda) and the Bakongo (13% living in 
the North towards the border with the DRC). Angola also includes 2% of mixed-race – 
so-called Mestiços – and other ethnicities in total representing 22% of the population 
(Chokwé, Nganguela, Herero, Ovambo) (USDS 2007). 
 Angola has experienced four periods of armed conflicts over the last 40 years. 
The first period took place between 1961 and 1974 when domestic political movements 
fought for independence from Portugal. Armed conflict continued between 1975 and 
1991 and set the national liberation movements against each other. The civil war 
characterised by the intervention of external powers during the Cold War and ended with 
the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the signature of Bicesse Accords of 1991. 
Nevertheless, civil war resumed from 1992 to 1994; and then again from 1998 to 2002. 
Since 2002, Angola has been recovering from decades of armed conflict and is on the 
road to post-conflict peacebuilding with the triple challenges to manage the transition to 
peace, economic development and democratic and transparent governance. This Part 
briefly explores each of these phases in order to provide a background for the analysis of 
the relationship between conflict financing and recurrence.  
 
3.1.1. The colonial war, 1961-1974 
 
The presence of Portugal in Angola goes back to 1482. From the early exploratory 
missions, Angola became increasingly important for Portugal’s slave trade. It is estimated 
that Portugal shipped about 11,000 slaves annually between 1500 and 1850 to the 
Americas totalling about 4 million (Henderson 1979, 94). Over the centuries, Portuguese 
colonialism was mainly implemented through indirect rule through traditional authorities. 
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Only after the 1885 Berlin Conference did Portugal shift to direct rule to establish 
territorial control (Ibid, 117). Henceforth, Portuguese colonialism became increasingly 
authoritarian and systematically exploited coffee and diamonds (Marcum 1969, 7).  
 Portuguese rule dominated the local population and was characterised by forced 
labour, commercial extortion, land alienation and forced cultivation. While the greatest 
part of the population was impoverished, a small number of assimilados – assimilated, 
Portuguese-speaking Angolans received work and education opportunities. However, 
independent private enterprise was forbidden to all Angolans, including the assimilados, 
and reserved for Portuguese settlers which numbered about 330,000 in the late 1950s 
(Messiant 1998, 134, 151). 
 With the beginning of decolonisation in Africa, Portuguese rule became 
increasingly criticised internationally. However, the regime of Antonio Salazar refused to 
decolonise. The colonies were an important element in defining Portugal’s nationalism 
and, particularly Angola, considered an important economic asset (Marcum 1969, 7). In 
1960, Angola exported nearly USD 50 million of coffee and more than USD 20 million 
in diamonds. Revenue from Angola even balanced Portugal’s budget deficit of USD 135 
million at the end of the 1950s (Ibid.; Henderson 1979, 141-144). 
 While Portugal managed to suppress the emergence of national movements in the 
early 1960s, smaller organisations formed in Angola and abroad and progressively led to 
the formation of three national independence movements. The first was the MPLA which 
represented the Kimbundu people, mestiços and intellectuals in Luanda and was driven 
by a Marxist ideology. The second was the UNITA based on the support of the 
Ovimbundu people of the central highlands. The third was the Frente Nacional de 
Libertação de Angola (FNLA) composed of Bakongo émigrés from Kinshasa, based in 
North-Western Angola and backed by Zaire’s President Mobutu Sese Seko (Hodges 
2001, 8-9; Balencie and La Grange 2001, 1092-1096).46 The appeal and power of the 
national liberation movements derived from their claims to represent their constituencies 
of relatively unified ethnic groups associated to their respective areas of settlement within 
Angola (Andresen Guimarães 2001, 198). 
                                                 
46 At the same time, a fourth movement – the Cabinda Enclave Liberation Front (FLEC) – emerged to fight 
for the secession of the Cabinda from Angola (Hodges 2001, 8-9). For a comprehensive analysis of the 
emergence of national resistance movements see Marcum 1969 and Henderson 1979. 
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 Despite these ethnic elements, however, the movements were essentially 
organised by Angolan elites which became dissatisfied with Portuguese domination 
(Messiant 1998, 134). Portugal was not able to accommodate Angolan national ambitions 
into the colonial system and therefore frustrated domestic demands for change. The lack 
of opportunities provided a large pool of frustrated Angolans which became the support 
base of the national liberation movements. Even the small Angolan elite with a privileged 
status was dissatisfied because Portugal’s assimilation policy did not live up to fulfilling 
their material and political expectations (Andresen Guimarães 2001, 15, 30). 
 With the end of the Salazar regime in Portugal and the reduced importance of 
Angola for Portuguese trade – the greatest part of which was then conducted with other 
European states – the national movements filled a power vacuum in 1974. The Alvor 
Accords of January 1975 marked the end of the transition to independence. They 
concluded the retreat of Portugal from Angola and previewed an independent coalition 
government composed of MPLA, UNITA and FNLA as well as a unified national army47 
(Le Billon 2001, 57-58; Vines 2004, 74). 
 The legacies of Portuguese colonialism on Angola have been an important 
element for the future evolution of the conflict. Authoritarianism rule and the suppression 
of Angolan civil and labour movements, a free press as well as public demonstrations and 
debate did not prepare the Angolan elites and population for political participation and 
self rule (Le Billion 2005, 114). In a sense, all national liberation movements sought to 
emulate a one-party system aiming at the exclusive control of the state, rather than 
exploring multi-party arrangement. The provision of a multi-party system could have 
mitigated the confrontations between the three movements but was not considered until 
the 1991 Bicesse Accords (Messiant 1998, 145; Kwamba et al 1999, 72).  
 In addition, the suppression and exploitation of the Angolan population 
undermined the development of productive capacities and skills. As all productive and 
business opportunities were controlled by Portuguese settlers, their departure created a 
void of managerial and technical capacity which few Angolans could fill. As a result, the 
                                                 
47 The national army was supposed to be composed of 24,000 soldiers from the Portuguese army and 8,000 
from each national liberation movement (Kwamba et al 1999, 73). 
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Angola economy experienced a structural crisis, the effects of which are still felt today 
(Hodges 2001, 10).  
 Furthermore, the behaviour of the Portuguese army did much to alienate the three 
independence movements from each other. The divisive rather than unifying policy 
reflected the attitude that the leadership of the Portuguese army did not believe in 
decolonisation and wanted to maintain a presence in Angola. They first supported 
UNITA against MPLA between 1966 and 1968 thus laying the foundation for the 
antagonisms between UNITA and MPLA which should remain a driving force of the 
conflict for another three decades (Malaquias 2007, 203).48 In 1974, the Portuguese army 
sought to reconcile UNITA and MPLA to create a front against FNLA. After the Alvor 
Accords, however, it sided with MPLA and expelled FNLA and UNITA forces from 
Luanda on 14 May 1975 (Kwamba et al 1999, 66).  
 
3.1.2. Civil war, 1975-1991 
 
After the Alvor Accords, Angola rapidly returned to armed conflict. The renewal of 
conflict has been associated to the clashing interests of the MPLA, the FNLA and UNITA 
of establishing exclusive control over the state through a one-party system: “The Angolan 
conflict appears mainly as a struggle between various elites for hegemony, in which each 
maximised its potential and constructed its identity to gain legitimacy in leading the 
Angolan people” (Messiant 1998, 139; see also Kambwa 1999, 63-65). The international 
environment of the Cold War added to the competition of the national liberation 
movements as each superpower provided support along ideological lines (Kambwa 1999, 
73). 
 The fighting of 1975 and 1976 led to a situation in which the MPLA established 
control over the Government and the capital Luanda, UNITA became entrenched in 
Southern and North-Eastern Angola. The FNLA disappeared as a political and military 
organisation partly because Mobutu no longer supported the movement to construct better 
                                                 
48 In 1966, UNITA was close to extinction after a series of attacks led to the decimation of half of its 
soldiers (600 out of 1,200 men). The Portuguese army supported UNITA in order to prevent further attacks 
on strategic targets – such as the Benguela railway – and to weaken MPLA, leaving the perplex situation 
that a national liberation movement did in fact receive support from the Colonial power (Malaquias 2007, 
2003). 
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relations with the MPLA Government, partly because of the autocratic and parochial 
leadership of Holden Roberto (Messiant 1998, 146). The MPLA and UNITA, and their 
respective leaders Eduardo dos Santos and Jonas Savimbi, became the main protagonists 
of the conflict until the death of Savimbi in 2002. 
 The involvement of external actors has been an important feature of Angola’s 
transition to independence and civil war. While the involvement was part of superpower 
politics of the Cold War, external involvement also evolved in the context of domestic 
development in Angola. MPLA viewed Angola’s long term security linked to the creation 
of a friendlier regional environment. In consequence, MPLA became involved in the 
politics of its neighbours supporting the African National Congress (ANC) in South 
Africa, the South West Africa People’s Organisation (SWAPO) in Namibia and the Front 
National pour la Libération du Congo (FNLC) in Zaire. In response, South Africa and 
Zaire supported UNITA to weaken the MPLA Government. South Africa supported 
UNITA military and conducted 12 major operations between 1976 and 1988. The United 
States became involved in Angola to support Mobuto Sese Seko in Zaire after MPLA 
conducted two invasions into Zaire with the objective to topple Mobuto. Cuba and the 
Soviet Union supported MPLA for its ideological orientation and Angola’s resource 
wealth (Malaquias 2007, 204).  
 The United States increased its engagement with Angola after the repeal of the 
Clark Amendment in 1985.49 US Angola policy was part of a larger strategy to limit 
access to resources for the Soviet Union in Third World countries (Hodges 2001, 11). US 
involvement prompted large arms transfers from the Soviet Union to MPLA and the 
deployment of 50,000 Cuban troops. However, US support for UNITA was judged far 
inferior to that of the Soviet Union to MPLA. The latter was estimated to amount to 
between USD 5 or 6 billion, the equivalent of Angola’s foreign debt to the Soviet Union 
(Balencie and La Grange 2001, 1089, fn.19; Wills 2002, 2). 
 Despite the engagement of foreign actors, the civil war cannot be understood only 
as the outcome of third-party interests. The civil war also took place in the context of a 
power struggle between the three national movements for the control of the state after the 
                                                 
49 With the Clark Amendment of 1975, the United States Congress ended the United States’ assistance to 
UNITA due to pressures to reduce the support to rebel groups after the Vietnam War (Hodges 2001, 10). 
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end of Portuguese rule. External actors were important, but not the exclusive factors of 
the war: “It was a dynamic relationship in which parties to the domestic struggle for 
power looked outward to foreign backers, whose intervention, in turn, served to heed the 
internal conflict (…)”(Andresen Guimarães 2001, 197).  
 Nevertheless, the dynamics of the Angolan civil war changed with the 
transformation of its external environment at the end of the 1980s. Under Gorbachev, the 
Soviet Union distanced itself from supporting wars in Third World countries, including 
Angola. Also South Africa wanted to reduce its losses in Angola and get out of a military 
stalemate in the battlefield as well as find a peaceful solution for Namibia. These 
developments culminated in the 1988 New York Accords under which Cuban and South 
African forces committed themselves to withdraw from Angola (Kwamba et al 1999, 69; 
Hodges 2001, 11-12).  
 These systemic transformations also influenced Angolan politics. Towards the 
end of the 1980s, Angola changed from a planning to a market economy. This change 
was motivated by the poor economic performance of the socialist economic system and 
class interests of the leading Luanda families constrained by state control of the economy. 
Evidence of political and economic reforms included a general economic reform 
programme in 1987 and the abandonment of the one-party system in 1990. The transition 
to market economy increase opportunities for cronyism and self-enrichment (Hodges 
2001, 12). 
 With the end of the Cold War, 30 years of armed conflict in Angola were hoped to 
terminate with the Bicesse Accords of May 1991. The Accords provided for a ceasefire, 
the quartering of UNITA troops, the formation of new unified armed forces of 50,000 
soldiers composed of UNITA and MPLA soldiers, the demobilisation surplus troops,50 
the restoration of Government administration in areas controlled by UNITA, and multi-
party and presidential elections. The agreement was overseen by Portugal the United 
States, the Soviet Union and the United Nations (Vines 2004, 78; Hodges 2001, 13-14).   
 However, the implementation of the Bicesse Accord had many shortcomings. 
Given the magnitude of the task (demobilisation of combatants, deep distrust between 
                                                 
50 Overall UNITA and MPLA were estimated to have 65,000 respectively 127,000 soldiers. With creation a 
joint army of 50,000, demobilising surplus troops meant demobilising 142,000 soldiers (Vines 2004, 78).  
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MPLA and UNITA, shattered infrastructure) the United Nations Angola Verification 
Mission II (UNAVEM II) was insufficiently resourced and its time frame of 16 months 
too short. Moreover, elections were not conditional on the fulfilment of demobilisation 
and the creation of a unified army (Vines 2004, 78). Furthermore, the lack of a power-
sharing mechanism led to a “winner takes it all” approach without considering the 
consequences for the losing party. This approach was counterproductive for trust building 
and increased the polarisation between UNITA and MPLA as well as to an “ethnicisation 
of political choice” (Messsiant 1998, 162). 
 
3.1.3. Renewed armed conflict, 1992-1994 
 
The failure of the Bicesse Accords saw the recurrence of conflict in the period 1992-
1994. This period started with Savimbi’s refusal to accept the results of the presidential 
elections of 1992 and ends with the Lusaka Protocols of 31 October 1994.  
 Savimbi lost the elections to his opponent Dos Santos by 40% to 49.6%. Shortly 
after, UNITA and MPLA resumed armed hostilities. During the Bicesse process, UNITA 
had rearmed itself through the revenue from diamonds. After losing the support of the 
United States and South Africa, UNITA transformed itself into a self-financing army. It 
was then militarily superior to the Forças Armadas Angolanas (FAA)51 which had not 
modernised since 1988 and was in fact demobilising as previewed under the Bicesse 
Accords (Balencie and La Grange 2001, 1078). Based on its military superiority, UNITA 
established control over most parts of the territory including the strategically important 
cities of Huambo, Cafunfo, and N’Daldando. Particularly important was the capture of 
the alluvial diamond mines in Northern and Southern Luanda and the Cuando Valley 
which gave UNITA a quasi-monopoly on Angola’s diamond exploitation between late 
1993 and 1998 and the resources to buy more weapons (Dietrich 2000, 275).  
UNITA’s resumption of war further deepened the distrust between Savimbi and 
Dos Santos. The Government of Angola was exposed to the effects of neglecting its 
armed forces and used the enlarged control over petrol resources to acquire a new and 
expanded military capability. However, UNITA was a victim of its success. The 
                                                 
51 The FAA was the newly named national army of Angola composed of MPLA soldiers.  
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requirements to control and administer the towns and cities overstretched and 
overextended the armed group (Vines 2004, 75). As of mid-1994, FAA engaged in a 
number of counter-strikes with its newly created anti-guerrilla units. UNITA retreated to 
the hinterland after losing territory and was keen to sign the Lusaka Protocols. 
The Lusaka Peace Process built on the lessons of the Bicesse Accords and 
previewed a demobilisation before elections and a transitional period including power 
sharing provisions. Other key provisions were a ceasefire, the integration of UNITA 
generals and soldiers into the FAA, demobilisation under United Nations supervision, 
incorporation of UNITA into the national police force, and the creation of a Government 
of National Unity (Vines 2004, 81). The peace process included the political participation 
of UNITA which received seats in Parliament and Government positions. UNITA also 
agreed to withdraw from areas under its control. By 1998, the Government of Angola was 
in control of 90% of the territory. UNITA had returned 272 out of 335 occupied locations 
(Balencie and La Grange 2001, 1079). 
Despite these positive developments, the implementation of the Lusaka Protocols 
was confronted with serious challenges. There were long delays in quartering UNITA 
troops and handing-in heavy weapons. Ultimately, the two parties had no confidence in 
the peace process. Localised military incidents multiplied towards 1998. The peace 
process was further weakened when the Head of United Nations Observer Mission in 
Angola (MONUA), Alioune Blondin Beye, died in a plane crash (Hodges 2001, 16). 
 
3.1.4. Armed conflict renewed again, 1998-2002 
 
The second resumption of hostilities in Angola occurred from 1998 to 2002. It started 
with the resumption of Government offensives in November 1998 and ended with the 
signature of a Ceasefire Agreement on 4 April 2002.  
 UNITA’s intransigence to abide by the Lusaka Peace Process exhausted the 
patience of the Government of Angola. At the 4th MPLA Party Congress in late 1998, 
Dos Santos called an end to the Lusaka Peace Process and for MONUA’s withdrawal 
after UNITA repeatedly demonstrated its unwillingness to hand over all locations under 
its control as stipulated by the Lusaka Peace Accords (Hodges 2001, 16-17).  
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UNITA also exhausted the patience of the international community. Already since 
1993, the United Nations had levied sanctions on UNITA. UNSC Resolution 864 (15 
September 1993) imposed an arms and petroleum embargo against UNITA. Resolution 
1127 (28 August 1997) imposed a travel ban for senior UNITA officials and prohibited 
flights to and from UNITA-controlled territory. It also imposed diplomatic sanctions 
demanding the closure of all UNITA offices abroad. Resolution 1173 (12 June 1998) 
levied an embargo on diamonds, froze UNITA’s financial assets and banned all financial 
transaction with UNITA. MONUA was closed down when fighting escalated in 1998 and 
1999 and after UNITA shot down two planes of the United Nations (Cortright and Lopez 
2000, 153-154). The UNSC Monitoring Mechanism on sanction against UNITA 
produced detailed reports on the busting of sanctions and ‘named and shamed’ 
individuals and companies involved therein (UNSC 2002, 2001c, 2000a, 2000c). Overall, 
the engagement of the United Nations highlighted that there was an international front 
against UNTA and in support of the Government of Angola (Herbst 2000, 271).  
Armed conflict restarted in November 1998 when the government started a major 
offensive to recapture the diamond centre of Bailundo (Northern Huambo). It initially 
suffered great defeats against a strong UNITA. However, the FAA regrouped and started 
three major offensives in 1999 which allegedly destroying 80% of UNITA’s conventional 
military capacity (Balencie and La Grange 2001, 1083-1084). As a result, UNITA was 
weakened in its military capacity as evidenced by its change in military tactics from 
semi-conventional to guerrilla warfare. UNITA was no longer capable of subjecting cities 
to prolonged sieges or seizure. The FAA offensive also affected the organisational 
structure of UNITA with desertion increasing, a loss of confidence of its followers and 
the creation of a splinter party, the UNITA-Renovada (Hodges 2001, 17).  
After the assassination of Jonas Savimbi by Government Special Forces on 22 
February 2002, UNITA disintegrated. UNITA ceased to be a military force and 
transformed into an opposition party (Kibble 2006, 530). A nation-wide cease-fire came 
into effect on 4 April 2002 ending the last phase of over a generation of armed conflict.  
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3.1.5. Post-conflict Angola, 2002-2006 
 
After more than 40 years of conflict, Angola faces a triple transition: From war to peace, 
from devastation to reconstruction, and from a political patronage system to democratic 
and transparent governance (Kibble 2006, 525).  
 The wars had a very heavy toll on Angola. It is estimated that out of a total 
population of 12 million, approximately 500,000 people were killed and 25% of the 
population were displaced as a result or in consequence of war (Seybolt 2001, 20). By 
1991, the war had cost the lives of between 100,000 and 350,000 people (Vines 2004, 
74). The recurrence of conflict in 1992-1994 cost at least another 300,000 deaths. Most 
conflict deaths were civilians who died through combat operations, bombardments of 
civilian areas, landmine incidents or malnutrition (Hodges 2001, 15). This human toll 
underlines the terrible consequences of renewed armed conflict. 
The transition from war to peace is a monumental challenge of peacebuilding. 
About 80,000 UNITA soldiers and 33,000 FFA troops must be demobilised and 
reintegrated into Angolan society. In addition, around 360,000 of UNITA family 
members must be reintegrated and 4 million IDPs need to be resettled (Gomes Porto and 
Parsons 2003, 7-8). There have been indications that the Government did not allow 
enough time for demobilisation to be implemented effectively. Demobilisation was 
organised ad hoc and quartering sites were closed too early leaving ex-combatants with 
too little attention and assistance. Moreover, DDR programmes did not foresee the 
disarmament of civilians (Hitchcock 2004, 38-40). Disarmament remains, therefore, a 
major challenge with between 1.5 million and 4 million small arms in circulation. Rising 
crime rates provide a disincentive to civilian disarmament and contributed to the 
emergence of private security companies (Ferreira 2005, 518; IRIN 2006). 
The task of reconstruction is equally challenging as Angola’s social and economic 
infrastructure has been nearly entirely destroyed after decades of armed conflict. Life 
expectancy at birth is 43 years, the combined first-, second-, and third-level gross 
enrolment ratio is at 23%, 43% of the population is malnourished, there are 8 doctors for 
every 100,000 people. Angola is ranked place 146 in the Human Development Index 
(UNDP 2001a, 143, 160, 164). The war left Angola socially dislocated: In the times of 
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war, “survival meant fighting, violence, a disintegration of solidarity and a generalised 
culture of pillage” which finds its post-war manifestation in rising crime rates (Messiant 
1998, 163).  
Major infrastructure repairs have been started with oil-backed loans from Chinese 
banks. Overall, China and Angola agreed that the former would provide infrastructure 
development, transmission line equipment, agricultural assistance and local rail networks 
as well as rebuilt government buildings and improve energy supplies. However, there 
have been reservations on Chinese involvement because local companies have received 
few concessions. However, great challenges remain: A fragmented national economy, a 
history of corruption and embezzlement, little investor confidence, poor administrative 
capacity, and weak political opposition and civil society (Kibble 2006, 527). 
The transition to democratic governance and transparency is the third challenge 
for post-conflict Angola. After decades in power, the political elite built a strong client 
network to govern Angola. Despite winning the war, the Government must extend its 
administration to the entire territory and create government structures and functions to 
build an inclusive state (Gomes Porto and Parsons 2003, 7-8).  
The political elite, led by President Dos Santos, has been associated to 
embezzlement and corruption as exposed in various reports (Global Witness 2002b and 
1999, HRW 2004, World Bank 2005b). For example, the maintenance of the conflict led 
to the creation of a parallel budget to finance the war through SONANGOL, the state-
owned oil company. After sustained pressure of the IMF, the Government allowed an Oil 
Diagnostics – the auditing of Angola’s oil revenue – to be carried out revealing that 
unaccounted funds reached USD 4.22 billion between 1997 and 2002 (HRW 2004, 1). 
However, based on high oil prices in 2006, Chinese interests and expensive oil-backed 
loans, Angola could keep IMF intervention at bay as well as improve its negotiation 
position by playing off the interests of China and United States (Kibble 2006, 526).  
However, the IMF noted that “despite the end of hostilities in war zones and 
substantially lower military expenditures in 2000 and 2001, poverty was not being 
reduced because of the hesitant implementation of the government [reform] program and 
the persistence of severe governance and transparency problems (…)” (c.f. HRW 2004, 
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45-46). Thus, governance reform is essential to move forward on reconstruction and 
development as well as fostering peace after decades of war.  
 
3.1.6. The role of oil and diamonds in Angola’s wars 
 
A central dynamic of conflict in Angola has been attributed to both parties having had an 
independent source of financing through oil and diamonds. As a result, initiatives to end 
the conflict have been trapped in a security dilemma: 
  
“Since the Angolan belligerents have little common cause or ground upon which 
to build a stable peace, distrust the international community, and have means 
through oil and diamonds to prosecute war, both sides have a strong incentive to 
seek resolution through a military defeat of the other. Elements within the 
government and UNITA may believe that ending the war would be in their own 
best interest, but without a credible external or joint institution to guarantee 
observance once fighting ceases, the incentive to retain a residual war-fighting 
capacity is strong” (Cilliers 2000b, 350-351). 
 
 The control over oil resources has been a strategic asset for MPLA to finance its 
operation and govern Angola. The fact that nearly all of Angola’s oil deposits are 
offshore has made oil resources comparable to an economic sanctuary (Le Billon 2005, 
115). Oil production and export could be isolated from attacks during the civil war; 
except in late 1992, when UNITA attack an on-shore oil installation (Clarke 2000, 203). 
This strategic location may have given the MPLA the advantage over UNITA as 
diamonds were scattered over large territory in central and North-eastern Angola. While 
UNITA was initially able to exploit diamonds easily with diamond diggers – the so called 
garimpeiros – and could even partly shift to semi-industrial exploitation in the mid-
1990s, not being able to control the diamond field against MPLA advances compromised 
the ability of UNITA to finance itself and – as Part 4 of this Chapter suggests – was the 
beginning of the end of UNITA as an organised armed group. 
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 Oil also had important impacts on the governance of Angola. While oil resources 
allowed the government to keep financing and – as shown below – escalate the war, it 
also meant that the Government did not need to rely on the productive potential of its 
population. As a result, the Government became increasingly de-linked from the 
population, self-serving and corrupt. This is evidenced by the abandonment of the 
worker-peasant alliance seeking to mobilise support for MPLA in rural areas which 
initiated a shift from state and peasant farming to food imports even though Angola – 
even though Angola has one of Southern Africa’s most fertile soil. Rural communities 
were either completely abandoned or drafted into the army (Messiant 1998, 155).   
 
3.2. Conflict recurrence after the Bicesse Accords, 1992-1994 
 
This Part elaborates three phases with different conflict dynamics in the period 1992-
1994 and explores available revenue sources, the cost of starting and maintaining 
conflict, and the expected benefit of using armed force. The first phase saw UNITA 
establish control over most alluvial diamond deposits with relatively little resistance from 
MPLA. However, prolonged sieges and bombardments of cities had extensive 
humanitarian consequences. In the second phase as of mid 1993, MPLA increasingly 
challenged UNITA. After taking heavy losses initially, MPLA recaptured many diamond 
areas from UNITA. In the third phase towards the end of the conflict, UNITA accepted 
the Lusaka Peace Process to limit further advances of the MPLA.  
 
3.2.1. Available revenue sources 
 
Oil and diamonds have been the methods of conflict financing in Angola. While UNITA 
relied on diamonds, MPLA commercialised petrol and received oil-backed loans.  
 UNITA’s revenue sources are related to the exploitation and commercialisation of 
diamonds. After the discovery of diamonds in 1912, diamond exploitation was controlled 
by Portuguese, Belgian, British and American interests under colonial rule. Diamond 
mining started in 1917 with the establishment of the Diamonds Company of Angola   
(Tvedten 1997, 10, 26). During the war of liberation, the Portuguese used revenue from 
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diamonds to fight the independence movements (Smillie 2002, 16). In 1960, Angola 
exported more than USD 20 million in diamonds (Marcum 1969, 7).  
 UNITA is known to have used diamonds as a source of financing since the 1970s 
(Dietrich 2000b, 276). In the 1970s and early 1980s, UNITA acquired diamonds through 
hit-and-run attacks on government mines and free lance diggers, the so-called 
garimpeiros. Initially, UNITA’s annual revenue from diamonds was small with USD 4 
million in 1984. However, revenue increased to USD 14 million in 1989 (Dietrich 2002, 
28). Other estimates hold that UNITA made between USD 600,000 and USD 48 million 
annually by the late 1980s (Le Billon 2001, 68).52 In consequence of UNITA’s increasing 
control over diamonds fields, Angola’s official diamond revenues declined from USD 
221 million in 1981 to USD 33 million in 1986 (Ibid., 62).  
 However in the 1980s, UNITA’s diamond revenue is held to have been inferior to 
external support provided by the United States. UNITA is believed to have received from 
the United States approximately USD 41.6 million annually between 1986 and 1991 
making it the second largest covert military assistance programme after the Afghan 
Mujahidin (Vines 2004, 77).53 In 1986, UNITA received USD 25 million which increase 
to USD 90 million in 1990 (Tvedten 1997, 39, 41) Other sources of funding included 
gold, coffee, ivory and timber (Dietrich 2000b, 276).  
 Thus, considering these estimates on diamond revenue and external assistance, 
UNITA controlled revenue sources was between USD 42.2 million and USD 89.6 million 
annually in the late 1980s. 
 With the end of the Cold War, the United States terminated its covert assistance 
programme to UNITA. In consequence, a major source of conflict financing was cut off 
from UNITA and the organisation was forced to adapt. UNITA developed new sources of 
financing by enlarging its control over Angola’s diamond mines. This move was 
facilitated by a relatively easy access to diamonds in Angola because most deposits occur 
                                                 
52 Figures based on the estimate that the mines under UNITA control generated between USD 50,000 and 
USD 4 million monthly (Le Billon 2001, 68). 
53 Figure based on the estimate that UNITA received the total of USD 250 million in the period 1986 to 
1991 (Vines 2004, 77). 
  
167
in alluvial mines. In these mines, diamond deposits are scattered over large areas 
exploitable with a minimal amount of capital and skill (Smillie 2002, 25).54  
 When UNITA resumed fighting in late 1992, the first objective was therefore the 
control over the diamond fields in Luanda Norte and Luanda Sul in North-Eastern 
Angola, particularly the Cuanga 55Valley, Lucapa and Dundo (see Appendix 2, Map 1 
and Map 5) (Dietrich 2000, 174). UNITA expanded its control throughout 1993 and 
increasingly managed these previously unregulated diamond fields and ultimately 90 % 
of Angola’s diamond production (Vines 2004, 89). In consequence, Angola’s official 
diamond production dropped from USD 200 million in 1991 and USD 250 million in 
1992 to only between USD 30 to 35 million in 1993 (Dietrich 2000, 147).  
 UNITA relied on garimpeiros to extract diamonds. In 1991, Angola’s alluvial 
diamond fields attracted between 6,000-10,000 garimpeiros from Zaire and Angola. This 
increase was the result of the Angolan government legalising the possession and sale of 
diamonds in December 1991. Initially, exploitation was unorganised and included many 
self-demobilised fighters of MPLA and UNITA. By 1992, number of garimpeiros had 
risen to 50,000 (Dietrich 2002, 26).  
 In order to administer the diamond fields, UNITA established tax collection areas 
at river basins needed to wash-out diamonds. In open fields, UNITA used one soldier to 
control a group of 6 to 10 garimpeiros. In this way, 300 soldiers were able to control a 
workforce of about 2,000 people (Global Witness 2001a, 5). Initially, UNITA refrained 
from using force to intimidate garimpeiros because it needed them as a workforce to 
extract diamonds (Dietrich 2000, 177). 
 Estimates of UNITA diamond revenues vary substantially for the period between 
1992 and 1994. High estimates suggest that UNITA made USD 600 million annually 
(Global Witness 1998, 5). Medium estimates put the figure at between USD 500 million 
and USD 350 million annually (Le Billon 2001, 62; Dietrich 2002, 29-30). The lowest 
                                                 
54 Alluvial mines occur in contrast to deep-shaft mines in which diamond deposits are sub-terrainean and 
whose exploitation requires substantial capital investment (Smillie 2002, 25).  
55 A World Bank figure estimates the value of diamond export in 1993 USD 63 million for 295,000 carats 
(Dietrich 2000, 167; Hodges 2001, 149). However, this figure can be considered high given that it would 
imply an average price of about 210 USD per carat. Compared with carat values made by companies 
operating in Angola in 1996 and 1997, this figure as an average is high. Carat values ranged from 68.3 
USD per carat to about 200 USD per carat (Coakley 1997, 3; Coakley 1998, 2, 3).  
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estimate is the statement of a diamond dealer of below 150 million annually (Dietrich 
2002, 29).  
 The estimate of USD 600 million annually is an overestimation. Even though 
when considering that Angola’s total annual diamond production capacity is USD 1.1 
billion, and that the diamond mines in Luanda Norte and Luanda Sul account for about 
USD 400 million production capacity, the figure of an annual diamond revenue of USD 
600 million is inflated considering the conditions of commercialisation (Coakley 1996, 
1). Despite fluctuating control, UNITA never controlled all diamond mines and 
controlled an average of about half of Angola’s diamond potential; thus at most USD 550 
million annually. Given that UNITA is unlikely to have sold diamonds at the real market 
price and needed to sell diamonds at a discount, UNITA possibly made never more than 
USD 200-250 million annually (Shaw 2003, 19-20). A lower estimate is also more likely 
because even if labour was cheap, high prices for diesel and spare parts for machines 
reduced the diamond profits for UNITA (Dietrich 2000c, 292). 
 Thus, while estimations on UNITA revenue between 1992 and 1994 vary between 
USD 600 million and USD 150 million annually, there is enough evidence to argue that 
UNITA revenue amounted to about USD 300 million annually. The significance of this 
figure is that after the end of the Cold War and the cutting of third-party support, UNITA 
not only managed to replace the lost third-party assistance but also to increase its revenue 
between 3 and 7 times considering that its revenue in the late 1980s was between USD 
42.2 million and USD 89.6 million annually. 
  With the end of the Cold War, also the Government of Angola had to diversify its 
revenue sources. The Soviet Union had supported the MPLA with between USD 5 or 
USD 6 billion in the 1980s. These amounts reflect the debt accumulated by Angola with 
the Soviet Union which grew mainly as results of arms purchases from the Soviet Union 
(see also next Section)(Balencie and La Grange 2001, 1089). The diversification from 
external assistance started in the mid-1980s with political and economic reforms away 
from a one party system and command economy. Local elites used these reform 
processes to establish control over states assets and the development of a patronage 
system (Hodges 2001, 12).  
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 Oil has been the single most important economic asset for the government of 
Angola since commercial exploration began in 1968. Angola’s oil resources are off-shore 
deposits and range from shallow, deep and ultra-deep occurrences.56 The fact that nearly 
all of Angola’s oil deposit are offshore has been a most important strategic asset for 
MPLA because oil production and export could be isolated from the oil the instability and 
attacks during the civil war. Except in late 1992, oil installations were never attached by 
UNITA (Clarke 2000, 203, Le Billon 2005, 115). The Angolan Government started with 
oil exploration in the shallow deposits off the coast of the enclave of Cabinda which 
remains until today the most productive oil fields. Cabinda produced the biggest part of 
Angola’s oil production and maintained production in the 1980s at 0.5 million barrels per 
day (PBD) (IMF 2005, 6, 52).  
 In 1976, the government of Angola created the national oil company Sociedade 
Nacional de Combustiveis (SONANGOL). Through SONANGOL, the Government of 
Angola became the sole owner of oil resources and SONANGOL the only concessionaire 
for oil exploration and development as well as joint ventures (Hodges 2001, 125). 
SONANGOL became the institutional framework for the MPLA to finance its military 
activities through the proceeds from oil (World Bank 2005, iii). SONANGOL became 
also the integral element of creating a governance system of presidential patronage and an 
oil elite. Oil allowed the president to ration allocations of subsidised foreign exchange 
and provided opportunities for kick-backs for oil financed military procurement.   
 Given the lack of transparency of Angola’s military spending and the oil sector, 
there is little reliable data on the revenue sources for the period 1992-1994. Overall, 
revenue sources must be separated between those officially declared and those being part 
of a parallel system of conflict financing. Official revenue sources accrued from a 
conventional taxation system accounted for in the National Treasury. The parallel system 
is associated with SONANGOL which was used for extra-budgetary procurement of 
military equipment or oil-backed debt services.  
 Concerning the conventional system, the government of Angola extracted rents 
from petrol through two types of tax regimes: A tax and royalty regime and production 
                                                 
56 Off-shore oil deposits are separated in three ways of occurrence: (1) shallow (less than 200 metres), (2) 
deep (200-1000 metres), and (3) ultra-deep (deeper than 1000 metres) (Clarke 2000, 203). 
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sharing agreements (PSA). The former was applied to joint-venture operations and 
included a production as well as an income and transaction tax levied on net income 
(production minus operation and amortisation costs). The PSA are specific arrangements 
for exploration consortiums. Foreign companies were allowed to retain a share of oil 
production to recoup their investment (cost oil). The remaining oil (profit oil) was shared 
between the government and the companies according to agreed proportions (IMF 2005, 
9-10). 
 The oil sector provided the government of Angola with tax receipts of USD 1,578 
million in 1992, USD 1,780 million in 1993 and USD 1,518 million in 1994 and 
accounted respectively for 75.2%, 81.9% and 88.9% of total government revenue (Le 
Billon 2001, 62). Based on these figures total government revenue is estimated at USD 
2,098 million in 1992, USD 2,173 million in 1993, and USD 1,708 in 1994 (see Table 
3.2). Lower revenues in 1994 can be attributed to lower oil process which declined from 
19 USD per barrel to 15.3 USD per barrel (Le Billon 2001, 62). 
 However, in addition to revenue from oil exploration, the Angolan government 
also used oil-backed loans to generate immediate revenue to stabilise finances and 
support the war against UNITA. While Angola’s debt was mainly a result of loans from 
the Soviet Union for military procurement in the 1980s or ill conceives infrastructure 
projects, in the early 1990s the level of debt increased from USD 3 billion in the early 
1980s to USD 11 billion by the mid-1990s. In this way, the government of Angola was 
able to mortgage future revenue and generate an immediate cash flow to service present 
needs. Oil-backed loans thus provided the government of Angola with a flexible method 
to generate conflict financing. There are no estimates on the percentage used to finance 
MPLA’s war activities. Oil-backed loans were arrange through SONANGOL and part of 
the extra-budgetary revenue of  MPLA (World Bank 2005, iii). 
 In addition to oil, revenue was generated from the export of diamonds. Angola’s 
official diamond production amounted to USD 200 million in 1991 and USD 250 million 
in 1992 but dropped to only between USD 30 to 35 million in 1993 after UNITA gained 
control of diamond fields in Luanda Norte, Lunada Sul and the central highlands 
(Dietrich 2000, 147). However, government revenue from diamonds was low because of 
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high cost for security and dependence on air transport (Hodges 2001, 149). In 1994 
government revenue from diamonds accounted for USD 6.1 million (Le Billon 2001, 62). 
 Based on the estimations above, MPLA’s revenue sources are estimated to 
amount to at least USD 1.5 billion annually in the period 1992 and 1994. This estimate is 
based on the official revenue collected though taxed on oil production. However, revenue 
sources can be assumed to be much higher if extra-budgetary sources from SONANGOL 
and oil-backed loans are added.  
 Thus, when comparing revenue sources in the period 1992-1994, MPLA emerges 
as the by far better resourced organised armed group with an estimated USD 1.5 billion 
annually to finance conflict. In contrast, UNITA had an estimated annual revenue of 
about USD 300 million, thus about 5 times inferior to MPLA. The next Section looks at 
the cost to start and maintain armed conflict and seeks to identify the implications of a 
surplus of revenue sources for conflict dynamics.  
 
3.2.2. The cost of conflict 
 
The cost of the 1992 conflict must be considered in the context that both UNITA and 
MPLA had maintained an armed conflict over two decades and many firearms and 
conventional weapons were already in the area of conflict. UNITA developed into a 
standardised guerrilla force with support of South Africa after 1982. It had dispersed 
guerrilla formations of 15-20 troops each, 150-men guerrilla companies and 500-men 
strong semi-regular infantry battalions. UNITA had 30,000 members in 1982 and about 
60,000 to 70,000 in 1987/1988. In addition to firearms, UNITA used mortars, rockets 
launchers and after 1987 also anti-tank weapons and Stinger surface-to-air missiles 
provided by South Africa and the United States. UNITA’s equipment and training were 
geared towards a guerrilla strategy (De Beer and Gamba 2000, 75-77).  
 MPLA maintained a regular conventional military force including tanks, 
armoured personnel carriers, artillery pieces, multiple rocket launchers, artillery as well 
as an air-force composed of Soviet built MiG 21, MiG 23, and Su-22. MPLA modernised 
its equipment and replaced extensive battle losses in three waves. The fist was a 
modernisation of army and air-force equipment in 1981. The second wave occurred 
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between January 1984 and August 1985 and included the acquisition of 30 MiG 23s and 
8 Su-22 aircrafts; 33 Mi-24, 27 Allouette and 69 Mi-8 and Mi-17 helicopters, and 350 T-
55, 150 T-34 and 50 PT-76 tanks at the cost of about USD 1 billion. The third wave 
occurred after MPLA incurred heavy losses in the fighting of 1985 and yet another USD 
1.5 billion in defence acquisitions (De Beer and Gamba 2000, 76-77).57 The extent of 
Soviet assistance is reflected that 950 Soviet officers were posted in operational and 
training commands and it was in fact Soviet General Konstantin Shaganovitch who 
commanded all forces including 45,000 Cuban troops (Ibid., 77). 
 With the end of the Cold War, these military assistance programmes stopped and 
left a lot of military equipment in Angola. With the recurrence of armed conflict between 
1992 and 1994, Angola saw another round of intensive rearmament of UNITA and 
MPLA. UNITA rearmed during the Bicesse Accords and MPLA engaged in the 
restructuring and modernisation of its troops after the return of fighting in 1992. UNITA 
had its military largely intact after the Bicesse Accords while MPLA’s forces had not 
been modernised since 1988 and its troops were demobilising (Vines 2004, 78). 
 Prior to the 1992, UNITA was primarily a guerrilla army numbering about 65,000 
troops. In contravention to the Bicesse Accords, UNITA added a conventional capability 
to project its power over a larger territory and control alluvial diamond mines. The 3rd 
Motorised Brigade, for example, was equipped with 26 armoured personnel carriers, 9 T-
62 tanks, 18 automatic grenade launchers, 12  mortars, 17 multiple rocket launchers of 
various types, and 10 artillery batteries. Other military acquisitions included mechanised 
vehicles, armoured personnel carriers, landmines, small arms and light weapons, anti-
tank and –aircraft, and artillery pieces. (De Beer and Gamba 2000, 83, 91).  
 UNITA purchased most of its equipment from former Warsaw Pact countries, 
particularly from Bulgaria and Ukraine, including mortar bombs, anti-tank weapons, 
grenades, ammunition and small arms. Formers Warsaw Pact States had to reduce 
conventional armed force due to the provisions of the Conventional Forces in Europe 
Treaty (Hodges 2001, 154; De Beer and Gamba 2000, 82). Moreover, with the reduction 
of the security sectors in South Africa and the former Soviet Union, there were a lot of 
                                                 
57 In the third wave acquisitions included T-55 tanks, BTR-60 armoured personnel carriers, BRDM 
armoured cars, BMP1 infantry vehicles, BM-14 and BM-21 multiple rocket launchers, SA-8 and SA-13 
surface-to-air missiles, M-46 field guns, and Mi-24 combat helicopters (De Beer and Gamba 77).   
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brokers and private logistics companies who were skilled in running covert operations. 
UNITA also received support from Zaire, Burkina Faso, Rwanda, Togo, and other 
countries which allowed weapons shipment to transit their territories and provided fake 
end-user certificates (Shaw 2003, 46-52).  
 For the logistics of running supplying UNITA, a number of transport agents acted 
autonomously or as government agents within larger networks based on the relationships 
between UNITA and the Governments of Togo, Burkina Faso and Zaire (SAS 2001, 
117). The “Fowler Report” of the United Nations Security Council Report details the 
activities of three arms brokers – Ronnie  Watson, Joe De Decker and Johannes Parfirio 
Parreira – who played key role in organising arms shipments for UNITA (UNSC 2000c, 
paras. 16-17, 28-29). In the words of Peleman:  
 
 “UNITA and its allies in the subregion transformed the former supply network 
into lucrative business ventures, extracting the resources in the territory under 
UNITA control through the relationships with international commodity traders, 
diamond dealers and even organised crime groups. The former networks of the 
Cold War turned private while other private players joined forces with the local 
business community or with Lebanese, Belgian, or Portuguese expatriate 
merchants in the region and started acting as local sales agents, shipping 
diamonds out and war supplies into the region” (Peleman 2000, 297). 
 
As a result of these relationships, UNITA had relatively low transaction costs for its 
supply and through the control of diamonds started building a self-financing war 
economy.  
 The availability of large weapons stocks at low cost from Warsaw Pacts countries 
and the existence of numerous arms brokers reduced the cost for UNITA to start and 
maintain its activities. As the result of a saturated international arms market and the 
number of willing brokers, prices for weapons were low as exemplified by the prices for 
an AK-47 which dropped in Angola from 150 USD in 1990 to 12 USD in 1995 (Killicoat 
2006, 76).   
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 Estimating the cost of this rearmament of UNITA, there are no estimations as to 
the value of individual arms deals or overall estimations except that the available revenue 
sources of an above estimate of USD 300 million needed to suffice to buy all equipment. 
Applying the cost-estimation relationships (CERs) developed in Chapter 2 the following 
will estimate UNITA’s and MPLA’s start-up and annual maintenance cost for the period 
1992-1994. The key estimations variables include the following:  
 
• Price per weapon (PF) = 10 USD (Killicoat 2006, 76); 
• Price per round of ammunition (PA) = 0.05 USD (no data, assumed price reflecting the 
cheapness of weapons); 
• Annual average male salary (I) = 2,626 USD (data for 2002, UNDP 2003, 310-313. 
Represents approximately cost per soldier of 7.2 USD/day or 216 USD/month); 
• Number of fighters (N) = 65,000 for UNITA and 96,000 for MPLA (represents troops 
strength July 1991 (IISS 1991, 125-126)). 
 
The CERs for the start-up and annual maintenance of armed conflict suggest that 
UNITA had a start-up cost of about USD 1.5 million and annual maintenance cost for of 
between about USD 180 million for a low intensity conflict, USD 211 million for a 
medium intense conflict and USD 330 million for a high intensity conflict (Table 3.1).  
 When considering these figures it is important to bear in mind that these estimates 
are for a situation in which UNITA would have needed to buy all equipment prior to the 
onset of conflict. However, as the beginning of this Section illustrated, due to the 
previous episodes of armed conflict in Angola, UNITA had a pre-existing weapons stock 
and had captured weapons from government forces. It is therefore likely that the start-up 
and annual maintenance cost are lower than the estimate given. Nevertheless, considering 
the acquisitions of conventional military equipment by UNITA, the start-up and annual 
maintenance cost can be considered to have increased. 
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Table 3.1: Overview of the start-up and annual maintenance of armed conflict for UNITA and MPLA, 1992-1994 
 
 CERs Composites UNITA  MPLA  
   USD USD USD USD 
CER 1:  
Weapons 
1.5 firearms (F)  
x Price per firearm (PF)  
x Number of fighters (N) 
 
975,000 
 
1,440,000 
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t
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p
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t
 
CER 2:   
Ammunition 
1.5 firearms (F)  
x 100 rounds of ammunition (A) 
x Price per ammunition (PA) 
x Number of fighters (N) 
 
487,500 
 
Total start-up cost 
 
1,462,500  
720,000 
 
Total start-up cost 
 
2,160,000 
CER 3:  
Salaries 
Annual male income (I) 
x Number of fighters (N) 
 
170,690,000 
  
252,096,000 
 
CERL 4:  
Weapons 
 
0.33 firearms (F)  
x 1 x Price per firearm (PF) 
x Number of insurgents (N) 
 
214,500 
 
316,800 
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CERL 5:  
Ammunition 
 
1.5 firearms (F)  
x 20 rounds of ammunition (A) 
x 90 days of combat 
x Price per round (PA) 
x Number of insurgents (N) 
 
8,775,000 
 
Total maintenance 
(low intensity)* 
 
179,679,500 
 
12,960,000 
 
Total maintenance 
(low intensity)* 
 
265,372,800 
CERM 4:  
Weapons 
0.45 firearms (F)  
x 1.5 x Price per firearm (PF) 
x Number of insurgents (N) 
 
438,750 
 
648,000 
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CERM 5: 
Ammunition 
 
1.5 firearms (F)  
x 60 rounds of ammunition (A) 
x 90 days of combat 
x 1.5 x Price per round (PA) 
x Number of insurgents (N) 
 
39,487,500 
 
 
 
Total maintenance 
(medium intensity)* 
 
210,616,250 
 
58,320,000 
 
Total maintenance 
(medium intensity)* 
 
311,100,000 
CERH 4:  
Weapons 
 
0.65 firearms (F) 
x 3 x Price per firearm (PF) 
x Number of insurgents (N) 
 
1,267,500 
 
1,872,000 
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CERH 5:  
Ammunition 
1.5 firearms (F)  
x 120 rounds of ammunition (A) 
x 90 days of combat 
x 3 x Price per round (PA) 
x Number of insurgents (N) 
 
157,950,000 
 
Total maintenance 
(high intensity)* 
 
329,907,500 
 
233,280,000 
 
Total maintenance 
(high intensity)* 
 
487,248,000 
* Includes CER 3: Salaries. 
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 The CERs for the start-up and annual maintenance of armed conflict for MPLA 
suggests a start-up cost of about USD 2.2 million and annual maintenance cost of about 
USD 265 million for a low intensity conflict, USD 311 million for a medium intense 
conflict and USD 487 million for a high intensity conflict (Table 3.1). Concerning the 
cost figures for MPLA the reservations made of previously acquired military equipment 
also applies. In 1992, MPLA also had a conventional capacity including 500 tanks, 150 
armoured personnel carriers (APGs), 250 other APGs, 500 heavy artillery pieces and at 
least 100 multiple rocket launchers. However, when UNITA took over large parts of 
Angola’s territory, MPLA reacted by modernising and restructuring its forces. It did so 
with the assistance of 500 personnel of the private military company Executive Outcomes 
(De Beer and Gamba 2000, 82).   
 Due to MPLA being the army of a state, the estimation of cost of conflict can be 
supplemented with the figures of official defence expenditures. Based on the figures 
presented in Table 3.2, MPLA had an official military expenditure between USD 445 
million in 1992, USD 535 million in 1993 and USD 576 million 1994. However, MPLA 
is also known to have financed its military build-up through parallel systems of conflict 
financing. Estimations for unrecorded military expenditures suggest that MPLA nearly 
spent the same amount as official military expenditures using extra-budgetary means. 
These have been estimated to amount to USD 445 in 1992, USD 459 million in 1993 and 
USD 333 million in 1994 Combining official and unrecorded military expenditures for 
1993 and 1994, MPLA had total defence expenditures of nearly USD 1 billion per year.  
 These estimates are partially reflected in data of the International Institute for 
Strategic Studies according to which defence expenditure was USD 648 million in 1992, 
between USD 780-1,100 million in 1993, and USD 515 million in 1995 (IISS 1994, IISS 
1995), Moreover, this figure is about equal to the CER for high intensity conflict in Table 
3.2. 
 Another indication about the cost of conflict is provided by estimates on 
individual defence acquisitions. MPLA allegedly bought military equipment worth USD 
2.5 billion in 1993 and another USD 1 billion between January and July 1994 (Vines 
2004, 79). Much media coverage received the involvement of the French business man 
Pierre Falcone and oil companies in arming the Angolan government. Falcone allegedly 
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arrange an arms deal worth USD 47 million in 1993 and others worth between USD 463 
million and USD 633 million in 1994 (Global Witness 2002, 12).  
 
Table 3.2: Government revenue and military expenditure in Angola, 1992-1994 
(Based on Le Billon 2001, 62) 
 
 1992 1993 1994 
Government oil revenue (USD million) 1578 1780 1518 
Share of oil in government revenue (%) 75.2 81.9 88.9 
Total government revenue (Projection based 
on oil revenue, USD, million) 
2098 2173 1708 
Military expenditure (% of total government 
expenditures and net lending) 
21.2 24.6 33.7 
Military expenditure (USD million) 445 535 576 
Unrecorded military expenditure (% of total 
government expenditures and net lending) 
n/a 21.1 19.5 
Unrecorded military expenditure (USD, 
million) 
n/a 459 333 
Combined official and unrecorded military 
expenditure (% of total government 
expenditures and net lending) 
21.2 45.7 53.2 
Combined official and unrecorded military 
expenditure (USD, million) 
>445 994 909 
IISS estimates for defence expenditures (USD 
million) 
648 780-1100 515 
Estimates of defence acquisitions n/a 2500 1000 
Note: The estimations for military expenditure, unrecorded military expenditure, and combined official and 
unrecorded military expenditure are based on the assumption that government revenue equals government 
spending and net lending for the period 1992-1994. 
 This analysis suggests that UNITA’s minimum annual cost for the maintenance of 
conflict was USD 180 million for a low intensity conflict and USD 330 million for a high 
intensity conflict. For MPLA, the minimum annual cost for the maintenance of conflict 
was USD 265 million for a low intensity conflict and USD 487 million for a high 
intensity conflict. Available information on military expenditure, however, suggests that 
MPLA’s cost for maintaining the conflict was around USD 1 billion per year.  The 
difference between the minimum annual thresholds and the USD 1 billion figure may 
indicate the cost of modernising MPLA’s conventional capability.  
  When comparing these figures for the available revenue sources of MPLA (USD 
1.5 billion annually) and UNITA (USD 300 million) it emerges that MPLA had a surplus 
of revenue sources for a high intensity conflict and UNITA for a medium intensity 
conflict. These surpluses of revenue sources are reflected as follows in the conflict 
dynamics in the three phases of the armed conflict between 1992 and 1994.  
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 Since the outbreak of fighting until 1992, UNITA had been able to establish a 
relatively quick control over the North Eastern and Central diamond mines with the help 
of an international network of brokers and transport agents (see Appendix 2, Map 5). 
UNITA had a relative advantage over MPLA because it had re-armed while MPLA was 
demobilising in the framework of the Bicesse accords. UNITA’s initial military 
superiority was a prerequisite to make rapid advances to control the diamond fields. 
However, major battles took place to control the cities. Reflecting the increase in military 
capability, these battles were more destructive than the entire three decades of previous 
warfare (Le Billon 2005, 115). However, with increasing territorial capture, UNITA 
became overstretched in the face of needing to establish territorial control and administer 
the towns and cities it had captured (Vines 2004, 75).  
 As of mid-1994, FAA engaged in a number of counter-strikes with its newly 
created anti-guerrilla units. With new military acquisitions, MPLA increased the conflict 
intensity (making the conflict more expensive for UNITA) and re-capturing territory from 
UNITA (reducing its revenue sources). By the end of 1993, MPLA had continued its 
arms built-up and restructuring. The involvement of Executive Outcomes resulted in 
MPLA making territorial advances and recapturing the diamond locations of Cafunfo in 
the Cuango Valley (Luanda Norte) and the corridor Dundo-Lucapa-Saurimo (see 
Appendix 2, Map 2 and Map 5)(De Beer and Gamba 2000, 82; Dietrich 2000, 176). 
 The decision to agree the Lusaka protocol indicates that UNITA was not in a 
position to increase its military expenditure and match the capabilities of the MPLA. 
Through its petrol resources, MPLA outspent UNITA and pressed ahead with a military 
agenda of defeating UNITA. For UNITA, the cost to maintain the armed conflict 
increased as a result.  
 The estimates on UNITA’s available revenue sources provide evidence for this 
argument. In 1993, UNITA was not able to increase its expenditure beyond USD 300 
million to equally increase the level of conflict intensity. The estimates show, that 
UNITA had only funds available for a medium intensity conflict but not for a further 
escalation to high intensity conflict. UNITA was under military pressure from MPLA and 
not able to match its military expenditure and capacity. In this way, the material 
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environment in which UNITA was operating contributed to its acceptance of the Lusaka 
Peace Process.  
 At the end of the 1992 war, UNITA was still in control of major diamond areas in 
North Eastern and Central Angola and maintained control over large areas to the east of 
the coastal areas. However, MPLA had capture important cities such as Uige (Uige), 
Cufanfo (Luanda Norte), Luena (Moxico), Kuito (Bie) and Cuito Cuanavale (Cuando 
Cubango)(see Appendix 2, Map 2 and Map 5). 
  
3.2.3. Expected benefits and opportunity costs 
 
The expected benefits and opportunity costs are different for UNITA and MPLA at 
various stages of the war. At the beginning of war, UNITA used armed force to establish 
control of the diamond fields. This action was the culminating point of a larger process 
which started in 1986. Towards the end of the Cold War, both UNITA and MPLA 
became conscious that third-party assistance would not last indefinitely. As a result, both 
parties concentrated their activities on controlling natural resources. UNITA controlled 
diamonds and MPLA the production of oil. In this way, the end of the Cold War was not 
used to profit from a peace dividend but to restructure Angola’s political economy (De 
Beer and Gamba 2000, 69, 78).  
 While the control of the diamond fields provided UNITA with expected benefits 
to using armed force, reneging on the Bicesse Accords had no opportunity cost to 
UNITA. The lack of power-sharing provisions in the Bicesse Accords and its reliance on 
a “the-winner-takes-it-all” approach fostered divisions between UNITA and MPLA and 
the antagonism between Savimbi and Dos Santos (Hodges 2001, 14). Savimbi 
emphasised existing social and political divisions and played on urban-rural and ethnic 
difference to mobilise his support base. UNITA saw its mistrust against MPLA confirmed 
when shortly after the election results were announced MPLA attacked and destroyed 
UNITA’s Luanda offices and killed or captured military and civilian UNITA leaders in 
the capital (Paris 2004, 68-69). 
 Moreover, due to MPLA’s election victory, UNITA did not believe that MPLA 
would offer any power-sharing deals. UNITA therefore saw no possibility of controlling 
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Angola’s diamond areas in the framework of the Bicesse Accords (Newman 2006, 142). 
As a result, Savimbi restarted the war and is generally portrayed as the spoiler of the 
peace process. While he publicly supported the peace he had no intention of accepting the 
election outcome without becoming President of Angola. However, even if Savimbi had 
won the elections it is not sure if the renewal of conflict could have been prevented 
because Dos Santos was as unwilling to accept an election defeat as Savimbi (Paris 2004, 
68-69). 
 Having no opportunity cost, UNITA exploited its temporary military advantage 
over the MPLA. UNITA’s military was largely intact while at the same time rearming 
during the Bicesse Accord (Vines 2004, 75). Controlling diamonds had therefore the 
function to generate revenue for the maintenance of armed conflict and paying for the 
ever greater territorial control of UNITA.  
 It was MPLA which had greater incentives to work towards the success of the 
Bicesse Accord. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and its external support, 
MPLA needed to improve relations with the United States to attract investment and 
financial aid. In order to improve Angola’s investment climate, Dos Santos started 
liberalising the economy, changed the constitution towards a multi-party democracy and 
sought to settle the conflict with UNITA. The failure of the Bicesse Accord was, 
therefore, a blow to Dos Santos’ plans to open Angola to foreign investment and financial 
aid (Paris 2004, 65). 
 While the failure of the Bicesse Accords was a setback for the Government, 
existing revenue sources MPLA the confidence to by new arms and use them in an effort 
to crush UNITA once and for all. The expected benefit was to regain the territory lost in 
UNITA advances of late 1992. UNITA responded to MPLA attacks with a strategy which 
aimed at making Angola ungovernable, thus seeking to further undermine the legitimacy 
of the Government in the eyes of the people. It increased attacks on soft targets, such as 
bridges as well as water and electricity networks, and targeted towns and the civilian 
population to show that the Government was not able to protect its citizens. Moreover, it 
sought to push citizens into Government held areas to overwhelm state structures and 
show the incapacity of the Government to deal with the internally displaced (Malaquias 
2007, 211-212). 
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 In addition, many MPLA generals had the benefit of controlling diamond areas 
for profit making. While the cooperation with Executive Outcomes was successful in 
ousting UNITA from many diamond areas, it was not enough to prevent the direct 
involvement of MPLA soldiers in diamond exploration. Operations became increasingly 
opaque and led to an independent client network involving MPLA soldiers and PMCs. 
Thus, the expected benefit of re-establishing control over the diamond areas had the dual 
purpose of limiting revenue sources for UNITA and allowing MPLA soldiers to profit 
from diamonds (Dietrich 2000b, 173-174).  
 In addition, UNITA’s expected benefit of maintaining the conflict became smaller 
while the opportunity cost of continued fighting increased. Given the growth in military 
capability of MPLA under guidance from Executive Outcomes, UNITA was no longer 
able to maintain the military pressure of the MPLA and signed the Lusaka Protocol 
(Vines 2004, 80-81). It had increasing problems to supply its new conventional capability 
with fuel and proved inexperienced to hold cities such as Huambo in the Central 
Highlands. Cities provided concentrated targets for MPLA and where new strategic 
challenges for UNITA which had previously fought mainly based on guerrilla tactics (De 
Beer and Gamba 2000, 83). Furthermore, as the analysis on the material environment of 
UNITA above has shown, UNITA was not able to escalate the fighting through 
increasing its defence expenditure and impose itself against the military prowess of 
MPLA. This increase in the opportunity cost pushed it towards accepting the Lusaka 
Peace Process.  
 While being perceived as a strategic necessity by UNITA, the Lusaka Protocol 
was considered a mistake by the Military establishment which wanted to pursue UNITA 
until it was crushed as an organisation: Chief of Staff General João de Matos illustrated 
this conviction of the military by saying that “only the total defeat of Savimbi can ensure 
peace” (c.f. Vines 2004, 81). Nevertheless, international pressure pushed MPLA towards 
accepting the Lusaka Protocol. However, the Lusaka Protocol led to a peace process that 
none of the leaderships fully believed in as antagonisms between Savimbi and Dos Santos 
and their respective organisations increased preparing the way for yet another renewal of 
armed conflict. 
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3.2.4. Assessment 
 
UNITA had a short-term military advantage over MPLA in 1992 which it used to 
establish control over diamond mines. The weakness of MPLA at the beginning of the 
conflict provided UNITA with a low barrier-to entry into the conflict as evidence by the 
little resistance against taking control over nearly all Angola’s territory with the 
exception of the coastal areas. With an estimated annual revenue of USD 300 million for 
the period 1992-1994, UNITA bolstered its military power beyond guerrilla tactics and 
acquired a conventional capability. The cost of conflict was mitigated by a saturated post-
Cold War international arms market with military supplies emanating from former 
Warsaw Pact states as well as the persistence of Cold War military logistics networks.   
 However, MPLA restructured and modernised its military and countered UNITA 
by mid-1993. MPLA had a surplus of revenue sources and approximately an annual 
revenue to finance conflict of USD 1.5 billion for the period 1992-1994 which it used to 
rearm and buy strategic advice from Executive Outcomes. With the progressive recapture 
of territory – including the North Eastern diamond fields – UNITA found it increasingly 
difficult to hold on to the cities and territory it had controlled in 1993. Moreover, UNITA 
was not able to further escalate the conflict due to a lack of revenue sources to buy 
additional conventional equipment.  
 Concerning the relationship between conflict financing and recurrence, this Part 
highlights the following points:  
 
• The availability of revenue sources fosters conflict recurrence if it occurs at a time 
when the adversary is weak, thus creating a low barrier-to-entry for the start of armed 
conflict. What was essential for the initial successes of UNITA was that revenue 
sources became available at a point in time when MPLA was weak – it was disarming 
in the framework of the Bicesse accords.  
• The availability of military equipment at low prices lowered the start-up cost of 
conflict and fostered the recurrence of conflict. The availability of military equipment 
from former Warsaw Pact counties was a necessary requirement in addition to the 
availability of revenue sources for the conflict to recur. The combination of control 
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over diamonds, the availability of cheap arms and the existence of private logistics 
firms was an important combination for UNITA to prepare and restart the conflict. 
• Increasing the cost of competition can lead to the end of a conflict. During the 
conflict, MPLA increased its military capability and escalated the conflict. UNITA 
had a lack of revenue sources to maintain a high intensity conflict and was therefore 
militarily challenged. After increasing territorial losses, the opportunity cost of 
maintaining the armed conflict increased and contributed to the Lusaka Protocol. 
   
Table 3.3: Propensity to renew armed conflict of UNITA and MPLA, 1992 
 
 UNITA MPLA 
MATERIAL 
ENVIRONMENT 
Surplus of revenue sources (RS>C) 
for an armed conflict of medium 
intensity 
Surplus of revenue sources (RS>C) 
for an armed conflict of high 
intensity 
Potential revenue 
sources (annual) 
USD 300 million from taxation and 
commercialisation of diamonds 
USD 1.5 billion from taxation of oil 
production and oil-backed loans  
Cost of conflict (annual)   
Start-up USD 1.5 million USD 2.2 million 
Maintenance low USD 180 million USD 265 million 
Maintenance medium USD 211 million USD 311 million 
Maintenance high USD 330 million USD 487 million 
INCENTIVE TO USE 
ARMED FORCE  
 
 
High 
 
Low 
Expected benefit of 
using armed force 
Control diamond fields to acquire 
weapons to bolster conventional 
military capability 
 
Military victory over UNITA by 
overwhelming force  
Re-establish control of diamond 
fields to cut resources from UNITA 
and allow MPLA troops to profit 
 
Opportunity cost of 
using armed force 
Bicesse Accords represented no 
opportunity cost  
Better relations with USA to attract  
foreign investment and financial 
assistance 
PROPENSITY TO 
RENEW ARMED 
CONFLICT  
 
High 
 
Low 
 
 
3.3 Conflict recurrence after the Lusaka Peace Process, 1995-2002 
 
The period of the Lusaka Peace Process provided Angola with four years of relative 
peace during which UNITA and MPLA formed a Government of National Unity. 
However, both parties used this period to generate revenue sources from diamonds and 
oil in order to procure additional military equipment. UNITA did so by busting United 
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Nations Sanctions which were part of an increasingly comprehensive effort by the 
international community to isolate UNITA. However, by 1997 both parties undertook 
efforts to get back to armed conflict. In 1998, the Angolan civil war erupted again. After 
taking heavy initial losses, MPLA managed to impose itself over UNITA in the Central 
highlands of Angola in 1999 forcing UNITA to retreat to the East. The conflict ended 
after the killing of Jonas Savimbi by Government forces in 2002 and the subsequent 
disintegration of UNITA as a military force.  
 
3.3.1. Available revenue sources 
 
For the second recurrence of the civil war in Angola in 1998, diamonds and oil continued 
to be the two most important revenue sources for UNITA and MPLA.  
In the period of the Lusaka Peace Process, UNITA’s diamond revenues reached 
their peak with estimates ranging from USD 150 million to USD 800 million annually in 
1996 and 1997 (Table 3.4).  
 
 Table 3.4: Various estimates of UNITA diamond revenue, 1994-2000  
(USD million) 
 
Annual 
estimates 
Global 
Witness  
UNSC  
 
Le Billion  
 
Vines  Dietrich 
 
A diamond 
dealer 
1994 600  500  350 below 150
1995 320  600   below 150
1996 700 800 600-760 730  150
1997 700 700 700 500  150
1998 200  200 200 250  
1999  300 120-300 120 300  
2000    80 100  
Sources: Global Witness 1998, 5; UNSC 2000a, para.152-153; UNSC 2001, para.54; Le Billion 2001, 62, 
69; Vines 2004, 87; Dietrich 2002, 29-30. 
 
 The increase in revenue is associated with the relative military stability after 1994. 
The Lusaka Protocol did not specifically address the issue of diamonds because it was 
considered unrealistic that UNITA would relinquish control over the diamond fields. In 
order to recognise UNITA’s control of diamonds, it received the ministerial position for 
mines and geology. This control was considered important for UNITA to play an active 
role in Angola’s multi-party system because it gave UNITA an independent source of 
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financing. In November 1996, UNITA and the Government of Angola even signed a 
Memorandum of Understanding which gave UNITA the right to control and explore 
some diamond fields through recognised holding companies (Vines 2004, 89-90). 
 Another reason for the increase in diamond revenue is that UNITA exploited 
diamonds more systematically. UNITA used its role as a junior partner in a unified 
government to explore contacts with international diamond dealers to work towards a 
more intensive exploitation of diamonds. While UNITA’s expertise in diamonds 
increased, it still needed foreign assistance for industrial exploitation. The geographic 
occurrence of diamonds in clearly demarcated areas under UNITA control facilitated the 
industrial exploitation as well as the centralisation of profits accruing to UNITA’s 
leadership (Dietrich 2000, 278-279; UNSC 2002, paras.121-122). 
 Various estimates suggest that UNITA made USD 150-800 million annually from 
1994 to 1997. These estimates must be qualified on similar grounds as in the period 
1992-1994: Higher levels of industrial exploitation increased production cost and reduced 
profits; higher estimates may represent the total production possibilities and not the 
profits accruing to UNITA; and UNITA is unlikely to have sold diamonds at the real 
market price but at a discount, thus, reducing profits.  
 In addition to diamonds, UNITA was able to mobilise two additional revenue 
sources which were, however, inferior to diamonds. First, UNITA charged a landing fee 
of USD 2,000 to USD 5,000 per plane in UNITA controlled territory. It is estimated that 
UNITA generated approximately USD 5 million in this way between 1996 and 1997 
(UNSC 2000c, para.117). These figures highlight the dependence of UNITA on air 
transport to supply its war efforts and indicate that about two planes landed in UNITA 
territory per day between 1996 and 1997.58 Secondly, UNITA representative abroad are 
known to have had a number of bank accounts in France, Portugal, Switzerland, Ireland, 
Belgium, Côte d’Ivoire and the United Kingdom as well as in offshore centres which may 
have generated some revenue from interest payments (UNSC 2002, para.199; UNSC 
2001c, paras.234-247).  
                                                 
58 At an average price of USD 3,500 per landing, the figures suggest that 1428 landings took place between 
1996 and 1997. This translates into 714 landing per year or about 2 landings per day. 
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 Based on these considerations, UNITA’s revenue must have been lower than the 
highest estimate USD 800 million but higher than the estimated annual revenue of USD 
300 million in the period 1992-1994. Thus, it is suggested that UNITA’s average annual 
revenue sources were around USD 500 million in the period 1995-1997. 
 The conflict recurrence in 1998 marked a rapid decline of revenue for UNITA. 
Some estimates suggest that revenue declined from USD 700 million to USD 200 million 
between 1997 and 1998 with continued decline to USD 80-100 million in 2000 (see 
Table 3.4). This decline is associated to MPLA’s military campaign in the Central 
Highlands in 1998 in which UNITA lost control over major diamond areas. While MPLA 
suffered initial losses, it could capture UNITA’s headquarters in Luzumba, and ultimately 
push back UNITA to Bailundo and Andolu (see Appendix 2, Map 3)(UNSC 2002, 
para.114; Hodges 2001, 17).  
 The result of these advances was the end of centralised exploitation of diamonds 
for UNITA. By driving a wedge between UNITA controlled territory in Northern and 
Eastern Angola and the Central Highlands, MPLA separated UNITA territory into two 
parts, thus making communication and supply increasingly difficult for UNITA (see 
Appendix 2, Map 3). UNITA sought to compensate its losses by shifting exploitation to 
the mines of the Cuando Valley (Moxico Province), the Cuango Valley (Uige Province) 
and Luanda Norte and Luanda Sul. However, UNITA never again established a similar 
level of centralisation over its diamond activities (UNSC 2002, para.114). 
 UNITA’s revenue also declined because its mines became increasingly depleted. 
After three years of intensive industrial mining, the most lucrative and easy-to-exploit 
mines had been exploited (Vines 2004, 89). The decline in revenue is also associated the 
absence of new investments as well as a general downturn in the diamond market due to 
the economic recession in the United States (UNSC 2001c, para.173).   
 The most visible evidence of UNITA’s lack of revenue sources was the shift in 
military strategy from semi-conventional to guerrilla warfare. On 20 July 1999, UNITA 
was still able to launch a surprise conventional attack on Catete, a city just 60 kilometres 
in the South-East of the capital Luanda. With the Catete attack, UNITA committed a 
major strategic military error which ultimately led to its military defeat: By attacking 
Catete, UNITA’s supply lines became too long and unsustainable; by pooling resources 
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around Catete, positions in the Central Highlands became vulnerable; and by 
overestimating its military strength, UNITA overlooked that it would have never been 
able to defeat MPLA forces which were most heavily concentrated in and around Luanda. 
These military blunders were explained by UNITA loosing most of its experienced 
military leaders under the Bicesse or Lusaka Peace Accord as they left to be integrated 
into a national army (Malaquias 2007, 212-215).  
 MPLA exploited UNITA’s concentration around Catete and prepared the 
Cocimbo (cold season) offensive against the UNITA strongholds Bailundo59 and Andulo 
in the Central Highlands. MPLA prepared the offensive through the cities of Huambo, 
Kuito, Malanje, and Menongue surrounding the Central highlands and which it 
controlled. Rather than continuing the siege of these cities, UNITA focused its attention 
on pressing towards Luanda. The Cocimbo offensive started on 14 September 1999 
included army and air-force operation on Bailundo and Andulo. MPLA moved into the 
Central Highland from the North, South and East and officially declared the capture of 
Bailundo and Andulo on 20 October 1999 (Malaquias 2001, 323-324). This victory is 
important as it meant UNITA’s loss of the central highlands and its diamond mines as 
well as Bailundo which was considered the cradle of Ovimbindo nationalism (Malaquias 
2007, 214-215).  
 By the end of 1999, the landscape of territorial control changed. UNITA withdrew 
to Northern and Eastern Angola and changed from semi-conventional to guerrilla warfare 
in the territory that was then MPLA controlled (see Appendix 2, Map 4). MPLA 
weakened UNITA by first driving a wedge into UNITA territory between the Central 
Highlands and Northern and Eastern Angola, before retaking the Central Highlands 
(compare Map 3 and Map 4 in Appendix 2). As a result, UNITA found it increasingly 
difficult to procure new weapons and maintain supply lines for conventional weapons 
systems. In parallel, UNITA started to lose coherence as a military organisation. 
Surrender and desertions increased and a parallel movement was created under the name 
                                                 
59 Bailundo is not indicated in Map 1 of Appendix 3 but is located between Huambo and Bimbe in Huambo 
Province.  
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UNITA-Renovada60 (Hodges 2001, 17). In consequence of the reduced cohesion and loss 
of diamond fields, Jonas Savimbi built up a diamond stockpile controlled only by him. 
UNITA resorted to paying for arms in diamonds and left the risk of transport and selling 
diamonds to the arms brokers (Dietrich 2000c, 286). 
 Together with the territorial advances of the MPLA and the capture of major 
airports, sanctions also contributed to preventing UNITA following the escalation of the 
war. By 1999, United Nations sanctions made it more difficult to commercialise 
diamonds and increased the transaction cost for UNITA. The UNSC levied a new set of 
sanctions including Resolution 1127 (28 August 1997) which banned the travel of senior 
UNITA cadres, closed all UNITA offices abroad, and interdicted all aircraft travel to 
UNITA-held territories. Resolution 1173 (12 June 1998) levied an embargo on diamonds 
emanating from UNITA-held territories, froze UNITA’s bank accounts and banned all 
financial transaction with UNITA (Hodges 2001, 16).  
 Thus, as a result of the territorial losses and the increasing exposure to sanctions, 
UNITA’s revenue sources and organisational coherence declined. By 2002, UNITA was 
no longer functional as an organised armed group. UNITA disintegrated entirely when 
Jonas Savimbi was killed by Government Special Forces on 22 February 2002 (Le Billon 
2005, 122).  
 Thus, in the period 1998-2002, UNITA’s revue sources eroded to levels well 
below the annual USD 500 million of the period 1995-1997. Given the estimates 
presented in Table 3.4, UNITA is estimated to have had revenue sources of around USD 
200 million in 1998; USD 100 million in 1999, and below USD 100 million for the 
period 2000 to 2002. 
 While diamonds represented the revenue source of UNITA, MPLA continued 
financing conflict with oil. Revenue was generated through oil production, signature 
bonuses for new oil blocks or oil-backed loans.  
 In the mid-1990s, the Government of Angola benefited from the invention of new 
deep-water drilling technology and expanded petrol exploration. With the partnership of 
foreign firms, the Government opened deep-water blocks 3 and 14 as well as ultra-deep-
                                                 
60 UNITA-Renovada was created in September 1998 by two high-profile cadres of UNITA, Eugénio 
Manuvakola and Jorge Valentim, who broke rank with Jonas Savimbi. The Government of Angola 
immediately exploited the movement to further split UNITA (Hodges 2001, 59-60). 
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water blocks 15, 17 and 18. The opening of these blocks allowed Angola to increase oil 
production from 0.5 to 1.0 million barrels per day which translated into the doubling of 
government oil revenue from USD 1,324 million in 1995 to 2,625 million in 1996 and 
USD 3,945 million in 2000 (see Table 3.5). 
 A drop in oil prices from 18 USD per barrel to 12 USD per barrel decreased the 
revenue sources of MPLA in 1998 and early 1999 (Le Billon 2001, 62). The importance 
of this drop in revenue is that it coincided with the beginning of the military campaign of 
UNITA in Catete bringing UNITA forces into the proximity of Luanda. The drop in oil 
prices led to a budget deficit which was further amplified that existing oil production 
would not create immediate revenues (Vines 2004, 88). 
 
Table 3.5: Value of oil production and Government oil revenue, 1995-2002  
(USD million) 
(Le Billon 2001, 62; IMF 2005, 10, 28, 69, 70; HRW 2004, 44) 
 
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Value of oil 
production 
3,735 5,071 4,741 3,220 4,751 7,414 6,144 7,739 
Government oil 
revenue  
1,324 2,625 2,475 1,215 2,377 3,945 3,194 3,892 
Government 
diamond revenue 
3.8 3.9 6.8 10.0 21.0 30.0* 45.5 44.6 
Government 
military 
expenditure 
300-400 450 640 934 1,572 793 680 808 
* Estimation based on IMF 2005, 26.  
 
 Thus, being challenged militarily and facing a budgetary crises, MPLA decided to 
open new ultra-deep oil blocks 31, 32 and 33. For the opening of new oil blocks the 
Government of Angola is alleged to have benefited of signature bonuses of around USD 
1 billion in 1999 (see Table 3.6). The oil blocks 31, 32 and 33 alone already amounted to 
USD 866 million. The signature bonus of British Petroleum, for example, amounted to 
USD 111 million (Vines 2004, 88-89). Overall, the Angolan Government was able to 
make USD 1.541 million from signature bonuses between 1994 and 2002 (see Table 3.6). 
The revenue from signature bonuses helped MPLA to bridge the cash deficit incurred 
through low oil prices and was essential to pay for the Cocimbo offensive.  
 However, signature bonuses also helped to reduce pressures from multilateral 
lenders to adjust Government spending and engage in economic reform. Angola’s debt 
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rose nearly four-fold from USD 3 billion in the early 1980s to USD 11.7 billion the mid 
1990s and pressures from the IMF increased to engage in structural adjustment (Hodges 
2001, 140). In 1996, Angola negotiated a debt relief from Russia which reduced its debt 
to USD 8.5 billion. However, Angola knew that no further debt rescheduling was 
possible by the end of the 1990s and debt maintenance became increasingly 
unsustainable. In order to prevent structural adjustment and keep the IMF at bay, the 
Government resorted to using SONANGOL to negotiate oil-backed loans with private 
lenders, alas at higher interest rates. By 1999, oil-guaranteed debt amounted to USD 2.7 
billion in 1999 or 28% of total debt. In this way, oil contributed to the prevention of the 
collapse of state financing.  
 
Table 3.6: Signature bonus payments to the Government of Angola, 1994-2002 
(HRW 2004, 29-30) 
 
Year Block Companies Amount  
(USD million) 
1994 15 Exxon Mobile (40%), BP (26.67), Agip (20%), Statoil (13.33) 35 
1995 14 Chevron Texaco (31%), Sonagol (20%), Agip (20%), Total 
Elf Fina (20%), Petrogal (9%) 
12 
1996 18 BP (50%), Shell (50%) 9 
1998 19 Total Fina Elf (30%), Canadian Natural Resources (25%), 
Sonangol (20%), Ocean Energy (20%), Naphta-Israel (5%) 
10 
1998 21 BHP (30%), Sonangol (20%), BP (20%), Exxon Mobile 
(20%), Shell (10%) 
41 
1999 24 Exxon Mobile (50%), Sonangol (20%), Ocean Energy (15%), 
Petronas (15%) 
69 
1999 25 Agip (40%), Exxon Mobile (35%), Sonangol (25%) 69 
1999 31 BP (26.67%), Exxon Mobile (25%), Sonagol (20%), Statoil 
(13.33%), Marathon Oil (10%), Total Elf Fina (5%) 
335 
1999 32 Total Elf Fina (30%), Marathon Oil (35%), Sonangol (20%), 
Exxon Mobile (15%), Petrogal (5%) 
231 
1999 33 Exxon Mobile (45%), Sonangol (20%), Total Elf Fina (15%), 
Falcon Oil (10%), Naphta-Israel (5%), Petrogal (5%) 
300 
2001 34 Norsk Hydro (30%), Sonangol (20%), Conoco Philipps (20%) 
Petrobras (15%), Shell (15%) 
400 
2002 16 Ranger Oil (50%), Odebrecht (30%), Sonangol (20%) 30 
TOTAL  
(1994-2002) 
  1541 
Total (1999)   1004 
Note: These figures are based on a KPMG report Current Assessment of the Angolan Petroleum Sector: 
Inception Report July 2002. The report was not made public but parts were published in HRW 2004. 
 
 The Government also used oil to facilitate arms procurement and to gain political 
or economic advantages. Many smaller foreign petrol companies served as intermediaries 
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to arms dealers and were rewarded with oil shares. While multinational companies were 
obvious partners due to their technical expertise of deep-water oil exploration, many 
experts question the commercial necessity to include smaller companies. In addition to 
facilitating access to armed markets oil was used to gain commercial and diplomatic 
leverage by allowing competition between companies from various countries (Reno 2000, 
22-29). 
 In addition to oil, the Government also generated revenue sources from diamonds. 
With the increasing control over diamond mines, the Government could increase its 
revenue from diamond exploitation. Revenue increased from USD 3.8 million in 1997 to 
USD 44.6 million in 2002. However, the Government’s revenue capture was low given 
that the export value of diamonds USD 629 million in 1999 and USD 638 million in 2002 
(IMF 2004, 58). The increase in revenue was possible to the increasing centralisation of 
the diamond industry through the government. The Angola Selling Corporation 
(ASCORP) became the only organisation allowed to buy and sell diamonds. 
Nevertheless, continuing informal sector activity and corruption led to greater pressure 
from the IMF to increase the transparency of the diamond sector (Hodges 2001, 162-
163). 
 
Table 3.7: Revenue deriving from official oil and diamond production 
and signature bonuses, 1995-2002 (USD million) 
(based on Le Billon 2001, 62; IMF 2005, 10, 28, 69, 70; HRW 2004, 44) 
 
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Government oil 
revenue  
1,324 2,625 2,475 1,215 2,377 3,945 3,194 3,892 
Signature bonuses 12 9 0 51 1,004 0 400 30 
Government 
diamond revenue 
3.8 3.9 6.8 10.0 21.0 30.0* 45.5 44.6 
TOTAL by year 1,340 2,638 2,482 1,276 3,402 3,975 3,640 3,967 
TOTAL by period 6,460 16,259 
Average annual 
revenue 
 
2,153 
 
3,252 
* Estimation based on IMF 2005, 26.  
 
 When considering the revenue sources deriving from official oil and diamond 
production as well as signature bonuses Government of Angola. Table 3.7 shows that 
MPLA was able to improve its revenue sources from the annual average of about USD 
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1.5 billion in the period 1992-1994. In the period 1995-1997, MPLA had an average 
annual available revenue of about USD 2,153 million and in the period 1998-2002 of 
about USD 3,252 million.  Table 3.7 also shows that signature bonuses were crucial to 
offset the drop in revenue from USD 2,482 million in 1997 to USD 1,276 million in 1998 
to USD 3,402 million in 1999. 
 In addition to these official figures, the government of Angola is known to have 
maintained a parallel system of conflict financing through SONANGOL (World Bank 
2005, ii-iii, see also above). An IMF commissioned study into oil sector found that 
SONANGOL underpaid the National Bank of Angola by more than USD 2.1 billion in 
2000 (HRW 2004, 27). Under Parliamentary Decree 30/95, SONAGOL must deposit all 
oil revenues in the Central Bank. However, SONANGOL failed to remit any profits to 
the central bank and underpaid its taxes (HRW 2004, 27). Under Parliamentary Decree 
15/89, SONANGOL was obliged to transfer the profits of its involvement in production 
sharing agreements to the Ministry of Finance. However, when comparing how much the 
Ministry of Finance received and how much SONAGOL said it had transferred in 2000 
and discrepancy of USD 323 million emerged. Concerning the SONANGOL’s tax and 
royalty discrepancies, it is suggested that the Ministry of Finance received USD 114 to 
418 million more than what SONANGOL declared without the Ministry undertaking any 
efforts to reconcile the figures (HRW 2004, 23-25). 
 These figures illustrated the potential value of the revenue sources deriving from 
parallel finances. How much of these additional revenues were used to support the war is 
not known. Due to the high level of corruption in the public service of Angola, a 
substantial proportion may also have been used for self-enrichment of officials and the 
maintenance of a client network (Hodges 2001, 139).  
 If, therefore, the official figures on revenue sources are taken as a minimum 
estimate on MPLA’s available revenue sources to finance armed conflict, estimates 
suggest that MPLA annual average revenue was at least USD 2,153 million in the period 
1996-1997 and USD 3,252 million in the period 1998-2002. These figures indicate that 
MPLA surpassed UNITA’s revenue sources of an estimated annual revenue of about 
USD 500 million in the period 1995-1997 by more than 4 times and between 15 and 30 
times in the period 1998-2002.   
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 The most important element of MPLA conflict financing have been that it as able 
to diversify its sources of revenue though signature bonuses in a time when it needed 
immediate cash revenue in 1999 and that over time MPLA could increase its available 
revenue while UNITA’s revenue stream eroded. While UNITA revenue sources were 
curtailed through MPLA military advances and UNSC sanctions, MPLA increased its 
revenue sources though oil production revenue, bonus payments and oil-backed loans. 
This led to the situation in which MPLA could choose, pay for and pursue a strategy of 
military imposition and escalation. In the words of one MPLA General: “If we lose a 
tank, we pick up the phone and order another one. If UNITA loses one, it is more 
difficult” (c.f. Vines 2004, 8).  
 
3.3.2. The cost of conflict 
 
This Part looks at the period prior to the recurrence of conflict to establish the start of cost 
for both parties as well as the period 1998-2002 to establish the cost of maintaining 
armed conflict.  
 The Lusaka Peace Process provided for a period of relative peace which both 
parties used to procure military equipment. Between 1994 and 1998, UNITA bought 
military equipment mainly from Ukraine and Bulgaria including 50 T-55 and T-62 tanks, 
large amount of 155 millimetre G-5, B-2 and D-30 guns, medium- and long-range 
artillery BM-21 multiple rocket launchers (Malaquias 2007, 217).   
 However, despite the acquisition of conventional military equipment, UNITA 
largely remained an insurgency group and used its conventional capability only tactically 
in the period of the Lusaka process. UNITA is not known to have maintained a 
sophisticated logistical supply system to maintain its conventional capacity. It was 
dependent on air transport for receiving supplies (see above). Most of UNITA’s fighting 
was carried out with small arms and light weapons while conventional capability was 
used in the sieges of cities. UNITA was also able to capture large amounts of military 
hardware from MPLA. The import of spare parts was organised to rehabilitate captured 
tanks (UNSC 2000c, paras, 49-51).  
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 There are no estimations of the cost of this rearmament except that the estimate of 
USD 500 million of available annual revenue sources in the period 1995-1997 (see 
Section 3.3.1.). Applying the costing tool the following estimates UNITA’s and MPLA’s 
start-up and annual maintenance cost for the period 1995-2002. The key estimations 
variables include the following:  
 
• Price per weapon (PF) = 12 USD (Killicoat 2006, 76); 
• Price per round of ammunition (PA) = 0.05 USD (no data, assumed price reflecting the 
cheapness of weapons); 
• Annual average male salary (I) = 2,626 USD (data for 2002, UNDP 2003, 310-313. 
Represents approximately cost per soldier of 7.2 USD/day or 216 USD/month); 
• Number of fighters (N) = 50,000 for UNITA and 107,500 for MPLA (represents 
estimated troops strength in (IISS 2000, 260)). 
 
 The CERs for the start-up and annual maintenance of armed conflict suggest that UNITA 
had a start-up cost of about USD 1.3 million and annual maintenance cost about USD 138 
million for a low intensity conflict, USD 162 million for a medium intense conflict and 
USD 352 million for a high intensity conflict (see Table 3.8). The reduction of the 
estimated cost of conflict in comparison to the period 1992-1994 is mainly attributable to 
the reduction of UNITA’s size from 65,000 to 50,000 men. 
 Similar to the period 1992-1994, these estimates are for a situation in which 
UNITA would have needed to buy all equipment prior to the onset of conflict. However, 
due to the previous episodes of armed conflict in Angola, UNITA had a pre-existing 
weapons stock and had captured weapons from government forces. The start-up and 
annual maintenance cost can therefore be considered to be lower than the estimate given. 
Nevertheless, considering the acquisitions of conventional military equipment by UNITA 
in the period 1995-1998, the start-up and annual maintenance cost can be considered to 
have increased considerable. 
 One aspect to consider in relation to the cost of conflict for UNITA is the effect of 
sanctions. Sanctions had the objective to limit UNITA’s revenue source through banning 
the sale of diamonds internationally and making its supply more difficult by banning 
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landing in UNITA held territory. In addition, sanctions deteriorated UNITA’s operating 
environment through ‘naming and shaming’ and a higher rate of enforcement of sanctions 
through national legislation (UNSC 2002b, 200-231). The Monitoring Mechanism argued 
that due to sanctions “[UNITA] was obliged to alter its military tactics, concentrating on 
civilian targets, unprotected towns and villages, and infrastructure. (...) UNITA fighters 
were even short of ammunition and basic supplies (...)” (UNSC 2002b, para.5). 
 Sanctions were unable to decisively affect UNITA’s supply network and conflict 
financing prior to 1997. UNITA was resilient and relocated assets to more secure places 
and reduced its visible contacts with arms brokers or other supporters (UNSC 2001c, 
para.231). UNITA officials were able to protect some diamond stocks, bank accounts and 
other assets. Jonas Savimbi was also known to have controlled a considerable diamond 
stock the size of which was unknown (UNSC 2002, para.98). UNITA operations were not 
affected because of the remaining loopholes allowed the continuation of conflict 
financing with diamonds. These loopholes included murky diamond legislation in trading 
centres and consumer markets, the persistence of porous borders, corruption and 
smuggling networks, high financial incentive for diamond smugglers to continue 
diamond trafficking (UNSC 2002b, para.233-237). 
 After 1998, sanctions had greater impacts. The recapture of the diamond mines as 
well as wider sanctions increased the transaction cost of UNITA. The loss of major 
airfields in late 1998 made it more difficult for UNITA to supply itself. Particularly, the 
supply of petrol was a problem and affected its military capability in 1999. In addition, 
the MPLA intervened in the DRC in 1997 to cut of UNITA from its military sanctuary. 
The difficulty to reach UNITA and greater efforts by the international community to 
enforce sanctions increased the risk for brokers dealing with UNITA (Hodges 2001, 17).  
 Looking at MPLA’s military acquisitions leads to suggest that they were superior 
to those of UNITA. MPLA started an unprecedeted shopping spree in the mid-1990s. It 
bought 100 BMP-2 infantry fighting vehicles, MiG 23 and SU-22 aircraft, Mi-17 and Mi-
24 attack helicopters, and 12 Pilatus PC-7 training aircraft. It bought aircrafts, vehicles 
and artillery from Brazil; helicopters air-to ground missiles and ammunition from France; 
and AK-47s, rocket-propelled grenades, mortars, ammunition, T-55 tanks and aircraft 
from Russia (De Beer and Gamba, 2000, 84). 
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Table 3.8: Overview of the start-up and annual maintenance of armed conflict for UNITA and MPLA, 1995-2002 
 
 CERs Composites UNITA  MPLA  
   USD USD USD USD 
CER 1:  
Weapons 
1.5 firearms (F)  
x Price per firearm (PF)  
x Number of fighters (N) 
 
900,000 
 
1,935,000 
S
t
a
r
t
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u
p
 
c
o
s
t
 
CER 2:   
Ammunition 
1.5 firearms (F)  
x 100 rounds of ammunition (A) 
x Price per ammunition (PA) 
x Number of fighters (N) 
 
375,000 
 
Total start-up cost 
 
1,275,000  
806,250 
 
Total start-up cost 
 
2,741,250 
CER 3:  
Salaries 
Annual male income (I) 
x Number of fighters (N) 
 
131,000,000 
  
282,295,000 
 
CERL 4:  
Weapons 
 
0.33 firearms (F)  
x 1 x Price per firearm (PF) 
x Number of insurgents (N) 
 
198,000 
 
427,700 
L
o
w
 
i
n
t
e
n
s
i
t
y
 
CERL 5:  
Ammunition 
 
1.5 firearms (F)  
x 20 rounds of ammunition (A) 
x 90 days of combat 
x Price per round (PA) 
x Number of insurgents (N) 
 
6,750,000 
 
Total maintenance 
(low intensity)* 
 
137,958,000 
 
14,512,500 
 
Total maintenance 
(low intensity)* 
 
297,235,200 
CERM 4:  
Weapons 
0.45 firearms (F)  
x 1.5 x Price per firearm (PF) 
x Number of insurgents (N) 
 
450,000 
 
870,750 
M
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CERM 5: 
Ammunition 
 
1.5 firearms (F)  
x 60 rounds of ammunition (A) 
x 90 days of combat 
x 1.5 x Price per round (PA) 
x Number of insurgents (N) 
 
30,375,000 
 
 
Total maintenance 
(medium intensity)* 
 
161,780,000 
 
65,306,250 
 
Total maintenance 
(medium intensity)* 
 
348,472,000 
CERH 4:  
Weapons 
 
0.65 firearms (F) 
x 3 x Price per firearm (PF) 
x Number of insurgents (N) 
 
1,170,000 
 
2,515,500 
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CERH 5:  
Ammunition 
1.5 firearms (F)  
x 120 rounds of ammunition (A) 
x 90 days of combat 
x 3 x Price per round (PA) 
x Number of insurgents (N) 
 
121,500,000 
 
Total maintenance 
(high intensity)* 
 
253,670,000 
 
261,225,000 
 
Total maintenance 
(high intensity)* 
 
546,035,500 
* Includes CER 3: Salaries. 
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 The composition of MPLA’s acquisition reflected its strategic needs. MPLA 
strengthened its air force because UNITA was in control of about 70% of Angola’s 
territory including nearly all major roads in rural areas. An increased air force capacity 
was thus necessary to break UNITA’s position. Moreover, MPLA needed to supply its 
troops as well as the inhabitants of major town such as Saurimo, Kuito, Luena, Malanje 
and Uige (see Appendix 2, Map 1)(De Beer and Gamba 2000, 84). 
 Estimating the cost of this rearmament of MPLA using CERs suggests a start-up 
cost of about USD 2.7 million and annual maintenance cost of about USD 297 million for 
a low intensity conflict, USD 348 million for a medium intense conflict and USD 546 
million for a high intensity conflict (see Table 3.8).   
 Given that MPLA was a state party these estimates can be supplemented with 
estimates on Angola’s defence expenditure (see Table 3.9). A review of Angola’s official 
Government expenditure suggest that at Government defence expenditure had an annual 
average of USD 885 million in the period 1995-1997. The Government increased its 
official military budget from USD 477 million in 1995 to USD 1,191 million in 1997 
before it dropped to USD 474 million due to the drop in the price for oil (see above). 
However, the Government had an annual of USD 686 million of unrecorded military 
expenditure in the period 1995-1997. Joint official with unofficial defence expenditure 
leads to an average annual expenditure of USD 1,570 million for the period 1995-1997. 
 Alternative defence expenditure estimations of the International Institute for 
Strategic Studies suggests smaller amounts including USD 300-400 million in 1995, USD 
450 million in 1996, and USD 658 million in 1997 reflecting more the official defence 
expenditure. So do, estimates of Human Rights Watch which hold that the defence 
expenditures was USD 640 million in 1997 and USD 934 million in 1998 are similar 
(HRW 2004, 44). The discrepancy of these alternative figures is that defence expenditure 
increases rather than decreases in 1998. 
 Unrecorded Government expenses have also been an issue in an IMF 
commissioned study in 2002. It revealed that the Government of Angola had unexplained 
expenditures amounting to USD 4,222 million in the period 1997-2002 or an annual 
average of USD 704 million. The discrepancy is particularly high in 1997 and 1999 at the 
time when MPLA conducted offensives against UNITA (see above). 
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Table 3.9: Government revenue and military expenditure in Angola, 1994-1998 
(Based on Le Billon 2001, 62) 
 
 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Government oil revenue (USD million) 1,324 2,625 2,475 1,215 
Share of oil in government revenue (%) 87.2 89.2 83.1 69.7 
Total government revenue (Projection 
based on oil revenue, USD, million) 
1518 2943 2978 1743 
Military expenditure (% of total 
government expenditures and net 
lending) 
31.4 33.5 40.0 27.2 
Military expenditure (USD million) 477 986 1191 474 
Average annual 1995-1997 
(USD, million) 
 
885 
 
Unrecorded military expenditure (% of 
total government expenditures and net 
lending) 
48.8 26.3 18.2 13.8 
Unrecorded military expenditure 
(USD, million) 
741 774 542 241 
Average annual 1995-1997 
(USD, million) 
 
686 
 
Combined official and unrecorded 
military expenditure (% of total 
government expenditures and net 
lending) 
80.2 59.8 58.2 41.0 
Combined official and unrecorded 
military expenditure (USD, million) 
1218 1760 1733 715 
Average annual 1995-1997 
(USD, million) 
 
1,570 
 
IISS estimates for defence 
expenditures (USD million) 
300-400 450 658 955 
HRW estimates for defence 
expenditures (USD million) 
n.a. n.a. 640 934 
Note: The estimations for military expenditure, unrecorded military expenditure, and combined official and 
unrecorded military expenditure are based on the assumption that government revenue equals government 
spending and net lending for the period 1992-1994. 
 
 Table 3.10: Unexplained expenditure discrepancies of the Government of Angola,  
1997-2002 (HRW 2004, 36) 
 
 
Year 
 
1997 
 
1998 
 
1999 
 
2000 
 
2001 
 
2002 
 
TOTAL 
Annual 
average 
Total Government 
Expenditure  
(USD million) 
 
4,966 
 
2,771 
 
 
5,016 
 
5,387 
 
4,383 
 
5,370 
 
27,893 
 
4,649 
Discrepancy  
(USD million) 
 
 
1,775 
 
34 
 
1,119 
 
407 
 
540 
 
347 
 
4,222 
 
704 
Discrepancy  
(% of Government 
Expenditures) 
35.7 1.2 22.3 7.6 12.3 6.5 15.1 15.1 
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 Another perspective of the cost of conflict for MPLA provides knowledge on 
individual arms deals. Overall they confirm the magnitude of start-up cost of armed 
conflict and unexplained expenditures. For example, in 1995 and 1996, MPLA bought 
MiG 23 and SU-22 aircraft for USD 300 million (De Beer and Gamba 2000, 84). 
Moreover, Global Witness documents and arms deal worth USD 45 million including 
USD 12.25 million  for 35 BMP-2 infantry fighting vehicle and USD 4.59 million for 30 
BMD troop transporters (Global Witness 2002, 17). Moreover, President Dos Santos 
travelled to Moscow in June 1998 (thus nearly one year before the Cocimbo offensive) 
with a shopping list of military equipment. The total value of contracts was estimated of 
up to USD 1 billion (Vines 2004, 91). The Brazilian Government confirmed to have sold 
military equipment worth USD 87.5 million in the late 1990s including 27 aircrafts 
(Vines 2004, 92). 
 These additional estimates on MPLA’s cost of conflict suggest that the cost of 
conflict must be higher than the estimates provide through CERs given the magnitude of 
conventional arms acquisitions. Considering the CER as a minimum threshold, the 
difference between the CERs and the estimates of combined official and unofficial 
defence expenditure highlight the cost for MPLA to develop its conventional capability. 
Given the CER for maintaining high intensity conflict of USD 546 million, the cost of 
acquisitions of conventional equipment was about USD 1 billion.  
  When comparing these figures for the available revenue sources in the period 
1995-1997 of MPLA (USD 2.153 million annually) and UNITA (USD 500 million 
annually) it emerges that both MPLA and UNITA had a surplus of revenue sources for a 
high intensity conflict and UNITA for a medium intensity conflict. The reduced revenue 
sources of MPLA in 1998 brought it closer to a shortage of revenue sources for a high 
intensity conflict while UNITA launched the Catete offensive. The resilience of MPLA to 
diversify its revenue sources through signature bonuses and oil-backed loans provided it 
with the necessary revenue to rearm and launch the Cocimbo offensive in the Central 
Highlands. Once MPLA had wrest control of diamond mines and the Central Highlands 
from UNITA, the revenue base of UNITA was undermined as evidenced by declining 
annual revenue under the minimum threshold to maintain even a low intensity conflict 
and the subsequent return to guerrilla warfare.  
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3.3.3 Expected benefits and opportunity costs 
 
The expected benefits and opportunity costs of MPLA and UNITA for conflict recurrence 
are related to clashing hegemonic interests, distrust between both parties and the few in-
built opportunity costs of the Lusaka Peace Process. In 1998, the driver for conflict 
recurrence was MPLA and not – as in 1992 – UNITA. Dos Santos lost its patience when 
it became clear that UNITA would not adhere to the provisions of the Lusaka Peace 
Accords. UNITA did not entirely demobilise, hand in its heavy weapons and return all 
areas under its control to state administration. By the deadline of 1 April 1998, UNITA 
had only returned 80% of 344 municipalities under its control unwilling to hand-over 
strategic locations (Vines 2004, 81).  
 In consequence, MPLA had no confidence in UNITA to ever show a credible 
commitment to the peace process. Indeed, Savimbi only showed lukewarm support for 
the Lusaka proccess and left the task of implementation to subordinates. He did not want 
to take any responsibility in case the Protocols did not work of fear this would undermine 
his authority. When the Protocols failed, the UNITA representatives involved in the 
Protocols became scapegoats (Vines 2004, 81). 
 The lack of confidence between the parties was also a reflection of the deep 
distrust which both parties had against each other. The armed conflict in Angola had been 
conducted by two antagonistic leaderships who fought each other for over two decades. 
Distrust on behalf of Dos Santos was confirmed through the conflict recurrence in 1992. 
From the perspective of UNITA, Savimbi considered the Lusaka Protocol just another 
strategy of MPLA against UNITA which he only accepted due to the weakness of his 
forces and military situation in 1994 (Le Billon 2005, 113).  
 As a result of distrust between MPLA and UNITA and disbelief in the Lusaka 
Peace Process, MPLA started pursuing a strategy of stealth. At the root of this strategy 
was a belief within the MPLA leadership that UNITA could only be vanquished though 
force. In the words of the MPLA Chief of Staff, João Matas, “only the total defeat of 
Savimbi can ensure peace” (c.f. Vines 2004, 81).  
 The expected benefits from using force for MPLA was to crush UNITA as an 
organised armed group. An essential element of this strategy was to recapture the 
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diamond filed to limit the revenue sources for UNITA, disrupt its organisation structure 
and reduce its international room to manoeuvre through UNSC sanctions.  
 However, the expected benefit of using armed force was not entirely related to the 
crushing of UNITA. MPLA also had a domestic political agenda to reign in an 
increasingly influential client network which had emerged in the Government-controlled 
diamond areas (Dietrich 2000b, 173-174). In mid-1996, the Government already 
controlled the alluvial diamond mines of Dundo-Lucapa-Saurimo valley and around 
Cuango in Luanda Norte (see Appendix 2, Map 2). The network of MPLA Generals 
became increasingly powerful through the control of the airports and roads. They became 
involved in the exploitation of diamonds in collaboration with junior international 
diamond companies (mainly from South Africa) and also taxed incoming goods about 
10% and onward transportation of another 10-15%. The result was that MPLA generals 
control diamonds and the supply of goods (Dietrich 2000b, 183). The result was that 
MPLA leaders and their families created a client network in Luanda Norte which became 
increasingly independent from the Government (Dietrich 2000b, 176-178). 
 The Government responded to this threat to its power by annulling the 
international status of all airports in Luanda Norte and Luanda Sul – thus making it a 
requirement for all planes to land in the capital Luanda first – and by centralising 
diamond acquisitions and selling though the creation of ASCORP in 2000: 
 
 “The noble pretext of preventing UNITA rough [diamonds] from tarnishing 
Angola’s legitimate diamond trade enabled the central élite to dominate the legal 
diamond sector and expand control over informal diamond networks. Rather than 
revamping buying practices by licensed dealers, the monopoly seems to be aimed 
more at co-opting and incorporating financially rebellious generals, forcing them 
to obtain the necessary paperwork through partners in the Fatungo [the 
Presidential Palace]” (Dietrich 2000b, 188-189). 
 
 In comparison to the previous phase of conflict recurrence, UNITA was the 
reactive and not pro-active actor. The Lusaka Peace Process provided relative stability, 
foreign investment and cooperation opportunities to UNITA to develop the diamond 
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mines under its control. UNITA had therefore no real incentive to get back to armed 
conflict as long as the Lusaka Peace Process sheltered its areas of influence from MPLA 
influence and attack. Once MPLA restarted the conflict, UNITA expected benefits of 
using armed force was defensive, i.e. to remain in control of diamond mines.  
 This pattern of strategic behaviour suggests that both UNITA and MPLA were 
unable to overcome the hegemonic aspirations and zero-sum perception of the land and 
natural resources. The capacity of both parties to finance a military option to dealing with 
the adversary was a key aspect in the recurrence of conflict. Particularly for MPLA, the 
revenue from petrol resources, bonus payments and oil-backed loans provided the MPLA 
the means not be forced to accept any compromise and to pursue an independent military 
strategy to impose itself over UNITA through the use of overwhelming force. In these 
circumstances, the breaking Lusaka Peace Process did no represent any opportunity cost 
to MPLA as it had lost to serve its political purpose for MPLA to win against UNITA 
through negotiation and peaceful means. 
  
3.3.4. Assessment 
 
The analysis of the 1998 Angola conflict suggests that the availability of revenue sources 
contributed to the recurrence of conflict. MPLA had disproportionately higher revenue 
sources available to finance conflict recurrence than UNITA. MPLA financed its military 
activities from oil production revenue, signature bonuses and oil-backed loans providing 
the Government of Angola with an estimated USD 2,153 million annually in the period 
1995-1997 and USD 3,252 million annually in the period 1998-2002. The magnitude of 
these revenue sources explains why MPLA chose a military strategy to crush UNITA 
without considering any compromise on the political front.  
 Ultimately, MPLA chose to leave the framework of the Lusaka Peace Process and 
adopted a military strategy to further escalate the conflict and defeat UNITA. MPLA had 
the revenue sources to pay for increasing the intensity of conflict. While UNITA had 
sufficient revenue sources to gain short-term military advantages at the beginning of the 
Catete offensive, in the long run, it could not sustain its deployment with long supply 
lines while being militarily challenged the Central Highlands. UNITA subsequently lost 
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control over its diamond revenues, its operating environment became more difficult 
through sanctions, and organisational structure eroded. While UNITA experienced a lack 
of revenue sources to confront MPLA, MPLA experienced a petrol revenue bonanza 
which it used to crush UNITA. 
 The analysis highlights that MPLA’s military strategy came at a high cost. MPLA 
had the revenue sources to cover the USD 546 million to maintain a high intensity 
conflict as well as acquire a conventional military capability of between USD 1.5-2.0 
billion. However, the magnitude of these figures are secondary because what matters is 
that MPLA had the revenue sources to pay for the escalation of a high intensity 
conventional armed conflict. In comparison, after 1999 UNITA not even had the 
resources to pay for the USD 132 million to maintain a low intensity conflict.  
 In terms of the relationship between conflict financing and conflict recurrence, the 
period 1995-2002 highlights the following issues:  
 
• Different characteristics of natural resources as methods of conflict financing can 
provide a strategic advantage in fighting wars: The reliance of MPLA on oil was a 
strategic advantage of MPLA over UNITA. The off-shore characteristics of Angola’s 
oil deposits, international interests as well as the commercial value of oil provided 
MPLA with a revenue stream which was superior to the one of UNITA. Moreover, 
the off-shore characteristics isolated MPLA from attack of its economic base, while 
UNITA’s diamond mines were more vulnerable. After MPLA’s military campaigns, 
UNITA lost its main source of conflict financing. It was unable to diversify and thus 
disintegrated as a military organisation. For MPLA, oil provided sufficient revenue to 
renew the conflict at a higher level of intensity.  
• The management of resources provided MPLA a strategic advantage: MPLA 
managed to diversify its revenue stream when financially pressured by opening new 
deep-water oil fields and attracting oil-backed loans. MPLA managed to translate the 
control over diamonds into immediate revenue by cashing in on signature bonuses of 
about USD 1 billion in 1999 and oil-backed loans. Being a state gave MPLA the 
advantage of mortgaging future revenue sources for present purposes.  UNITA could 
not parallel MPLA’s fundraising as centralised control was more difficult in alluvial 
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diamond fields. Once MPLA split UNITA territory in two separate parts, 
centralisation was no longer possible. Thus, while MPLA increased its centralised 
control over resources, UNITA’s control of diamonds became increasingly 
decentralised.  
• The lack of revenue sources of UNITA to maintain the conflict affected the conflict 
dynamics and contributed to the end of fighting. During the course of the conflict, re-
armament of MPLA changed the military balance. The territorial advances of MPLA 
further tilted the military balance in MPLA’s favour as it reduced UNITA’s revenue 
sources. Ultimately, UNITA could no longer pay for the maintenance of its 
conventional capability and its supply was limited due to United Nations sanctions. 
 
Table 3.11: Propensity to renew armed conflict of UNITA and MPLA, 1995-2002 
 
 UNITA MPLA 
MATERIAL 
ENVIRONMENT 
Surplus of revenue sources (RS>C) 
for of high intensity conflict 1995-
1997; in 1998 lack of revenue 
sources (RS<C) for medium 
intensity conflict and after 1999 for 
low intensity conflict 
Surplus of revenue sources (RS>C) 
for an armed conflict of high 
intensity 
Potential revenue 
sources (annual) 
USD 500 million (1995-1997) 
USD 200 million (1998) 
USD 100 million (1999) 
Below USD 100 million (2000-
2002) 
USD 2,153 million (1995-1997) 
USD 3,252 million (1998-2002) 
 
Cost of conflict (annual)   
Start-up USD 1.3 million USD 2.7 million 
Maintenance low USD 138 million USD 207 million 
Maintenance medium USD 162 million USD 348 million 
Maintenance high USD 254 million USD 546 million 
Alternative  USD 1,570 million 
INCENTIVE TO USE 
ARMED FORCE  
 
 
Low 
 
High 
Expected benefit of 
using armed force 
Defend diamond mines from MPLA 
attack 
Establish control over capital 
Luanda 
Crush UNITA as a military 
organisation; reign in domestic 
client network in Government 
controlled diamond areas 
Opportunity cost of 
using armed force 
Losing framework conditions of 
Lusaka protocol which provided 
form profitable diamond extraction 
Breaking with the Lusaka Protocol 
had little opportunity cost because 
implementation did not few tangible 
results 
PROPENSITY TO 
RENEW ARMED 
CONFLICT  
 
Low 
 
High 
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3.4. Risk of conflict recurrence since 2002 
 
Since the death of Jonas Savimbi in 2002 and the end of armed  conflict, international 
attention has shifted away from Angola. While in the late 1990s and early 2000s, 
advocacy groups such as Global Witness and Partnership Africa-Canada as well as the 
UNSC Sanctions Monitoring Mechanisms produced multiple reports on diamonds, oil 
and war, Angola’s post-conflict period received much less attention with the exception of 
IMF, World Bank and UNDP reports (IMF 2005, World Bank 2005b, UNDP 2005).  
 This absence of coverage stands in great disproportion to Angola’s challenges of 
post-conflict transition. The end of the conflict led to the demobilisation of 80,000 
UNITA soldiers and 360,000 of their family dependents as well as 33,000 MPLA soldiers 
(Gomes Porto and Parsons 2003, 7-8). Disarmament is a major challenge with between 
1.5 million and 4 million small arms in Angola. Rising crime rates provide a disincentive 
to civilian disarmament and contributed to the rise of 307 private security companies 
employing 35,715 men (Ferreira 2005, 518; IRIN 2006).  
 Demobilisation and disarmament occurs in the context of a war ravaged country 
whose social and economic infrastructure has been devastated and a state never had any 
meaningful functional attributes. In this sense, peacebuilding in Angola is more about 
construction that re-construction. The state needs to be newly created, extend its 
administration to the entire territory and foster a relationship between state and society. 
 At the same time, the social indicators of Angola illustrate the challenges ahead: 
Life expectancy is 42 years, every fourth child dies before the age of five, every woman 
bears an average 7 children, one third of the population is illiterate, 40% of the population 
does not have access to safe drinking water and do not have access to sanitary facilities. 
In consequence, HIV/AIDS and infectious diseases erode the social fabric of Angola 
(UNDP 2005, 4). 
 These examples of incomplete disarmament, dysfunctional governance and socio-
economic destitution are an important background for the analysis of conflict recurrence. 
While UNITA was defeated and disintegrated as a military organisation, many economic 
incentives to use armed force persist.  
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 The likelihood that diamonds contribute to the financing of renewed conflict 
depends primarily on whether a new armed group will be able to organise itself and how 
well the Government of Angola controls the areas of diamond exploration. The history of 
UNITA as well as the behaviour of MPLA Generals in the diamond fields indicates that 
the diamond reserves in Lunada Norte and the Central Highlands can provide the revenue 
sources to renewed Warlordism61 ranging from the organisation of an armed resistance 
movement to the development of a powerful opportunistic network parallel to the state.  
 The danger of Warlordism is emphasised when considering that some of the 
opportunities for profit-making from illicit diamonds have not changed since the 1990s. 
These factors include that diamonds are simply the ideal smuggling object. They are easy 
to conceal and market, and nearly impossible to destroy. They are one of the most 
concentrated forms of wealth and high profits ensure the incentive to smuggle diamonds. 
Moreover, the origin of diamonds is nearly impossible to identify and their tracing 
becomes difficult as a result. Furthermore, the borders of Angola remain porous and 
diamonds can easily be smuggled out of the country without being detected. Finally, 
corruption facilitates the smuggling of diamonds. Due to low salaries of state officials 
and a general environment of deprivation, diamonds can easily be laundered through the 
domestic output of transitory countries using forged, acquired or stolen certificates of 
origins or diamond bags. 
 These explanations underline that diamonds still have the potential to provide the 
revenue sources for an organised armed group to establish control over diamond mines 
and surrounding areas by using armed force. Government control in remote parts of 
Angola remains weak, there are many ex-combatants seeking economic opportunities, 
and weapons ammunition are either available for free or at very low cost. However, if the 
potential value of diamond reserves will be high enough to pay UNITA-like military 
organisation is questionable because UNITA has already exploited the most easily 
accessible and valuable diamond areas.  
 The Government of Angola has identified the risk emanating from the diamonds 
fields based on its experience with UNITA and the emergence of an independent client 
network during the period of the Lusaka Peace Process. The management of the diamond 
                                                 
61 For an explanation of the phenomenon of Warlordism see Chapter 1 and Reno 1998. 
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areas is vital to limit the revenue sources of potential peace spoilers. In response, the 
Government of Angola has modified the management of the diamonds sector with the 
aim of reducing informal mining and increasing Government control over diamond mines 
and revenues. About 100,000 foreign diamond diggers – mainly from the DRC – have 
been expelled since the end of the war. The remaining 150,000-300,000 Angolan diggers 
were absorbed by new companies with a government licence agreement. Moreover, the 
Government opened the diamond sector. In July 2004, 264 national companies and 34 
international companies explored diamonds in Angola. This development was preceded 
by the lifting of ASCORP’s monopoly as the diamond buying agency in July 2003 which 
allowed the entry of new actors into Angola’s diamond markets (IMF 2005, 21-27).  
 In addition to spoilers in Eastern Angola, the risk of conflict recurrence is also 
associated to the danger of a coup d’état. This is because the control of the state still 
remains the only way to control revenue from Angola’s oil revenues. Since the end of the 
war, the Government of Angola has been able to increase oil production from 741,000 
bpd in 2001 to 980 bpd in 2004. Oil production fro 2005 has even been estimated at 1,3 
million bpd (EIU 2005, 211). This production increase is mainly due to the expansion of 
the oil sector into deep-water oil deposits. It contributed to a dramatic increase in 
Government revenues from USD 3.2 billion in 2001 to USD 4.5 billion in 2004 (IMF 
2005, 19).62 An IMF forecast suggest that oil revenue is likely to grow to about USD 10 
billion by 2008 (IMF 2005, 18).63  
 These figures suggest that the economic incentives to control the state are 
important. A coup d’état would lead to a prolonged conflict between the ruling elite 
because one client network would replace another. The opportunity cost of renewed 
armed conflict is highest for the Government of Angola because the absence of armed 
conflict provided the context for increasing investments into oil and diamond extraction. 
Should conflict recur, these investments would likely be lost. This is why the 
Government of Angola should have all interest to reduce the emergence of spoilers and 
increase the level of satisfaction of the population.  
                                                 
62 The increase in revenue had little effect on Angola’s balance of payment because expenditures increased 
while high inflation and debt payment persisted (EIU 2006).    
63 This estimate is based on an oil price of 33.7 USD per barrel and can be revised upwards taking into 
account that the price of oil increase to 60 USD per barrel (EIU 2006). 
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 Ultimately, the stability of Angola does not exclusively depend on the 
management of oil and diamonds, but also how the Government manages its relations 
with the various ethnic groups of the country. Revenue sharing is an essential element in 
creating peace dividends and economic opportunities for the population and ex-
combatants: 
 
 “The vested interests (…) that have become established over 25 years make it 
difficult to remain genuinely optimistic about obtaining peace dividends. In fact, 
quite the opposite is true. The insistence on an economic model based on 
increasing the exports of natural resources (…) the structuring of the economic 
and political system on the basis of an attitude of rent-seeking, and the 
‘legitimacy’ afforded by the end of the civil war and the holding of future 
elections – all these may become ingredients from which the populations feels no 
tangible effect whatsoever” (Ferreira 2005, 20). 
 
If the Angolan peacebuilding process does not create tangible benefits for a greater part 
of the population the two central revenue sources of Angola – oil and diamonds – can 
become the source of renewed armed conflict. It is unlikely that a personality equal to 
that of Savimbi’s will emerge in Angola soon, however, the expected economic benefits 
from establishing control over oil and diamonds may be the reason for the formation of 
spoilers. In addition, spoilers may again turn to existing ethno linguist divisions and 
attempt to mobilise their discontent with a Government that is not in touch with its 
people. From the perspective of the late 1970s, Henderson observer that   
 
 “FNLA, FLEC and UNITA may disappear, but the struggle will continue. 
Ethnolinguistic loyalties and Africa-European culture conflict are so basic to the 
Angolan reality that whatever the fortunes of particular leaders of parties, these 
features will exert a profound influence on the continuing struggle in Angola” 
(Henderson 1979, 265) 
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 However, there are two lessons drawn from the analysis of conflict recurrence in 
Angola in 1992 and 1998 which put the risk of conflict recurrence in context. The 
analysis showed that UNITA did not have the revenue sources to maintain and defend 
permanently the control over territory and especially cities. An annual average of USD 
300 million in the period 1992 and 1994 and USD 500 million in 1995-1997 was not 
sufficient to establish permanent control of territory and keep government forces at bay. 
Thus, any group wishing to challenge the government control in the diamond areas needs 
overcome a barrier-to-entry of at least USD 300 million per year to start thinking about 
challenging the Government. UNITA tried, but was eventually unsuccessful. With many 
diamond mines depleted and the absence of major external backers, raising adequate 
amounts of revenue sources is a challenge. By increasing the functional capability of the 
military through security sector reform, the Government may even increase the barrier-to-
entry for those challenging the state. This underlines the importance of supporting 
responsible security and police forces to manage insurgencies before they occur and 
therefore consolidate the state’s monopoly on the use of force (Herbst 2004, 261, 367).  
 The other lesson of this case study is that ultimately, the Government generated 
the revenue sources to pay for the escalation of the conflict in 1993 and 1999. The 
geographic location of oil resources and the strategic and commercial value of oil, 
allowed the Government to generate disproportionately more income than UNITA. Given 
high oil prices and exploding future oil revenues, the Government of Angola is likely to 
generate an even higher income and be able to pay for imposing itself militarily whoever 
challenges the state.  
 However, the more prosperous the capital Luanda and the rest of Angola may 
become in the future, the bigger the opportunity cost for the Government to use force to 
settle incompatibilities relating to territorial control as investors and creditors will depart 
with renewed fighting. Thus, the Government should manage relations with its population 
in such a way that all feel a benefit from an inclusive state building project.  
 
 
 
 
  
210
3.5 Conclusion 
 
The armed conflict in Angola started in the early 1960s with the formation of three 
national liberation movements against Portuguese colonialism. After Portugal left Angola 
in 1975, the three national liberation movements fought against each other. During the 
Cold War, the conflict transformed itself into a confrontation between UNITA and 
MPLA and ideological driven proxy-war supported by the United States, the Soviet 
Union and South Africa. When the Cold War ended, the external environment changed 
and led to pressures to end the conflict. For those conceiving the civil war as a proxy war, 
it was over. However, the struggle over the control of the state remained unresolved.  
 In 1992, UNITA had a surplus of revenue sources to restart the conflict. The 
barrier-to-entry for a high-intensity conflict was low.  MPLA was disarming and had not 
modernised its forces since 1988. Revenue from diamonds, low prices for conventional 
weapons and the existence of a logistics network enabled UNITA to rearm and renew the 
armed conflict. However, during the course of the conflict, MPLA re-armed and 
challenged UNITA by escalating the conflict. In this way, MPLA increased the cost of 
competition for UNITA which contributed to military stalemate and the Lusaka Protocol.  
 In 1998, MPLA restarted the conflict. By escalating the conflict, UNITA’s cost of 
competition increased. UNITA could not follow the escalation because it lost control over 
major diamond mines and Zaire as an ally. In addition, it faced rising transaction costs 
after UNSC sanctions. UNITA became a victim of its own success: In 1992, it committed 
a strategic mistake to develop a conventional capability without considering the 
implications of maintaining supply lines in the face of a continuously escalating conflict. 
It had extended its forces over too large a territory. UNSC sanctions successfully limited 
the potential of UNITA to escalate the conflict after 1998. Thus, the Angola conflict 
shows the potential of sanctions to lock-in a conflict on a given level of intensity and 
prevent escalation.  
 The risk of conflict recurrence in Angola has become lower since the demise of 
UNITA because the barrier-to-entry to challenge Government forces is high. High oil 
revenues and an overwhelming military force of the Government reduce the likelihood of 
successfully engaging the Government with a military strategy. When considering the 
  
211
recurrence of conflict, it must be kept in mind that despite the control of diamonds, 
UNITA did not have the revenue sources to permanently maintain and defend the control 
over territory. The likelihood that a successor organisation will in the future – under less 
favourable circumstances as UNITA – remains unlikely. The Government of Angola can 
co-opted spoilers into the peace process by asserting state control over the diamond 
fields, implementing development sensitive resource management programmes and 
extending a functional state administration to eastern Angola. 
 Thus, these explanations underline that oil and diamonds undeniably affected the 
course of armed conflict in Angola. But how exactly did they relate to the recurrence of 
conflict in 1992 and 1998? First, the case study showed that the availability of revenue 
sources increased the risk of conflict recurrence. Oil and diamonds provided the means to 
finance the continuation of armed conflict, an incentive to seek conflict resolution 
through armed force rather than negotiation, and a disincentive to disarm given mutual 
distrust (Cilliers 2000b, 350-351). The availability of revenue sources also defined 
Angola’s political economy: Oil and diamonds exempted MPLA and UNITA from the 
need for any public legitimacy and accountability while providing resources for the 
financing of conflict and opportunities for corruption (Le Billon 2005. 79).  
  However, increasing the risk of conflict recurrence does not mean that natural 
resources caused the conflict. This case study concludes that the availability of revenue 
sources was a necessary but not sufficient condition for conflict recurrence. The 
availability of revenue sources did not cause the conflict to recur (sufficient condition) 
but was needed to renew the conflict (necessary condition).  
 The following observations seek to further refine the understanding of the 
relationship between conflict financing and recurrence: 
 
• Conflict recurrence in Angola was dependent on the triangular relationship between 
money, weapons and logistics. In this relationship, the availability of revenue sources 
was an important but not exclusive material condition to restart the war. Equally 
important were the availability of weapons from former Warsaw Pact countries and 
the privatisation of transnational logistics networks.  
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• Conflict recurrence is dependent on the relative availability of revenue sources of 
MPLA and UNITA. In 1992, diamond revenue was only beneficial to UNITA because 
MPLA was not rearming at the same time. This lowered the barrier-to-entry for 
armed conflict. UNITA had a short-term military advantage over MPLA which it 
exploited. However, UNITA could not keep-up the ensuing escalation driven by 
MPLA and agreed to the terms of the Lusaka Protocol. In 1998, MPLA increasing it 
available revenue sources by opening deep-water oil deposits. Bonus payments 
provided immediate revenue to cover revenue gaps from low oil prices and ultimately 
enabled MPLA to change the military balance. These findings emphasising the 
relational characteristics of conflict financing. 
• The relationship between conflict financing and recurrence varies depending on the 
management of revenue sources. The case study highlights that the revenue sources 
from MPLA have been disproportionately higher than that of UNITA. In the period 
1995-2002, MPLA’s revenue was between 7 and 10 times higher than that of 
UNITA; however, this did not translate in success in the battlefield given its 
inefficient use of resources. For UNITA, effective use of revenue sources increased 
with the creation of centralised revenue management. It derived its greatest benefits 
from diamonds for conflict financing when its control of diamonds was centralised in 
1996-1997. However, once the territorial advances of MPLA undermined UNITA’s 
centralised revenue management in 1998, UNITA lost the financial and operational 
capacity to resist further attacks.  
• Different characteristics of natural resources as methods of conflict financing can 
provide a strategic advantage and facilitate the recurrence of conflict: The off-shore 
characteristics of Angola’s oil deposits, the international interests in its exploration 
and the commercial value of oil, were the conditions which allowed MPLA to exploit 
oil as an effective method of conflict financing. The off-shore quality of oil isolated 
MPLA from attack of its economic base, while UNITA’s diamond mines were 
vulnerable to attack. When MPLA took over most of the diamond mines previously 
controlled by UNITA, UNITA lost its main source of conflict financing and provided 
unable to diversify.  
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 This analysis of conflict financing in terms of the combination of revenue sources 
and the cost of conflict provides a new perspective on the dynamics of the Angola 
conflict. In 1992, UNITA exploited a window of opportunity when a demobilising MPLA 
provided for a low barrier-to-entry to start a conflict to control the state. In subsequent 
conflict episodes, MPLA was able to escalate the conflict and increase the cost of 
competition for UNITA to such a level that a military strategy ultimately succeeded in 
defeating UNITA. The case study highlights that the end of the war already occurred 
much earlier than the assassination of Jonas Savimbi in 2002. The war ended when 
Government forces drove a wedge between the two main diamond areas controlled by 
UNITA as part of the Catete offensive in 1999. The loss of control of the territory linking 
the two diamond areas eroded UNITA’s functional capabilities and was the beginning of 
the end of UNITA as a military organisation. 
 Given a 10-fold material superiority, one is left to wonder why it took MPLA so 
long to defeat UNITA. Explanations point to the inefficient use of oil revenues, 
embezzlement and corruption. Only when revenue was combined with a comprehensive 
political and military strategy against UNITA could the Government of Angola valorise 
its financial superiority. In hindsight, the elements of such a strategy consisted of limiting 
UNITA’s revenue sources through military operations in the diamond fields and 
increasing the cost of conflict though escalation. These activities were paralleled by 
multilateral initiatives against UNITA’s diamond operations and supply network. 
 Thus, the case study underlines the importance to understand conflict financing 
within its broader political and military context. From such a perspective, initiatives 
against conflict diamonds and sanctions against UNITA were part of a strategy to support 
the Government of Angola in its fight against UNITA. In consequence, the conflict 
financing of UNITA received disproportionately more attention. By looking at the 
financing of both groups, this case study contributed to a more nuanced understanding of 
conflict financing in Angola and the role of oil and diamonds therein. 
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CHAPTER 4 
The Abkhazia conflict 
 
Between 1992 and 1994, Georgia and Abkhaz separatist forces fought a major armed 
conflict over the control of the territory of Abkhazia leaving about 10,000 people dead 
and 260,000 Georgians displaced. Over 10 years after the end of the Abkhazia conflict, 
the incompatibilities between Georgia and Abkhazia – the territorial control of Abkhazia, 
security guarantees for the Abkhaz population and the return of Georgian refugees – have 
remained unresolved. While the security situation deteriorated in 1998 and 2001, the 
conflict has seen no recurrence of major armed conflict. However, after the Rose 
Revolution in 2003 the risk of conflict recurrence increased as evidenced by the re-
establishment of control of the Government of Georgia over the renegade province of 
Adjara, the recurrence of armed conflict in South Ossetia in 2004 and the Georgian 
military activities in the Khodory Gorge close to Abkhazia in 2006.  
 The Abkhazia conflict is an important case study for conflict recurrence exactly 
because armed conflict did not recur. In this sense, it is the study of a “non-event” which 
analyses the conditions which contributed to the prevention of conflict recurrence. This 
case study seeks to understand why there has been no conflict recurrence in Abkhazia 
even though both Georgia and Abkhazia had a surplus of revenue sources to fight an 
armed conflict of high intensity.  
 The case study highlights that in the period 1994-2003, conflict did not recur 
because the Government of Georgia did not capture the available revenue sources. Under 
President Edouard Shevardnadze the control of the economy was decentralised. Regional 
strongmen were allowed to profit from the parallel economy in exchange for political 
support to the centre. While Georgia had an overall surplus of revenue sources to fight a 
war of high intensity, a lack of revenue capture and the benefits of the status quo were a 
disincentive to use force.  
 After the Rose Revolution, the risk of conflict recurrence increased because the 
Government improved its control over the economy and consolidated state finances. As a 
result, between 2003 and 2006 the defence budget increased 10 times. At the same time, 
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the generational change brought to power a new political elite which did not consider the 
unresolved status of the conflict as beingin the interest of Georgia. 
 However, despite the increase of revenue capture, the Georgian Government did 
not launch an attack against Abkhazia – although they did against South Ossetia. The 
case study points out that the Georgian Government refrained from conflict renewal in 
Abkhazia because of the opportunity cost of using force – the loss of military and 
development assistance, Georgia’s positive post-Rose Revolution image and the prospect 
of NATO membership. In addition, the case study highlights that the assistance of Russia 
to Abkhazia has kept the barrier-to-entry into armed conflict high. While Georgian armed 
forces could have launched an attack against Abkhazia, the prospect of facing Russia’s 
military increased the barrier-to-entry and the cost of competition.  
 The case study provides important lessons for the management of post-conflict 
economies in view of preventing the recurrence of conflict. It shows the economic 
decentralisation can prevent the recurrence of conflict by increasing the number of 
stakeholder in the economy and reducing the central government’s ability to capture 
resources for the pursuit of armed conflict. It also shows that third parties can play an 
important role to prevent conflict recurrence by increasing the barriers-to-entry as well as 
the opportunity cost to use armed force. The case study also illustrates that parallel 
economies contribute to the viability of small armed groups as witnessed along the cease-
fire line between Georgia and Abkhazia. Ultimately, the case study shows that data 
produced by the Government of Georgia on the parallel economy was over-estimated and 
part of a discourse which sought to legitimise the use of force in terms of bringing back 
law and order to Abkhazia and South Ossetia. 
 The analysis of the Abkhazia conflict is presented in four parts. The first part 
provides the background to the Abkhazia conflict. It sketches the rise of Georgian 
nationalism, Georgia’s decent into civil war between 1991 and 1994, and political and 
economic development in Georgia and Abkhazia after the end of the wars. It also 
highlights the special role of parallel economies as a means of conflict financing in 
Georgia in contrast to natural resources in Angola and the diaspora in Kosovo. The 
second part analyses the economic dimension of the Abkhazia conflict in view of 
highlighting the confluence of declining revenue base in Georgia and increasing cost of 
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competition with Russia’s support for Abkhazia as an explanation of Abkhazia’s victory 
in war. The third part looks at the period of the “Frozen Conflicts” under Shevardnadze 
underlining the role of Georgia’s political economy in keeping the conflict from 
recurring. The fourth Part looks at the period after the Rose Revolution in Georgia and 
explains how the higher risk of conflict recurrence was confronted by increasing the cost 
of conflict and opportunity costs.  
 
4.1 Background  
 
Georgia remained relatively unknown outside circles of specialists until the ‘Rose 
Revolution’ in late 2003. It is located on the southern slopes of the Caucasus Mountains 
and is surrounded by Russia to the North, Azerbaijan to the East, Armenia to the South, 
Turkey to the South West and the Black Sea to the West (Appendix 2, Map 6). It has a 
territory slightly smaller than Austria and a population of about 5 million. Abkhazia is 
located on the South-Western slopes of the Caucasus Mountains bordering Russia and the 
Black Sea. It is estimated that between 180,000 and 250,000 people, including Armenian 
and Russian minorities, live in Abkhazia in a territory slightly bigger than Luxemburg 
(CIA 2005). 
 Three armed conflicts took place in Georgia between 1991 and 1994: a violent 
power struggle over the state in Tbilisi (September 1991- September 1993), a war of 
secession in South Ossetia (June 1991- June 1992) and another war of secession in 
Abkhazia (August 1992 – May 1994). These conflicts are generally understood as 
struggles between elite groups competing for power, resources and territory in a moment 
of transition (Cohen 2002, 404). With the end of the Soviet Union, some ethnic groups 
sought to realise their power based on pre-existing institutional structures of ethno-
federalism contributing to the emergence of radical nationalism in Georgia (Zverev 1996, 
13; Nodia 1996, 82-83; Coppieters 1999, 1; Appendix 2, Map 7). While Georgia was 
driven by breaking away from Russian rule, Abkhazia was driven by the fear of 
assimilation into Georgia and future existence of their community (Matveeva 2002, 418; 
Coppieters 1999, 2). This Section explores the background of the Abkhazia conflict. 
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4.1.1. The rise of nationalism in Georgia 
 
The collapse of the Soviet Union led a new round of determining the status of Abkhazia 
and South Ossetia. Tensions between Georgia and its minorities were nothing new at the 
time of the collapse of the Soviet Union. Differences between Abkhazia and Georgia, for 
example, had already led to disturbances in 1957 and 1967, 1978 and 1981 (Cornell 2001, 
155-159). The Soviet policy of Perestroika in the 1980s gradually transformed the 
Georgian dissident movement into various political groups (Tarkhnishvili c.f. Demetriou 
2002, 867). From the perspective of the minorities, the increasing exclusivity of Georgian 
nationalism confirmed the fear that the security and survival of the Abkhaz and South 
Ossetians as ethnic groups was at risk. From their perspective, Georgia was building its 
“miniature-empire” (Sakharov c.f Suny 1994, 322). In the growth of Georgian 
nationalism minority populations became increasingly marginalised. In 1989, Georgia 
was home to about 80 ethnic groups the main groups of which included Georgians 
(70.1%), Armenians (8.1), Russians (6.1%), Azeris (5.7%), Ossetians (3.0%), Greeks 
(1.9), Abkhaz (1.8%) and Ukrainians (0.9%) out of a population of about 5 million 
(Cornell 2001, 142).  
 The suppression of demonstrations by Soviet troops on 9 April 1989 radicalised 
the Georgian national movement and contributed to ever greater calls for independence 
for Georgia (Suny 1994, 332; Zverev 1996, 40-41).  The relations between Georgia and 
the Abkhaz and South Ossetian minorities became increasingly polarised after April 
1989, particularly after the Parliament of Georgia strengthened the status of the Georgian 
language. The ensuing “War of Laws” aimed at the progressive Georgianisation of 
Georgia and instituted Georgian as the only official language in August 1989. The latter 
has been particularly symbolic as this provided a barrier to many minorities to work in 
the public sector and participate in politics (Cornell 2001, 163-164).64 Mutual polarisation 
climaxed in March 1991 when Abkhazia and South Ossetia accepted the Soviet 
Referendum on Preserving the Union, while Georgia was unified in its rejection. A vote 
                                                 
64 Georgia is an extremely multilingual territory in which over 80 languages – many of them local – are 
spoken in addition to Georgia (Interview Speck). 
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on Georgian independence was overwhelmingly accepted by Georgians and Zviad 
Gamsakhurdia elected President on 25 May 1991 (Zürcher 2005, 93).  
 Gamsakhurdia henceforth promoted an exclusive nationalism which did much to 
further antagonise the minorities. He considered minorities as “guests” on Georgian 
territory – thus implicitly threatening their expulsion – and said “if they behaved” they 
could stay in Georgia (c.f. Nodia 1996, 76-77). While Eduard Shevardnadze – Georgia’s 
post-war President – changed the national discourse when coming to power, Georgian 
nationalism never became inclusive: “(…) no one attacked ethnic minorities in Georgia 
or questioned their loyalty, but neither was any effort made to integrate them into 
political life and create the conditions that would facilitate their genuine political 
participation” (Nodia 2005, 47).   
The development of exclusive nationalism has been explained by the weakness of 
civic identities in post-Soviet space. In the Soviet Union, nationality was defined in 
ethnic terms and considered a non-political attribute of individuals and groups. It was 
even separately indicated in passports. Nationality was distinct from citizenship which 
was understood as an external relationship to the state of individuals or groups. With the 
disappearance of this state – the Soviet Union – nationalities replaced the civic aspect of 
citizenship by giving nationalism a political function. In consequence, the new states 
defined themselves in ethnic terms rather than in terms of the more inclusive 
characteristics of civic identities (Nodia 1996, 81). 
 
4.1.2. The years of armed conflict, 1991-1994 
 
Zviad Gamsakhurdia not only estranged the minority populations but also influential 
political and economic figures within Georgia. His overemphasis on personal loyalty and 
generally suspiciousness prevented an evolution of his leadership to rational policy 
making. Instead he estranged many political supporters and “convinced the world that he 
was a real dictator even before he became one” (Nodia 1996, 87).  
 An alliance of two influential strongmen of the Georgian shadow economy, 
Tengiz Kotovani and Jaba Ioseliani, and former Prime Minister Tengiz Sigua, – sacked 
by Gamsakhurdia earlier – formed against Gamsakhurdia and overthrew him in a military 
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coup in December 1991 (Nodia 1996, 85-87). About 500 forces loyal to Tengiz Kitovani 
besieged the Georgian Parliament until Gamsakhurdia fled to his support base in 
Mingrelia where he died in December 1993. The power struggle came to an end with the 
suppression of Gamsakhurdia supporters in Mingrelia (Zürcher 2005, 93-94).  
The war in South Ossetia developed in parallel to the power struggle in Tbilisi. 
The campaign to upgrade the status of South Ossetia from Autonomous Oblast to 
Autonomous Region was fiercely resisted by Tbilisi and led Gamsakhurdia to organise 
the “March on Tskhinvali” of 20,000-30,000 protesters in August 1989. In September 
1990, South Ossetia boycotted the first Georgian elections and declared independence 
after which Gamsakhurdia levied an economic blockade. In March and June 1991, South 
Ossetian militias successfully repelled the Georgian National Guard who sought to invade 
South Ossetia. In September 1991, Gamsakhurdia wanted to escalate the war to 
strengthen his power position in Tbilisi but failed to secure victory with a little motivated 
National Guard. After a final clash in June 1992, a cease fire was agreed in the Sochi 
Agreement of 24 June 1992 leading to the deployment of the Commonwealth of 
Independent States Peace Keeping Force (CISPKF) and observers of the Organisation for 
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). The conflict had between 700-1,000 
casualties and resulted in about 100,000 refugees. Most South Ossetians fled across the 
Caucasus Mountains to North Ossetia (Cornel 2001, 165-167, Zverev 1996, 43-47).  
After the coup and the war in South Ossetia the politics of Georgia became 
increasingly militarised. This militarization was fostered through the establishment of a 
State Council in Tbilisi which included two influential warlords: Tengiz Kitovani of the 
National Guard, Jaba Ioseliani of the Mkhedrioni, as well as Tengiz Sigua. The National 
Guard became Georgia’s state army and Mkhedrioni the forces of the Ministry of Interior 
the latter being primarily responsible for Western Georgia (Zürcher et al 2005, 272). In 
March 1992, they invited Eduard Shevardnadze to redress their legitimacy problem 
which resulted from overthrowing a democratically elected President. Shevardnadze – a 
native Georgian – brought with him the political experience to lead Georgia as well as a 
network from his political functions in the Soviet Union including being the last Foreign 
Minister of the Soviet Union (Cornell 2001, 158-163, 168-169; Darchiashvili 2003b).  
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Thus, prior to the war in Abkhazia, Georgia was in disarray after a military coup 
in Tbilisi, an unsuccessful attempt to take South Ossetia, three warlords in government 
and a powerless Shevardnadze. 
 The war in Abkhazia started on 14 August 1992 when about 5,000 forces of the 
Georgian National Guard and militias entered Abkhazia. When the National Guard took 
control over Sukhumi, the Abkhaz Parliament retreated to Gudauta in Northern 
Abkhazia.65 At the same time, about 1,000 Georgian forces landed in Gagra to cut off 
Abkhazia from Russia (Baev et al 2002, 26). Tengiz Kitovani started the war on the 
pretext to release hostages previously taken by Zviadist66 and to secure the railway link to 
Russia. The initial stages of the war were marked by the looting of Sukhumi and Gagra 
reflecting the criminal character of the National Guard and Mkhedrioni. The Abkhaz 
perceived these events as a systematic attempt to destroy traces of Abkhaz culture 
(Cornell 2001, 173).  
After regrouping in the mountains, Abkhaz militias started their campaign to repel 
the Georgian troops. They recaptured Gagra in October 1992 to restore control over the 
land-link with Russia. Sukhumi was recaptured in September 1993 with the help of the 
Russian air force and volunteers from the North Caucasus. The latter were mobilised 
through the Confederation of Caucasian Mountainous Peoples which launched an appeal 
to send fighters to Abkhazia. About 1,500 fighters volunteered, most of whom were 
Chechens (Fairbanks 1995, 25; Cornell 2001, 171, 344-353). At the same time, 180,000-
240,000 Georgians were displaced and their homes looted by Abkhaz forces (Walker 
1998, 13). Finally, Abkhaz forces established control over the entire territory except the 
Khodory Valley and the Gali area where pockets of resistance remained until early 1994 
(Cornell 2001, 170-174).  
Georgia’s defeat in Abkhazia greatly reduced the power of the warlords. The wars 
also eroded Georgia’s political, economic and social fabric and contributed to the near 
collapse of the state in Georgia. Zviadist forces retreating from Abkhazia had a brief 
comeback when attempting to bring the port of Poti under their control in September 
1993. However, Shevardnadze could suppress this uprising with the help of Russian 
                                                 
65 The Abkhaz Parliament was an institution of the Autonomous region of Abkhazia and part of the Soviet 
institution to govern Georgia (see Zverev 1996, 13; Nodia 1996, 82-83). 
66 Supporters of the extreme nationalism of Zviad Gamsakhurdia became to be called ‘Zviadists.’ 
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troops at the political price of accepting Georgia’s membership in the Commonwealth of 
Independent States (CIS) (Cornell 2001, 173).  
 The Abkhazia conflict formally ended with the Moscow Agreement of 14 May 
1994. The agreement stipulated a cease fire line (CFL) along the Inguri River, 
demarcated a security and restricted weapons zone and the deployment of the CISPKF 
(Mackinlay and Sharov 2003, 90-91, 100-101; MacFarlane 1999). The objective of the 
2,500 men strong CISPKF was to maintain the ceasefire, promote safe conditions for the 
return of the displaced, implement the conditions of the Moscow Agreement, pursue a 
political settlement, and supervise the withdrawal of heavy weapons (Mackinlay and 
Sharov 2003, 91, 96). The role of Russia as the principle actor behind the CISPKF was 
the consequence of the multitude of peacekeeping commitments of Western states at the 
time, particularly in the Balkans and Africa. Both European states and the United States 
considered it politically and financially opportune to leave the leadership of the CISPKF 
to Russia (Interview Brunner). The United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia 
(UNOMIG) was established by Security Council Resolution 858 (August 1993) with the 
mandate to monitor and verify the Moscow Agreement of 1994, to observe the operation 
of the CISPKF, and to contribute to the safe and orderly return of refugees and Internally 
Displaced Peoples (IDPs). 
At the end of the wars, Georgia lost effective control over Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia. About 10,000 people died in Abkhazia and about 1,000 in South Ossetia. 
According to official Georgian figures the wars also created 261,217 IDPs, 11,987 of 
whom are from South Ossetia. In addition, Georgia lost about a 1 million people by way 
of migration most of whom are believed to have settled in Russia (Antonenko 2005, 205). 
These IDP figures have been recognised as inflated by the Georgian Government67, and a 
recent figure of the Georgian Ministry of Refuges and Integration estimates the existence 
of 209,013 IDPs including 45,000 who have retuned to the Gali area in the North of the 
cease-fire line between Georgia and Abkhazia (ICG 2007, 19). The war completely 
changed the ethnic composition of Abkhazia: In 1989, Abkhazia was inhabited by 
                                                 
67 On 5 April 2004, President Mikhail Saakashvili told a cabinet meeting that “the current number of 
refugees – 260,000 – is grossly inflated” (c.f. Antonenko 2005, 205). 
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239,872 Georgians (45.7%) and 93,267 (17.7%); after the war as all Georgians had left.68 
Since then, 45,000 Georgians returned voluntarily to the Gali district. The return of 
refugees remains one of the biggest challenges in the resolution of the Abkhazia conflict. 
(Ibid, 18-23). 
   
4.1.3. Post-conflict development in Georgia and Abkhazia, 1994-2006 
 
After the wars, Eduard Shevardnadze consolidated his power by cracking down on 
paramilitary forces and creating the Citizen’s Union of Georgia (CUG) as a broad 
political movement. By 1995, he disbanded the National Guard and Mkhedrioni and 
jailed Tengiz Kitovani and Jaba Ioseliani after a failed assassination attempt on him. The 
period 1995-1998 saw attempts of state building including the implementation of 
constitutional development and legal reforms (Demetriou 2002a, 877).  
Despite the initial success of reforms, Georgian politics became increasingly 
influenced by personal and economic interests increasing the antagonisms within the 
CUG. In the period 1998-2001, Shevardnadze successfully balanced the power of 
influential clans at the cost of political and economic stagnation. He managed a highly 
decentralised political system which some observers likened to a medieval fiefdom: “The 
central government managed to consolidate power and establish de jure control of the 
province by giving regional authorities access to governance structures and by allowing 
them to profit from the shadow economy” (Metreveli 2004, 6).  
Corruption became endemic, political reforms were halted, institutions eroded and 
the population estranged from the state (Khaindrava 2004, 25-30). Actors from the 
shadow economy became increasingly intertwined with state institutions to foster 
monopoly control of economic sectors while state institutions eroded (Gotsiridze and 
Kondelaki 2004, 68-76).  
The Rose Revolution of October 2003 occurred within a context of state collapse 
and economic crises. Shevardnadze was ousted after rigged elections that triggered mass 
protests. After a re-run of the elections, Mikheil Saakashvili was brought to power and 
                                                 
68 Other ethnicities included 76,541 Armenians (14.5%),74,914 Russians (14.2%),and 14,664 Greeks 
(2.7%) and 40,467 others. For a discussion of demographics see Cornell (2001, 156).  
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became the President of Georgia. Saakashvili was confronted with the monumental task 
to manage the legacy of the collapse of the Soviet Union, two lost wars as well as 
Shevardnadze’s period of mismanagement and corruption.  
Saakashvili’s rise to power was accompanied by high expectations for change. In 
April 2004, he successfully re-established control over Adjara – a renegade province on 
the border with Turkey and the Black Sea – which led to fears in Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia that the use of force would also be directed against them in the future. This fear 
was confirmed when Georgian troops attacked South Ossetia in 2004 constituting the first 
full scale recurrence of conflict since the end of the fighting there in 1993.  
Post-conflict developments in Abkhazia were closely related to Vladislav 
Ardzinba, the de-facto President of Abkhazia. Ardzinba emerged strengthened from 
military victory in 1994. In the initial phase after the war, the Abkhaz regime was 
supported by Russia until the establishment of a CIS embargo in January 1996 which 
Russia agreed to in order to secure Georgia’s support during the First Chechen War 
(Matveeva 2002, 421). The dissolution of the Soviet Union and the effects of the war 
reduced much of Abkhazia’s once rich economy to subsistence (Interview Van Reeth). 
Nevertheless, the Abkhaz leadership managed to control the few available economic 
opportunities and construct a viable resistance economy which was tightly controlled by 
the Ardzinba clan (Interview Khashig). The economic situation slightly improved after 
Russian-Georgian relations deteriorated during the Second Chechen War and Russia no 
longer enforced the CIS embargo in 1999 (Matveeva 2002, 421).  
Russian influence on the economy of Abkhazia is significant in terms of trade and 
investment. Russian companies invest in Abkhazia to avoid Russian taxes and acquire 
ports and tourist resorts. However, Abkhaz politicians are aware of the dangers of 
economic dependence on Russia because investments may be withdrawn should its status 
be resolved (Interview Turnava). Thus, sympathies between Abkhazia and Russia may 
require qualification. At present, investments in Abkhazia are tolerated by Russia. In the 
words of Abkhaz business man Nikolaj Atschba: “Abkhazia’s bank system as well as its 
whole economy is in a semi-legal state at present. We are thanking Russian for giving us 
the opportunity to work. You can close down the whole economy of Abkhazia in 15 
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seconds: Russia simply has to take an interest in the legality of the registration of our 
banking system.”69 
Since the end of the war, the politics of Abkhazia has remained very personalised 
and autocratic with ever growing levels of corruption. The elections in early 2005 
reflected the discontent of the population with the Abkhaz leadership (Interview Gumba 
and Khashig). The frustration with Ardzinba and his corrupted regime was exploited by 
the presidential contender, Sergey Bagapsh. He became a strong advocate for political 
change in Abkhazia and the champion of the Abkhaz population despite Russian pressure 
for the alternative candidate, Raul Khadjimba. The standoff between Bagabsh and 
Khadjimba was solved with the former becoming de-facto President the latter de-facto 
Vice-President. Overall, the elections showed that many Abkhaz were sceptical about 
associating themselves too closely with Russia. While Russia remains Abkhazia’s main 
economic lifeline, there are many who fear that Russia only seeks its own benefits 
without giving anything back to Abkhazia, particularly in terms of political status.  
 Over time, the abyss between Georgia and Abkhazia deepened. Abkhazia is de-
facto separated from Georgia: The currency is the Russian Rouble, all products are 
Russian or Turkish, people speak Russian, and a majority of the population holds Russian 
passports.70 These realities have given rise to the consideration that “Georgia has already 
lost Abkhazia. Non-recognition of the separatist state allows Georgia to continue living a 
dream of national and territorial unity” (Lynch 2004a, 73).  
 
4.1.4. The role of external actors 
 
The influence of external actors has played an important role in the Georgian armed 
conflicts. This Section reviews the involvement of the main external actors in the conflict 
– Russia, the United States, the European Union and Turkey.  
 Russian involvement must be considered in the context of a dissolving Soviet 
Union and its military establishment. Russian military assistance continued during the 
                                                 
69 I am grateful to Martin Malek for drawing this quote to my attention. It was in the Russian newspaper 
Vremja Novostej on 10 February 2005, page 6. The quote has been translated from Russian to German to 
English.  
70 For a discussion of the citizenship dispute between Georgia and Russia see Antonenko (2005, 254-255). 
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break-up of the Soviet Union but was far from coherent. Commanders of Soviet 
battalions stationed in Georgia supplied weapons to the Abkhaz, South Ossetian and 
Georgian sides (Demetriou 2002, 10-14). During the conflicts, Russian assistance tilted 
towards Abkhazia and South Ossetia and helped change the military balance in their 
favour. Many commanders were united in their disliking of Shevardnadze whom they 
blamed for the break-up of the Soviet Union (Zverev 1996, 53). In both Abkhazia and 
Georgia, Russian involvement in the war undermined trust in its role as an impartial 
mediator (Antonenko 2005a, 210). 
 The war in Chechnya took attention away from the frozen conflicts which were 
neglected by President Yeltsin. In exchange for Georgia’s support in Chechnya, Yeltsin 
levied sanctions against Abkhazia. However, the sanctions became ineffective because 
they were ignored by Russia’s North Caucasian regions which signed a series of 
agreements with Abkhazia. At the same time, the Duma promoted the economic 
engagement with Abkhazia even though this was not the official policy of the Kremlin 
(Antonenko 2005a, 226-228). 
 President Vladimir Putin took a more proactive stance on the unresolved conflict, 
particularly with deteriorating Russian-Georgian relations. His priorities were Russian 
security interests in the North Caucasus and the maintenance of Russia’s role as mediator 
in Abkhazia. The Putin administration was also concerned with the increasing expansion 
of the United States, NATO and the European Union into the South Caucasus. Officials 
in the Russian administration considered the unresolved conflicts in terms of Cold War 
superpower competition and viewed with great suspicion the advance of the former arch-
rival in a historically Russian sphere of influence. Moreover, the Putin administration had 
a sustained interest in keeping the situation in Georgia stable in order to prevent conflict 
in the North Caucasus (Antonenko 2005, 230-232). 
 Russian policy towards the Abkhazia and South Ossetia conflict has been marked 
by contradictions and inconsistencies. In the words of Pavel Baev:  
  
 “[Russian policy’s] key paradox is perhaps the lack of connection between its 
desire to dominate a region where many of its vital interests are at stake and its 
inability to influence political developments in the same way. Russia behaves 
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simultaneously as an old colonial power in retreat and a young expansionist state, 
as a guardian of the status quo and as a dynamic predator, while its policy style 
betrays a fusion of superiority and inferiority complexes” (Baev 2003, 41).  
 
This approach has confronted Russia with a dilemma: If Russia supported the resolution 
of the frozen conflicts it would lose its geopolitical monopoly in Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia. If it did not produce progress and was perceived as wanting to maintain the 
status quo, it would be marginalised by more dynamic actors willing to engage on the 
resolution of the frozen conflicts (Antonenko 2005a, 228). 
 The United States engagement in Georgia started very cautiously after the end of 
the Soviet Union when the South Caucasus was still considered Russia’s backyard. Only 
with the diversification of United States’ petrol supplies did the South Caucasus receive 
more attention as it is a transit country for petrol and gas exports from the Caspian Sea. 
The main interest of the United States was the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline 
(Shaffer 2003).  
More important were the geopolitical implications of the pipeline: It would bypass 
Russia and limit Iran from benefiting from Caspian petrol. Moreover, it was a way to 
compensate Turkey for its economic cost incurred during the Gulf War in 1991 and 
reducing the quantity of petrol shipments though the Bosporus. These interests were 
sufficient to overcome considerable commercial reservations. British Petroleum only 
accepted the construction the BTC pipeline after sustained pressure by the United States. 
Also, the European Union was hesitant as it favoured a route through Romania, Bulgaria 
and Greece thus bypassing the Mediterranean and Turkey. Construction of the pipeline is 
now complete and the pipeline is expected to operate at full capacity by 2010 (Helly and 
Gogia 2005, 277-279; Shaffer 2003, 54-57).  
 Interest in Georgia grew after the 11 September 2001 and the war on Iraq due to 
its proximity to the Middle East as well as being an air corridor to Afghanistan. 
Increasing interest is evidenced by the renovation of two military airbases by the 
Pentagon in collaboration with Turkey (Interviews Tbilisi). Washington has also become 
one of the main supporters of Georgia’s association with NATO even though it has been 
  
228
made it clear to Tbilisi that this would be conditional on the non-resumption of hostilities 
and the continuation of reforms (ICG 2004a, 18).  
 The interest in stability is also reflected in United States assistance to Georgia. 
Georgia has received USD 1.1 billion US development assistance plus USD 408 million 
Department of Defence and privately donated commodities since 1992 (Department of 
State 2002). A major part of this assistance has benefited the reform of Georgia’s security 
sector (Fluri and Darchiashvili 2004). The Georgian Train and Equip Programme (GTEP) 
supports Georgia’s border guards, coast guards and other law enforcement agencies and 
provides equipment, training and services to enhance its border protection and anti-
terrorism capability. 
 However, despite this high levels of assistance, conflict resolution in Georgia is 
weighed against other interests such as Russian-American relations and its geopolitical 
interests in Central Asia and the Middle East. The dilemma of US engagement is that it 
has a long term interest in conflict resolution but a short term interest in stability. 
However, the persistence of the unresolved status of the conflicts does not foster the 
resolution of the conflict (Helly and Gogia 2005, 271). 
 After the United States, the European Union is the second biggest donor in 
Georgia providing a total of EUR 369.43 million since 1992 (EU 2005). Moreover, 
Tbilisi has strategically raised the profile of Georgia within the European Union by 
creating a lobby in Poland and the Baltic countries. In the long term, Georgia wants to 
diversify its political support and reduce its dependence on the United States. The 
European Union is in the process of refining its policy towards Georgia as evidenced by a 
hearing of the European Parliament71 and the support of two studies on how to engage 
with Georgia (Lynch 2006, ICG 2006).  
 Turkey and Georgia have common interests which have been strengthened by the 
BTC-pipeline and the planed Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum gas pipeline. Turkey is dependent on 
Georgia in its objective to become an alternative energy supply route for the European 
market.  Both countries want to accede to the European Union and Georgia needs Turkish 
support for its association to NATO (Waal 2005, 334). Turkish military support for 
                                                 
71 “Promoting Stability and Democratization in Our Neighbourhood: What Role for the EU in the South 
Caucasus”, Public Hearing of the European Parliament, Brussels, 22 February 2006. 
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Georgia has also been significant with USD 37 million since 1998. This assistance was 
used for equipment, training and the modernisation of Vaziani airbase according to 
NATO standards (Lynch 2006, 56).  
 A central distinction between external actors is that the United States and the 
European Union – in contrast to Russia and Turkey – have no history of engagement in 
Georgia and the South Caucasus. This lack of historical memory as well as their 
geographic distance indicates that their interests are largely determined by the current 
geopolitical and strategic situation. Should developments in Russia, Central Asia and the 
Middle East change, a declining interest in Georgia may follow. The United States and 
the European Union therefore emphasise that Georgia should find a way to coexist with 
Russia: “Georgian leaders seem to believe that the West’s chief concern is addressing 
Georgia’s aspirations to be part of the Euro-Atlantic community, when in fact the West’s 
main priority is for Georgia to put its house in order and, in cooperation with Russia and 
its other neighbours, to find a durable solution to its domestic problems and those of its 
immediate region” (Helly and Gogia 2005, 274). 
 How well Georgia is willing and able to put its house in order remains to be seen. 
Despite Presidents George Bush’s reference to Georgia as a “beacon of liberty” during 
his state visit in 2005, much needs to be done in judicial and security sector reforms, 
institution building, and decentralisation. External actors are concerned about the power 
concentrated in the hands of President Saakashvili, military spending, corruption and 
radical rhetoric leading some to suggest that the rose of the Rose Revolution has started 
to wilt (Jacoby 2005, Kupchan 2006).  
 
4.1.5. Parallel economies and the Abkhazia conflict 
 
The resolution of the Abkhazia conflict – as well as the one over South Ossetia – remains 
an open and controversial issue. Since the end of hostilities in 1994, the conflict have 
remained calm despite the violence in 1998 and 2001 in Abkhazia and renewed armed 
conflict in South Ossetia in 2004. These events have underlined the potential to endanger 
Georgia’s peaceful political and economic transition. After the cessation of hostilities, the 
central incompatibilities – the legal status of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, security 
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guarantees and the return of refugees – remain unresolved. There has been little 
movement away from zero-sum solutions to possible settlements despite numerous 
attempts to settle the conflicts. 
 The Abkhazia conflict is not a “usual” conflict in terms of analysis of conflict 
financing. While armed conflicts involving natural resources – Angola (see previous 
Chapter), the DRC, Sierra Leone or Liberia – or diasporas – Kosovo (see next Chapter) or 
Sri Lanka – have received much attention, the Abkhazia conflict has not been 
systematically analysed in terms of conflict financing. Exceptions are Baev, Koehler and 
Zürcher (2005) and Wennmann (2006). This case study seeks to fill this gap and explore 
the relationship between conflict financing in the dynamics of the armed conflict and 
post-conflict period.  
 Conflict financing in the Abkhazia conflict emphasises the role of the parallel 
economy in conflict recurrence and post-conflict peacebuilding. While the regular 
economies of Abkhazia and Georgia were in crises, opportunities for money making 
emerged from the parallel economy, i.e. economic activity which is not captured by the 
state through taxation. The importance of the parallel economy goes back to Georgia’s 
traditional role as a transit territory for East-West and North-South trade. Control over 
trade routes and entry points for trade has been vital and contributed to the entrenchment 
of powerful clans in the Shevardnadze era. Consequently, in both Abkhazia and Georgia, 
the parallel economy has become part of a system of governance in which political 
stability was maintained by allowing clans to profit from the parallel economy in return 
for political support. How parallel economies, the weak Georgian state and the 
unresolved conflicts interacted is elaborated in the detail in the next Sections.  
 
4.2. Armed conflict in Abkhazia, 1992-1994 
 
The Abkhazia conflict started on 14 August 1992 with the entry of 5,000 forces of the 
National Guard to Sukhumi and another 1,000 to Gagra. The course of the war can be 
separated in three phases. The first period between August and September 1992 saw 
Georgian forces establishing control over the cities Sukhumi and Gagra while Abkhaz 
forces retreated into the Northern Abkhaz mountains. In the second phase of the conflict 
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between October 1992 and August 1993, Abkhaz fighters recaptured Gagra after 
regrouping in the mountain and receiving support from Russia and volunteers from the 
North Caucasus. In the third phase from September 1993 until May 1994, Abkhaz 
fighters and their allies recaptured Sukhumi and the territory South of Sukumi until Gali 
uprooting between 180,000 to 240,000 Georgians who previously lived in Abkhazia. The 
conflict ended in 14 May 1994 with the Moscow Agreement (see also Part 1 of this 
Chapter). The following seeks to explore the economic dimension of the occurrence of 
the Abkhazia conflict by applying the conceptual framework developed in Chapter 2.  
 
4.2.1. Available revenue sources 
 
There are hardly any reliable statistics on the economic situation prior to the outbreak of 
armed conflict in Georgia. After 1985, all collection of statistical material was a casualty 
of an eroding Soviet state bureaucracy and little government capacity (Zürcher et al 2005, 
262). In the late 1980s, Georgia had an estimated GDP per capita of about USD 1,100 to 
USD 1,300 (Ibid., 275). Given a population of about USD 5.4 million in 1989, GNP is 
estimated to have amounted to between USD 5.9 billion to USD 7.0 billion. In 1988, its 
per capita income was 8% above the average income of the Soviet Union only superseded 
by the Baltic Republics and Ukraine (IMF et al 1991, 231). 
 Another difficulty with official statistics was the growth of the shadow economy 
in the Soviet Union (Zürcher et al 2005, 262). In the 1970s and 1980s, the shadow 
economy became increasingly intertwined with the state apparatus. In addition to 
profiting from corruption, political cadres used the shadow economy to provide 
employment opportunities for the officially non-existing unemployed and to channel the 
energies of minorities into commerce rather than political opposition. In the long run, the 
shadow economy contributed to the erosion of the planned economy by diverting 
resources away from formal production, undermining the central government and shifting 
the value system from collectivism to individualism (Naylor 2002: 37-39). The parallel 
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economy in Georgia had an estimated value of between to be 40% and 50% of GDP in 
the 1980s (Zürcher et al 2005, 262).72 
 With the collapse of the Soviet Union the revenue sources to finance armed 
conflict were limited to the control of the shadow economy as the official system of 
transfers collapse. After the Georgian Parliament announced the creation of a 12,000 
strong national army in autumn 1990, Moscow drastically reduced the revenue transfers 
to Tbilisi (Zürcher et al 2005, 271). As a result, the National Guard was poorly resourced, 
trained and equipped (Demetriou 2002, 24). 
 The near complete collapse of the state and the economy in Georgia affected the 
availability of revenue sources in both Abkhazia and Georgia. In Soviet times, Georgia 
was a prosperous Republic of the Soviet Union producing mainly agricultural products 
including citrus fruits, grapes, vegetables and other fruit. It was the largest citrus fruit 
producer in the Soviet Union in the period 1986-1989 and third biggest grape producer 
after Azerbaijan and Moldavia (IMF et al 1991, 218).  Within Georgia, the Autonomous 
Republic of Abkhazia was the richest district and responsible for most of Georgia’s citrus 
fruit production in addition to tourism. Estimates of state income suggest that Georgia’s 
State Budget Revenue was USD 7.48 billion or 1.8% of the Soviet Union’s total State 
Budget Revenue of USD 422.8 billion in 1990 (IMF et al 1991, 279, 447).73 
 With the erosion of official funds, conflict entrepreneurs turned to the parallel 
economy and looting became the central means of sustaining and motivating the 21 
armed formations and numerous gangs operating in Georgia. The Georgian National 
Guard and Mkhedrioni took part in looting which occurred all over Georgia in the early 
1990s, but particularly in Sukhumi and Gagra in August 1992. The looting was 
accompanied by atrocities committed against Abkhaz, Armenians and Russians living in 
Abkhazia  (Fairbanks 1995, 21-23). In addition, to allowing their forces to loot in 
Abkhazia, the two respective leaders of the National Guard and Mkhedrioni, Kitovani and 
Ioseliani, generated funding from operations in the parallel economy including taxing 
illicit businesses, running extortion rackets, and smuggling weapons and fuel. Mkhedrioni 
                                                 
72 Based on the estimate of pre-war Georgian GDP of ranging between USD 5.9 billion to USD 7.0 billion, 
the value of the shadow economy is between USD 2.63 billion and USD 3.5 billion. 
73 These figures are based on estimated total revenue of Rouble 248.7 billion for the entire Soviet Union 
and Rouble 4.4 billion in 1990 for Georgia (IMF et al 1991, 279). The exchange rate was indicated as about 
100 USD = 60 Roubles in 1990 or 1 USD = 0.6 Roubles (IMF et al 1991, 447). 
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was a large criminal syndicate and able to raise funds trough the parallel economy 
(Demetriou 2002, 23-24).  
 The Georgian national movement of Zviad Gamsakhurdia was supported by 
contributions from the Georgian diaspora in Moscow, especially after a pro-nationalist 
revolt was crushed by the Soviet military in April 1989. When Edouard Shevardnadze 
arrived in Tbilisi in 1994, it is believed that he came with the financial support from his 
support base in Moscow (Baev et al 2002, 24-25, 35, 40-41).  
 With the collapse of the Soviet economy and the onset of the wars, the Georgian 
economy declined rapidly. At the end of 1992, the Georgian economy was estimated to 
have shrunk by 40% of GDP. Taking the earlier GDP figures, this decline decreased GDP 
per capita to between 660 USD and 780 USD and total GDP to between USD 3.5 billion 
and 4.5 billion. The parallel economy is considered to have declined in similar terms 
(Zürcher et al 2005, 275). The near economic collapse of the formal and informal 
economy by 1993 made a proper supply of the troops impossible and led to a poor 
organisation of the military campaigns (Zürcher et al 2005, 276).   
 While Abkhazia was also affected by the economic crisis, it counterbalanced the 
economic crisis through external support from Russia and the North Caucasus.  
 Thus, given the unclear data situation at the end of the Soviet Union and during 
the transition to armed conflict in Georgia, it is not possible to establish an estimate on 
the available revenue sources in 1992. However, what can be established are the trends of 
the availability of revenue sources. The revenue sources of independent Georgia were 
limited due to the reduction of funds previously emanating from Moscow and the 
economic crisis. With the decline of the official economy, armed groups resorted to the 
parallel economy to generate revenue mainly through looting or the operation of 
economic activities in the parallel economy. However, both the official economy and the 
parallel economy declined further during the Abkhazia war which eroded the revenue 
sources to maintain the armed conflict. In Abkhazia, the effect of the economic crisis was 
cushioned due to assistance from Russia whose entry into the conflict provided Abkhazia 
with the material support to change the military balance in the conflict. 
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4.2.2. The cost of conflict 
 
From the Georgian side, the armed conflict involved around 8,500 forces of the Georgian 
National Guard and militias. From these forces, 5,000 were deployed to capture Sukhumi, 
1,000 to capture Gagra (Baev et al 2002, 26). The Mkhedrioni militia had a size of about 
2,500 and were part of the contingent entering Sukhumi. On the Abkhaz side, a total of 
6,000 fighters included 4,500 fighters of the Abkhaz Secessionist National Guard 
Regiment and received 1,500 volunteers from the North Caucasus (Demetriou 2002, 21; 
Walker 1998, 13).  
The dynamics of the conflict were affected by the availability of arms from 
former Soviet bases as central control over the Soviet Armed Forces diminished with a 
disintegrating Soviet Union. The vast majority of weapons for both Georgian and Abkhaz 
formations originated from stockpiles of the Transcaucasian Military District. Weapons 
were obtained through stockpile seizures, free distribution by Russian troops, sales from 
Russian military stockpiles or sales from Soviet surplus weapons available in the regional 
arms market mainly from Armenia, Azerbaijan, the Czech Republic and Romania. Before 
and during the conflict, Georgia was awash with weapons and it was this availability of 
weapons which facilitated the outbreak of armed conflict (Demetriou 2002, 10-14).  
This oversupply of weapons had an effect on the price of weapons. Despite the 
constant demand for weapons generated by the three armed conflicts taking place in 
Georgia, prices for an AK-47 dropped from between 250 USD to 300 USD in the period 
1990-1991 to between 120 USD to 150 USD in the period 1992-1993 (Demetriou 2002, 
15). 
 Applying the cost-estimation relationships (CERs) developed in Chapter 2 the 
following estimates the start-up and annual maintenance cost for Georgia and Abkhazia 
for the period 1992-1994. The key estimations variables include the following:  
 
• Price per weapon (PF) = 120 USD (Demetriou 2002, 15); 
• Price per round of ammunition (PA) = 0.05 USD (no data, assumed price); 
• Annual average male salary (I) = 3,712 USD (data for 2001, UNDP 2003, 310-313. 
Represents approximate cost per soldier of 10.2 USD/day or 309 USD/month); 
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• Number of fighters (N) = 8,500 for Georgia (including 2,500 militias) and 6,000 for 
Abkhazia (including 1,500 volunteers) (Demetriou 2002, 21). 
 
The calculations summarised in Table 4.1 suggest that the Georgian had a start-up cost of 
about USD 1.6 million and annual maintenance cost for of between about USD 33 
million for a low intensity conflict, USD 37 million for a medium intense conflict and 
USD 54 million for a high intensity conflict. For Abkhazia, it is suggested that the start-
up cost was about USD 1.1 million and annual maintenance cost for of between about 
USD 23 million for a low intensity conflict, USD 26 million for a medium intense 
conflict and USD 38 million for a high intensity conflict. 
 These figures suggest that the start up and maintenance cost for Georgia and 
Abkhazia were not widely differential because all armed groups had similar cost factors. 
However, on the Abkhaz side, the involvement of volunteers and the Russian military 
reduced the cost to maintain their operations and changed the initial military balance in 
which the National Guard and Georgian militias were militarily superior to the Abkhaz 
who had only mobilised in early 1992 and lacked fighters (Baev et al 2002, 35). The 
volunteers were mobilised through the Confederation of Caucasian Mountainous Peoples 
which launched an appeal to send fighters to Abkhazia leading to about 1,500 volunteers, 
most of whom were Chechens led by Shamil Basayev (Cornell 2001, 171, 344-353).  
 Russian men and materiel emanated from a disintegrating Soviet Army. The 
Russian military supported Abkhazia with T-72 and T-80 tanks and artillery units which 
remained under Russian command. In the final stages of the conflict, unmarked Su-25 
and Su-27 fighters bombed Sukhumi. Allegedly, the 128th Motorised Rifle Regiment 
stationed in Gyumri, Armenia, supported the Abkhaz forces. Moreover, Russia assisted in 
placing about 100,000 landmines at the border to Georgia (Cornell 2001, 171, 349).  
 The CER calculations also highlight that given the low prices of weapons and the 
availability of men, the Abkhazia conflict relatively cheap to start, however, expensive 
too maintain. The largest cost factor was the provision of salaries to the troops. On the 
Georgian side, the inability to do so reflects the low morale of troops after the looting of 
Sukhumi and Gagra had taken place. Fighters did not want to return to the battle field 
without any financial rewards (Zürcher et al 2005, 276). 
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Table 4.1: Overview of the start-up and annual maintenance of armed conflict for Georgia and Abkhazia, 1992-1994 
 
 CERs Composites Georgia Abkhazia  
   USD USD USD USD 
CER 1:  
Weapons 
1.5 firearms (F)  
x Price per firearm (PF)  
x Number of fighters (N) 
 
1,530,000 
 
1.080,000 
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t
 
CER 2:   
Ammunition 
1.5 firearms (F)  
x 100 rounds of ammunition (A) 
x Price per ammunition (PA) 
x Number of fighters (N) 
 
63,750 
 
Total start-up cost 
 
1,593,750 
 
 
45,000 
 
Total start-up cost 
 
1,125,000 
CER 3:  
Salaries 
Annual male income (I) 
x Number of fighters (N) 
 
31,552,000 
  
22,272,000 
 
CERL 4:  
Weapons 
 
0.33 firearms (F)  
x 1 x Price per firearm (PF) 
x Number of insurgents (N) 
 
335,600 
 
237,000 
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CERL 5:  
Ammunition 
 
1.5 firearms (F)  
x 20 rounds of ammunition (A) 
x 90 days of combat 
x Price per round (PA) 
x Number of insurgents (N) 
 
1,147,500 
 
Total maintenance 
(low intensity)* 
 
33,035,100 
 
 
810,000 
 
Total maintenance 
(low intensity)* 
 
23,364,000 
CERM 4:  
Weapons 
0.45 firearms (F)  
x 1.5 x Price per firearm (PF) 
x Number of insurgents (N) 
 
688,500 
 
486,000 
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CERM 5: 
Ammunition 
 
1.5 firearms (F)  
x 60 rounds of ammunition (A) 
x 90 days of combat 
x 1.5 x Price per round (PA) 
x Number of insurgents (N) 
 
5,163,750 
 
 
Total maintenance 
(medium intensity)* 
 
37,404,250 
 
 
3,645,000 
 
Total maintenance 
(medium intensity)* 
 
26,403,000 
CERH 4:  
Weapons 
 
0.65 firearms (F) 
x 3 x Price per firearm (PF) 
x Number of insurgents (N) 
 
1,989,000 
 
1,404,000 
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CERH 5:  
Ammunition 
1.5 firearms (F)  
x 120 rounds of ammunition (A) 
x 90 days of combat 
x 3 x Price per round (PA) 
x Number of insurgents (N) 
 
20,655,000 
 
Total maintenance 
(high intensity)* 
 
54,196,000 
 
 
14,580,000 
 
Total maintenance 
(high intensity)* 
 
38,256,000 
* Includes CER 3: Salaries. 
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4.2.3. Expected benefits and opportunity costs 
 
From the Georgian perspective the expected benefit from using armed force was to 
prevent the fragmentation of Georgia and ensure Georgia’s territorial integrity. In 
Georgia, Abkhazia was perceived a traditionally Georgian territory in which prior to the 
break-up of the Soviet Union Georgia presented a majority of the citizens. In 1989, 
239,872 were Georgian (45.7%) and 93,267 Abkhaz (17.7%) along with 76,541  
Armenians (14.5%), 74,914  Russians (14.2%) and 14,664 Greek (2.7%)(Cornell 1001, 
156). 
 However, despite this ethnic element, there has been a clear economic dimension 
to the Abkhazia conflict which highlights the objective of Georgia to maintain control 
over Abkhazia to increase the viability of post-Soviet Georgia. Abkhazia was the richest 
region of Georgia and well known throughout the Soviet Union as a tourism destination. 
In addition, Abkhazia was a transport corridor to Russia and thus – like South  Ossetia – 
an important strategic territory to control. Both tourism and the strategic location for 
transport of Abkhazia were deemed important for the viability of Georgia. This rational 
was particularly promulgated by Kitovani when he became Minister of Defence in 1992. 
This position gave him an effective cover to organise the war in Abkhazia with the aim of 
establishing control over the province’s tourism industry and transportation networks. 
The prospect of loot and economic opportunities contributed to the mobilisation of 
Mkhedrioni (Zürcher et al 2005, 272).  
 The opportunity cost of losing Abkhazia by starting a war was barely considered 
by Georgia as nationalistic fervour blinded the main political actors. Ultimately, the war 
ended with Georgia having lost territorial control over Abkhazia, the near collapse of the 
state and economy, a demoralised and beaten army and a IDP population of between 
180,000 and 240,000. Due to the looting and property damage and displacement in 
Abkhazia, the once prosperous province that Georgia wanted to control was in ruins.  
 In Abkhazia, the expected benefits were associated to ensuring future survival as 
an ethnic community and potentially independence. Abkhaz consider themselves as the 
indigenous population of Abkhazia who have a different language and alphabet than 
Georgians. Since 1886, Abkhazia saw its percentage of the population diminish despite a 
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growth in its population. In 1886 28,320 Abkhaz lived in Abkhazia representing 42%. 
Figures then change from 55,918 in 1926 (27.8%) and 61,193 in 1959 (15%) to 83,097 in 
1979 (17.1%) and ultimately 93,267 in 1989 (17.7%). At the same time, Georgian 
migration into Abkhazia increased with Georgians numbering 34,114 in 1886 (50.3%), 
67,494 in 1926 (33.5%), 158,221 in 1959 (29.1%), 213,322 in 1979 and ultimately 
239,872 in 1989 (45.7%) (Cornell 2001, 156).  
 When Georgian became independent, the Georgian dominance was translated into 
the Georgianisation of society including the adoption of the Georgian language and 
alphabet as the official language (Cornell 2001, 155-156). The Abkhaz perceived the 
imposition of Georgianess and the looting as a systematic attempt by Georgia to destroy 
traces of Abkhaz culture (Cornell 2001, 173). The use of force was therefore related to 
the emerging Abkhaz separatism, survival and the dream of independence. 
 The opportunity cost of using armed force for Abkhazia was small. It had no other 
option but to respond to the Georgian attack and mobilise support from third parties.  
 The involvement of Russia was motivated by a long attachment of the Soviet 
military establishment to Abkhazia. It maintained sanatoriums along the black sea cost as 
well as a military research facility and two airbases. Moreover, many Generals of the 
Russian forces were united against (see Section 4.1.4.).  
 
4.2.4. Assessment 
 
The analysis of the Abkhazia conflict leads to suggest that this ethno-political conflict has 
a clear economic dimension which has so for been little considered. The economic 
dimensions emphasises the importance for Georgia to establishing territorial control over 
Abkhazia to increase the viability of Georgia by controlling Abkhazia’s tourism industry 
as well as strategic transport network. In addition, opportunities for looting motivated 
Georgian fighters to enter Abkhazia. Once there were no more financial rewards from 
fighting and the Georgian economy declined, it became impossible for Georgia to 
maintain an escalating armed conflict.  
 The above analysis also highlights three findings concerning the relationship 
between conflict financing and conflict recurrence:  
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• The Abkhazia conflict points out that the cost to start an armed conflict can be low. It 
was low because large amounts of available military equipment. This situation led to 
a low barrier-to-entry to start the armed conflict with pre-existing equipment and 
revenue sources.  
• However, once the armed conflict had gone beyond existing military stocks, Georgia 
could not mobilise the funds and materiel to maintain the armed conflict. The war 
was waged on the cheap by mobilising existing resources though looting. But in its 
course, Georgia’s revenue base eroded beyond the point of paying for the cost of 
competition of an estimated USD 54 million per year for a high intensity conflict.  
• In addition, the entry of Russia increased the cost of competition. Russia’s 
intervention solved the revenue problem of the Abkhaz side – as it also faced the 
effects of economic crisis – and changed the military balance in Abkhazia’s favour. 
Georgia was not resilient enough to follow the escalation conflict by attracting 
external support. Thus, Russia’s support for Abkhazia and Georgia’s deteriorating 
material environment during the conflict contributed to Georgia’s defeat and the end 
of the armed conflict from which Abkhazia and its backers emerged as the winners. 
 
Table 4.2: Overview of propensity to renew armed conflict of Georgia & Abkhazia, 1992 
 
 Georgia Abkhazia 
MATERIAL 
ENVIRONMENT 
Surplus of revenue sources (RS>C) 
in 1992.  
Lack of revenue sources during the 
war (RS<C) in 1993 and 1994. 
Surplus of revenue sources (RS>C) 
based on third-party support 
Potential revenue 
sources  
Defence budget, parallel economy, 
looting 
Third-party assistance, looting  
 
Cost of conflict (annual)   
Start-up USD 1.6 million USD 1.1 million 
Maintenance low USD 33 million USD 23 million 
Maintenance medium USD 37 million USD 26 million 
Maintenance high USD 54 million USD 38 million 
INCENTIVE TO USE 
ARMED FORCE  
 
 
High 
 
High 
Expected benefit of 
using armed force 
Territorial control and integrity, 
control of economic opportunities 
and transport routes to Russia 
Survival as an ethnic community, 
territorial control, independence  
 
Opportunity cost of 
using armed force 
The loss of Abkhazia  
PROPENSITY TO 
RENEW ARMED 
CONFLICT 
 
High 
 
High 
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4.3. The “Frozen Conflict”, 1994-2003  
 
With the end of the armed conflicts in 1994, Edouard Shevardnadze progressively 
consolidated his power as the president of Georgia. The National Guard and Mekhedrioni 
were weakened after their defeat in war and by 1995 Shevardnadze broke the armed 
groups by imprisoning their leaders. In Abkhazia, a similar consolidation of power took 
place, with Vladislav Ardzinba establishing control over the territory and economy of 
Abkhazia after victory in war. The legacies of the wars represented formidable challenges 
for Georgia and Abkhazia, including economic crises and a population of internally 
displaced persons (IDPs), the latter, economic and political isolation.  
 However, despite the main issues of incompatibility – territorial control of 
Abkhazia and the return of IDPs – remaining unresolved, there was no recurrence of 
major armed conflict in the period 1994 to 2003. The existing tensions found their 
expression in two security crisis in 1998 and 2001, the former of which saw the departure 
of Georgians which were spontaneous returnees in the Gali district on the Abkhazian side 
of the cease-fire line. In addition, low level fighting occurred sporadically along the 
cease-fire line.  
 The following analyses of the period of the so-called “Frozen Conflict”, in which 
no advances on the settlement of the Abkhazia conflict could be made, looks at the 
economic dimension to explore why there has been no conflict recurrence in this period.  
 
4.3.1. Available revenue sources 
 
The main sources of financing of the security actors in Georgia were official budgets, 
corruption, racketeering and foreign military assistance. Corruption and racketeering was 
one of the principle incomes of the Ministry of the Interior. During the office of Kakha 
Targamadze as Minister of the Interior, the police forces resembled a commercial firm. It 
was associated to the cigarette and oil business as well as the retail and wholesale markets 
(Darchiashvili and Nodia 2003, 12). The official budget of the Ministry of the Interior 
was USD 21 million (GEL 42 million) in 2002. However, the Ministry’s parallel income 
was superior to the official budget considering that oil smuggling alone was estimated to 
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account for tax losses of USD 250 million (Darchiashvili and Nodia 2003, 12; Gotsiridze 
2003, 9,11). The Police supplemented official salaries of 50-150 USD by organising a 
sophisticated bribery system.74  
After the defeat in Abkhazia, the role and capacity of the Georgian Armed Forces 
have been limited as well as its control over the economy. The defence expenditure 
dropped by nearly two thirds between 1996 and 2000 with an upward tendency towards 
2003 (see Table 4.3). Between 1999 and 2002, the defence budget was below than 1% of 
GDP. The decline in military expenditure is associated with the economic crises in 
Georgia and is thus a reflection of declining state revenue. Since the low point in 2000, 
defence expenditure is rising in real terms and as a percentage of GDP.  
 
Table 4.3: Georgian Military Expenditure, 1996-2003 
 
Year  GEL million US million 
(2003 prices and 
exchange rates) 
% of GDP 
1996 85.0 63.4 2.2 
1997 57.1 39.6 1.2 
1998 57.1 38.2 1.1 
1999 52.4 29.4 0.9 
2000 37.2 20.1 0.6 
2001 49.4 25.5 0.7 
2002 74.6 36.4 1.0 
2003 91.5 42.5 1.1 
Source: SIPRI 2006, 334, 341, 347. Figures for 1997-2001 are SIPRI estimates. 
 
Since 2002, the Georgian armed forces have received foreign military assistance 
from the United States. Under the banner of the Train and Equip Programme the US 
government supports Georgia’s border guards, coast guards and other law enforcement 
agencies by providing equipment, training and services to enhance its border protection 
and anti-terrorisms capability. USD 64 million are earmarked to train and equip 2,000 
Georgian border guards and to establish and anti-terrorism force in Georgia (Philipps 
                                                 
74 The traffic police in Tbilisi was another example of the privatisation of the state. Individual police men 
bought themselves the rights to stand in a certain square or corner from more senior police officers or 
public officials. The amount of bribes varied according to the location: trading routes and central avenues 
were the most expensive. Once the rights had been acquired, individual police men generated a return on 
investment by giving random fines (without receipts) or subjecting suspects in preliminary detention to 
physical abuse until the payment of a bribe (Interview Dürst; Darchiashvili and Nodia 2003, 12). After the 
Rose Revolution, taxi drivers in Tbilisi observed that this organised bribe taking by the police stopped and 
its presence was reduced. The reform of the police services is one of Saakashvili’s success (Interview 
Widmer).  
  
242
2004, 3). Overall, official US assistance in the field of security and law enforcement 
amounted to USD 31.7 million in 2002, USD 41.4 million in 2003 and 38.5 million in 
2004 (Department of State 2002, 2004a, 2004b). These levels of assistance suggest that 
US assistance is about equal to Georgia’s defence budget. In addition to the official 
defence budget and US military assistance, the Georgian armed forces were financed by 
parallel channels of support not accounted for in the defence budget. According to the 
former Minister of Defence, Giorgi Baramidze, the Ministry also recieved individual 
donations.75 
 After the end of the armed conflict, Georgia also became one of the biggest 
recipients of development assistance of the United States and the European Union. From 
the United States alone, Georgia has received USD 1.1 billion development assistance 
plus USD 408 million Department of Defence and privately donated commodities since 
1992. Calculating this figure on a 10 year annual average suggests that Georgia received 
an annual USD 110 million in the period 1992-2002. Georgia is the second biggest per 
capita recipient of US development assistance (Department of State 2002). The European 
Union provided a total of USD 480 million (EUR 369.43 million)76 since 1992 and is 
after the United States the second biggest donor. Annual average in the 12 year period 
1992- 2004 is USD 40 million (EU 2005). Thus, Georgia had a combined development 
assistance of at least about USD 150 million as available revenue sources.  
 Georgia’s landscape of security actors also includes paramilitary groups. The 
Tetri Legioni (White Legion) and the Tkis Dzmedbi (Forest Brothers) were the two main 
groups active in the Gali district on the cease-fire-line (CFL) between Georgia and 
Abkhazia and headed by two strongmen involved in the previous wars, Surab Samushiya 
and Dato Shengelia. Both groups recruited their support from the Georgian IDP 
community and had the broader objective to recapture Abkhazia. They carried out attacks 
in the Gali district and where heavily implicated in the 1998 Gali crisis (Feinberg 1999, 
34).   
 Both paramilitary groups received support from the Executive Council of the 
Abkhaz Government in Exile which was in turn subsidized by the Georgian Government 
                                                 
75 This statement is based on the comments of Baramidze in a television debate on Imedi TV, 6 April 2005, 
18.00. I am thankful to Volker Jakoby for bringing this information to my attention.  
76 Exchange rate 1 EUR = 1.3 USD. 
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(Lynch 2004, 71). The Abkhaz Government in Exile received GEL 5 million (about USD 
2.5 million) in the period 1997-2000 from Georgian state coffers. In 2001, its revenue 
was increased to GEL 7.6 million (about USD 3.8 million). Government support 
represents 72 percent of incomes with the rest being made from taxes on businesses 
registered in the name of Abkhazia (Gotsiridze 2003, 15-16).  
 Moreover, the White Legion and Forest Brothers have been involved in criminal 
activities in the Gali district and smuggling across the CFL. While the groups have been 
created for political reasons to destabilise the de-facto authorities in Abkhazia, over time, 
they became increasingly economically motivated and beyond the control of Tbilisi 
(Interview Gegeshidze). 
 In Abkhazia, potential revenue sources were taxation of economic activity, 
tourism, timber, the parallel economy and humanitarian assistance and foreign 
investment. The economy of Abkhazia is based on subsistence. There is no industry and 
its main base is services and agriculture. Most parts of the population were impoverished 
and old. Unemployment was rampant and levels of consumption low.  
 Politics and economics were tightly connected because the survival of the de-facto 
state related to the control over the economy. The little economic activity was allegedly 
controlled by about 15-20 people of the Ardzinba clan (Interview Khashig). Given this 
control over the economy and its utilisation towards the political goal of survival, the 
Abkhaz economy has become a resistance economy.  
The potential for conflict financing of the de-facto government of Abkhazia was 
rooted in the taxation and operation of economic activity taking place within the territory 
under its control. Data on the Abkhaz economy was linked to the de-facto government of 
Abkhazia or the Georgian government.  
For the Georgian authorities, business contacts with Abkhazia were quickly 
labelled as illegal because the Abkhaz de-facto authorities were considered illegitimate. 
From the Georgian point of view, therefore, Abkhaz exports of agricultural and timber 
could be classified as conflict goods as they finance the resistance against Georgia. From 
the Abkhaz point of view, however, the Abkhaz economy was the economy of a state in 
which the government controls the economy and its profits to ensure the security of its 
people. In relation to the various types of war economies discussed in Chapter 1, 
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Abkhazia resembled the economy of a de-facto state whose economic interactions could 
be considered illegitimate because it was not recognised as a political unit. Abkhazia was 
different from a warlord economy because the de-facto Government did – even if limited 
– maintain relations between the state and society. 
The Budget Office of the Parliament of Georgia estimated that Abkhazia has a 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of USD 50 million or USD 250 per capita. It is alleged 
that only 60% of the budget for 1994-1997 was transparent while 40% remained secret. 
The non-transparent part of the budget allegedly covered the armed forces of Abkhazia. 
For 1995 and 1997, non-transparent revenue was estimated at USD 2.7 million and USD 
2.1 million respectively while non-transparent was believed to be USD 4.1 million and 
USD 4.6 million respectively for the same years. The official defence budget of Abkhazia 
was at USD 1.5 million in 1997. However, this amount is believed to be inferior to what 
is needed to sustain the armed forces of Abkhazia (Parliament Budget Office 1998, 5, 8, 
14). In order to supplement their budget, Abkhaz security forces were known to have run 
control and customs points (Billingsley 2001, 19).  
Tourism has been a major revenue source for the de-facto Government of 
Abkhazia. Georgian sources allege that 25% of the income generated through tourism 
was used by the de-facto government to pay for its armed forces (Chkhartishvili et al 
2004, 147).77 Tourism was once the main economic activity of Abkhazia. In 1990, 
Abkhazia had the capacity to accommodate 65,000 foreign visitors. However, the war of 
1992-1993 destroyed most holiday resorts: Out of 125 resorts, 90 were destroyed and 13 
needed major repair. In 2003, the Abkhaz tourism industry amounted to 2 state owned, 33 
rented and 1 private resort with the capacity of 5,000 beds and 2,000 employees. In 2003, 
the occupancy rate was 23,8% (Ministry of Tourism of Abkhazia c.f. Gumba and Ketsba 
2004, 164-166). Gagra is alleged to have received between 20,000 and 26,000 visitors in 
2001 (Chkhartishvili et al 2004, 147).  
However, given that tourism was targeted at low budget tourists from Russia and 
Armenia, revenues were believed to be moderate. An estimation based on the above 
figures would suggest that Gagra generated at least USD 1.08 million and up to USD 2.35 
                                                 
77 One of the authors of this source cite the Secret Service of Georgia as the origin of this estimate 
(Interview Gotsiridze). 
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million in 2001.78 Nevertheless, the de-facto authorities benefited from their tourism 
infrastructure to gain political and diplomatic support by offering free holidays to 
prominent figures in Moscow (Chkhartishvili et al 2004, 147). 
Extra-budgetary sources of revenue allegedly included the exploitation of timber, 
agricultural produce and fish, the smuggling of cigarettes, drugs or consumer goods. 
According to the Ministry of State Security of Georgia, the Abkhaz leadership controlled 
the most profitable business of these activities namely logging and the smuggling of 
petrol and cigarettes (Chkhartishvili et al 2004, 136).79 Georgian sources allege that 
timber exports from Abkhazia grew steadily from 24,000 m³ in 1997 to and 63,430 m³ in 
2002 and an expected 80,000 m³ in 2003. Given a price of at least USD 100 per m³ 
annual turnover is estimated to be about USD 6.3 million in 2002 (Chkhartishvili et al 
2004, 138-139).   
The revenue from fruit and fish are believed to be inferior to timber. Abkhazia 
exports nearly all its fruits to Russia with a documented 4,500 tons of citrus fruit in 2001 
(Gotsiridze 2003, 26). Fishing is believed to have amounted to a value of about USD 
300,000 with a capacity of 630-740 tons per year. Most fish was caught by Turkish 
trawlers and it is unclear whether the de facto government of Abkhazia profited from 
fishing (Chkhartishvili et al 2004, 143). The tea industry which produced 110,000 tons of 
tea in 1989 is destroyed producing a mere 2,000 tons in 2000 (Gotsiridze 2003, 24). Even 
though Abkhazia used to be the biggest producer of citrus fruit in the Soviet Union, at 
present agriculture is mainly used for subsistence and trade on local markets. With the 
collapse of the Soviet Union and the armed conflict, agricultural production chains ceased 
to function and have since not been re-established (Interview Van Reeth). 
Smuggling is often cited by Georgian sources as one of the main sources of 
revenue for the de-facto authorities of Abkhazia. The smuggling of cigarettes from and 
through Abkhazia into Georgia was estimated to have an annual value of USD 17.2 
million. Some cigarettes smuggled into Georgia were produced in the Gudauta and 
Sukhumi cigarette factories producing Marlboro, Marlboro Medium and Astra. These two 
factories were allegedly controlled by the Ardzinba regime and the smuggling by high 
                                                 
78 The lower estimate is based on 20,000 visitors staying 18 days at hotel prices of 3 USD per night.  The 
higher estimate is based on 26,000 visitors staying 18 days at hotel prices of 5 USD per night.   
79 This information has generally been confirmed during a research mission to Abkhazia. 
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officials and influential clan leaders. However, the bulk of cigarettes was believed to 
come from Turkey and smuggled via Abkhazia into Georgia (Chkhartishvili et al 2004, 
1136, 139-140).  
Moreover, Abkhazia was alleged to be a hub for drug smuggling and part of the 
so-called  “Balkan Route” bringing heroin from the Afghan provinces of Helmand and 
Nangarhar via Iran, Azerbaijan, or Nagorno Kharabakh into Georgia and Abkhazia for 
further shipment to Russia or Europe. Moreover, it is part of the Southern flank of the 
“Northern Route” trafficking heroine from Afghanistan via Turkmenistan, the Caspian 
Sea and Azerbaijan to Georgia (Cornell 2003, 28-34, 37).  
However, observations collected during field research in Abkhazia suggest that 
smuggling was not systematic and large scale (hundreds of USD millions) and possibly 
not even medium scale (tens of USD millions) in the period 1994-2003. It is mainly 
subsistence smuggling which was paralleled in the past by individual operations of actors 
close to the Ardzinba regime. This assessment is based on the following observations: (1) 
If smuggling were a pervasive social phenomenon, there would have been more visible 
signs of profiteering (fancy cars, renovated houses, etc). (2) Given the close knit social 
fabric in Abkhazia, there would have been an unofficial discourse on smuggling if it was 
pervasive. However, there is no such discourse at all times in the period 1994-2003. (3) 
Interlocutors with experience in other post-conflict zones indicated that the level of 
smuggling from Abkhazia into Georgia was negligible. (4) Sukhumi has no functioning 
port which could be used for major smuggling operations. (5) Smuggling has never been 
an issue in official peace negotiations between Georgia and Abkhazia.  
The de facto government has also gained revenue from humanitarian assistance 
and direct foreign investment from Russia. International organisations and NGOs 
provided most of the social services in Abkhazia. With an official budget for social 
services of USD 183,000 or 3.4% of the budget of Abkhazia, the welfare functions of the 
de facto state were effectively outsourced to the international assistance community. 
Figures for 1997 suggest that Abkhazia received a total of USD 17.5 million in 
humanitarian assistance which is nearly three times the official revenue of Abkhazia for 
this year or about 35% of GDP. The biggest donors included the International Committee 
of the Red Cross (ICRC) with USD 10 million, United Nations High Commission for 
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Refugees (UNHCR) with USD 2.5 million and NGOs with a combined USD 5 million 
among which Acción Contre la Hambre, International Partnership and the Halo Trust 
Fund contributed about USD 1.2 million each (Parliament Budget Office 1998, 13).  
Moreover, the Abkhaz de facto government was able to attract significant foreign 
direct investment from Russia. In 1994, Russian Banks gave Abkhaz banks a loan of 
RUB 16 billion (USD 4 million) for them to start operations. RUB 5 billion (USD 1.25 
million) were invested to rehabilitate the port of Sukhumi. Moreover, the Parliament of 
Georgia alleged that a Russian Bank transferred a about USD 8 million to the Abkhaz 
authorities between November 2003 and March 2004. In addition, Russian banks have 
given out loans to the Abkhaz leadership and other Abkhaz citizens in return for 
guarantees on sanatoriums, hotels, land or resorts (Parliament Budget Office 1998, 14). 
While transfers seemed linked to commercial activities, it is unclear if they could be 
classified as transfers from individual supporters or Russian government assistance.  
The Parliament Budget Office noted that Abkhazia benefits from family transfers 
from citizens living outside Abkhazia (Parliament Budget Office 1998, 5). A source in 
Sukhumi suggested that the de-facto authorities are presently developing their diaspora 
network in Russia and Turkey.  
Table 4.4 summarises the annual revenues sources of Georgia and Abkhazia in the 
period 1994-2003. The summary suggests that Georgia had potential annual revenue 
sources of at least USD 591 million and Abkhazia of about USD 49 million.  
 
Table 4.4: Potential annual revenue sources in Georgia and Abkhazia, 1994-2003  
(USD million) 
Georgia Abkhazia 
Official Forces  Transparent budget (1995) 2.7 
Smuggling oil and cigarettes (per 
year) 
320 Parallel budget (1995) 4.1 
Budget Ministry of Interior (2002) 21 Tourism 1.0 
Budget Ministry of Defence annual 
average 1998-2002) 
35 Timber (2002) 6.3 
Foreign development assistance 
(annual average) 
150 Fishing 0.3 
Train and Equip Programme 64 Humanitarian assistance (1997) 17.5 
  Smuggling cigarettes to Georgia 17.2 
Paramilitary forces  Smuggling to Russia N/A 
Abkhaz Government in Exile 
(annual average 1997-2000) 
0.6 Foreign investment and bank 
loans 
N/A 
Smuggling N/A Diaspora remittances N/A 
Total potential revenue sources 590.6 Total potential revenue sources 49.1 
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4.3.2. The cost of conflict 
 
After the Abkhazia conflict, the Georgian Armed Forces were demoralised and 
dysfunctional and never recovered from their defeat. By 2003, they consisted of an army 
of 18,700 soldiers and 900 in each navy and air force (Larsson 2003, 29). In 1996, they 
were estimated to have about 30,000 soldiers however at low operational levels. When 
the post-war military was created in 1994, out of a total conscript army of 49,000 men 
there were never more than a few thousands in the barracks (Darchiashvili 2005, 131) 
Overall, its combat effectiveness was very limited and it was “wholly unable to tackle the 
chronic instability in the country” (Perlo-Freeman and Stålenheim 2003, 14). Just prior to 
the ‘Rose Revolution,’ the Georgian Armed Forces did not have enough ammunition to 
sustain a single day of combat and only 70 out of 220 tanks were operative (Interview 
Rondeli). In April 2001, salaries had not been paid for 16 month, soldiers were 
undernourished, desertions increased and corruption was endemic (Perlo-Freeman and 
Stålenheim 2003, 12-13).  
 Shevardnadze neglected the Armed Forces because he based his power on the 
Ministry of the Interior. Its troops numbered approximately 12,000 men in 1996 
(Darchiashvili 2005, 131).80 The reliance on the Ministry of the Interior shows that 
Shevardnadze considered domestic threats more important than international threats. This 
reflected the institutional legacy of the Soviet Union in which the Ministry of Interior was 
the main security institution (Interview Iskanderov). 
  
Table 4.5: Price development of selected weapons systems 
(Demetriou 2002, 33) 
 
 1991/1992 
(USD) 
1992/1993 
(USD) 
1994/1995 
(USD) 
2001 
(USD) 
AK-47 AR 250-300 120-150 100-150 100 
AKMS AR 500 300-500 400-500 N/A 
SVD Dragunov SR N/A 900-1,200 1,500-2,000 1,200-1,500 
AK-74 SU N/A 500 700-1,000 500 
OZ-14 Groza AR N/A 2,000-2,500 3,500-4,000 4,000 
PKM (7.62) GPMG N/A 300-500 500-700 1,200-1,700 
                                                 
80 The number of 12,000 men of the Ministry of Interior is inferred from subtracting the total troop strength 
of the Ministry of Defence of 30,000 in 1996 from an estimated combined strength of 42,000 men of 
Ministry of Defence and Ministry of Interior (Darchiashvli 2005, 131). 
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 Weapons prices developed differently for various types of weapons after the end 
of the armed conflicts (see Table 4.5). Standard Kalashnikov models were available for 
around 100-150 USD between 1994 and 2001, down from 250-300 USD in the pre-war 
period 1990/1991. This price indicates that there was little demand for Kalashnikovs after 
the conflicts. However, more specialised weapons (AKMS AR, SVD Dragunov SR) used 
by special forces and for urban combat settings increased in price but had a downward 
trend by 2001. Advanced assault rifles general purpose machine guns and sniper rifles 
saw the most continuous price increases as exemplified by the OZ-14 Groza AR and the 
PKM (7.62) GPMG. This price development can be partly associated to the weapons 
demand in Chechnya which transited over Georgian territory (Demetriou 2002, 33-35). 
However, they may also indicate the greater weapons demand in Georgia to supply 
special forces and militias with more specialised military equipment.  
 The Government of Georgia was able to benefit from the disarmament of the 
paramilitary groups in the mid-1990s. According to an official estimate 60 % of weapons 
were collected from Mkhedrioni, 28 % from the National Guard and 12% from the 
public. In total, 9,717 small arms and 28,000 grenades, missiles and mines were 
collected. One quarter of the collected weapons was destroyed and the rest distributed 
within the Ministry of the Interior, the border guards and the Ministry of State Security 
(Demetriou 2002, 30-32).   
 For the estimation of the cost to start and maintenance of armed conflict the 
following will assume an average price of 400 USD per weapon reflecting that 2/3 of a 
1,000 strong force have a Kalashnikov costing 100 USD and 1/3 a more advanced 
weapons costing 1,000 USD. For ammunition, the value of 0.05 USD per round of 
ammunition is taken. There are no estimates on the price development for ammunition. 
However, interviewees in Tbilisi indicated that the price per round would not be more 
than several US cents.   
 The first available data of annual average male salary of 3,712 USD based on data 
for 2001 must be revised downward (UNDP 2003, 310-313). Evidence on salaries 2000 
suggest that officers participating in the US funded Train and Equip Programme (GTEP) 
received between 180 USD and 360 USD while regular soldiers and officers received 
only 38 USD monthly (Chanadiri and Sapashvili 2004). Taking the 1996 troop strength 
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of 30,000 men and considering a monthly average of USD 270 for the 2000 men taking 
part in GTEP (Antonenko 2005, 233) and a monthly salary of 38 USD for the remaining 
28,000, the monthly average of per soldier is 53.5 USD or 642 USD per year or about 
1.75 USD per soldier per day. These estimates are lower then the approximate cost per 
soldier of 10.2 USD per day or 309 USD per month inferred from UNDP data on annual 
average mail income for 2001. In order to reflect the need to increase the salary for 
soldiers to motivate them to active combat, the following estimation uses average 
between the annual salary figures for the Georgian military of 642 USD per soldiers and 
the UNDP figure for 2001 on average annual male income of 3,712 USD. The average 
between these figures is 2,177 USD. The same figure will be used for Abkhazia. 
 Applying the CERs developed in Chapter 2 the following estimates the start-up 
and annual maintenance cost for Georgia and Abkhazia for the period 1992-1994. The 
key estimations variables include the following: 
 
• Price per weapon (PF) = 400 USD (Demetriou 2002, 33); 
• Price per round of ammunition (PA) = 0.1 USD (no data, assumed price higher 
because of more advanced weapons included in weapons count); 
• Annual average male salary (I) = 2,177 USD (see discussion above. Represents 
approximately cost per soldier of 6.0 USD/day or 181 USD/month); 
• Number of fighters (N) = 30,000 for Georgia and 6,000 for Abkhazia representing 
previous troop levels (Darchiashvili 2005, 131; Demetriou 2002, 21). 
 
 The calculation summarised in Table 4.6 suggest that Georgia had a start-up cost 
of about USD 18.4 million and annual maintenance cost for of between about USD 71 
million for a low intensity conflict, USD 110 million for a medium intense conflict and 
USD 235 million for a high intensity conflict. Abkhazia had a start-up cost of about USD 
3.7 million and annual maintenance cost for of between about USD 15 million for a low 
intensity conflict, USD 22 million for a medium intense conflict and USD 47 million for 
a high intensity conflict.  
 A comparison of these figures to the annual revenue sources USD 591 million in 
Georgia and USD 49 million in Abkhazia suggests that both Georgia and Abkhazia had a 
surplus of revenue sources to conduct an armed conflict of high intensity.  
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Table 4.6: Overview of the start-up and annual maintenance of armed conflict for Georgia and Abkhazia, 1994-2003 
 
 CERs Composites Georgia Abkhazia  
   USD USD USD USD 
CER 1:  
Weapons 
1.5 firearms (F)  
x Price per firearm (PF)  
x Number of fighters (N) 
 
18,000,000 
 
3,600,000 
S
t
a
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t
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u
p
 
c
o
s
t
 
CER 2:   
Ammunition 
1.5 firearms (F)  
x 100 rounds of ammunition (A) 
x Price per ammunition (PA) 
x Number of fighters (N) 
 
450,000 
 
Total start-up cost 
 
18,450,000  
90,000 
 
Total start-up cost 
 
3,690,000 
CER 3:  
Salaries 
Annual male income (I) 
x Number of fighters (N) 
 
65,310,000 
  
13,062,000 
 
CERL 4:  
Weapons 
 
0.33 firearms (F)  
x 1 x Price per firearm (PF) 
x Number of insurgents (N) 
 
3,960,000 
 
792,000 
L
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w
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n
t
e
n
s
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t
y
 
CERL 5:  
Ammunition 
 
1.5 firearms (F)  
x 20 rounds of ammunition (A) 
x 90 days of combat 
x Price per round (PA) 
x Number of insurgents (N) 
 
1,782,000 
 
Total maintenance 
(low intensity)* 
 
71,052,000 
 
1,620,000 
 
Total maintenance 
(low intensity)* 
 
15,474,000 
CERM 4:  
Weapons 
0.45 firearms (F)  
x 1.5 x Price per firearm (PF) 
x Number of insurgents (N) 
 
8,100,000 
 
1,620,000 
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CERM 5: 
Ammunition 
 
1.5 firearms (F)  
x 60 rounds of ammunition (A) 
x 90 days of combat 
x 1.5 x Price per round (PA) 
x Number of insurgents (N) 
 
36,400,000 
 
 
Total maintenance 
(medium intensity)* 
 
109,860,000 
 
7,290,000 
 
Total maintenance 
(medium intensity)* 
 
21,972,000 
CERH 4:  
Weapons 
 
0.65 firearms (F) 
x 3 x Price per firearm (PF) 
x Number of insurgents (N) 
 
23,400,000 
 
4,680,000 
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CERH 5:  
Ammunition 
1.5 firearms (F)  
x 120 rounds of ammunition (A) 
x 90 days of combat 
x 3 x Price per round (PA) 
x Number of insurgents (N) 
 
145,800,000 
 
Total maintenance 
(high intensity)* 
 
234,510,000 
 
29,160,000 
 
Total maintenance 
(high intensity)* 
 
46,902,000 
* Includes CER 3: Salaries. 
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4.3.3. Expected benefits and opportunity costs 
 
The Section looks at the opportunity costs deriving from the parallel economy, the 
political and economic opportunity costs of renewed conflict for Georgia and Abkhazia 
as well as external actors. It shows that the status quo of the Frozen Conflict was the best 
possible outcome for all stakeholders and therefore did not provide an incentive renew 
armed conflict.  
 Profiteers from the parallel economy had an interest in stability. Georgia’s parallel 
economy is based principally on transit trade. Clan leaders in the regions of Georgia and 
their collaborators in the public sector derive their power from controlling borders and 
transit routes. Given that most of the smuggling was transit trade, even if some part was 
for local consumption, suggests that local clans were not opposed to each other because 
they relied on cooperation with others to transit the country. To make the parallel 
economy work, therefore, required collaborators on all levels of government and society. 
Hence, the emergence of tacit arrangements between the regions and the central 
government in which the protection of profits at the regional level are exchanged for 
political support at the national level (Wennmann 2004, 109-113).  
 These characteristics of smuggling in Georgia suggest that profiteers from the 
parallel economy had an interest in stability and the status quo because it was a 
prerequisite for maintaining established business practices. As the regimes of 
Shevardnadze and Ardzinba profited from the control of the shadow economy they had 
little incentive to change the status quo and a “reasonable strong economic incentive not 
to settle the conflicts” (MacFarlane 2004, 138). The conflicts of Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia, like other post-Soviet conflicts, became “a system with myriad levels of 
interaction between the system’s constituent parts and with an internal logic that drives 
it” (Lynch 2004a, 119-120). 
 Georgia also had little political and economic interests in changing the status of 
the conflicts. Abkhazia and South Ossetia provided a rallying point for political support 
for Shevardnadze. If he had agreed to far reaching concessions, it would have exposed his 
government to criticism by nationalist parties, destabilisation and risking losing popular 
support. At the same time, Georgia could not grant Abkhazia and South Ossetia full 
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independence for fear of similar requests from other regions, thus further undermining its 
territorial integrity (Nodia 1999; Interview Kukhianidze). Abkhazia and South Ossetia 
were also an important element in deflecting attention from the Georgia’s political and 
economic situation. They were frequently portrayed as the principle reasons for Georgia’s 
problems with corruption, smuggling and its weak state. However, it may have been the 
other way around: The reasons for Georgia’s political and economic situation were 
related to Georgia’s political system under Shevardnadze and not exclusively to the 
frozen conflicts (Wennmann 2006, 44-47). 
 Moreover, the maintenance of the status of the frozen conflicts was all the 
Georgian government could pragmatically hope to achieve. Georgia lost the war, the 
economy and state nearly collapsed; it did not have the military capability to retake 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia and there was little intent to consider power sharing as an 
option for conflict resolution. At the same time, the external economic barriers worked 
from the point of view of Tbilisi: The separatist regions did not prosper, the barriers 
exerted pressure on the separatist regions during negotiations, and they avoided Georgia 
recognising its defeat in war (Interview Lynch). In addition, the status quo did not create 
an economic incentive to implement agreements. As long as a dialogue was maintained, 
foreign financial support continued (King 2001a, 548-549).  
 Even if Georgia had had the will to get back to war with Abkhazia, it would have 
been unlikely to win a war against Abkhazia given the desolate state of its armed forces 
and the geo-strategic features of mountainous territory of Abkhazia. Georgian forces 
would have been unlikely to maintain control over Abkhazia. As in 1991-1994, a 
Georgian advance would have likely triggered a retreat into the mountains from where 
guerrilla warfare had been organised (Interview Iskanderov and Gegeshidze; Walker 
1998, 13). In addition, the continued support of Russia for Abkhazia increased the 
barrier-to-entry for Georgia. 
 Concerning economic interests, the recurrence of conflict would have jeopardized 
the provision of bilateral and multilateral aid and the BTC Pipeline. Georgia is the second 
biggest per capita recipient of US development assistance (Department of State 2002). 
The recurrence of conflict would not only have destroyed the conditions to build the BTC 
pipeline but also driven away multilateral and bilateral donors. Overall, humanitarian and 
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development assistance increased the opportunity cost of conflict recurrence and fostered 
an interest in keeping the conflicts unresolved. 
  For Abkhazia, the maintenance of the status of the frozen conflicts was also all 
what could be achieved. With de-facto statehood and control over economic resources, 
Abkhazia achieved its war aims except international recognition. There was no real 
incentive to join Georgia or advocate policies of power sharing given Georgia’s abysmal 
economic situation and a sustained discourse against the two autonomous regions (Lynch 
2004a, 69; Huber 2004, 62-63). In the words of a Georgian analyst: “What has Georgia 
done to make Georgia more attractive to Abkhazia? Georgia is hardly attractive to 
Georgians” (Zakareishvili c.f. Lynch 2004a, 71-72). In this sense, Georgia was 
negotiating from a relative position of weakness, Abkhazia and South Ossetia from 
relative positions of strength.  
 Abkhazia also had an economic interest to avoid the recurrence of armed conflict. 
Given the lower level of assistance to Abkhazia, this argument is less important to 
Abkhazia in comparison to Georgia. Nevertheless, the activities of humanitarian 
organisations in Abkhazia helped the Abkhaz leadership to survive politically and foster 
the creation of a de-facto state. In 1997, Abkhazia received a total of USD 17.5 million 
humanitarian aid. A large segment of society is dependent on external aid (Lynch 2004, 
78). Without these activities, popular discontent may have provoked much higher levels 
of popular discontent with the de-facto authorities of Abkhazia thus creating political 
pressure for change (Interview Gotsiridze). 
 External actors also had an interest in stability. Russia wanted to keed control 
over Abkhazia and South Ossetia because of Russia’s security interests in the South 
Caucasus (Wennmann 2006, 20-22). These interests were driven by a group close to the 
Kremlin which viewed Abkhazia and South Ossetia to prevent Western expansion into 
the former Soviet space. The Russian military supported the autonomous regions to 
prevent encirclement by NATO and destabilising effects into the North Caucasus. Russia 
feared armed conflict on its Southern flank fearing potential repercussions in the North 
Caucasus, in particular offsetting its delicate ethnic balance. Moreover, the Russian 
military and individuals have investments in Abkhazia which they would like to 
safeguard (Antonenko 2005a, 30; Antonenko 2005b, 231-232; Wennmann 2006, 20-23).  
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 The main interest of the United States is to keep Georgia stable in order to ensure 
a pro-Western regime and to safeguard its investments into the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan 
(BTC) pipeline. The latter is part of the larger strategy concerning the energy reserves of 
the Caspian Sea and the diversification of American energy supplies. However, at 
present, the United States’ involvement in Georgia may be more adequately explained by 
its geopolitical interests in the Middle East and Central Asia. The United States has an 
interest to foster its alliance with Georgia given its proximity to the Middle East and its 
role as transport corridor to Afghanistan (Huber 2004, 12; Vaux 2003, 16; Shaffer 2003). 
 However, despite the opportunity costs of renewing armed conflict in Georgia, the 
security situation deteriorated markedly in 1998 and 2001. In May 1998, the spontaneous 
return of refugees and incursions by Georgian paramilitaries were countered by about 
1,500 Abkhaz militias who swept the Gali district. About 40,000 returning IDPs were 
displaced for the third time after Abkhaz militias burnt all Georgian houses in order to 
ensure that Georgians do not return again (Cohen 1998). Nevertheless, about 40,000 IDPs 
have again returned to live in the Gali district motivated by a strong sense of attachment 
to their land and having no where else to go.  
The events in 2001 were linked to a crisis in the Pankisi Valley which sparked a 
crisis between Russia and Georgia concerning Chechen militias who were hiding there. 
Russia frequently criticised Georgia for giving sanctuary to Chechen fighters in the 
Pankisi Valley. Tengiz Targamadze – then Minister of Interior – coordinated travel 
arrangements for a group of about 500 Chechen fighters from the Pankisi to Khodori 
Valley. The Khodori Valley links Georgia with Abkhazia and is inhabited by the 
reclusive Svan population (Interviews Speck, Gogia, Freiser, Gegechidze).81  
 These crises were fostered by the existence of small unified armed groups which 
thrived on controlling parallel economic activities. The parallel economy is an important 
factor in understanding the risk of conflict recurrence because it affects the viability of 
paramilitary groups. The Ministry of Interior, the Ministry of Defence and the three 
paramilitary groups were key actors in the parallel economy of Georgia which generated 
income to create and sustain small unified armed groups (Wennmann 2006, 40-51). 
                                                 
81 The Svans are notorious for their military toughness. The Khodori Valley has neither been controlled by 
Abkhazia nor Georgia after the fall of the Soviet Union. The Svans were so militantly guarding the Khodori 
valley that even Stalin did not touch them (Interview in Tbilisi). 
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4.3.4. Assessment 
 
In the period 1994-2003, Georgia and Abkhazia had sufficient potential revenue sources 
to start and maintain armed conflict of high intensity. This is a conundrum because 
despite a surplus of revenue sources and the continuation of the unresolved status of the 
conflict, the Abkhazia did not experience conflict recurrence. This situation contradicts 
the argument that armed conflict recurs if sufficient revenue sources are available. This 
Part highlights the following on the relationship between conflict financing and 
recurrence:  
 
• Despite the availability of revenue sources, Georgia could not renew armed conflict 
because the Georgian Government did not capture revenue resources. While in 
Abkhazia, the revenue stream was controlled by Ardzinba, in Georgia it was 
decentralised. Revenue sources were not officially controlled by the state but by clans 
or individuals that captured the economic opportunities within their area of influence. 
The decentralised control structure of Georgia’s revenue sources and the lack of 
resource capture explains why the Georgian Government was not in the position to 
finance an armed conflict under Shevardnadze.  
• The Georgian Government did not have sufficient resources to fight the type of war 
needed to establish permanent control over Abkhazia. Georgian troops would have 
needed to sustain a prolonged high intensity conflict to defeat an insurgency of 
Abkhaz and likely attacks from Russia. Through Russian support, Abkhazia ensured a 
barrier-to-entry for Georgia. With a lack of resource capture, the Georgian 
Government was unable to overcome the barriers-to-entry and cost of competition. 
• In addition to these material explanations, neither side did have an expected benefit 
from using armed force. The situation of “no war no peace” represented the best 
outcome for all elite stakeholders. Most domestic and foreign actors had a high 
opportunity cost of using armed force: For Georgia, it was losing the control of the 
parallel economy, relative domestic stability, the BTC-pipeline project and foreign 
military and development assistance; for Abkhazia, the main opportunity cost was 
associated with losing control of the territory and economy or Abkhazia. 
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• This Part also highlighted that the main risk of conflict recurrence in Georgia 
emanated from small armed groups operating along the cease-fire line. By controlling 
the parallel economy, these armed groups became self-financing and capable spoilers 
as evidenced in the crises of 1998 and 2001. 
 
Table 4.7: Propensity to renew armed conflict of Georgia and Abkhazia, 1994-2003 
 
 Georgia Abkhazia 
MATERIAL 
ENVIRONMENT 
Surplus of revenue sources (RS>C) 
for armed conflict of high intensity 
Surplus of revenue sources (RS>C) 
for armed conflict of high intensity 
Potential revenue 
sources (annual) 
USD 591 million from state budgets, 
foreign development and military 
assistance, smuggling 
USD 49 million from state budget, 
parallel budget, tourism, timber, 
fishing, humanitarian assistance, 
smuggling to Georgia and Russia, 
foreign investment, bank loans, 
diaspora remittances 
Cost of conflict (annual)   
Start-up USD 18.4 million USD 3.7 million 
Maintenance low USD 71 million USD 15 million 
Maintenance medium USD 110 million USD 22 million 
Maintenance high USD 235 million USD 47 million 
INCENTIVE TO USE 
ARMED FORCE  
 
 
Low 
 
Low 
Expected benefit of 
using armed force 
Establishment of territorial control 
over Abkhazia 
Defence of territorial control and 
economic opportunities 
Opportunity cost of 
using armed force 
Losing control of the parallel 
economy, relative domestic stability, 
the BTC-pipeline project, foreign 
military and development assistance. 
Losing control of the territory and 
economy or Abkhazia. 
 
PROPENSITY TO 
RENEW ARMED 
CONFLICT  
 
Low 
 
Low 
 
4.4. The Rose Revolution, 2003-2006 
 
The Rose Revolution brought a new political elite to power in Georgia. President 
Mikhael Saakashvili represented at the same time a new generation of young Georgians 
as well as the desire to move away from corruption and mismanagement of the 
Shevardnadze era. With the new elite taking power in Tbilisi, the period of the “Frozen 
Conflicts” ends because the situation in which all political and economic elites benefited 
from the unresolved status of the conflicts ceased to exist. Instead, the Georgian 
Government realised that a continuing unresolved status would not be in Georgia’s 
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favour as the gulf between Abkhazia and Georgia widened. The evidence of this gulf was 
that Abkhaz authorities openly adopted long term development plans.  
 The desire to change the status of the unresolved conflict was paralleled by a 
drive towards the consolidation of state finances in Georgia. As part of the increase in 
state finances, the defence budget grew which in turn created fears in Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia that Georgia was planning the renewal of armed conflict. This fear was confirmed 
from their perspective with Georgia’s capture of the renegade province of Adjara as well 
as an attack on South Ossetia in 2004. These events illustrate that the risk of conflict 
recurrence increased after the Rose Revolution as Abkhazia and Georgia became 
increasingly disconnected in the economic and political fields.  
 
4.4.1. Available revenue sources 
 
After Rose Revolution, Georgia’s economic performance improved leading to the 
increasing revenues for the Government of Georgia.  GDP grew from USD 13.1 billion in 
2003 to USD 16.1 billion in 2006 (see Table 4.8). Government revenue increased by 24.2 
% between 2004 and 2005 from USD 1,129 million in 2004 to USD 1,431 million in 
2005.82 The Georgian Government was also able to increase its tax revenue from USD 
1,192 million in 2004 to USD 1,259 million in 2005 representing a 5,6% increase 
(Government of Georgia 2005, 6, 14).83 The increase reflects the Government’s efforts to 
reducing the parallel economy of the Shevardnadze era to consolidate state finances. 
 
 Table 4.8: Georgian economic situation and military expenditure, 2003-2006 
Year  GDP 
(USD billion) 
Defence 
expenditure 
(GEL million) 
Defence 
expenditure 
(US million) 
Exchange rate 
USD to GEL 
Defence 
expenditure 
(as % of GDP) 
2003 13.1 60.0 28.2 2.14 0.46 
2004 13.5 70.0 26.6 1.91 0.52 
2005 14.2 389.0 213.0 1.82 1.45 
2006 16.1 604.0 349.0 1.73 2.16 
Source: based on IISS 2007, 166 and IISS 2005, 120-121. % of GDP inferred from figures above. Exchange rates 2003-20056 from 
IISS 2005, 120.  
                                                 
82 Based on official Georgian revenue figures of GEL 2,601.7 million for 2005 and an exchange rate of 1 
GEL = 0.55 USD. The figure for 2004 was inferred from 2005 figure representing a 26.7% increase to 2004 
(Government of Georgia 2005, 14) 
83 Based on official Georgian revenue figures of GEL 2,288.9 million for 2005 and an exchange rate of 1 
GEL = 0.55 USD. The figure for 2004 was inferred from 2005 figure representing a 5.6 % increase to 2004 
(Government of Georgia 2005, 14). 
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Table 4.9: Security Budgets in Georgia (USD millions) 
 
 Ministry of 
Defence 
Ministry of 
Interior(2) 
State Border 
Guards 
Department 
Ministry of 
State 
Security(3) 
 
State 
Intelligence 
Department  
 
Total 
Security 
Budget  
 
2002 36.4 27.0 4.6 4.1 0.6 72.7 
2003 42.8 28.0 5.4 4.5 0.8 80.5 
2004 90.1 (1) 66.0 (2) n/a (1) 9.0 n/a 165.1 
2005 200.5 69.0 n/a 14.0 n/a 283.5 
2006   (4) 335.4 122.0 n/a n/a n/a 457.4 
 
Source: Based on Jane’s Intelligence (http://www.janes.com). Data for Ministry of Defence adapted to 
SIPRI (2006) figures for 2003 and to Table for 2003-2006.  
Notes: (1) Provisional figure. (2) Includes Police and Interior Ministry troops. From 2004, also includes 
State Border Guards. Interior Ministry troops merged into Ministry of Defence in November 2004. (3) 
From 2004, included State Intelligence Department. From early 2005, State Security was merged into 
Ministry of Interior. (4) Include Government proposal of supplementary defence budget of USD 120 
million (GEL 212.5 million) of July 2006. 
  
The Georgian security sector has been the largest recipient of state resources after the 
Rose Revolution.84 It increased rapidly from USD 72.7 million in 2002 to USD 457.4 
million in 2006 (see Table 4.9). After the near collapse of the military in the last two 
years of Shevardnadze, military spending increased rapidly from USD 28.4 million to 
USD 349.0 million in 2006 (see Table 4.8). In July 2006, the Ministry of Finance 
announced an amendment to the state budget which previewed a 50% increase of the 
2006 budget for the Ministry of Defence of USD 120 million (GEL 212.5 million) 
leading to a total defence budget of USD 335 million (Civil Georgia 2006).85  
 The budget increases for the security sector have been justified by the expenses 
relating to security sector reform and modernising the Georgian military in view of 
achieving NATO-interoperability standards. Considering the state in which the Georgian 
military establishment has been prior to the Rose Revolution, the security sector had to be 
entirely renewed. The greatest part of the increase was devoted for the payment of 
salaries. The rapid increase from USD 26.6 million to USD 213 million of the Ministry of 
Defence budget was associated to the inclusion of troops from the Ministry of Interior 
                                                 
84 The next biggest recipient is the Ministry of Energy (GEL208.7 million) and the Ministry of Economic 
Development (GEL 162.3 million) with about half the budget of the Ministry of Defence in 2005 (GEL 365 
million) (Government of Georgia 2005, 28 31). 
85 Differential between figures of Table 4.8 and 4.9 are based on exchange rate differences.  
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(various interviews Tbilisi). The total number of Ministry of Interior troops was estimated 
to amount to 6,300 in 2005 (IISS 2005, 121). 
 
Table 4.10: Foreign Military Assistance, USD millions 
 
 US  Turkey 
2000 3.4 n/a 
2001 5.0 1.5+ 
2002 31.9 3.0 
2003 8.2 n/a 
2004 30.0 n/a 
2005 73.7 1.5+ 
2006 13.2+ n/a 
 
Source: Based on Jane’s Intelligence (http://www.janes.com).  
Notes: US figures include Foreign Military Funding (FMF) and International Military Education and 
Training (IMET) allocations. IMET funding to Georgia began in 1997. Figure for 2002 includes 
a USD20 million supplementary FMF allocation. Turkey provided Georgia with USD 28 million of 
military assistance between 1998 and 2001, mainly in the form of cascaded equipment. Since 2002 Turkey 
has concentrated on funding training and rehabilitation of military infrastructure. In the three years to end 
of 2004 it provided another USD 9.4 million in assistance.  
  
 In addition to budgetary financing, Georgia received large amounts of foreign 
military aid from the United States and Turkey. Between 2002 and 2004, the US financed 
Georgian Train and Equip Programme (GTEP) was USD 64 million. Foreign military 
assistance covered nearly all training and infrastructure development and included the 
provision of surplus weapons and ammunitions from Bulgaria and Romania (see Table 
4.10). 
 In addition, the Ministry of Defence draw on the Army Development Fund which 
collected anonymous donations from the private sector to kick-start the modernisation of 
the military after the Rose Revolution. The fund was worth and estimated USD 17 
million USD and was severely criticised by the opposition because of its lack of 
transparency.86 Voluntary funds were allegedly also created to generate emergency 
funding for the police and Adjara (Interview Kindersheli). However, government circles 
indicated that all three funds no longer exist, are now depleted and the military only 
draws on a transparent budget which is approved by Parliament.  
 Nevertheless, some analysts suggest that parallel funding continued in the first 
two years after the Rose Revolution derived from continued practices of the parallel 
                                                 
86 Based on Jane’s Intelligence information on Georgia’s defence budget (http://www.janes.com). 
  
261
economy. Government officials received payments from economic stakeholders in 
exchange for allowing economic activity to be controlled by a specific individual. This 
strategy was used to create windfall revenue which was channelled into the Army 
Development Fund. Those profiting from the parallel economy under Shevardnadze were 
allegedly allowed to keep their businesses by paying into the parallel funds. From this 
perspective, the Rose Revolution could be considered merely an ownership change within 
the parallel economy rather than the end to Shevardnadze’s balancing strategy (Interview 
Losaberidze and Kindersheli). 
 The Georgian military could also profit from weapons seizures. It was able to 
supplement its weapons stocks after the capture of Adjara. Aslan Abashidze, the ousted 
leader of Adjara, maintained his own militia which was equipped with modern state-of 
the-art military equipment. Much of this equipment could be captured by Georgian forces 
when Abashidze was ousted in 2004 (Interview Rondeli). Abashidze’s forces were 
financed by his control over the local economy which mainly consisted of cross border 
trade with Turkey and the port of Batumi. Moreover, in a military operation in the 
Khodori George in July 2006, the Georgian military allegedly captured weapons and 
ammunition from a local militia worth USD 30 million (Corso 2006).87 
Given the official budgets for the security sector, foreign military assistance, 
parallel funding, and weapons seizures, the Georgian military sector operated far beyond 
its level of subsistence which was estimated between USD 32 million and USD 57 
million in 2002.88 Taking all potential revenue sources together, Georgia had potential 
revenue sources to finance armed conflict of about USD 501.2 million. The amelioration 
of Georgia’s budget situation as well as continued foreign military assistance contributed 
to the modernisation of the Georgian security sector.  
These developments were observed with much concern in Abkhazia. It feared that 
Georgia wanted to bolster its military power to force a military solution to the unresolved 
conflicts as evidenced by the attack in South Ossetia in 2004 (Interview Turnava and 
Gamisonija; Lynch 2004, 58). Claims from the Georgian side that the rise in defence 
                                                 
87 This figure is from a news report and based on estimations based on official Georgian statements. The 
figure could not be independently verified.  
88 Based on Jane’s Intelligence information on Georgia’s defence budget (http://www.janes.com). 
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expenditure only reflected an attempt towards the normalisation of the Georgian Armed 
Forces were given little credence.  
 The potential revenue sources available in Abkhazia remain similar to those of the 
previous phase. Abkhazia became increasingly involved in development planning. In 
September 2005, the de-facto authorities presented a new economic development concept 
for Abkhazia’s potential in transport, energy and tourism. Moreover the concept 
advocated integration into the Russian economic space and aims at the development of 
the public sector. In April 2005, the de-facto authorities passed a budget of USD 22.8 
million (RUR 643 million) which was about one third increase from the previous year 
(Fuller 2005). Most of revenue was generated though customs duties amounting to about 
USD 7.9 million (RUR 222.3 million) and about US 2 million (RUR 58 million) from tax 
revenues (Jatchvadze 2005). 
 However, given the potential revenue sources through trade between Abkhazia 
and Russia and tourism revenue sources can be assumed to be higher. About 1.5 million 
Russians visited Abkhazia for holidays in 2005. If each tourist stayed and average 10 
days with hotel expenses of 5 USD, revenue possibilities for accommodation are USD 
USD 75 million. Allegedly it is common practice to underreport hotel visitors for hotel 
owners to avoid paying taxes (Interview Matveeva). However, given the various 
stakeholders involved in the hotel business in Abkhazia, it remains open if the Abkhazian 
Government could capture these resources except through taxation.  
 Smuggling of petrol and scrap metal over the CFL has largely stopped while petty 
trade and smuggling of cars and cigarettes continued on a small scale (Interview 
Matveeva).  
 The revenue stream from the economic opportunities continues to be controlled 
by a few clans. The Ardzinba clan remains in control of the most lucrative economic 
resources including hotels, ports and telecommunication (Interview Matveeva).  
 Given the potential revenues sources available in Abkhazia, it can be asserted that 
the official budget is not sufficient to pay for the military. Alternatively funds are 
generated through the control structure of the economy in which the control of economic 
resources and the defence of Abkhazia are intertwined.  
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 In the case of resumption of hostilities, it is likely that Abkhazia would receive 
military support from Russia. This support could potentially emanate from individuals 
close to the Kremlin who support Abkhazia and South Ossetia to prevent the expansion 
of NATO at Russia Southern flank, the military establishment who has a long time 
attachment to Abkhazia and are united by and anti-Georgian sentiments, as well as 
Russian nationalists who seek to uphold Russian grandeur. Moreover, third, party support 
could emanate form the North Caucasus. However, it is unclear with how much 
commitment and resources the North Caucasus is able to assist Abkhazia weakening of 
the Chechen militias after sustained Russian special operations and the economic 
situation in the region (Trifanov 2006).  
 Thus, when reviewing the available revenue sources of Georgia and Abkhazia, the 
above analysis suggests that in 2006, Georgia had revenue sources of at least USD 501 
million to finance the recurrence of armed conflict and Abkhazia of USD 98 million. 
 
Table 4.11: Revenue sources in Georgia and Abkhazia, 2006 
 
Georgia (USD million) Abkhazia (USD million) 
Budget Ministry of Defence  349.0 Official budget (entire state budget) 22.8 
Budget Ministry of Interior 122.0 Parallel budget N/A 
Foreign Assistance (US & Turkey) 13.2 Tourism 75 
Army development Fund 17.0 Timber N/A 
  Fishing N/A 
  Humanitarian assistance N/A 
  Smuggling to Georgia N/A 
  Smuggling to Russia N/A 
  Foreign investment and bank loans N/A 
  Diaspora remittances N/A 
Total potential revenue sources 501.2 Total potential revenue sources 97.8 
  
4.4.2. The cost of conflict 
 
The Georgian military establishment currently includes 11,340 troops and 11.300 
paramilitaries. The army has 7,043 soldiers, the navy 1,350 and the Air Force 1350. The 
paramilitaries are the border guards with 5,400 personnel and Ministry of Interior forces 
of 6,300 (IISS 2005, 120-121). A contingent of 850 soldiers had been trained by US 
forces served in Iraq and 200 in Kosovo (Cornell 2007, 14). However, troops who have 
undergone US training have also been active in South Ossetia in 2004 (ICG 2004a, 18). 
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The involvement of US trained troops in South Ossetia gave rise to fears in Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia that this US assistance created a rapid reaction force targeted against them. 
 Applying the cost-estimation relationships (CERs) developed in Chapter 2 the 
following will estimate the start-up and annual maintenance cost for Georgia and 
Abkhazia in 2006. The key estimations variables include the following:  
 
• Price per weapon (PF) = 250 USD (price for 2005 Killicoat 2006, 77-80); 
• Price per round of ammunition (PA) = 0.05 USD (no data, assumed price); 
• Annual average male salary (I) = 3,712 USD (data for 2001, UNDP 2003, 310-313. 
approximately cost per soldier of 10.2 USD/day or 309 USD/month, higher in 
comparison to previous periods due to higher salaries after the Rose Revolution); 
• Number of fighters (N) = 17,640 for Georgia (including 6,300 Ministry of the Interior 
Troops) and 6,000 for Abkhazia (including 1,500 volunteers, assuming equal troop 
strength than in 1992) (Demetriou 2002, 21). 
 
 The calculations summarised in Table 4.12 suggest that the Georgian had a start-
up cost of about USD 6.7 million and annual maintenance cost for of between about USD 
69 million for a low intensity conflict, USD 79 million for a medium intense conflict and 
USD 117 million for a high intensity conflict. For Abkhazia, it is suggested that the start-
up cost was about USD 2.3 million and annual maintenance cost for of between about 
USD 24 million for a low intensity conflict, USD 26 million for a medium intense 
conflict and USD 40 million for a high intensity conflict. 
 Comparing these figures to the annual revenue sources USD 501 million in 
Georgia and USD 98 million in Abkhazia, the conclusion is that both Georgia and 
Abkhazia had a surplus of revenue sources to conduct an armed conflict of high intensity.
 Thus, as in the previous Part, Georgia leaves us with a conundrum. The 
Government in Georgia had enough finances to launch a war against Abkhazia, but did 
not. This situation suggests that a surplus of revenue sources is in itself insufficient to 
explain conflict recurrence. In the case of Georgia, other factors deserving considerations 
is the role of Russia in shifting the asymmetry in Abkhazia’s favour and the opportunity 
cost of Georgia of using armed force. 
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Table 4.12: Overview of the start-up and annual maintenance of armed conflict for Georgia and Abkhazia, 2003-2006 
 
 CERs Composites Georgia Abkhazia  
   USD USD USD USD 
CER 1:  
Weapons 
1.5 firearms (F)  
x Price per firearm (PF)  
x Number of fighters (N) 
 
6,615,000 
 
2,250,000 
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CER 2:   
Ammunition 
1.5 firearms (F)  
x 100 rounds of ammunition (A) 
x Price per ammunition (PA) 
x Number of fighters (N) 
 
132,300 
 
Total start-up cost 
 
6,747,300  
45,000 
 
Total start-up cost 
 
2,295,000 
CER 3:  
Salaries 
Annual male income (I) 
x Number of fighters (N) 
 
65,479,680 
  
22,272,000 
 
CERL 4:  
Weapons 
 
0.33 firearms (F)  
x 1 x Price per firearm (PF) 
x Number of insurgents (N) 
 
1,455,300 
 
495,000 
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CERL 5:  
Ammunition 
 
1.5 firearms (F)  
x 20 rounds of ammunition (A) 
x 90 days of combat 
x Price per round (PA) 
x Number of insurgents (N) 
 
2,381,400 
 
Total maintenance 
(low intensity)* 
 
69,315,380 
 
810,000 
 
Total maintenance 
(low intensity)* 
 
23,577,000 
CERM 4:  
Weapons 
0.45 firearms (F)  
x 1.5 x Price per firearm (PF) 
x Number of insurgents (N) 
 
2,976,750 
 
1,012,500 
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CERM 5: 
Ammunition 
 
1.5 firearms (F)  
x 60 rounds of ammunition (A) 
x 90 days of combat 
x 1.5 x Price per round (PA) 
x Number of insurgents (N) 
 
10,716,300 
 
 
Total maintenance 
(medium intensity)* 
 
79,172,730 
 
3,645,000 
 
Total maintenance 
(medium intensity)* 
 
26,929,500 
CERH 4:  
Weapons 
 
0.65 firearms (F) 
x 3 x Price per firearm (PF) 
x Number of insurgents (N) 
 
8,599,500 
 
2,925,000 
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CERH 5:  
Ammunition 
1.5 firearms (F)  
x 120 rounds of ammunition (A) 
x 90 days of combat 
x 3 x Price per round (PA) 
x Number of insurgents (N) 
 
42,865,200 
 
Total maintenance 
(high intensity)* 
 
116,944,380 
 
14,580,000 
 
Total maintenance 
(high intensity)* 
 
39,777,000 
* Includes CER 3: Salaries. 
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4.4.3. Expected benefits and opportunity costs 
 
After the Rose Revolution, the Georgian Government realised that it derived no long term 
benefit from the unresolved status of the conflicts. As a consequence, the resolution of 
the frozen conflicts became a political priority for the new political elite. Georgia had to 
be the actor giving the impulse for change because Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Russia and 
the United States were unwilling to advocate any radical change. Thus, an imbalance 
emerged between external pressures for the maintenance of the status quo and domestic 
pressure in Georgia for change. 
 Georgia felt encouraged to change the status quo because it was confident of long-
term US support.89 This confidence was based in the perception that Georgia’s 
geopolitical importance increased in the context of the war in Iraq and Afghanistan and 
the crisis over Iran, particularly in terms of over-flight rights and a potential location for 
US bases in response to basing problems in Central Asia and Turkey. The Georgian 
government also perceived the period after the Rose Revolution as a window of 
opportunity in which it had high levels of US support. However, aware of its dependence 
on US support, Georgia started actively lobbying the European Union to diversify the 
structure of its external support by the new member states Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Poland, Bulgaria, and Romania in an effort to put and maintain Georgia on the European 
agenda (Helly and Gogia 2005, 295). 
 Furthermore, the change in the status quo was fostered by an unprecedented unity 
of the Government of Georgia in gaining NATO membership. In October 2004, Georgia 
received NATO’s Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP) with the outlook to gaina  
NATO Membership Action Plan (MAP) as soon as 2008 or 2009 (Nation 2007, 25).  
 However, the threat of immediate conflict recurrence may be qualified if 
considering the opportunity costs of using armed force. The Georgian Governemnt 
perceived  a military option as ultimately self-defeating because Georgia would not be 
able to hold Abkhazia in the long run due to its mountainous feature and military 
                                                 
89 This paragraph is based on various conversations in an interview trip to Tbilisi, 28 February-4 March 
2006. See Appendix 1 for interlocutors.  
  
267
sanctuaries. This has been one of the main lessons of the war against Abkhazia in 1992-
1994 (Wennmann 2006, 31-33).  
 However, the use of force in South Ossetia in 2004 led Abkhazia to question if 
Georgia was really willing to renounce the use of force. The crisis involved between 
1,650 and 2,000 South Ossetian militias and about 1,000 Russian mercenaries as well as 
3,000 Georgian troops (ICG 2004a, 14). Mobilisation from the Georgian side was 
uncoordinated and under the Ministry of Defence. While some troops were transported to 
the border in busses, many soldiers and officers took their own car to drive to South 
Ossetia and park it close to the battle field (Anonymous interview in Tbilisi). Georgian 
forces were unable to maintain their position because they lacked the resources to engage 
in months of combat. The military was still not equipped and trained enough to sustained 
prolonged fighting (Interview Rondeli). Moreover, Tbilisi was pressed by the United 
States and the European Union to avoid escalating the crisis (ICG 2004a, 14, 21). 
 The events suggest that the risk of conflict recurrence is real. The crisis 
highlighted the disproportionate influence of small unified armed group, reminiscent of 
the crises of 1998 and 2001 in Abkhazia (Wennmann 2006, 42-43). The renewal of 
armed force in 2004 was planned from within the Ministry of Defence which remained 
the most committed government institutions to the implementation of a military agenda to 
solve the conflict of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The influence of former members of 
the Mkhedrioni remained strong in the Ministry of the Interior (Anonymous interview in 
Tbilisi). The fighting in South Ossetia also brought attention to the negative side effects 
of US military capacity building given the involvement of the units trained by the US 
financed Train and Equip Programme (ICG 2004a, 18). The security crisis in the Khodori 
Gorge in 2006 again increased the risk of conflict. Russian President Vladimir Putin 
confirmed that Russia would defend Abkhazia, the United States emphasised that it 
would not support military action by Georgia (Krastev 2006).  
 The military activities in the Khodory Gorge were followed by the demotion of 
the Georgian Minister of Defence, Irakli Okruashvili, who had been the spearhead of an 
group in favour of a military agenda and a driving force behind the 2004 South Ossetia 
attack. In Tbilisi, his demotion was considered a sacrifice by Saakashvili to improve 
relations with Moscow and the removal of his main political opponent (Fuller 2006).  
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  From an Abkhaz perspective, the events in South Ossetia confirmed the 
reservations on Georgia’s good faith and the threat that it was willing to put its new 
armament to use. Abkhazia itself had little interest to renew the conflict. The armed 
conflict of 1992-1994 produced territorial control and so far ensured the survival of the 
Abkhaz as an ethnic group despite continuing economic hardship. The expected benefit 
from using armed force was therefore associated to defending what has been achieved.  
The expected benefits to use force for Georgia should be balanced with the 
opportunity cost of using armed force. Georgia would risk losing its good international 
post-revolution image, millions of international assistance, the support of key allies and 
the prospect of NATO accession. Relative Georgian restraint during the election in 
Abkhazia in 2005 signalled willingness to diffuse tensions. The knowledge of the 
opportunity cost contributed to the emergence of a political agenda which focused on the 
resolution of the Abkhazia conflict through the diversification of the deployment of 
peacekeeping forces and obtaining the NATO’s MAP status.  
The Ministry of Defence’s priority was to gain MAP and considered the 
resumption of conflict as counterproductive. NATO and US officials have on a number of 
informal occasion emphasised that the renewal of armed conflict would reduce the 
prospect for ultimate NATO membership (Anonymous interview Tbilisi). Given the 
importance of US military assistance in the Georgian Security Sector Reform and 
achieving NATO interoperability, one of the levers of influence over the Georgian 
Government was the threat – or actual – withdrawal of military assistance.  
United States non-military assistance after the Rose Revolution also fostered a 
strong link between the two states the severance of which would have been to Georgia’s 
detriment. In January 2004, just a few months after the Rose Revolution, the United 
States made available an aid package of USD 166 million. In May 2004, it announced the 
inclusion of Georgia into the Millennium Challenge Account and the disbursement of 
USD 500 million over three years (Helly and Gogia 2005, 297). The World Bank and the 
European Union even pledged USD 1 billion to in assistance to the new leadership which 
should be directed towards energy and governance reform, poverty reduction, child 
welfare, as well as infrastructure agricultural development (Ibid, 298).  
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In addition, United States based organisation have also been important to 
supporting the opposition to Shevardnadze which could then be empowered after the 
Rose Revolution.  The United States National Democratic Institute organised trainings to 
prepare and unify opposition leaders for the elections. Other organisations involved 
included the International Republican Institute and the International Foundation for 
Election Systems. The Georgian International Society for Fair Elections and Democracy 
was set up and trained by American experts. A special fund for 5,000 civil servants was 
created by Soros Foundations, other American foundations and UNDP including 
supplementary salaries for government officials ranging from the President to traffic 
police (Helly and Gogia 2005, 300).90 
These figures suggest that Georgia benefited greatly from international assistance 
and partly owed its coming to power and post-Rose Revolution stability to this external 
support. Thus, in parallel to providing important support functions for state reform and 
the social system, high levels of development assistance and the creation of personal 
linkages between the United States and all levels of the Georgian Government through 
training and policy advice, made Georgia susceptible to United States pressure.  
In addition to the opportunity cost from the use of armed force, Russia’s likely 
military assistance to Abkhazia in the case of conflict recurrence increased the barrier-to-
entry into an armed conflict. Russia’s military strength was illustrated by its deployment 
of 4,000 Special Forces of the Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Internal Affairs, the 
Federal Security Service as well as 200,000 paramilitary troops from the Ministry of 
Internal Affairs in the North Caucasus (Trifanov 2006, 36). In addition, Russia 
maintained an air bombing squadron in Maikop in the Russian province of Krasnodar and 
in Budenovsk in the Province of Stavropol. An airborne infantry force was based in Agoy 
and Novorossisk in Krasnodar on the Black sea cost close to Abkhazia. Various motor 
rifle, artillery and other combat units are posted around Chechnya (See Appendix 2, Map 
8). While the contingents in the North Caucasus focused on Chechnya at the moment, 
                                                 
90 The salaries were structured as follows: USD 1,500 = The President, Prime Minister, Parliamentary 
Speaker, head of Supreme Court. USD 1,200 = 15 Ministers, 4 State Ministers, National Security Council 
Secretary, Head of Presidential Administration. USD 1,000 = Heads of Economic Council, Interior Troops, 
Army’s General Staff, Traffic Police, State Protection Guard, Tax Department and Financial Police. USD 
700 = 60 Deputy Ministers. USD 500 = National Security Council Deputies. USD 150 = Traffic Police staff 
members. Based on Rezonansi newspaper article 25 March 2004 c.f. Helly and Gogia 2005, 300. 
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they also represent an important deterrence against a Georgian attack of Abkhazia. This 
military capability could be mobilised to support the current CISPKF.  
 Thus, overall, despite the existence of a surplus of revenue sources to organise the 
renewal of armed conflict the opportunity cost Georgia prevented Georgia from realising 
a military agenda. In addition, Russia’s support for Abkhazia increases the barrier-to-
entry into armed conflict for Georgia. 
 Nevertheless, even though these constellations may have prevented the recurrence 
of conflict up until 2006, political developments in Georgia and the North Caucasus 
highlight the continuing risk of conflict recurrence. Nearly five years after the Rose 
Revolutions, the absence of reforms and economic developments disappointed 
expectations of the population in President Saakashvili.  An alliance of IDPs and reform 
losers provides a fertile recruiting ground for political entrepreneurs and represents a real 
threat to stability in Georgia. 15,000 police forces were laid off after the Rose Revolution 
and the anti-corruption campaign deprived parts of Georgia’s Armed Forces of their 
sources of income, thus, creating discontent in senior and lower ranks (Huber 2004, 42). 
This situation has provided Irakli Okruashvili – the former Minister of Defence – with a 
mobilisation platform with which he returned to politics in 2007 as a leading figure of the 
opposition. Pressing for armed conflict in Abkhazia would give the reform losers a cover 
to reassert their economic entitlements and power position while weakening and 
reversing reforms.  
In these circumstances, Saakashvili may be pressed to garner political support by 
revitalising the unresolved conflicts. In order to secure his power position, he could 
engage in a violent state building project and attempt to recapture Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia. If Saakashvili’s promises of political and economic reform remain unfulfilled 
and popular disillusionment emerges, the government may resort to mobilising popular 
support though a more assertive military policy and eventually a call to arms to preserve 
territorial integrity (Huber 2004, 12).  
The incentives for armed force may also become more favourable when 
considering the following long term shifts in the political environment: Georgia becomes 
more isolated from the international community, thus more inward looking and 
nationalistic; the Georgian Government becomes more vulnerable before the next 
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Presidential elections in 2008; Georgia’s military strength becomes superior to that of 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia; Russia ceases to support Abkhazia and South Ossetia 
(Interview Gegeshidze). However, these conditions are not in sight in mid 2007. As long 
as Russia will be supporting Abkhazia militarily, Georgia will be unable to cross the 
barrier-to-entry with its own means.  
 
4.4.5. Assessment 
 
The Rose Revolution increased the capture of the Georgian Government over revenue 
sources to use armed force. The defence budget increased about ten times allowing for 
the security sector reform and the acquisition of military equipment. However, while the 
Georgian Government had a surplus of revenue sources to start an armed conflict, it did 
not renew armed conflict in Abkhazia. Nevertheless, the Georgian government was a key 
actor in advocating a change in the status quo. Conflict resolution became a priority for 
the new political elite the status quo of which was no longer considered to be in 
Georgia’s benefit.  
 The non-recurrence of conflict in the phase of the Rose Revolution highlights that 
the surplus of revenue sources is a necessary but not sufficient condition to explain 
conflict recurrence. It highlights two points:  
 
• The threat of or real military assistance of a third party – in this case Russia – can 
change the barrier-to-entry into an armed conflict. While Georgia had a surplus of 
revenue sources to renew armed conflict against Abkhazia alone, it would not have 
had the revenue sources to fight a war against Russia.  
• Georgia faced opportunity costs which were an important element in dissuading 
Georgia to use force. These opportunity costs included the potential loss of NATO’s 
MAP status and ultimately perhaps also NATO membership, a favourable post-
revolutionary image and third-party military and development assistance.  
 
These points suggest that by increasing the cost of armed conflict (expected military 
assistance of Russia for Abkhazia) and increasing the opportunity cost (cutting military 
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and development aid) the risk of conflict recurrence could be mitigated. Thus, this Part 
underlines the importance of third parties in making the start and maintenance of armed 
conflict more expensive or increasing the opportunity cost of using armed force. 
 
Table 4.13: Propensity to renew armed conflict of Georgia and Abkhazia, 2003-2006 
 
 Georgia Abkhazia 
MATERIAL 
ENVIRONMENT 
Surplus of revenue sources (RS>C) 
for armed conflict of high intensity 
Surplus of revenue sources (RS>C) 
for armed conflict of high intensity 
Potential revenue 
sources (annual) 
USD 501 million from budgets, 
foreign development and military 
assistance, parallel funds with 
increased state capture 
At least USD 98 million from 
budget, parallel budget, tourism, 
timber, fishing, humanitarian 
assistance, smuggling to Georgia 
and Russia, foreign investment and 
bank loans, diaspora remittances 
Cost of conflict (annual)   
Start-up USD 6.7 million USD 2.2 million 
Maintenance low USD 69 million USD 24 million 
Maintenance medium USD 79 million USD 26 million 
Maintenance high USD 117 million USD 40 million 
INCENTIVE TO USE 
ARMED FORCE  
 
 
High 
 
Low 
Expected benefit of 
using armed force 
Establishment of territorial control 
over Abkhazia as adversary 
perceived weak 
Defence of territorial control and 
economic opportunities 
 
Opportunity cost of 
using armed force 
Potential NATO membership 
Good image 
Foreign military and development 
assistance and political support.  
Losing control of the territory and 
economy or Abkhazia. 
 
PROPENSITY TO 
RENEW ARMED 
CONFLICT  
 
Low 
 
Low 
 
4.5 Conclusion 
 
The Abkhazia conflict occurred in the context of the dissolution of the Soviet Union 
which created incentives for various elite groups to compete for power, resources and 
territory. In Georgia, the end of the Soviet Union fostered a strong national identity which 
became increasingly radical and polarised the relations between Georgians and Abkhaz. 
 The availability of revenue sources influenced the course of the conflict in various 
ways. In Phase 1 (1992-1994), all parties had a surplus of revenue sources to start the 
war. However, the barrier-to-entry for high intensity conflict was low: Small arms and 
conventional weapons were available at discount prices. However, during the course of 
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the conflict, Georgian security actors could not maintain conflict financing because the 
collapse of Georgia’s economy had eroded its revenue base. At the same time, Russia’s 
intervention increased the cost of competition for Georgia. Its security actors rushed into 
a high-intensity conflict without considering its maintenance cost. 
 In Phase 2 (1994-2003), both Abkhazia and Georgia had a surplus of revenue 
sources but did not start an armed conflict. While Georgia had a potential surplus of 
revenue sources, the Government did not control this revenue centrally. Georgia’s 
political system was based on a network of relationships in which strongmen were left to 
profit from local sources of revenue in exchange for political support to the centre. In 
Abkhazia, revenue sources were centralised because the political system focused on 
defending the territory of Abkhazia. Moreover, the post-conflict stalemate persisted 
because the barrier-to-entry for armed conflict remained high given Russia’s support of 
Abkhazia. In addition, the political elites of Abkhazia and Georgia had few incentives to 
renew armed conflict because they benefited from the parallel economy. 
 However, the security crisis of 1998 and 2001 highlighted that the risk of conflict 
recurrence did exist. It was nurtured by the grievances of IDPs and the military agenda of 
actors within the Ministry of Interior. However, the Government did not allow the 
conflict to escalate because it wanted to protect its economic benefits deriving from the 
politico-economic arrangements Shevardnadze had constructed to govern Georgia.  
 In Phase 3 (2003-2006), the Rose Revolution altered the incentives to use armed 
force. With the end of the Shevardnadze era, the situation in which the unresolved status 
of the conflicts benefited all stakeholders no longer existed. The new elite which came to 
power in Tbilisi had a strong desire to advance the resolution of the frozen conflicts in its 
favour. The Government centralised control over revenue sources and increase the 
defence budget. The higher risk of conflict recurrence was evidenced by Georgia’s attack 
on South Ossetia in 2004 and the crisis of the Khodori Gorge in 2006. 
 However, continuous Russian support for Abkhazia kept the barrier-to-entry for 
renewed armed conflict at a high level. In addition, the opportunity costs relating to the 
loss of military and development assistance, the prospect of NATO association, and 
Georgia’s positive image after the Rose Revolution reduced the incentives for Georgia to 
use armed force. 
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 Based on the analysis of this case study, this Chapter provides a series of insights 
into the relationship between conflict financing and recurrence:  
 
• The availability of revenue sources is not a sufficient condition for conflicts to recur. 
The mere availability of revenue sources did not lead to the outbreak of renewed 
armed conflict in Georgia in Phase 2 and 3. Georgia and Abkhazia both had a surplus 
of revenue sources but did not restart the conflict. In Phase 2, both leaderships 
benefited from the status quo and Russia’s support for Abkhazia increased the 
barrier-to-entry for armed conflict; In Phase 3, Georgia did not attack Abkhazia 
because of the opportunity cost to use armed force and the high barrier-to-entry.  
• The risk of conflict recurrence in Georgia increased with an increasing centralisation 
of revenue sources of the Georgian Government. While Georgia had sufficient 
revenue sources to start an armed conflict in Phase 2, it had not captured the 
resources for military purposes. Only when Georgia’s revenue sources became 
increasingly centralised after the Rose Revolution did the risk of conflict recurrence 
increase. However, the centralisation of revenue resources was a result of an 
incentive shift of the new elite in Tbilisi which emphasised the resolution of the 
Abkhazia conflict in its favour. 
• The risk of conflict recurrence was reduced due to a high barrier-to-entry for high 
intensity armed conflict. The barrier-to-entry remained high because Russia continued 
supporting Abkhazia. The occurrence of the Abkhazia conflict was fostered by a low 
barrier-to-entry; however, once Russia intervened on the side of Abkhazia, the cost of 
competition went beyond Georgia’s revenue sources. In subsequent periods, Russian 
assistance meant increasing the barrier-to-entry into armed conflict for Georgia. 
• The risk of conflict recurrence was reduced because external actors increased the 
opportunity costs of using armed force. The provisions of development and military 
assistance and the prospect of NATO association increased the opportunity cost for 
Georgia to use armed force.  
 
 In addition to thee points, the case study also contributes to a better understanding 
of parallel economies in Georgia. It shows that Georgian estimates on smuggling in 
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Abkhazia were inflated and part of a discourse portraying Abkhazia as a “black hole”. 
Both elements were part of a strategy to justify military intervention in terms of bringing 
back law and order to Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Evidence of such a strategy was the 
2004 conflict recurrence in South Ossetia which was conducted as an anti-crime 
operation. Abkhazia’s response to this strategy was to engage in long term development 
planning and build public legitimacy through elections. In addition, the unresolved 
conflicts were portrayed as the reasons for Georgia’s problems with corruption, 
smuggling and its weak state. However, what remains largely unconsidered is that these 
problems were rather a manifestation of Georgia’s political system under Shevardnadze 
than a result of the unresolved conflicts.  
 Thus, the cases study highlights the importance of understanding the parallel 
economies – as well as conflict financing in general – within the broader political context 
which includes in Georgia the instrumentalisation of the unresolved conflicts for 
domestic political purposes. 
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CHAPTER 5 
Kosovo 
 
This Chapter analyses the relationship between conflict financing and recurrence in 
Kosovo over the period 1989 and 2006. In 1998, a major armed conflict took place in 
Kosovo between the security forces of Serbia and Montenegro and the Kosovo Liberation 
Army (KLA). The conflict cost the lives of between 6,000 to 10,000 lives and to 800,000 
refugees and 500,000 Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) (Ballencie and La Grange 
2001, 1556). Since the end of the conflict in 1999, Kosovo has been under international 
administration of the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). However, the 
deterioration of the security situation in 2004 was a potent reminder that Kosovo is an 
unresolved conflict the final status of which remains a key incompatibility.  
 The Kosovo case study is a valuable case study for conflict recurrence because it 
shows that a surplus of revenue sources to organise armed conflict does not automatically 
lead to the recurrence of armed conflict. In the period 1989-1995, the Kosovo Albanian 
resistance had a surplus of revenue sources for a conflict of medium intensity; however, it 
opted for a strategy of non-violent resistance. In the period 1999-2006, Kosovo also had a 
surplus of revenue sources but did not restart an armed conflict. Both situations highlight 
that a surplus of revenue sources is not a sufficient condition for conflict recurrence. The 
case study – like the one on Abkhazia – analyses the conditions which contributed to non-
recurrence conflict. The case study explains that conflict did not occur in the period 1989-
1995 and 1999-2006 because the military capability of the adversary represented a high 
barrier-to-entry into armed conflict and the Kosovo security actors did not have sufficient 
revenue sources to finance the type of military strategy needed to win.  
 The case study also highlights that the cost of escalation can influence conflict 
dynamics and military strategies. In the period 1995-1999, the KLA made a tactically 
informed choice from non-violent to armed resistance. This choice occurred in the 
context of favourable circumstances to organise armed conflict: The collapse of Albania, 
the availability of weapons at low costs, pre-existing financial networks and a high rate of 
savings among the diaspora. However, during the course of the conflict, the KLA lacked 
the revenue sources for escalation to a high intensity conflict. By October 1998, the KLA 
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was nearly defeated and was only saved once NATO reversed the balance of power and 
paid about USD 4 billion for the escalation of the conflict (Seybold 2000, 32).  
 The lesson that the KLA was unable to maintain a major armed conflict on its 
own has important implication for conflict recurrence in Kosovo. While in post-conflict 
Kosovo there are potentially sufficient revenue sources for an armed conflict of high 
intensity, it would not suffice to adopt a military strategy for a “war of independence” 
without external support. The risk of conflict recurrence lies in low intensity conflict 
which spoilers use to influence the final status negotiations or protect vested interests 
deriving from the unresolved status. Kosovo would be ill advised to force independence 
because it could not maintain an armed conflict without external assistance. Moreover, 
starting a war would mean undermining Kosovo’s economic development and any 
prospect of a future within the European Union and NATO.  
 In comparison to the case study on Angola and Abkhazia, the Kosovo case study 
highlights the limitations of diaspora financing as a method of conflict financing. Conflict 
financing in 1998 was facilitated by a high degree of solidarity, cohesion and voluntarism 
but did not generate enough revenue needed to pay for conflict escalation. In comparison 
to oil and diamonds in Angola, diaspora financing is more limited because it is more 
difficult to capture centrally. Given the number of individuals and layers of interaction 
involved, it is comparable to the decentralised control of the parallel economy in Georgia. 
In part, the problem of starting a “war of independence” would be to find the revenue 
sources to pay for it. To convince the diaspora to pay for another war is elusive as 
emigrants have become better integrated in their host countries and have fewer savings. 
Moreover, many could be reluctant to support a military strategy the consequences of 
which would destroy private investments into Kosovo made since the end of the war.  
 The analysis of conflict financing and recurrence is conducted in four parts. The 
First Part elaborates the background to the Kosovo conflict including the demise of 
Yugoslavia, repression and non-violent resistance between 1989 and 1995, the rise of the 
KLA after 1995, the conduct of armed conflict in 1998 and 1999, and Kosovo under 
international administration. The First Part also introduces the significance of the 
diaspora for conflict financing in Kosovo. The Second Part looks at the period of non-
violent resistance from 1989 to 1995 highlighting that a surplus of revenue sources was 
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used for non-violent resistance and not for the conduct of war. The Third Part looks at the 
period of the rise of the KLA and the war. It underlines the limitations of the KLA to 
finance the escalation of the armed conflict independently. The Fourth Part considers the 
risk of conflict recurrence in Kosovo under international administration. It highlights that 
low intensity armed conflict could be used as a calculated strategy to influence the 
negotiations on the independence for Kosovo. Kosovo would be ill advised to start a “war 
of independence” as they would be unable to pay for the escalation of armed conflict 
without international support. 
 
5.1. Background 
 
Kosovo is a territory in the South-Western part of the Republic of Serbia bordering 
Montenegro, Albania and Macedonia. Its size of 10.887 square kilometres is equal to that 
of Lebanon (CIA 2005; Appendix 2, Map 9). Kosovo is a high plateau which is 
surrounded by high mountains except toward Serbia where it flattens out (Malcom 1998, 
1-2). In 1991, Kosovo was inhabited by about 2 million people with an 80% Albanian 
majority, a 10% Serb minority and other peoples including southern Slav-speaking 
Muslims, Roma, Montenegrins, Turks, and Croats (CIA 2005). An estimate of the OSCE 
in 2001 suggests that 2.4 million people live in Kosovo (PISG 2007). 
 The Kosovo conflict emerged in the context of the dissolution of Yugoslavia, the 
growth of Serbian nationalism, the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the collapse of 
Albania in 1997. Overall, the recent history of Kosovo can be separated into three phases. 
The first phase (1989-1995) is characterised by the emergence of the system parallel 
governance of Kosovo and non-violent resistance against Serbia. The second phase 
(1995-1999) includes the rise of the KLA after the 1995 Dayton Agreement and war. The 
third phase (1999-2006) is the period of international administration including the efforts 
of the international community to negotiate the final status of Kosovo. This Part briefly 
reviews the developments in Kosovo from the break-up of Yugoslavia at the end of the 
1980s until the negotiations on the status of Kosovo in 2006. 
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5.1.1. The demise of Yugoslavia 
 
Yugoslavia was a multinational state and the management of the nationalities was one of 
the key challenges for the Yugoslav leadership under Joseph Broz Tito. In a population of 
about 23.5 million (1991) Serbs represented 36.3% (8.4 million), Croats 19.7% (4.6 
million), Muslims 10.0% (2.4 million), Albanians 9.3% (2.2 million), Slovenes 7.5% (1.8 
million), Macedonians 5.8% (1.4 million), Montenegrins 2.3% (0.5 million), Yugoslavs 
3.0% (0.7 million) and others 6.2% (1.5 million including Hungarians, Romany, Turks, 
Czechs, Slovaks, Romanians Italians and Jews).91 There was a high degree of ethnic 
mixture and no group had an absolute majority countrywide even though Croats, 
Macedonians, Montenegrins, Serbs, Albanians and Slovenians had a majority in their 
respective territories (Woodward 1995, 32-35). 
 The Yugoslav leadership sought to address the dilemma of national self-
determination in a multinational state through the notion of “Yugoslavness”, a strong 
military, and political and economic decentralisation. Tito sought to defuse the 
nationalities problem by building a sense of community around “Yugoslavness”. He 
filled the terms with reference to the self-management of the nationalities and the partisan 
struggle which contributed to the creation of Yugoslavia after the Second World War. 
However, “Yugoslavness” remained an empty shell and “had no content except the sum 
of its parts” (Ramet 1992, 251).   
 In addition, Tito created the Yugoslav National army as a “guardian of Socialism” 
to enforce the authority of the Communist Party. However, the heavy reliance on Serbs in 
the higher ranks compromised its neutrality. The centrality of the army in the state also 
fostered the conviction in the army that it would have quasi veto power over political 
developments which expressed itself through the violent suppression of political activities 
(Ibid.). 
 The objective of political decentralisation was to appease republican demands for 
autonomy while keeping Yugoslavia unified and the authority of the Communist Party 
unchallenged. The authority of the Communist Party was maintained through the 
                                                 
91 Real figures calculated by the Author based on Woodward’s figure of a total population of 23.5 million 
in 1991 (Woodward 1995, 32). 
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suppression of nationalist movements and the appointment of loyal party cadres to 
regional posts (Woodward 1995, 29-30). After the fall of Alexander Rankovic – the Head 
of the Secret Police of Yugoslavia – in 1963, the tension within Yugoslavia between the 
centre and the regions became more pronounced. The rising tension over identity and 
regional governance was evidenced by the Muslim question (1961) and Croatian Spring 
(1971). These events contributed to the increasing autonomy of the nations and 
nationalities of Yugoslavia92, to the constitutional reform of 1974 and, ultimately, to the 
independence of Slovenia, Croatia, Macedonia and Serbia (Weller 1999, 46).  
 However, even though the 1974 Constitution provided the nations and 
nationalities with an unprecedented level of autonomy, it did not end ethnic tensions. 
After the death of Tito in 1980, centrifugal tendencies competed with attempts to 
recentralise Yugoslavia. The process towards greater autonomy was driven by the 
respective nationalist parties of Slovenia and Croatia. However, the Serbian nationalists 
wanted to preserve the unity of Yugoslavia as a vehicle to project Serbian power over the 
Balkans; thus, seeking to recentralise the political and economic organisation of 
Yugoslavia (Ramet 1992, 176-213, 225-238). 
 In the economic realm, the 1974 constitutional overhaul left the federal 
government with authority over the common market, defence, and foreign policy, but 
without the ownership of productive assets. The republics had administrative and 
budgetary autonomy over their regional economy, education, and culture (including the 
media). Local governments were also responsible for the consumer market, welfare, 
unemployment, health care and other social affairs. In this way, continuing 
decentralisation increasingly undermined the role of the federal institutions (Woodward 
1995, 31, 38, 40).  
 However, economic decentralisation had a high economic price (Bojicic 1996). 
By 1982, the Communist leadership fully realised the extent of the indebtedness at the 
federal and regional level (Dyker 1990, 123). In addition to the USD 20 billion federal 
debt Croatia alone had arrears amounting to USD 5 billion (Meier 1999, 34). Reforms 
aiming at the recentralisation of budget control failed due to the resistance of the regions 
                                                 
92 Nations were all those peoples inside Yugoslavia – the Croats, Slovenes, Montenegrins, Bosnians and 
Serbs – and nationalities where peoples who were cut of from their motherland such as the Kosovo 
Albanians and Hungarians of the Vojvodina (Judah 2002, 36-37). 
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which were unwilling to compromise their budgetary authority (Conert 1997, 223). The 
ensuing economic crises led to mass unemployment and hyper inflation and, ultimately, 
made the Yugoslav population feel that all they had worked for in the previous twenty 
years was then being lost (Meier 1999, 28). The dissatisfaction of the population with the 
economic situation was evidenced by a tide of strikes including 384 incidences in 1983, 
699 in 1985, and 847 in 1986 (Conert 1987, 227). 
 In the final analysis, the Yugoslav state was a complex political arrangement and 
there is no single factor explanation for its violent break-up in the early 1990s: “(…) 
Economics, demographics, programmatic choices, institutional structures, religious 
cultures, elite dynamics and deficiencies in system legitimacy all played a role in pushing 
the country towards violent breakup” (Ramet 2005, 55).  
 
5.1.2. Repression and non-violent resistance in Kosovo, 1989-1995 
 
In the context of self-determination and the maintenance of a multinational state, Kosovo 
Albanians sought to protect their right to exist as a community. The development of 
Kosovo Albanian nationalism is related to the broader Albanian national question which 
contributed to the development of more excusive nationalisms in Serbia and Kosovo.93  
 Albanian nationalism developed in the late 19th after the break-up of the Ottoman 
Empire and culminated in the establishment of the Kingdom of Albania in 1913. 
However, Albania never included all Albanians into the state and about 50% lived 
outside its border in adjacent territories and abroad (Troebst 1999, 49). From 1912 
onwards, Kosovo with its Albanian majority has been under the rule of Serbia. Since 
then, there have been various historical arguments over who represeted the majority in 
Kosovo. Albanian historians argue that Albanians have been in Kosovo since Roman 
times while Serbian historians argue that Albanians arrived only after the Serbs had 
migrated away from Kosovo in 1696 (Vickers 1998, 1-21, Malcom 1998, xxxi-xxxiii).94  
                                                 
93 For a full analysis of the Albanian national question see Pettifer and Vickers 2007. 
94 Politicians on both sides have used history to foster nationalisms and create group cohesion. However, a 
balanced historical analysis suggests that Kosovo is not a historic unit: It was sub-divided into various 
principalities administrative units under Ottoman rule and has no continuous history within Serbia (Malcom 
xxxiii). 
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 Albanian nationalisms provoked fears in Serbia of a “Greater Albania” with the 
desire to expand in the Balkans.  However, even if Albanian nationalism has received a 
revival with the Kosovo War, overall Albanian nationalism seems to evolve into “an 
extra-national pan-Albanian consciousness, which is growing within the modern 
European norms of the open and abolition of national borders” (Pettifer and Vickers 
2007, xx; see also 257-259, 265). 
 With the growth of Serbian nationalism, Kosovo saw the return of repression and 
cycles of violence and counter-violence in the 1980s(Judah 2002, 42). The situation 
deteriorated in March and April 1981 when demonstrations in the canteen of the 
University of Pristina escalated into a widespread protest against poor living conditions in 
Kosovo. The demonstrations were suppressed by force with an estimated 1,000 dead, 
around 4,200 arrests and purges within Kosovo’s Communist Party (Judah 2002, 38-40).  
 Tensions rose further in 1986 with the publication of the Memorandum of the 
Serbian Academy of Sciences calling for the establishment of a Greater Serbia. The 
Memorandum’s main tenets were that decentralisation was against Yugoslavia, that the 
constitutional structure of Yugoslavia discriminated against Serbia and that Kosovo was 
part of a historic heartland of Serbia (Judah 2002, 48). On 24 April 1987, Milosevic held 
a speech in Kosovo and vowed to the Serbs living in Kosovo that “no one shall dare to 
beat you” and that Serbia would protect all Serbs in Yugoslavia. The speech was part of a 
then growing Serbian nationalism and established Milosevic as the leader of the Serbian 
nationalists (IICK 2000, 40-41). Mass demonstrations and strikes were held in Kosovo in 
1988 and set the stage for the withdrawal of Kosovo’s autonomous status. In 1989, the 
Serbian Assembly passed a number of laws revoking Kosovo’s control over security, the 
judiciary, finance and social planning which was followed by the revocation of Kosovo’s 
autonomous status in 1990 (IICK 2000,41).  
 The loss of Kosovo’s autonomy led to the creation of a non-violent resistance 
movement under the leadership of Ibrahim Rugova (Mertus 1999, 232-233). The element 
of non-violence had the function to redress the self-esteem of Kosovo Albanians in a time 
when they were vilified and contributed to a defensive homogenization. The latter was 
achieved through an emphasis on traditionalism and the revitalisation of honour codes to 
discipline the movement (SAS 2005, 216). This strategy was built on the trend towards 
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larger family structures which emerged in the 1980s in response to repression, economic 
hardship and lack of housing (World Bank 2001, 32).  
 The emergence of the parallel governance in Kosovo was paralleled by a policy of 
systematic discrimination of Kosovo Albanians. Kosovo Albanians were barred from 
holding public offices and the dismissal of 15,000 Kosovo Albanians led to a general 
strike involving 200,000 people in September 1990. On 28 September 1990, the Serbian 
Parliament adopted a new constitution which abolished the previous autonomous status of 
Kosovo and Vojvodina and was accompanied by the removal of 100,000 Kosovo 
Albanians from factories, mines, schools, hospitals, the judiciary, cultural institutions, the 
media, as well as municipal and regional authorities (Troebst 1998, 7). The developments 
led to the creation of parallel governance structures as well as a Government in Exile 
based in Bonn, Germany (Troebst 1999, 49). The Prime Minister of the Government in 
Exile was led by Bujar Bukhoshi. 
The parallel governance system was embedded in the Kosovo Albanian diaspora 
of approximately 1.78 million. In the late 1990s, the main centres of the Albanian 
diaspora are the United States (500,000), Greece (500,000), Germany (400,000), 
Switzerland (200,000), Turkey (65,000), Sweden (40,000), Great Britain (30,000), 
Belgium (25,000) and France (20,000) (Mutschke 2000, 4). The diaspora of Kosovo 
Albanians formed in three waves (World Bank 2001, 65). The first wave occured in the 
late 1960s and early 1970s with mainly unskilled and poorly educated persons from rural 
areas which migrated to Germany and Switzerland as guest workers.95 The second wave 
took place in the 1980s and early 1990s and inlcuded better educated and skilled persons 
from urban areas after Kosovo Albanians were forbidden to work in public service. They 
also inlcued young men who wanted to avoid military service during the wars in Croatia 
and Bosnia and Herzegovina. In this period about 400,000 Kosovo Albanians left Kosovo 
(IICK 2000, 47). The third wave was a consequence of the 1998 Kosovo conflict and 
included 863,000 people with a mix of origin and eductaion seeking refuge abroad (Ibid., 
2).  
 
                                                 
95 Based on the figures for total number of diaspora of 1.78 million and the figures for the second (400,000) 
and third wave of emigration (865,000) it can be estimated that about 500,000 people emigrated in the first 
wave.  
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5.1.3. The rise of the KLA, 1995-1998 
 
In the early 1990s, the wars in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina took the attention 
away from Kosovo. In this period neither Serbs nor Kosovo Albanian’s had an incentive 
to start a war: the Serbs had already deployed all their capabilities in Bosnia and could 
not afford a war on another front. The Albanians were afraid of being ethnically cleansed 
while keeping Kosovo on the international agenda and building legitimacy for a future 
“Republic of Kosovo” (Judah 2002, 73, 74, 98).  
 However, with the signature of the Dayton Peace Accord on 21 November 1995, 
the unified position on non-violent opposition of the Kosovo Albanian elite split. The 
Dayton Peace Agreement was negotiated without participation of any Kosovo Albanian 
representation. It only mentioned Kosovo in relation to maintaining sanctions against 
Serbia and full diplomatic recognition of Serbia, its membership in international 
organisations and the release of frozen assets. Nowhere was a reference to the 
consideration of the status of Kosovo. Germany even decided to “repatriate” Kosovo 
Albanians refugees to Serbia (Troebst 1998, 9). The Dayton Agreement essentially 
overlooked Kosovo and undermined Rugova’s policy of non-violence because it 
signalled that, first, ethnic partition was possible in the eyes of the international 
community; secondly, non-violence had not been an effective strategy to advance 
Kosovo’s ambitions of independence; and thirdly, armed violence was an alternative to 
non-violence (Judah 2002, 94, 95, 126). In consequence, the political elite of Kosovo 
split and was no longer a unified actor.  
These developments fostered the emergence of the KLA. It was a rural counter-
movement against the non-violent movement which was mainly composed of urban 
intellectuals. The KLA formed in 1993 in its heartland, the Drenica region, and grouped 
together an amalgam of smaller organisations (Pettifer and Vickers 2007, 98). Its 
membership was limited in the beginning counting only about 150 active members 
mainly drawn from rural areas and the radicalised diaspora (Judah 2002, 118). The 
assassination of the Jashari clan in Prekaz in early 1998 (see below) mobilised many 
more to join the KLA (Judah 2002, 42). However, despite high cohesion and commitment 
to fight, the KLA remained  
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“a mixture of village defence force and insurgent army, where some basic military 
problems were never solved until the end of the war, such as adequate weapons 
and ammunitions supply, and clear and functional command structures. Some 
soldiers who volunteered were primarily loyal to the commanders, who recruited 
them, or to their political organisation, or to the senior men in their local village 
or town. (…) So many of its members were not professional soldiers, possessed 
little or no training, and were involved primarily in the self-defence of their local 
communities” (Pettifer and Vickers 2007, 107-108). 
 
The emergence of the KLA was also fostered by the collapse of the Berisha 
regime in Albania. With the fall of Berisha, Ibrahim Rugova lost one of his major 
financial and political supporters while the KLA could boost its power by establishing 
control over large flows of weapons emanating out of Albanian weapons depots (Judah 
2002, 128-129). Since 1989 and the withdrawal of autonomy of Kosovo, some 
individuals had already attempted to purchase weapons secretly for distribution. With the 
collapse of Albania, the supply problem was solved and transfers could easily cross the 
porous borders between Albania and Kosovo (SAS 2005, 215).  
 Thus, prior to the outbreak of the Kosovo conflict, the KLA had formed into an 
armed liberation movement. The Dayton Peace Agreement undermined the non-violent 
movement and politics within Kosovo became increasingly polarised as atrocities against 
Kosovo Albanians and Serbs hardened the resolve to fight on both sides.  
 
5.1.4. Armed conflict, 1998-1999 
 
The Kosovo war started on 28 February 1998 with the arrest and killing by Serbian Police 
Forces of Adem Jashari, a strongman in the Drenica region. Within a week, the Serbian 
police killed 58 members of the Jashari clan. In response to this attack, village militias 
formed all over Kosovo to repel attacks by Serbian police (IICK 2000, 55).  
The armed conflict can be separated into three phase. Between February and 
October 1998, a major armed conflict took place between the KLA and regular units of 
the Army of Yugoslavia, regular Serbian police forces and three specialised police forces 
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from the Ministry of Interior of Serbia. In the summer of 1998, the KLA was nearly 
defeated given the military superiority of Serbian troops. The latter had employed a step-
by-step strategy to avoid large scale manoeuvres which could attract Western attention 
and retook village by village. However, a ceasefire was reached on 12 October 1998 
reflecting international pressure to avoid a humanitarian catastrophe during winter. At the 
time of the ceasefire, the KLA was militarily beaten and was short of fighters, morale and 
weapons: “The myth of the KLA as a modern, omnipresent and ultimately superior force 
and as such the nucleus of a new nation-state of Kosovo Albanians was seriously 
damaged” (Troebst 1999, 57). The ceasefire saved the KLA from defeat and gave the 
movement time to re-group and re-arm.  
From the military point of view, Serbian operations were driven by the geo-
strategic importance of Kosovo (Troebst 1999, 49). Kosovo is surrounded by high 
mountain ranges towards Albania and Macedonia and thus represent a natural protection 
of Serbian territory which Serbia would have liked to control (Vickers 1998, xvi). 
Moreover, the mineral and brown coal resources of Kosovo were an important element of 
the energy planning of Serbia and part of ensuring the sustainability of a Greater Serbia 
(Malcom 1998, 5). Furthermore, Kosovo is a crossroad: Whoever controls Kosovo 
controls access to Bosnia from the South, to Albania from the East and could threaten 
cutting off links between the Serbia and the Macedonian and Aegean region (Malcom 
1998, 7). 
The second phase of the conflict covers the period between the ceasefire 
agreement of 12 October and the failure of the Rambouillet peace negotiations on 23 
February 1999. The ceasefire materialised after the sustained threat of limited NATO air-
strikes and ultimately United States Special Envoy Richard Holbrook and Slobodan 
Milosevic agreed on the reduction of force and the deployment of monitors (IICK 2000, 
76). This phase was marked by the strengthening and legitimisation of the KLA as they 
were the lead actors in the Rambouillet peace negotiations sidelining more moderate 
political forces within Kosovo around Ibrahim Rugova and the Democratic League of 
Kosovo (LDK). The Rambouillet negotiations and the Paris meeting of 15-19 March 
1999, however, did not produce any agreement between Serbia and Kosovo Albanians 
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and the OSCE withdrew 1,400 observers which had been sent to observe the ceasefire 
while the security situation deteriorated (IICK 2000, 82). 
 The third phase of the Kosovo conflict started with the ethnic cleansing of Kosovo 
by Serb troops. Between January and March 1999, Serbian troops uprooted between 
150,000 and over 200,000 Kosovo Albanians form their homes. Given the renewal of 
atrocities against civilians, NATO started a bombing campaign on 24 March 1999. 
Overall, 13 NATO countries flew 38,400 sorties, 10,484 of which were strike sorties 
releasing 26,619 air munitions. The United States flew 60% of all sorties and 80% of all 
strike sorties (IICK 2000, 91).96 NATO support was essential for the KLA to win the war 
as it tilted the military balance on the ground against Serbia. With the internationalisation 
of the Kosovo conflict the KLA achieved what a decade of non-violence was unable to 
achieve: Foreign intervention in support of Kosovo (Cooper 2001, 81; Ballencie and La 
Grange 2001, 1554-1555). 
 The Kosovo conflict claimed the lives of 6,000-10,000 people (Ballencie and La 
Grange 2001, 1556). The civilian impact was important with 90% of population being 
displaced: more that 863,000 people fled to neighbouring countries or further abroad; 
590,000 people were displaced within Kosovo (IICK 2000, 2, 90). In terms of physical 
destruction, 25 percent of the houses were damaged severely; farm assets were made 
unusable or looted on a massive scale hampering post-conflict reconstruction (World 
Bank 2001, 57).   
 
5.1.5. Post-conflict Kosovo, 1999-2006 
 
UNSC Resolution 1244 of 10 June 1999 formally ended the Kosovo conflict and 
established the UNMIK. Within its mandate was the establishment of a functioning 
interim civil administration and substantial autonomy and self-government, the 
facilitation of a process to determine Kosovo’s final status and the deterrence of new 
hostilities and the maintenance of security. UNMIK is built on four pillars to implement 
its mandate: (1) police and justice, (2) civil administration, (3) democratisation and 
                                                 
96 For various views on the NATO intervention including the right to intervention, the humanitarian aspects 
of NATO’s intervention and American foreign policy see the articles collected in Buckley (2000, 291-359) 
and the literature review in Ramet (2005, 220-242). 
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institution building and (4) reconstruction and economic development (Yannis, 2003, 
179; ICG 2004c, 7, n.28). Pillar 1 and 2 are implemented by the United Nations, pillar 3 
by the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and pillar 4 by the 
European Union (ICG 2004c, 7, n.28). 
In the immediate post-conflict period, the withdrawal of Serbian forces led to a 
power vacuum and changes in the military balance in Kosovo. Numerous revenge killings 
took place perpetrated by Kosovo Albanian against Kosovo Serbs (Human Rights Watch 
1999). In the absence of UNMIK deployment, the KLA used the power vacuum to 
establish control over territory, income generating activities and property. From the 
beginning, UNMIK did not have the adequate capacity, experience and resources to 
implement its mandate, particularly concerning the parallel economy. UNMIK adopted a 
policy of cooptation attempting to transform parts of the informal economy into 
legitimate economic activities (ICG 2001b, 6).  
The limits of cooptation became evident in March 2004 when riots occurred in 
Kosovo and displaced between 3,000-4,500 Kosovo Serbs. The crisis was triggered by 
road blockings in Caglavica and Gjilan by Kosovo Serbs after a Serb teenager was shot 
and wounded and the drowning of three Kosovo Albanian boys on the northern bank of 
the Iban River near Mitrovica (ICG 2004c, 13-14). These events ignited 33 riots 
involving 51,000 participants (UNMIK c.f. ICG 2004c, 15). The crises resulted in 19 
deaths, over 900 injured and displaced between 3,000-4,500 Kosovo Serbs. Over 700 
Serb, Ashkhali and Roma homes, 10 public buildings, 30 Serbian churches and 2 
monasteries were damaged or destroyed (Vrieze, 2004, 147; ICG 2004c, 1).  
These events were the culmination of a deteriorating atmosphere in Kosovo. The 
continued lack of economic opportunities and the absence of a clear political perspective 
for Kosovo embittered many Kosovo Albanians. In the months prior to the crisis, attacks 
against Serbian property increased and the taboo of using violence against the 
international peacekeepers by Kosovo Albanians was broken (ICG 2004c, 10). In 
addition, the annual events on 3-7 March to commemorate the national liberation of 
Kosovo brought together large crowds in Pristina and Prekaz and refocused attention on 
the Kosovo Albanian grievances.  
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There has been a lot of rumour surrounding the riots and so far not all elements 
are properly understood (Interview Anderson). There is evidence that they started as a 
mix of spontaneous popular reactions as well as planned operations:  
 
“The two days of violence were not centrally organised but were a vortex which 
 different radical extremists and criminal structures poured in and out of, an 
 impromptu marketplace for violence to which each brought their waves and found 
 their niche. (…) While cells of extremists were most definitely exploiting, feeding 
 and sustaining the hysteria and its violent products, they were doing so with 
 organisation that was loose, multi-headed, often catching up and supplementing 
 actions that were driven by feverish copycatting and rivalry both between 
 different locations, and among different contestants for leadership” (ICG 2004c, 
 17).  
 
Evidence of organisations includes the simultaneous occurrence of riots in 33 places, the 
transportation of numerous nationalist supporters from Drenica to Pristina (about two 
hours by car), as well as the riots never overstepping the level of violence and effectively 
preventing KFOR intervention. Groups that were involved in the riots included the KLA 
Veterans, the KLA Invalids and the Families and Martyrs and the University of Pristina 
Student Union (ICG 2004c, 10).  
The March 2004 crisis was a watershed event and led to a reassessment of the 
international role in Kosovo by the United Nations. It exposed UNMIK’s structure and 
mandate as “inappropriate to prepare Kosovo for the transition from war to peace, from 
socialism to the market economy, and from international political limbo to final status” 
(Ibid., 1). Overall, the 2004 crisis was counterproductive for Kosovo Albanian political 
leaders. Despite the armed reprisals against Kosovo Serbs after the war in 1999, the 
Kosovo Albanian leaders had until the riots been able to use their victim status to further 
their relationship with the international community. However, after the 2004 riots, it was 
the Kosovo Serbs who moved into the role of victims (UNSC 2004c, 3; Interview Singh). 
The Norwegian special Envoy of the United Nations Secretary General, Kai Eide, 
highlighted that the crisis exposed UNMIK’s structure and mandate to be “inappropriate 
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to prepare Kosovo for the transition from war to peace, from socialism to the market 
economy, and from international political limbo to final status” (ICG 2004c, 1). It was 
understood that the crisis grew from a serious lack of economic opportunities, the 
absence of a clear political perspective for Kosovo, and the increasing belief of Kosovo 
Serbs that they were victims (UNSC 2004, 3). Previously, negotiations on the final status 
were postponed by the international community through the policy of “Standards before 
Status” which previewed that Kosovo first had to comply to political, economic and 
human rights standards before status could be addressed.  
However, the March 2004 riots emphasised the importance of addressing the final 
status as underlined in the 2004 Eide Report (UNSC 2004) and the activities of United 
Nations Special Envoy, Martii Ahtisaari. At the end of January 2007, Ahtisaari presented 
a Report to Serbian and Kosovo Albanian delegations and the Contact Group – the 
United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, France, Italy, and Russia (Smith 2007a). 
The Report promoted a vision of supervised self-rule – not independence – with a strong 
role of a special international representative holding the administrative authority similar 
to the arrangements in Bosnia Herzegovina. The Report also includes provisions on the 
maintenance of minority rights for Serbian communities in Kosovo. Moreover, the Report 
suggests exchanging United Nations and UNMIK with European Union leadership while 
NATO continues to provide security guarantees (Smith 2007a; Pettifer 2007, 1-4, 
Goldirova 2007).  
The reaction to the Report was mixed. Serbia rejected it because it allegedly 
opened the road to full independence of Kosovo. Kosovo accepted the Report, but was 
not satisfied because it did not offer full independence and included major provisions for 
minority protection. Overall, the Report was deemed to giving too little to Kosovo 
Albanians and taking too much from the Serbs (Waters 2007). The dissatisfaction with 
the Report was voiced violently in the streets of Pristina in two riots on 10 and 19 
February 2007 in which 2 people died and UNMIK vehicles were destroyed (Pettifer 
2007, 4, 6). The European Union was generally supported the Report but this support was 
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not uniform for all members.97 Russia and China are sceptical with regard to 
independence considering it a dangerous precedent for the management of other 
unresolved conflict, such as Sri Lanka, Abkhazia, Moldova (Pettifer 2007, 7). Delaying 
the management of the final status longer, however, would increase the risk of instability 
and violence deriving from the radicalisation in Kosovo and Serbia (ICG 2006b, i). 
The status talks on status were paralleled by the evolution of the political system 
in Kosovo. The political landscape has become more diversified after the October 2004 
election which led to a coalition government with an opposition. Prior to the elections, 
political life of Kosovo was characterised by the LDK led by Ibrahim Rugova and the 
Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK) of Hashim Thaci. The LDK has taken over the 
former Communist party’s network and evolved in an administrative structure with few 
change (ICG 2005a, 14). In 2006, it was in coalition with the Alliance for the Future of 
Kosovo (AAK) of Ramush Haradinaj who left Kosovo in March 2005 after being 
indicted by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY). After 
the death of Rugova late 2005, the party split (Pettifer 2007, 5). For the status talks, 
Kosovo formed a “Unity Team” of institutional and party leaders (ICG 2006b, 12). 
The indictment of Haradinaj and mutual allegations on corruption increased the 
tension within the political elite. With the departure of Haradinaj from Kosovo, there was 
no other figure who could equally unify the political sphere. His lack of a unifying figure 
has been attributed to the emergence of more radical political parties such as the Kosovo 
People Movement (LPK) which received more support with concerns over the delay of 
independence (Pettifer 2007, 5).  
These political developments have not been helpful for the creation of a broad 
political platform for the status talks (ICG 2005a, i). In addition, there is a growing sense 
of frustration particularly in terms of employment and among those under 30 years who 
represent about 60 percent of Kosovo’s population. In the Kosovo Serb communities, 
there is also a growing feeling of insecurity even though this feeling could not 
corroborated by crime statistics which recorded only few ethnically motivated crimes 
(World Bank 2005, 41-42). 
                                                 
97 Greece, Slovakia and Hungary support the Report rhetorically but are reserved and politically closer to 
Serbia. Italy, Spain and France recognise that independence is unavoidable but would like a strong control 
mechanism. The United Kingdom, Austria and German are in favour of independence (Pettifer 2007, 8). 
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5.1.6. The diaspora and the Kosovo conflict 
 
Conflict financing in relation to the Kosovo conflict has usually been considered in terms 
of the assistance of its diaspora in Western Europe and the United States. Built on the 
financial system of parallel governance, the KLA mobilised funding to start and maintain 
the armed conflict against Serbia. Diaspora financing included both the taxation of 
Kosovo Albanians working abroad as well as contributions from Kosovo Albanian 
transnational crime networks. In looking at Kosovo’s system of diaspora financing, this 
case study provides insight into another method conflict financing and its role in conflict 
recurrence in addition to oil and diamonds in Angola and the parallel economy in 
Georgia.  
 However, the considerations of conflict financing in Kosovo does not stop with 
diaspora financing. An often overlooked aspect of the war in Kosovo is that the KLA was 
nearly defeated, broke and without fighters by the end of 1998. It was saved by the 
ceasefire of 12 October 1998 as well as NATO intervention. Thus, on its own, the KLA 
would have been highly unlikely to resist the Serbian army. In a sense, NATO – and 
particular the United States – won the war for the KLA. Through military intervention, it 
escalated the conflict and therefore increased the cost of competition for Serbia.  
 As negotiations on the final status are ongoing, conflict financing is an important 
element in understanding the risk of conflict recurrence in Kosovo. Radicalisation in 
Kosovo produces a dangerous situation which has already erupted in street violence in 
February 2007. The analysis of the next Parts leads up to the questions (1) if Kosovo 
could potentially self-finance a low intensity conflict or even a “war of independence”, 
(2) what would be the barriers-to-entry for the cost of conflict and (3) what the strategies 
available to the international community to increase the opportunity cost and to decrease 
the expected benefits from using armed force.  
 
5.2. Parallel governance and non-violent resistance, 1989-1995 
 
In the late 1980’s, Kosovo became a central element in the emergence of Serbian 
nationalism. Serbia established territorial control over Kosovo by increasing repression 
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against Kosovo Albanians and revoking the province’s autonomous status in 1990s. 
Kosovo Albanians were banned from the public sector and employment in Kosovo’s 
mines leading to a wave of emigration to Western Europe. These developments fostered a 
movement of peaceful resistance leading to parallel governance including a Government 
in Exile and efforts to maintain social, cultural and educational institutions in Kosovo. At 
the same time, the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina took attention away from Kosovo as 
well as the capability of Serbia to further increase its coercion in Kosovo. 
 
5.2.1. Available revenue sources 
 
The parallel governance and non violent resistance in Kosovo was financed through a 
system of diaspora financing. It was a development fund for non-violent resistance and 
survival financing in Kosovo an underground education network for 500,000 students and 
36.000 teachers, the Office of the President and Parliament in Exile, and representations 
in Geneva, Zurich, Stockholm, Tirana, Bonn and Brussels (Interview Mustafa).  
The management of this parallel system was constructed on principles of 
solidarity, cohesion, voluntarism and legality. These principles were the foundation of 
mobilising the financing for over 9 years. One of the instigators of the system, Naip Zeka, 
underlined: "My generation believed that everything that happens to the other may also 
happen to you. This created our solidarity and the base of our security" (Interview Zeka). 
Through its voluntary nature, the parallel system was essentially self-financing. In 1991, 
the Government of Kosovo in Exile decided that 3% of net income of Kosovo Albanians 
working abroad should be devoted to the survival of Kosovo. The threshold of 3% was 
chosen to keep contributions as low as possible but spread to everyone, like fiscal 
politics. Another essential element of the system was its reliance of legal transactions. 
The Government in Exile solicited legal experts to ensure compliance to the laws of the 
countries of residence. The legality of the parallel financing was important to ensure 
confidence in the system and prevent subversion by the authorities of Yugoslavia.  
The system’s operation was based on a network of political representations 
abroad. A first meeting took place in Stuttgart, Germany, early 1991, where it was 
decided to create a parallel finance system to ensure the survival of Kosovo. The decision 
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was inspired by the experience of how Israel financed its state building in the initial 
stages (Interview Mustafa). Prior to the development of the parallel financing system, the 
LDK conducted research on the available diaspora funds whose outcome was that private 
saving of the diaspora totalled the equivalent of EUR 3 billion in 1991. After the 
exclusion of Kosovo Albanians from the public sector in Kosovo in the 1980s, the 
majority went into business at home or abroad without investing their savings (Interview 
Zeka). 
The fundraising was organised and controlled by the local LDK Councils and 
withdrawals were only allowed by consent of the National Council administering the 
fund. The 3% of net income were transferred by direct debit to designated bank accounts. 
Each contributor received a report card in which personal details were collected as well 
as the history of financial contributions. These report cards were carefully administered 
and are still believed to be in existence in Western Europe. In Kosovo, they were 
destroyed during the war (Interview Zeka). About 16.000 people were involved in 
operating the local offices of the Government in Exile. Only in Germany and Switzerland 
there were about 5,500 and 3,000 people respectively involved in operating the system 
(Interview Zeka and Mustafa). About 70% of the total revenue was collected in Germany 
(Interview Mustafa).  
One of the key problems was transfers from Western Europe to Kosovo. All 
transaction had to be secret as Yugoslav police regarded the parallel finance structure as 
illegal. From bank accounts in Western Europe, money was channelled to Kosovo two 
ways: First, it was electronically transferred to the Bank of Albania to bring it closer to 
Kosovo and then transported from Tirana to Kosovo in cash by couriers. Alternatively, 
funds were transferred in cash by couriers directly to Kosovo by plane (Interview Zeka 
and Mustafa). The control of the means of displacement to and from Kosovo was an 
important element in operating the parallel funding system. The operation of travel 
agencies, bus and plane services was a channel for funds into Kosovo and a source of 
revenue (Augoustures and Pascal 1996, 517). 
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Various estimates exist on the amount of diaspora remittances.98 In a discourse by 
Bujar Bukoshi, Former Prime Minister of the Kosovo Albanian Parallel Government, it 
was mentioned that USD 666 million (DEM 1 billion) were collected for parallel 
governance structures between 1991 and 1999 (USD 83 million annually) (Bujar Bukoshi 
c.f. ICG 2001, 13). However, in a personal interview with Mr. Bukoshi, he mentioned the 
figure to be only at USD 338 million (EUR 260 million) for 1992-1999 (USD 48 million 
annually)(Interview Bukoshi). Other sources close to the organisation of the diaspora 
financing held that USD 50 million were collected per year through 18 funds in Western 
Europe from 1991 to 1999 (Interview Zeka and Mustafa).  
 These figures suggest that between 1989 and 1995, the Kosovo Albanian 
resistance had annual revenue sources between USD 48 million and USD 83 million. The 
value of these figures must be considered in the context of inflation in Yugoslavia of the 
1990s. Inflation had the effect to increase the real value of the financing by five times; 
thus, increasing the financial power of the diaspora fundraising. The gained value of 
revenue sources was invested in the maintenance of the structure of parallel governance 
both in Kosovo and internationally (Interview Mustafa).  
 The revenue sources of Serbia were severely curtailed by its economic crises and 
sanctions during the Bosnian war. In the period 1991-1994, Serbia’s GDP decreased by a 
cumulative 54 %, industrial production fell by 30 %, agricultural output by 80 % and 
unemployment rose to 27 % in 1995. Exports decreased as a result of the disintegration of 
Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union from USD 2.5 billion in 1992 to USD 3.58 million in 
1993 and USD 45.35 million in 1994. A the same time imports grew USD 88.2 million in 
1993 to USD 183.5 million in 1994 leading to a balance of payments deficit. By 1994, 
Serbia had nearly depleted its foreign reserves (see Table 5.1). This economic situation 
limited the capacity of Serbia to pay for an additional armed conflict over Kosovo.  
 The economic crisis is also revealed in the defence budget of Serbia and 
Montenegro. While the overall defence budget of Yugoslavia prior to the break-up in 
1989 was USD 3,699 million, defence expenditures were only USD 251 million in 1993, 
USD 444 million in 1994, and USD 597 million in 1995 (SIPRI 1996, 366; SIPRI 1999, 
                                                 
98 Conversion from DEM is 1 USD = 1.5 DEM and from EUR 1 USD = 1.3 USD. Based on 
http://www.xe.com. 
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314). These figures translate into an annual average of USD 431 million for the period 
1993-1995.  
 
Table 5.1: Selected economic indicators of the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) 
(Pashko 1998, 347. *Figures for 1995 are estimates) 
 
 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995* 
GDP (USD billion) 20.2 13.7 9.3 10.0 10.7 
Annual GDP change (%) -10.9 -32.5 -30.2 6.5 7.0 
Gross Industrial Product (annual 
change %) 
-16.0 -21.0 -39.0 1.2 9.0 
Gross Agricultural Product (annual 
change %) 
-7.0 -9.7 -17.8 4.0 4.0 
Unemployment rate (%) 22.7 24.3 24.7 25.0 27.0 
Retail prices (% annual change) 120 8,991 30,000,000,000,000 0  
Budget deficit (% of GDP) 15.0 24.0 38.9 20.0 n/a 
Current account (USD million) -35.0 -1,284.0 n/a -616.0 n/a 
Foreign exchange reserves (USD bn) 5.5 2.7 2.0 0.2 n/a 
 
5.2.2. The cost of conflict 
 
In the period 1989-1995, Kosovo’s resistance movement had no military capacity 
because its strategy was to manage Serbia’s suppression by peaceful resistance. On the 
opposing side, Serbia inherited weapons and materiel from the Yugoslav Peoples Army 
(YPA) and was involved in two armed conflict against Croatia and Bosnia and 
Herzegovina.  
 In 1948, the YPA was the third largest land force in Europe. However, over the 
years it was reduced to 220,000 in 1980 and 180,000 in 1990 (Woodward 1995, 27). With 
the dissolution of Yugoslavia the YPA disintegrated and was reduced to 126,500 active 
military personnel of which 60,000 were conscripts. During the war in Croatia alone 
25,000 draftees deserted (Pietz 2005, 13-14). The dissolution of the YPA led to the 
emergence of regional forces based on the Territorial Defence Forces (TDF).99 The Army 
of the Republica Srpska and Kraijna emerged as a fighting force of 67,000 and 16,000 
men respectively in 1992 (Pietz 2005, 13). 
                                                 
99 TDFs were the heart of Yugoslavia’s military strategy to prevent foreign invasion and guerrilla warfare. 
They were an all peoples civilian militia organised under the control of the republics (Woodward 1995, 
26.27).   
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 Serbian forces were involved in the war in Bosnia Herzegovina with 35,000 
soldiers of the Bosnian Serb Army (BSA). In addition, about 56 paramilitary groups 
numbering in total between 20,000 to 40,000 soldiers were actively participating in the 
war. In total, Serbia was involved with between 55,000 and 75,000 men in the war in 
Bosnia Herzegovina. These were equipped with small arms and mortars and the BSA had 
several hundred armoured vehicles and artillery pieces (Bojicic and Kaldor 1997, 158-
160). 
  This maintenance of Serbian populated territories and the war in Bosnia put 
financial pressure on Serbia. It is estimated that USD 15.3 billion were paid by Serbia to 
the territories with Serbian populations in Croatia and Bosnia (Pashko 1998, 336, 353). 
The cost of maintaining control over Kosovo was estimated to amount to USD 6 billion 
(Vickers 1998, 263).100 This amount was essential to maintaining a Serbian presence in 
Kosovo but also to finance a repression campaign against Kosovo Serbs101 and the 
deployment of 25,000 Serbian police forces (Malcom 1998, 345). 
 The figures underline the superiority of coercive means in the hands of Serbia. 
Had the Kosovo leadership opted for organising an armed resistance the cost would have 
been high due to the high cost of weapons – a result of high demand for weapons during 
the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina – and difficult to organise because of the presence of 
Serbian police.  
 Applying the costing tool developed in Chapter 2, the following will estimate the 
start-up and annual maintenance cost for the Kosovo resistance and Serbia for the period 
1989-1995. The key estimations variables include the following:  
 
• Price per weapon (PF) = 150 USD (SAS 2002, 66); 
• Price per round of ammunition (PA) = 0.1 USD (Bourne and Berkol 2006, 108-110); 
• Annual average male salary (I) = 4,088 USD (data for 1999, UNDP 2001, 210-213. 
Represents approximately cost per soldier of 11.2 USD/day or 341 USD/month); 
                                                 
100 It is not specified if these numbers are an annual or total figure. However, given their value and the 
reduced economic potential of Serbia and Montenegro during its economic crises, the estimate is 
considered t be a total figure for the first half of the 1990s. 
101 In 1994, a human rights organisation in Kosovo recorded 2,157 physical assaults by the police, 3,553 
raids on private dwellings and 2,963 arbitrary arrests (Malcom 1998, 350). 
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• Number of fighters (N) = 10,000 for Kosovo and 25,000 for Serbia (representing size 
of Police force; Malcom 1998, 345).  
 
 The CERs for the start-up and annual maintenance of armed conflict suggest that 
Kosovo had a start-up cost of about USD 2.4 million and annual maintenance cost for of 
between about USD 44 million for a low intensity conflict, USD 54 million for a medium 
intense conflict and USD 92 million for a high intensity conflict. For Serbia the figures 
are a start-up cost of about USD 6 million and annual maintenance cost for of between 
about USD 110 million for a low intensity conflict, USD 135 million for a medium 
intense conflict and USD 231 million for a high intensity conflict (see Table 5.2).  
 A comparison of these cost figures with the annual average available revenue 
sources of the Kosovo resistance of between USD 48 million and USD 83 million and 
Serbia of USD 431 million for the period 1989-1995 highlights that the Kosovo 
resistance could have maintained a medium intensity conflict and Serbia and conflict of 
high intensity.  
However, despite the material possibility to organise these types of armed 
conflict, none of the parties did. For Serbia, one may suggest that the available revenue 
sources to finance conflict were already fully invested in the war in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, leaving no additional resources for another war in Kosovo. For Kosovo, 
starting a low intensity conflict against Serbia did not provide a promising perspective for 
achieving the independence of Kosovo.   
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Table 5.2: Overview of the start-up and annual maintenance of armed conflict for Kosovo and Serbia, 1989-1995 
 
 CERs Composites Kosovo Serbia  
   USD USD USD USD 
CER 1:  
Weapons 
1.5 firearms (F)  
x Price per firearm (PF)  
x Number of fighters (N) 
 
2,250,000 
 
5,625,000 
S
t
a
r
t
-
u
p
 
c
o
s
t
 
CER 2:   
Ammunition 
1.5 firearms (F)  
x 100 rounds of ammunition (A) 
x Price per ammunition (PA) 
x Number of fighters (N) 
 
150,000 
 
Total start-up cost 
 
2,400,000  
375,000 
 
Total start-up cost 
 
6,000,000 
CER 3:  
Salaries 
Annual male income (I) 
x Number of fighters (N) 
 
40,880,000 
  
102,200,000 
 
CERL 4:  
Weapons 
 
0.33 firearms (F)  
x 1 x Price per firearm (PF) 
x Number of insurgents (N) 
 
495,000 
 
1,237,500 
L
o
w
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n
t
e
n
s
i
t
y
 
CERL 5:  
Ammunition 
 
1.5 firearms (F)  
x 20 rounds of ammunition (A) 
x 90 days of combat 
x Price per round (PA) 
x Number of insurgents (N) 
 
2,700,000 
 
Total maintenance 
(low intensity)* 
 
44,075,000 
 
6,750,000 
 
Total maintenance 
(low intensity)* 
 
110,187,500 
CERM 4:  
Weapons 
0.45 firearms (F)  
x 1.5 x Price per firearm (PF) 
x Number of insurgents (N) 
 
1,012,500 
 
2,531,250 
M
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m
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t
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CERM 5: 
Ammunition 
 
1.5 firearms (F)  
x 60 rounds of ammunition (A) 
x 90 days of combat 
x 1.5 x Price per round (PA) 
x Number of insurgents (N) 
 
12,150,000 
 
 
Total maintenance 
(medium intensity)* 
 
54,042,500 
 
30,375,000 
 
Total maintenance 
(medium intensity)* 
 
135,106,250 
CERH 4:  
Weapons 
 
0.65 firearms (F) 
x 3 x Price per firearm (PF) 
x Number of insurgents (N) 
 
2,925,000 
 
7,312,500 
M
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CERH 5:  
Ammunition 
1.5 firearms (F)  
x 120 rounds of ammunition (A) 
x 90 days of combat 
x 3 x Price per round (PA) 
x Number of insurgents (N) 
 
48,600,000 
 
Total maintenance 
(high intensity)* 
 
92,405,000 
 
 
121,500,000 
 
Total maintenance 
(high intensity)* 
 
231,012,500 
* Includes CER 3: Salaries. 
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5.2.3. Expected benefits and opportunity costs 
 
In the early 1990s, neither Serbia nor Kosovo had an incentive to start a war despite the 
material possibility of doing so. Serbian had already deployed its capabilities in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina and could not open another front. In Kosovo, the use of armed force 
was not considered out of fear to be ethnically cleansed. Moreover, non-violence 
resistance and the international network of Kosovo Albanians kept Kosovo on the 
international agenda and built legitimacy for a future “Republic of Kosovo” (Judah 2002, 
73, 74, 98). Due to the absence of armed formations, Kosovo Albanians would not have 
been able to impose themselves on Serbian Forces which were militarily superior. In the 
words of Ibrahim Rugova:  
 
 “We have no territorial forces like the Slovenes and Croats. All our weapons have 
 been taken away by the Serbian police. We are not certain how strong the Serbian 
 military presence in the province actually is, but we know that it is overwhelming 
 (…). We would have no chance in successfully resisting army. In fact, the Serbs 
 only wait for a pretext to attack the Albanian population and wipe it out. We 
 believe it is better to do nothing and stay alive than to be massacred” (c.f. Vickers 
 1998, 264). 
 
5.2.4. Assessment 
 
This Part showed that that the Kosovo parallel government had a surplus of revenue 
sources to pay for the start and maintenance of a low intensity conflict but did not. The 
reason was that the Kosovo resistance did not have the revenue sources to pay for a 
military strategy (high intensity conflict) needed to fight against Serbia and that the 
capabilities of Serbia represented a high barrier-to-entry into armed conflict. Instead, 
revenue sources were used to maintain parallel social, educational and cultural 
institutions as well as a parallel Government abroad. Thus, the Kosovo Albanian 
Government in Exile had a low incentive to use armed force and ultimately opted for 
peaceful resistance. As part of non-violent resistance, an international network of 
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diaspora financing was developed which was based on the principles of solidarity, 
cohesion, voluntarism and legality.  
 Also Serbia had a low propensity to start a conflict in Kosovo. It had limited 
revenue sources and engaged in the war in Bosnia Herzegovina and the maintenance of 
Serbian populations in Croatia and Bosnia. Serbia was therefore unable to open a second 
front in Kosovo.  
 Concerning the relationship between conflict financing and recurrence this Part 
highlights the following points:  
 
• The availability of revenue sources is not a sufficient condition for armed conflict to 
occur. The Kosovo resistance had sufficient revenue sources to start a low intensity 
conflict. They had enough money for the wrong military strategy as a powerful 
opponent would have necessitated at least revenue sources to maintain and high 
intensity conflict.  
• A high barrier-to-entry into armed conflict can prevent the recurrence of conflict. 
Serbia’s military capability represented such a barrier-to-entry while the Kosovo 
resistance did not have the revenue sources to overcome it. 
• Revenue source only become a source of conflict financing once a organised armed 
groups makes a tactically informed choice to invest into the organisation of armed 
conflict rather than other strategies of resistance. Based on the high barrier-to-entry, 
the Kosovo resistance made a choice for non-violent resistance.  
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Table 5.3: Overview of propensity to renew armed conflict of Kosovo and Serbia,  
1989-1995 
 
 Kosovo Serbia 
MATERIAL 
ENVIRONMENT 
Surplus of revenue sources (RS>C) 
in 1992 for medium intensity 
conflict 
Surplus of revenue sources (RS>C) 
for conflict of high intensity 
Potential revenue 
sources (annual) 
USD 48 million – USD 83 million 
based on diaspora funding 
USD 431 million based on defence 
budget 
Cost of conflict (annual)   
Start-up USD 2.4 million USD 6.0 million 
Maintenance low USD 44 million USD 110 million 
Maintenance medium USD 54 million USD 135 million 
Maintenance high USD 92 million USD 231 million 
INCENTIVE TO USE 
ARMED FORCE 
 
 
Low 
 
Low 
Expected benefit of 
using armed force 
None – armed force considered 
counterproductive because it could 
potentially be used as a pretext for 
ethnic cleansing 
Control of territory of Kosovo 
Opportunity cost of 
using armed force 
Opportunity to garner international 
attention and legitimacy; preventing 
more suppression and potentially 
ethnic cleansing 
Overstretch of military capacity due 
to deployment in Bosnia, possible 
negative strategic consequences by 
opening a second front in Kosovo 
PROPENSITY TO 
RENEW ARMED 
CONFLICT 
 
Low 
 
Low 
 
5.3. The rise of the KLA and armed conflict in Kosovo, 1995-1999  
 
The period after the 1995 Dayton Peace Agreement, saw the emergence of an alternative 
form of resistance in Kosovo which wanted to go beyond non-violence and take up an 
armed struggle against Serbian presence. From its heartland in the rural Drenica region, 
the KLA started as a small group in 1995 and received widespread support after the 
assassination of nearly the entire Jashari clan of Prekaz by Serbian interior police forces 
in 28 February 1998. After this event, a major armed conflict took place in Kosovo 
between the KLA and a mixture of Serbian armed forces including three phases. Phase 1 
was an armed conflict between Serbian armed forces and the KLA leading to the near 
defeat of the KLA until the ceasefire of 12 October 1998. Phase 2 was a period of 
negotiations between the Serbian Government and Kosovo Albanian representatives 
which culminated in the failure of the Rambouillet peace talks on 23 February 1999. In 
Phase 3, the conflict escalated with the intervention of NATO on the side of Kosovo 
  
304
leading to the victory of KLA and the establishment of an international presence in 
Kosovo. 
 
5.3.1. Available revenue sources 
 
Before 1998, diaspora financing was devoted to the funding of the parallel governance 
structure and peaceful resistance. Only when the peaceful resistance was frustrated after 
the Dayton Peace Accords of 1995, the system became a tool of conflict financing and 
changed ownership (Interview Mustafa). Initially, the KLA based its funding on the 
network developed by the Government in Exile, however, soon developed its own 
network through the “Homeland Calling” fund. “Homeland Calling” was essentially a 
network of bank accounts administered from Geneva.102 Even though it was based on the 
experience of the existing parallel financial network, it was a separate fundraising front 
and was operated by different people (Hockenos 2003, 248, 252).  
 The Government in Exile made an offer to collaborate with the KLA putting at its 
disposal the financial network, well trained organisers as well as an institutional cover. 
However, this collaboration failed as the KLA wanted to do it alone due to the divisions 
between the Government in Exile and the KLA. By creating its own parallel structure, the 
KLA contributed to dividing the society of Kosovo and undermining the solidarity 
underlying the parallel governing structure (Interview Bukoshi; Hockenos 2003, 258-
259). Moreover, the KLA shifted from a voluntary to involuntary contributions thus 
further increasing antagonisms within the diaspora and in Kosovo.  
 It is estimated that in the late 1990s, 50% of families living in Kosovo received up 
to USD 2,000 per year from family members abroad, 25% between USD 2,000 and USD 
4,000  per year, 10% USD 4,000 and USD 6,000 per year and 15% above USD 6,000 per 
year. The average remittance was between USD 170 and USD 660 per year. Total 
remittances for the late 1990s were estimated at USD 500 million and USD 560 million 
annually (RIINVEST 1999 c.f. World Bank 2005, 71). These figures are estimates of 
total remittances and it is unlikely that the KLA controlled all of it. The former Minister 
                                                 
102 Bank accounts existed in Switzerland, Germany, Australia, the United States, Austria, Norway 
Denmark, France, Sweden, Italy, Belgium and Canada (Hockenos 2003, 248). 
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of Finance of the Government in Exile, Isa Mustafa, estimated the KLA’s annual revenue 
from the diaspora at around USD 40 million in 1998 (Interview Mustafa).103 
However, the KLA was not only relying on diaspora financing but also on 
revenue from the parallel economy. The parallel economy was based on a mix of 
economic activities including the smuggling of oil, drugs, arms, people, cars, cigarettes 
and other commodities as well as prostitution, corruption, counterfeiting and asset and 
property seizures (Mutschke 2000).  
The emergence of the parallel economy was fostered by a number of 
developments in and around Kosovo. The parallel economy was part of the parallel 
governance structures in Kosovo established in response to Serbian discrimination at the 
beginning of the 1990s. It provided alternative economic opportunities for the pool of 
unemployed seeking sources of income (Naylor 1999, 370; Yannis 2003, 174). Moreover, 
the parallel economy was a continuity of the Yugoslav parallel economy as a 
consequence of the wars in other parts of Yugoslavia which empowered criminal actors. 
The sanctions regime against the Yugoslavia stimulated Kosovo’s economy as it was a 
corridor for sanctions busting (Cooper 2001, 71). Furthermore, Albanian and Kosovo 
Albanian crime groups benefited from the break-up of American crime cartels in the 
United States. They also pushed Turkish groups out of the market, notably in heroin 
trafficking in Switzerland, Germany, Austria, and Scandinavia (Mutschke 2000, 3-4). 
Finally, business in Kosovo has been traditionally based on the besa, an absolute respect 
for oral principles of agreement, reconciliation and protection which was mercilessly 
enforced in case of breach. In this way, Kosovo crime groups had a high degree of 
cohesion and loyalty and became difficult to infiltrate (Naylor 1999, 365; Köppel and 
Székely 2002, 130-131).  
The profits from the parallel and criminal economy are difficult to estimate and 
vary widely. Some estimates include the following: 
 
• USD 600 million (DEM 900 million) between 1996 and 1999 from organised crime, 
half of which is thought to be drug money (Mutschke 2000, 6).104 
                                                 
103 These USD figures are based on DEM figures converted according to 1 USD = 1.5 DEM. Based on 
http://www.xe.com 
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• USD 163 million through aid in connection to the refugee problem emerging during 
the Kosovo war (Mutschke 2000, 3). 
• USD 500 to 800 million allegedly transferred to accounts of Italian criminal groups 
before the crash of the pyramid scheme in Albania (Mutschke 2000, 3). 
• USD 50 million in 1999 through trafficking illegal immigrants to Western Europe 
(Mutschke 2000, 5). 
 
 There is also evidence that the KLA financed its operations through drug money. 
It is probable that at one point during the armed conflict, the KLA managed an exchange 
mechanism smuggling drugs from Turkey to Western Europe against the acquisition of 
arms (Mutschke 2000, 6). The KLA is also alleged to have received support from radical 
Islamic groups. However, support by these groups is unlikely to have been systematic and 
widespread. Many local KLA commanders maintained their own contacts to the 
underworld and individuals from the Middle East but overall sympathies for radical Islam 
and its financial support have been low in Kosovo (Huckenos 2003, 255).  
 Whether the KLA was in control of the entire revenue stream generated through 
the parallel economy is questionable. What is more likely is that it benefited from the 
parallel economy operated by Kosovo Albanians by means of taxation or larger payments 
by individuals. If its riches had been as high as the figures on the parallel economy and 
the higher estimates on diaspora financing suggest, it may be difficult to explain why the 
KLA was nearly defeated prior to winter 1998 and why it needed NATO support to win 
the war. This is why it is more reasonable to suggest that the revenue sources at the 
disposal of the KLA generated between USD 40 million and USD 150 million depending 
on the level of capture of revenue sources from the parallel economy. 
 The 40,000 Serbian armed forces were maintained through a military budget 
which averaged USD 690 million between 1996 and 1999. Nevertheless, NATO 
intervention reduced Serbia’s economic and military potential to maintain the conflict. 
NATO bombardment brought Serbia’s economy to a standstill with 59 major bridges (7 
over the Danube) destroyed, telecommunications transmitters damaged and two thirds of 
                                                                                                                                                 
104 Exchange rate 1USD = 1.5 DEM. 
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its industrial plants destroyed. NATO figures suggest that 70% of electricity production 
and 80% of refinery production was hit (IICK 2000, 93).  
 
Table 5.4: Military budget of Serbia and Montenegro, 1996-1999 
(SIPRI 2006, 335, 341, 348) 
 
 million Dinars Million USD  
(constant 2003) 
% of GDP 
1996 3,950 654 n/a 
1997 5,406 756 4.8 
1998 6,441 695 4.4 
1999 8,600 653 4.5 
 
5.3.2. The cost of conflict 
 
In the beginning of 1998, the KLA was estimated to have a membership of 350-1,500 
fighters. This number increased to 5,000-30,000 members in late spring of 1998. The 
KLA was equipped with AK-47s as well as anti-tank rockets, anti-aircraft weapons and 
sniper rifles. They had no heavy weapons except if it was captured from Serbian forces. 
The KLA was a collection of small groups and fighting was organised by a nucleus of 
groups of 100 trained fighters which were supported by locally organised members 
(Troebst 1999, 50-51). Overall they were poorly trained and a core group of fighters 
included around 8,000-10,000 men (IICK 2000, 87). 
 The KLA was outnumbered in strength and numbers by Serbian forces which 
deployed regular units of the Army of Yugoslavia and the Serbian Police as well as three 
specialised police forces of the Ministry of the Interior of Serbia. Combined these forces 
amounted to 40,000 men deployed in Kosovo. According to NATO estimates, these 
forces had at their disposal 350 tanks, 440 armoured personnel carriers and 750 artillery 
pieces, mortars and anti-aircraft artillery (Seybold 2000, 29; Troebst 1999, 47). 
 Prices for weapons fluctuated in Kosovo during the conflict. For example, prices 
for an AK-47 changed from 40 USD in spring 1997, to 150 USD in winter 1997/1998 to 
300 USD in spring 1998 to 650 USD autumn 1998. This price development suggests that 
strong demand for weapons exhausted the supply of weapons after the collapse of 
Albania. They played a role in igniting the conflict but could not sustain it (SAS 2002, 
69). The prices also highlight the potential of the increasing cost of conflict during armed 
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conflict. The CER estimation technique suggests that prices increase 5 and 10 times 
respectively for medium and high intensity conflict. Starting from a base price of 40 USD 
this means an increase to 200 US and 400 USD which is a valid cautious approximation 
of the real price development.  
 Applying the CERs developed in Chapter 2 the following will estimate the start-
up and annual maintenance cost for the Kosovo resistance and Serbia for the period 1995-
1999. The key estimations variables include the following:  
 
• Price per weapon (PF) = 40 USD (SAS 2002, 69); 
• Price per round of ammunition (PA) = 0.1 USD (Bourne and Berkol 2006, 108-110); 
• Annual average male salary (I) = 4,088 USD (data for 1999, UNDP 2001, 210-213. 
Represents approximately cost per soldier of 11.2 USD/day or 341 USD/month); 
• Number of fighters (N) = 17,500 for Kosovo (average between 5,000 and 30,000 
soldiers - Troebst 1999, 50-51) and 40,000 for Serbia (Seybold 2000, 29).  
 
 The CERs for the start-up and annual maintenance of armed conflict suggest that 
the KLA had a start-up cost of about USD 1.3 million and annual maintenance cost for of 
between USD 76 million for a low intensity conflict, USD 93 million for a medium 
intense conflict and USD 158 million for a high intensity conflict. For Serbia the figures 
are a start-up cost of about USD 3 million and annual maintenance cost for of between 
about USD 175 million for a low intensity conflict, USD 213 million for a medium 
intense conflict and USD 361 million for a high intensity conflict (see Table 5.5).  
 A comparison of these cost figures with the KLA’s annual average available 
revenue sources of between USD 40 million and USD 150 million and Serbia of USD 
690 million for the period 1995-1999 highlights that the KLA could have maintained a 
medium intensity conflict. Serbia could have maintained conflict of high intensity.  
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Table 5.5: Overview of the start-up and annual maintenance of armed conflict for Kosovo and Serbia, 1995-1999 
 
 CERs Composites Kosovo Serbia  
   USD USD USD USD 
CER 1:  
Weapons 
1.5 firearms (F)  
x Price per firearm (PF)  
x Number of fighters (N) 
 
1,050,000 
 
2,400,000 
S
t
a
r
t
-
u
p
 
c
o
s
t
 
CER 2:   
Ammunition 
1.5 firearms (F)  
x 100 rounds of ammunition (A) 
x Price per ammunition (PA) 
x Number of fighters (N) 
 
262,500 
 
Total start-up cost 
 
1,312,500  
600,000 
 
Total start-up cost 
 
3,000,000 
CER 3:  
Salaries 
Annual male income (I) 
x Number of fighters (N) 
 
71,540,000 
  
163,520,000 
 
CERL 4:  
Weapons 
 
0.33 firearms (F)  
x 1 x Price per firearm (PF) 
x Number of insurgents (N) 
 
231,100 
 
528,000 
L
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w
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n
t
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n
s
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t
y
 
CERL 5:  
Ammunition 
 
1.5 firearms (F)  
x 20 rounds of ammunition (A) 
x 90 days of combat 
x Price per round (PA) 
x Number of insurgents (N) 
 
4,725,000 
 
Total maintenance 
(low intensity)* 
 
76,496,100 
 
10,800,000 
 
Total maintenance 
(low intensity)* 
 
174,848,000 
CERM 4:  
Weapons 
0.45 firearms (F)  
x 1.5 x Price per firearm (PF) 
x Number of insurgents (N) 
 
472,500 
 
1,080,000 
M
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CERM 5: 
Ammunition 
 
1.5 firearms (F)  
x 60 rounds of ammunition (A) 
x 90 days of combat 
x 1.5 x Price per round (PA) 
x Number of insurgents (N) 
 
21,262,500 
 
 
Total maintenance 
(medium intensity)* 
 
93,275,000 
 
48,600,000 
 
Total maintenance 
(medium intensity)* 
 
213,200,000 
CERH 4:  
Weapons 
 
0.65 firearms (F) 
x 3 x Price per firearm (PF) 
x Number of insurgents (N) 
 
1,365,000 
 
3,120,000 
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CERH 5:  
Ammunition 
1.5 firearms (F)  
x 120 rounds of ammunition (A) 
x 90 days of combat 
x 3 x Price per round (PA) 
x Number of insurgents (N) 
 
85,050,000 
 
Total maintenance 
(high intensity)* 
 
157,955,000 
 
194,400,000 
 
Total maintenance 
(high intensity)* 
 
361,040,000 
* Includes CER 3: Salaries. 
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 These figures highlight a number of issues with regard to the Kosovo conflict. 
First, it clearly shows that the KLA had possibly sufficient revenue sources to maintain a 
medium intensity conflict. However, it did have a shortage of revenue sources to escalate 
the conflict to a high intensity conflict. On its own, it would not have been able to 
escalate the conflict and thus needed external support to do so. This external support 
came with NATO’s intervention. The cost of the escalation was estimated at about USD 4 
billion (Seybold 2000, 32).  
 In addition the figures show, that NATO’s strategy to attack the economy of 
Serbia through air-strikes on military-industrial infrastructure led to the reduction of its 
economic potential (IICK 2000, 93). Thus, Serbia was no longer able to maintain a high 
intensity, conventional war in Kosovo. Direct economic cost of the bombings was 
estimated to amount to at least USD 30 billion. In addition 70% of energy production and 
80% of oil refinery capacity was destroyed. Economic life was disrupted and 
unemployment rose from 26.8% in 1998 to 33.0% in 1999 (IICK 2000, 248).   
 Thus, these two observations suggest that the KLA successfully escalated the 
conflict through external intervention. NATO intervention increased the cost of 
competition and reduced the availability of revenue sources for Serbia.  
  
5.3.3. Expected benefits and opportunity costs 
 
In the period after the Dayton accords until the beginning of the Kosovo conflict the 
incentive to use force changed within Kosovo and its diaspora. This incentive change was 
associated to the limitation of non-violent resistance, the growth of the KLA and the 
collapse of Albania.  
 The non-violent movement collapsed after the Dayton Agreement which ended 
the war in Bosnia. The Agreement made no reference to Kosovo and therefore 
undermined the concept on non-violent resistance. Many Kosovo Albanians interpreted 
the Dayton Agreement in a way that ethnic partition is a possible outcome of an armed 
conflict and tolerated by the international community. In Bosnia, armed force achieved 
what some Kosovo Albanians aspired to, namely a future separate from Serbia. The 
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lesson learned was that non-violence was ineffective and armed force a viable alternative 
(Judah 2002, 94, 95, 126). 
These developments led to a split within the political establishment of Kosovo 
and the unified support behind the strategy of non-violence. The split became evident 
with the rise of the KLA as a new political force. The KLA was a rural counter-force 
against the non-violent movement which was mainly composed of urban intellectuals. 
The rural nature of the KLA explains its reliance on honour codes and the local 
customary law, the Kanun.105 The KLA formed in 1993 in its heartland the Drenica 
region and had initially not more than 100 members. In 1997 the KLA had about 150 
active members mainly drawn from rural areas and the radicalised diaspora (Judah 2002, 
118; SAS 2005). The assassination of the Jashari clan in Prekaz in early 1998 mobilised 
many supporters to join the KLA and represents the start of the war (Judah 2002, 42).  
The mobilisation of the KLA was also fostered by the collapse of the Berisha 
regime in Albania. With the fall of Berisha, Ibrahim Rugova lost one of his major 
financial and political supporters while the KLA could boost its power by establishing 
control over large flows of weapons emanating out of Albanian weapons depots (Judah 
2002, 128-129). Since 1989 and the withdrawal of autonomy of Kosovo, some 
individuals had already attempted to purchase weapons secretly for distribution among 
the population in Kosovo. With the collapse of Albania, weapons procurement became 
much easier because the border between Albania and Kosovo became very porous and 
weapons were readily available (SAS 2005, 215). This situation reduced the costs to start 
armed conflict and thus provided an additional incentive to start the war. 
The collapse of the non-violent movement, the mergence of the KLA, and the 
availability of small arms changed the incentive to use armed force and underlined the 
expected benefits from using armed force: To gain control over Kosovo through ethnic 
partition and the use of force with the ultimate goal of independence. With the support of 
the Diaspora as well as support from major Western countries, the KLA managed to 
change the military balance in its favour and defeat the armed forces of Serbia.  
                                                 
105 The Kanun is a traditional code of law. Its key principles are a belief in personal honour, the equity of 
people, freedom to act in accordance with one’s honour within the limits of the law and the word of honour 
(besa) which creates and inviolable trust (Malcom 1998, 17-18). 
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Once the conflict had begun, the KLA’s military strategy was based on fostering 
attrition of Serb forces by applying guerrilla tactics. Up until the intervention of NATO, 
the KLA was inferior to the Serb formation in numbers, fire power and experience. The 
only military advantage of the KLA was the support of the international community 
which was united against Milosevic and Serbia’s ambition to expand in the Balkan (IICK 
2000, 87).  
 
5.3.4. Assessment 
 
The Part showed that the shift from a non-violent to violent resistance was fostered by the 
reduction of the barrier-to-entry into armed conflict for the KLA. The collapse of Albania 
increased availability of arms at lower costs while the KLA’s capture of the system of 
diaspora financing increased the revenue available to finance conflict.  
 The analysis also shows that the KLA had a shortage of revenue sources to 
escalate the conflict to a high intensity conflict. On its own, it would not have been able 
to escalate the conflict and thus needed external support to do so. This external support 
came with NATO’s intervention which provided the revenue sources to cover the cost of 
a bombing campaign. At the same time, the intervention increased the cost of competition 
for Serbia and, by attacking the economy, eroded its revenue base.  
 The undermining of the non-violent resistance as a strategy against Serbia, the 
collapse of Albania and Western reservations against the Milosevic regime, contributed 
to a high incentive to use force. On the Serbian side, the maintenance of control over 
Kosovo was an important incentive to use armed force.  
 In addition to these explanations, this Part contributes to the understanding of the 
relationship between conflict financing and recurrence in the following ways: 
 
• Methods of conflict financing differ in their capacity to generate sufficient revenue 
sources to finance the type of armed conflict needed realise the objective of an armed 
group. In Kosovo, diaspora financing generated sufficient revenue sources to pay for 
the start of armed conflict and the maintenance of a medium intensity armed conflict. 
However, it did not generate the resources to pay for a high intensity conflict. While 
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in Angola, revenue from oil allowed the Government to escalate the conflict; in 
Kosovo, the revenue from diaspora financing was insufficient to do so. Only with 
NATO’s intervention did the conflict escalate. Thus, different characteristics of 
revenue sources can influence the recurrence of armed conflict. They include the 
ability of a conflict organiser to centrally capture revenue – which has been the 
problem of the parallel economy in Georgia – and the amount of revenue it can 
generate.  
• Diaspora financing is not automatically a method of conflict financing. Only when 
the KLA captured the system of parallel governance did it become a method of 
financing conflict. Thus, the incentive to use force determines what objective a 
revenue source is used for.  
• Third party assistance is an effective method of conflict financing. The KLA would 
not have been able to cover the cost of escalation. NATO paid for conflict escalation 
which the KLA could not pay for on its own.  
 
Table 5.6: Overview of propensity to renew armed conflict of Kosovo and Serbia,  
1995-1999 
 
 Kosovo Serbia 
MATERIAL 
ENVIRONMENT 
Surplus of revenue sources (RS>C) 
in 1998 for medium intensity 
conflict. 
Surplus of revenue sources (RS>C) 
for conflict of high intensity 
Potential revenue 
sources (annual) 
USD 40 million – USD 150 million 
based on diaspora funding and 
taxation of parallel economy  
USD 690 million based on defence 
budget 
Cost of conflict (annual)   
Start-up USD  1.3 million USD 3,0 million 
Maintenance low USD 76 million USD 175million 
Maintenance medium USD 93 million USD 213 million 
Maintenance high USD 158 million USD 361 million 
INCENTIVE TO USE 
ARMED FORCE  
 
 
High 
 
High 
Expected benefit of 
using armed force 
Ethnic partition as in Bosnia, 
attrition of Serbian presence through 
guerrilla tactics, ultimately 
independence 
Maintenance of control over Kosovo 
Opportunity cost of 
using armed force 
Risk of ethnic cleansing Facing NATO, damage to economy 
PROPENSITY TO 
RENEW ARMED 
CONFLICT 
 
High 
 
High 
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5.4. Kosovo under international administration, 1999-2006 
 
After the end of the armed conflict, Kosovo was internationally administered by UNMIK 
as mandated by UNSC Resolution 1244 of 10 June 1999. The regulation of the final 
status has been postponed in the immediate post-war peace arrangements to allow the 
situation in Kosovo to consolidate. The 2004 riots, however, have highlighted the risk of 
conflict recurrence in Kosovo and provided an impetus to the international community to 
start tackling the final status. United Nations Special Envoy, Martii Ahtisaari, was 
mandated by the UNSC to mediate between Serbia and Kosovo to finding an acceptable 
solution for both sides. 
 This Part explores the possibilities of conflict recurrence should Kosovo’s 
ambitions for independence be disappointed. The previous Part has shown that the KLA 
was unable to escalate the conflict and saved by NATO’s intervention. In case the UNSC 
would not vote for independence, would Kosovo be able to launch a war of 
independence? And could it start and maintain an armed conflict without external 
support? The following explore the availability of revenue sources, the cost of conflict 
and the incentives to use armed force in view of finding an answer to these questions.  
 
5.4.1. Available revenue sources 
 
The financing of the Kosovo conflict created a conflict economy whose legacy is still 
present today in terms of a high degree of a parallel economy and the continued support 
from the diaspora. However, Kosovo remains the poorest economy of South-Eastern 
Europe with a GDP per capita of USD 790 in 2003. In comparison, the GDP per head of 
Albania is USD 1,537, Serbia and Montenegro USD 1,924, Macedonia USD 1,860, and 
Bosnia and Herzegovina USD 1,362. GDP growth peaked with 21 % in 2001 and since 
then stabilised around 4.3 % per year (World Bank 2005, 15).  
The economy of Kosovo is mainly driven by high levels of public expenditures 
and private investments, mainly from the diaspora. While donor assistance declined by 
70% since 2000, private investments and government revenue increased in the period 
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2000-2004 (see Table 5.7). Nevertheless, the external accounts are characterised by a 
sever export-import imbalance.  
In 2003, the Kosovo General Government had a budget of EUR 138 million. The 
main security actors in Kosovo paid out of this budget include the Kosovo Protection 
Corps (KPC) and the Kosovo Police Service (KPS). In 2003, USD 15.9 million was spent 
on the Office of the KPC and USD 51.9 million on the KPS (KGG 2004: 137, 141, 226). 
In the framework of implementing police reforms, the responsibility of the KPS was 
given to the local authority because maintaining an international police force was too 
expensive. Alone costs in subsistence allowances for the international police amounted to 
USD 115 million per year (KIPRED 2005a, 17). The KPS increase its budget since to 
USD 78 million for 7,000 police men in 2005 while the KPS has been constant around 
USD 19.5 million (ICG 2006, 2). 106 
 
Table 5.7: Selected macroeconomic indicators in Kosovo, 2000-2004 
(World Bank 2005, 15) 
 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
National Accounts      
Real GDP growth (%) - 21.0 3.9 4.7 6.5 
Investments (% GDP) 35.6 40.0 40.7 38.0 45.3 
      
Government balance (% GDP)      
Revenue 17.2 28.0 38.9 44.7 45.4 
Expenditure 31.5 24.4 33.5 47.5 50.8 
Donor Grants 21.5 7.3 3.0 2.2 0.0 
      
External Accounts (% GDP)      
Exports of goods 0.5 3.0 7.4 8.2 21.7 
Import of goods 156.4 113.7 108.3 99.2 117.4 
Workers remittances 73.7 52.0 42.9 43.2 42.5 
      
Savings and investment (% GDP)      
National savings 44.9 38.5 14.8 7.6 7.1 
Investment 66.9 57.7 48.3 40.5 45.3 
 
The principle economic potential of Kosovo is based on energy and mineral 
resources (Rücker 2005). Kosovo is the most important resource base in South Eastern 
Europe for Lignite (brown coal) and minerals such as Lead, Zinc, Bauxite, Ferronickel 
                                                 
106 Figures base on conversion from DEM is 1 USD = 1.5 DEM and from EUR 1 EUR = 1.3 USD. Based 
on http://www.xe.com. 
  
316
and Magnesite (See Appendix 2, Map 10). The estimated resource reserves of Lignite 
amount to 8.3 billion tons and an additional 10 billion tons (ICMM 2005). These reserves 
are supposedly sufficient to ensure energy security for South Eastern Europe for the next 
400-500 years. Lignite in Kosovo is a very attractive reserve because of its high energy 
value and occurs just below the surface thus allowing exploitation at low cost 
(anonymous interview). The potential value of lignite has been estimated at 6.5 USD (5 
EUR) per metric ton of lignite (EU 2002). When considering this estimation, the value of 
8.3 billion tons of the Pristina Basin can be estimated at about USD 54 billion. 
The natural resources available in Kosovo are concentrated mining resources and 
therefore more related to competition over state rather than guerrilla financing. They have 
the potential to be monopolized by the state because their exploitation is capital intensive 
and therefore do not lend themselves to predatory strategies of conflict financing.  
Natural resources are closely related to the identity of some regions as evidenced 
by protests against the privatisation of State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs). In the Drenica 
region, for example, the attribution of the Ferronickel factory in Glogovac to actors 
outside the region sparked protests and led KFOR to protect the factory out of fear local 
stakeholders would occupy the factory (anonymous interview).  
In order to commercialise the natural resources, the final status arrangements are 
important. Ending Kosovo’s in-limbo status may attract foreign direct investment and 
allow for international credits to modernize the industrial infrastructure. Moreover, 
natural resources are an economic incentive to controlling the territory of Kosovo and are 
part of a strategy to ensure the viability of statehood.  
 
Table 5.8: Natural resource occurrence in Kosovo (ICMM 2005) 
 
Resource Location Estimated reserves 
(million tons) 
Additional reserves  
(million tons) 
Lignite Pristina Basin 8,300  
 Klina and Pristina basins  10,000 
Lead Zinc Belo Brdo 3.7  
 Crnac 2.4  
 Stari Trg 9.0  
 Ajavalija 2.9  
 Novo Brdo 3.6  
Bauxite 18 sites 1.7 4,0 – 5,0 
Ferronickel Two districts 14.0  
Magnesite Strezovce 2.8  
 Golesh Magnesite   1.7  
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Another potential revenue source is the parallel economy whose main components 
are administrative corruption and organised crime. The parallel economy is a legacy of 
Kosovo’s war economy and remained one of Kosovo’s key challenges for UNMIK. 
Criminality grew under UNMIK’s mandate as the KLA took over apartments, real estate 
and previously state owned economic assets. The KLA were also involved in money 
laundering, parallel taxation and the informal economy (Yannis 2003, 181; ICG 2000, 14-
18). “In many cases, criminal activity was thus institutionalised though the usurpation of 
power and control of economic resources by self-appointed groups and individuals” 
(Yannis 2001, 25; see also ICG 2000). Once UNMIK was deployed and control over the 
economy was established, “organised crime and political extremism eventually merged 
with revenge as the underlying factors behind the continuing Kosovo Albanian inter-
ethnic violence in Kosovo” (Yannis 2001, 37). After ignoring parallel structures for a 
long time, UNMIK now acknowledged their existence. It voiced public concerns in late 
2003 and recommended to absorbed non-criminal economic activity in the parallel 
economy into regular structures (ICG 2004c, 8). 
Administrative corruption became a potential revenue source with the 
establishment of UNMIK. Administrative corruption is believed pervasive, particular in 
relation to tenders and recruitment of personnel. There are no estimates of the value 
administrative corruption. The value of international assistance may provide a base to 
gauge the scope of administrative corruption.  Between 1999 and 2002, USD 2.5 billion 
were contracted and USD 2 billion were spent on reconstruction through 7,000 projects 
including donors from 33 countries, 17 international institutions or organisations and 7 
non-governmental agencies (KGG 2004: 137, 141, 226).107 Local actors have understood 
to exploit this system by creating NGOs: between 1999 and 2004 the number of NGOs 
grew from 65 to 2,300. Most of these NGOs are related to donor prerogatives of 
democratisation, reconciliation and human rights (KIPRED 2005, 7, 14). When 
considering a skimming of 10% of the USD 2 billion spent between 1999 and 2002, the 
potential revenue from administrative corruption is USD 200 million in this period or and 
average annual of USD 50 million.  
                                                 
107 Figures base on conversion from EUR 1 EUR = 1.3 USD. Based on http://www.xe.com. 
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Organised crime is another segment of the parallel economy in Kosovo and a 
problem that engulfs the entire Balkan region. In Kosovo, the main areas of organised 
crime are drugs smuggling, people trafficking, prostitution, money laundering, and arms 
trafficking (Stefanova 2004, 259-260). After the war, organised crime was mainly active 
in Northern Kosovo and towards the border of Albania and Macedonia. Its value is 
estimated to be in the hundreds of millions of Euros (various interviews in Kosovo, see 
Appendix 1). Outside Kosovo, ethnic Albanian organised crime is well established in 
Italy and Greece and other EU member states. They are mainly involved in drug 
trafficking, illegal immigration and the trafficking in human beings (Europol 2004 8).  
Another indicator for the available revenues sources are estimates on individual 
and corporate bank deposits. Individual bank deposits rose from USD 20 million in 2000 
to USD 270 million in 2002 and the latter from USD 40 million to USD 152 million for 
the same years (Stefanova 2004, 265).  
Remittances keep being important for Kosovo. After the war, Kosovo was rebuilt 
with money from abroad remittances. Moreover, remittances sustained the economic 
activities of family members in Kosovo. For example, a remittance of DEM 100-150 per 
month allowed a rural family to maintain a farm, local trading and the maintenance of 
other income generating activities (World Bank 2005, 35). However, between 2000 and 
2004 remittances declined by nearly half (see Table 5.7). This decline is associated to the 
increasing repatriation of refugees from Western Europe to Kosovo as well as the 
increasing absorption of Kosovo Albanians into their host societies. 
These amounts – in addition to the other revenue sources mentioned above – 
indicate that there is money available in Kosovo. Considering revenue from 
administrative corruption, business bank deposits and private bank deposits, Kosovo 
could have potential revenue sources of at least USD 409 million. An this figure excludes 
the potential revenue of USD 56 billion from lignite exploration.  
In comparison, Serbia’s economic potential is higher. It’s GDP per capita is about 
two and a half times bigger and is picking up economically after the war with GDP per 
capita increasing threefold between 2000 and 2005, official reserves were bolstered and 
external debt reduced (see Table 5.7). Also Serbia’s security sector is by far better 
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resources in comparison to Kosovo. Serbia and Montenegro had an annual average 
defence budget of USD 787 million between 2000 and 2005 (see Table 5.9) 
Despite the discrepancy, between the potential revenue sources of Kosovo and 
Serbia, it is nevertheless remarkable that a small territory like Kosovo is able to generate 
this kind of revenue sources (see Table). Should the commercialisation of brown coal be 
managed successfully and sustainable, Kosovo controls a strategic resource which could 
contribute to the viability of a state. 
 
Table 5.9: Selected economic indicators Serbia and Montenegro, 2000-2005 
(World Bank 2006) 
 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
 GDP billion USD  8.0  10.6  14.3 19.0 22.4   24.3  
 GDP per capita USD  1,044  1,373 1,902  2,527   2,931   3,243  
 GDP real growth  5.2  5.1 4.5  2.4   9.3   6.3  
 Inflation (end of period)  111.9 40.6  14.8  7.7   13.7   17.7  
 Gross official reserves, million USD  524 1,169  2,280  3,550   4,245   5,672  
 FDI, million USD  25 165  475  1,360   969   1,481  
 External debt %GDP  135.3 104.7  78.5  71.3   62.9   63.7  
 
Table 5.10: Military budget of Serbia and Montenegro, 2000-2005 
(SIPRI 2006, 335, 341, 348) 
 
 
 
Table 5.11: Potential Revenue sources in Kosovo and Serbia, 2005 
 
Kosovo USD million Serbia USD million 
Natural resources (over multiple 
years) 
At least 
56,000
Defence budget (annual average 
2000-2005) 
787.0 
Administrative corruption (annual 
average 1999-2002) 
50 million   
Organised crime n/a   
Business bank deposits (2002) 152.0   
Private bank deposits (2002) 207.0   
Total potential revenue (without 
natural resources) 
> 409.0 Total potential revenue > 787.0 
 
 
 million Dinars Million USD  
(constant 2003) 
% of GDP 
2000 21,292 952 5.6 
2001 33,060 774 4.3 
2002 43,695 844 4.4 
2003 42,070 730 3.5 
2004 48,275 765 3.4 
2005 47,782 656 n/a 
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5.4.2. The cost of conflict 
 
How much would it cost for a conflict entrepreneur to mobilise an organise armed group 
on the same level as in 1998 with Kosovo having an average number of troops of 17.500 
and Serbia 40,000? In Serbia and Montenegro the price of an AK-47 in 2005 was 300 
USD. In the region prices for AK-47 are the same in Croatia and Slovenia, 350 USD in 
Macedonia 500 USD in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Killicoat 2006, 77-80). Calculating a 
regional average brings the price for an AK-47 to 350 USD. The regional average is 
important because weapons could be purchased in neighbouring and not the home 
market.  
 Applying the CERs developed in Chapter 2 the following estimates the start-up 
and annual maintenance cost for the Kosovo resistance and Serbia for the period 1995-
1999. The key estimations variables include the following:  
 
• Price per weapon (PF) = 350 USD (regional average based on Killicoat 2006, 77-80); 
• Price per round of ammunition (PA) = 0.1 USD (Bourne and Berkol 2006, 108-110); 
• Annual average male salary (I) = 6,171 USD (data for 2004, UNDP 2006, 363-366. 
Represents approximately cost per soldier of 16.9 USD/day or 514 USD/month); 
• Number of fighters (N) = 17,500 for Kosovo (average number of troops in 1998 war – 
Troebst 1999, 50-51) and 40,000 for Serbia (number of troops in 1998 war – Seybold 
2000, 29).  
 
The CERs for the start-up and annual maintenance of armed conflict for a “war of 
independence” suggest that the KLA would have a start-up cost of about USD 9.5 million 
and annual maintenance cost for of between about USD 115 million for a low intensity 
conflict, USD 133 million for a medium intense conflict and USD 205 million for a high 
intensity conflict. For Serbia the figures are a start-up cost of about USD 21.6 million and 
annual maintenance cost for of between about USD 262 million for a low intensity 
conflict, USD 305 million for a medium intense conflict and USD 453 million for a high 
intensity conflict (see Table 5.12).  
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 A comparison of these figures with the KLA’s annual average available revenue 
sources of USD 409 million and Serbia of USD 787 million for the period 1999-2006 
highlights that the KLA could maintain a high intensity conflict. However, if the KLA – 
or any successor organisation – could capture the entire amount of available revenue 
sources is questionable. It is therefore more realistic to claim that the KLA only has the 
means to finance an armed conflict of medium intensity. 
 The significance of this finding lies in underlining that a Kosovo Albanian 
security actor would not have a surplus of revenue sources to maintain the cost of 
competition of a high intensity conflict. The possibility of the recurrence of a high 
intensity conflict depends on the degree of resource capture or external assistance. 
 When considering the material aspects of the conflict recurrence in Kosovo, one 
must underline that the KLA was unable to maintain an armed conflict in 1998 despite a 
positive enabling environment to start armed conflict including cheap weapons after the 
collapse of Albania and a pre-existing network to raise funds. During the conflict 
weapons prices increased more than 10 times and the KLA’s fighters were insufficiently 
trained and too few to maintain a long term resistance against a militarily superior armed 
force. In 1998, the KLA could barely maintain its military campaign and was ultimately 
saved by external intervention. Since then, the material environment became less 
amenable to organise armed conflict: Prices for weapons are higher and the United States 
and Europe strained in Afghanistan and Iraq. Thus, working toward conflict recurrence in 
Kosovo would be an ill advised strategy to gain independence. A military strategy would 
be unlikely to bring Kosovo closer to independence.  
 However, it is not excluded that security actors make tactically informed choices 
when to use low levels of armed force to do so as evidenced in the 2004 riots and in early 
2007 after the publication of the preliminary suggestions of the Ahtisaari Report. 
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Table 5.12: Overview of the start-up and annual maintenance of armed conflict for Kosovo and Serbia, 1999-2006 
 
 CERs Composites Kosovo Serbia  
   USD USD USD USD 
CER 1:  
Weapons 
1.5 firearms (F)  
x Price per firearm (PF)  
x Number of fighters (N) 
 
9,187,500 
 
21,000,000 
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t
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t
 
CER 2:   
Ammunition 
1.5 firearms (F)  
x 100 rounds of ammunition (A) 
x Price per ammunition (PA) 
x Number of fighters (N) 
 
262,500 
 
Total start-up cost 
 
9,450,000  
600,000 
 
Total start-up cost 
 
21,600,000 
CER 3:  
Salaries 
Annual male income (I) 
x Number of fighters (N) 
 
107,992,500 
  
246,840,000 
 
CERL 4:  
Weapons 
 
0.33 firearms (F)  
x 1 x Price per firearm (PF) 
x Number of insurgents (N) 
 
2,021,250 
 
4,620,000 
L
o
w
 
i
n
t
e
n
s
i
t
y
 
CERL 5:  
Ammunition 
 
1.5 firearms (F)  
x 20 rounds of ammunition (A) 
x 90 days of combat 
x Price per round (PA) 
x Number of insurgents (N) 
 
4,725,000 
 
Total maintenance 
(low intensity)* 
 
114,738,750 
 
10,800,000 
 
Total maintenance 
(low intensity)* 
 
262,260,000 
CERM 4:  
Weapons 
0.45 firearms (F)  
x 1.5 x Price per firearm (PF) 
x Number of insurgents (N) 
 
4,134,375 
 
9,450,000 
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CERM 5: 
Ammunition 
 
1.5 firearms (F)  
x 60 rounds of ammunition (A) 
x 90 days of combat 
x 1.5 x Price per round (PA) 
x Number of insurgents (N) 
 
21,262,500 
 
 
Total maintenance 
(medium intensity)* 
 
133,389,375 
 
48,600,000 
 
Total maintenance 
(medium intensity)* 
 
304,890,000 
CERH 4:  
Weapons 
 
0.65 firearms (F) 
x 3 x Price per firearm (PF) 
x Number of insurgents (N) 
 
11,943,750 
 
11,943,750 
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CERH 5:  
Ammunition 
1.5 firearms (F)  
x 120 rounds of ammunition (A) 
x 90 days of combat 
x 3 x Price per round (PA) 
x Number of insurgents (N) 
 
85,050,000 
 
Total maintenance 
(high intensity)* 
 
204,792,750 
 
194,400,000 
 
Total maintenance 
(high intensity)* 
 
453,183,750 
* Includes CER 3: Salaries. 
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5.4.3. Expected benefits and opportunity costs 
 
After 1999, armed conflict did not recur because there was a clear military victory and 
subsequent military superiority of the Kosovo Albanians. With the help of NATO, the 
KLA managed to control most of the territory of Kosovo forcing the withdrawal of 
Serbian forces. Moreover, the deployment of NATO as well as its potential to mobilise 
military force ensure the military superiority in the territory of Kosovo. On the other side, 
Serbian forces were decisively beaten and had no capacity to renew conflict (Interview 
Kersabiec). The strong mandate of UNSC Resolution 1244 and the subsequent 
establishment of an international administration were important to stabilise Kosovo.  
 The international administration made the Kosovo Albanian and Serb 
communities shift focus on resolving remaining conflicts by non-violent means. 
However, both had different reasons to pursue this shift. The Kosovo Albanians decided 
to work with and accept the international administration. They believed that time was 
working for them and a transition phase would be the first step towards independence. 
The Kosovo Serbs decided to work with the international administration because they 
saw UNSC Resolution 1244 as a way to stop worsening their situation in the face of 
violent reprisals of the KLA in the aftermath of the war (Yannis 2001, 18, 40, 45). Thus, 
directly after the end of the conflict, uncertainty over the final status created an 
environment which promoted consensus building between Kosovo Albanians and Serbs 
over the requirements to implements UNSC Resolution 1244 and temporarily froze 
maximalist aspirations of both parties (Yannis 2001, 30-31). 
 The recurrence of conflict would have had a high opportunity cost. Kosovo 
Albanians fulfilled nearly all their aspirations except independent statehood. Conflict 
renewal would undercut political and economic support by the international community 
and put into jeopardy what has been achieved through armed conflict (Interview 
Smailes). Opportunity costs are also high on the side of Serbia. It has no political interest 
to renew conflict over Kosovo because of its aspirations to become a member of NATO 
and the European Union. To renew conflict would effectively mean the end of these 
efforts and a return to national isolation (Interview Smailes and Kersabiec). 
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 Another opportunity cost is the vested interest created though the maintenance of 
an in-limbo status of Kosovo. Groups associated to these interests have neither an urge to 
resolve nor renew the conflict because their benefits are directly linked to the in-limo 
status of Kosovo. These interest groups include, for example, those who control property 
that was previously owned by Kosovo Serbs and do not want them to return. Low level 
violence has been used as a strategy to prevent return (ICG 2005, 7). Moreover, crime 
groups have an interest in keeping the status quo. The Serb enclaves – particularly in the 
North – are conduits for smuggling. The current situation facilitates the operation of the 
smuggling as there is essentially no state authority which controls the entire territory. 
Instability and sabotaging the final status talks is a strategy to protect these interests 
(Interview Rexhepi and Hasani). Another interest group is associated with those profiting 
from the UNMIK transitional administration through employment, tenders and 
corruption. They have no interest to see the international community leave as this would 
mean the end to a job, project or other forms of assistance (Interview Peci).  
 Despite these opportunity costs of using armed force, the events of 17-18 March 
2004 have shown the fragility of the security situation in Kosovo and highlight that 
unless the key issues of the status of Kosovo is resolved, Kosovo will remain unstable 
(see also Section 5.1.5.). The risk of recurrence remains because the principle dispute 
between territorial sovereignty of Yugoslavia and independence for Kosovo is not 
resolved (Yannis 2004, 68). Kai Eide, the Special Envoy of the UN Secretary General 
highlighted that the crisis “clearly demonstrated that extremists are ready to ignite inter-
ethnic tensions and  seek a further reduction in the Serb population in Kosovo. Support 
for such extremists is fuelled by a feeling that Serb leaders in Belgrade and Kosovo are 
holding up the process of defining future status” (UNSC 2004, 9). 
 Another factor feeding into the risk of conflict recurrence is the great sense of 
frustration in Kosovo society. On the Kosovo Albanian side the frustration is rooted in 
the lack of economic opportunities and the absence of a clear political perspective for 
Kosovo. On the Kosovo Serb Albanian side, it fostered a belief that they are victims of a 
campaign to reduce their presence in Kosovo (UNSC 2004, 3). For both groups, 
frustration is accompanied by disillusionment with UNMIK and the Provisional Interim 
Self-Government (PISG). This frustration and disillusionment could be mobilised by 
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radical groups for various political and economic objectives, particularly if final status 
talks do not deliver on expectations of independence (Interview Bukoshi). Mass 
mobilisation is facilitated by the demographic and socio-economic factors: About 60% of 
Kosovo’s population are under 30 years old and unemployment rates are between 50-80 
%. The danger of public mass protests has been identified by KFOR that reinforced its 
contingents after the March 2004 crisis in view of better dealing with riots (Interview 
Kersabiec) 
 Another aspect fostering the risk of conflict recurrence is that there is a lot of 
capacity and skill to organise conflict based on the experience of non-violent resistance 
and the 1998 conflict. Small radical groups within Kosovo have kept the skills and 
infrastructure to confront the international administration and conduct attacks on Serbian 
enclaves (Caplan 2002, 17). There is also a group of well experienced organisers in 
Kosovo who have established contact to groups in Serbia involved in organising the mass 
protest which contributed to the ousting of Slobodan Milosevic (Interview Kurti). These 
capacities underline the possibility that should armed force be used, it is likely to be part 
of a tactically informed choice to influence political developments on the final status.  
 The previous Part demonstrated that there are substantial revenue sources of 
conflict financing available in Kosovo. These include profits generated through 
administrative corruption, organised crime or diaspora remittances. However, how much 
of this could be captured by Kosovo’s security actors remained doubtful. For example, 
the declining trend of diaspora revenues gives rise to the question if the Kosovo Albanian 
diaspora would be motivated to finance another war and it would be possible to revitalise 
a system of conflict financing.  On the request of UNMIK, the parallel financial system 
was dismantled in 1999 and the remaining funds were used for the reconstruction of 
Kosovo (Interview Mustafa). However, even if the system no longer works at present it 
could potentially be revitalised given the organisational experience of key individuals 
who organised the parallel system and “Homeland Calling”. The revitalisation of the 
system would be facilitated by the continued existence of report cards on individuals used 
during the Kosovo war. Logistically, it would be possibly to revert back to cash transfers 
operated by couriers over land or by plane (Interview Zeka).  
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 Nevertheless, the likelihood to replicate the success of diaspora financing will be 
more difficult now then in the 1990s. The level of solidarity and cohesion of Kosovo’s 
society continually erodes. The economic opportunities available in Kosovo have 
strengthened individualism and fostered a trend towards more nuclear family relations. 
Moreover, the motivation of the diaspora to contribute to financing another war may be 
limited. Memories of involuntary fundraising used by the KLA have scared away long 
term supporters. Furthermore, the second generation of diaspora are already more 
removed from the homeland and therefore unlikely to contribute to an armed campaign. 
Overall the diaspora is considered to have fewer savings now than prior to the war. In 
addition, the diaspora invested into the reconstruction of Kosovo and would not like to 
see their investment destroyed through a war. Finally, new banking regulations in 
Switzerland and Germany make the organisation of the funds more difficult (Interview 
Mustafa and Zeka). In addition, the operation of transfers may even become more 
difficult in the absence of external support for a military strategy leading to greater levels 
of enforcement against funds should they break domestic or international banking laws. 
 Overall, these factors highlights that Kosovo has a lot of opportunity costs to use 
armed conflict as a strategy to gain independence including international political and 
economic support and prospect of independence and potential NATO or EU membership, 
existing reconstruction and development and the prospect of exploiting lignite. The 
previous Section also highlighted that the recurrence of conflict may confront Kosovo’s 
security actors with high costs of competition which they are unable to maintain.  
 However, the previous Part also highlighted that Kosovo’s security actors have 
the resources for a low intensity conflict which allows the organisation of the use of force 
as a tactically informed choice. Individual groups or members of the diaspora may have 
the resolve to pay for a political agenda which uses armed force as a strategy to influence 
the final status negotiations.  
 Actors associated to the use of armed force include the armed wing of the 
Democratic League of Kosovo called the Armed Force of the Republic of Kosovo, the 
Independence Army of Kosovo operating in Western Kosovo and the National 
Intelligence Service of the Democratic Party of Kosovo (Barnett 2006, 27-28). Serbia 
maintains police forces in Northern Kosovo whose numbers have grown (ICG 2006, 8). 
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Overall, the fragmentation of Kosovo Security actors suggests the importance of an 
integrated security apparatus which bridges the divisions between Kosovo political 
parties and the Serbian police forces in Northern Kosovo.  
 The existence of these actors suggests that there are small groups willing to 
promote their interests by useing force. The perceived deadlock on independence may 
lead to more radical small groups taking power and the advocacy of an armed solution to 
Kosovo’s independence. Most political leaders in Kosovo have built a political career out 
of achieving independence. Should this aim become a more distant possibility, these – 
more moderate – leaders make themselves vulnerable to being sidelined as more radical 
leaders that advocate the renewal of conflict (ICG 2005, 7). These leaders could be drawn 
from the groups who have already shown their capacity of organising disruption in the 
March 2004 crisis and include the KLA Veterans, the KLA Invalids and the Families and 
Martyrs and the University of Pristina Student Union. These groups can be divided into 
three categories:  
 
• Small groups that want to perpetuate the current in-limbo status: These groups are 
composed of profiteers from administrative corruption, smuggling or organised 
crime. Armed force would be motivated by short term political or economic interests 
such as maintaining vested interests in the perpetuation of the present situation. The 
use of force would be sporadic and unsystematic to achieve these objectives. 
• Small groups that want to prevent the final status talks: These groups object to 
Kosovo becoming independent and are composed of Serbian radical groups operating 
by proxy in the territory of Kosovo. The occurrence of violence would be sporadic 
but systematic for the political objective to prevent the final status talks and 
ultimately the independence of Kosovo.  
• Small groups that want to shape the final status talks: The use of force may become a 
tool to shape the dynamics of the final status talks. Violence would be sporadic and 
unsystematic to weaken the bargaining position of the negotiating parties. The violent 
demonstrations of early 2007 provide evidence for the pertinence of this group. 
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 Another scenario highlights the use of armed force to control the state and the 
economy of Kosovo. This scenario may materialise should final status talks advance to 
such an extent that a state becomes a real possibility. Various groups may compete over 
the control of the state and natural resources in view of establishing a power based to rule 
Kosovo. Control over the state will be essential to valorise Kosovo’s natural resources 
because their development is dependent on investments from international donors or 
private capital markets.108 Violence may start by sporadic attacks on specific institutions 
or factories but may escalate into a small scale civil war to establish control over key 
economic infrastructure. In the best of circumstances, the establishment of a state and the 
organisation of economic governance are managed through political processes. 
Despite these risks of conflict recurrence, there remain important disincentives for 
the use of armed force in Kosovo as the renewal of armed conflict would most certainly 
be counterproductive for the Kosovo’s independence and the international support needed 
to achieve it, Kosovo’s economic development and the prospect of a future of Kosovo 
within the European Union. The renewal of armed conflict would also undermine the 
development of Kosovo’s most potent revenue source – lignite. A new war would scare 
away investors, donors or the diaspora needed for the development if Kosovo’s energy 
potential. Only with a clear final status will Kosovo be able to attract investment into the 
telecom, energy and mining market and provide an economic base for viable statehood.  
 
5.4.4. Assessment 
 
The potential of conflict financing in Kosovo is anchored in the parallel economy whose 
main sources include organised crime, administrative corruption and diaspora 
remittances. However, the availability of these revenue sources for the objective of 
conflict financing depends on the ability of conflict organisers to capture them and garner 
support for another war in the diaspora and stakeholders of the parallel economy.  
 Overall, the risk of the recurrence of major armed conflict is low because 
Kosovo’s security actors would not have the revenue sources to pay for the renewal of 
                                                 
108 This argument is inspired by Le Billon’s model on the relationship between geographic characteristics of 
natural resources and types of armed conflict (Le Billon 2001). 
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armed conflict and incur high opportunity costs in terms of jeopardising external support, 
economic development and independence. However, spoilers could revert to the use of 
armed force as a calculated strategy to influence political processes such as the status 
negotiations. Small organised armed groups have a strategic advantage over international 
donors in post-conflict situations because revenue sources are controlled by small, 
homogenous and unified groups with quick decision-making processes. The international 
community, however, is composed of multiple stakeholders, split over the future of 
Kosovo and has cumbersome decision-making processes. This relationship gives the 
small organised armed group a strategic advantage to influence political outcomes though 
the use of force.109 
 However, these groups would be ill advised to pursue a strategy of conflict 
renewal to achieve independence. The experience of the 1998 war showed, that the KLA 
was unable to successfully impose a military solution on Serbian – despite a favourable 
environment to organise armed conflict – and was saved by NATO intervention. There is 
no reason to believe, that in an environment in which the organisation of armed conflict is 
more expensive, Kosovo’s security actors could pay for the cost of competition and lead 
an armed conflict to victory without external support.  
 This Part highlights the following points with regard to the relationship between 
conflict financing and recurrence: 
 
• A high barrier-to-entry into armed conflict is a powerful strategy to prevent the 
recurrence of armed conflict. The barrier to entry is high because of NATO’s 
deployment in Kosovo and the military potential of Serbia.  
• For conflict to recur, an armed group must have the revenue sources needed to pay 
for the strategy it needs to fulfil its political, military or economic objectives. 
Kosovo’s security actors may have sufficient resource to pay for an armed conflict of 
medium intensity but not for a high intensity conflict. 
• The cost of spoiling is low. The risk of conflict recurrence in Kosovo lies with the 
activities of spoilers which seek to influence the final status negotiations or maintain 
                                                 
109 This argument has been inspired by the work on small groups in internatioal trade. See Olsen 1971. 
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the in-limbo of Kosovo for vested interests. Kosovo has sufficient revenue sources to 
cover the cost of the use of armed force at a low level of intensity. 
 
Table 5.13: Propensity to renew armed conflict of Kosovo and Serbia, 1999-2006 
 
 Kosovo Serbia 
MATERIAL 
ENVIRONMENT 
Surplus of revenue sources (RS>C) 
for high intensity conflict but 
depending on revenue capture  
Surplus of revenue sources (RS>C) 
for conflict of high intensity 
Potential revenue 
sources (annual) 
USD 409 million based 
administrative corruption, business 
and private bank deposits. Potential 
revenue from lignite USD 56 billion  
USD 787 million based on defence 
budget 
Cost of conflict (annual)   
Start-up USD  9.5 million USD 21.6 million 
Maintenance low USD 115 million USD 262million 
Maintenance medium USD 133 million USD 305 million 
Maintenance high USD 205 million USD 453 million 
INCENTIVE TO USE 
ARMED FORCE 
 
 
Low 
 
Low 
Expected benefit of 
using armed force 
Influence over final status 
negotiations 
Regain the territory of Kosovo 
Opportunity cost of 
using armed force 
International political and economic 
support and prospect of indepen-
dence and NATO/EU membership 
Quasi-statehood achieved after war 
Profits derived from the in limbo 
situation of Kosovo: Property, 
employment, international projects 
Renewed political and economic 
isolation 
Economic recovery 
Future NATO and EU membership 
PROPENSITY TO 
RENEW ARMED 
CONFLICT  
 
Low 
 
Low 
 
5.5 Conclusion 
  
The Kosovo conflict of 1998 occurred in the context of the emergence of two competing 
nationalisms and incompatibilities over the territory of Kosovo. Increasing repression of 
Serbia in Kosovo led to the development of a system of parallel governance to ensure the 
survival of Kosovo Albanians as an ethnic group. The system was financed through the 
support of the Kosovo Albanian diaspora. However, with the end of the war in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, the policy of non-violent resistance was no longer workable. The KLA 
emerged as a movement advocating the use of force to liberate Kosovo. Based on 
diaspora funding and weapons available after the collapse of Albania, the KLA engaged 
into an armed conflict with Serbia in 1998. During the course of the armed conflict, the 
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KLA was nearly defeated had not NATO intervened on its behalf. Since the end of the 
conflict in 1999, Kosovo is under international administration. In 2004, a major security 
crisis led to the displacement of 3000-4,500 Kosovo Serbs. Since then, the United 
Nations and the European Union have facilitated a political process to find a solution for 
the future status of Kosovo.  
 This case study analysed three phases of the Kosovo conflict between 1989 and 
2006 to explore the relationship between conflict financing and recurrence. Phase 1 
(1989-1995) highlighted that the Kosovo Albanian resistance movement did not feel 
compelled to use armed force even if it had the revenue. The Kosovo Government in 
Exile had a surplus of revenue sources but made a strategic choice not to develop a 
military capability. Instead it constructed a system of diaspora financing to maintain 
social and cultural institutions in Kosovo and representation abroad. This choice was 
based on the high barrier-to-entry to challenge the armed forces of Serbia. From the 
perspective of Serbia, armed conflict in Kosovo had opportunity costs because its revenue 
sources were already strained though the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina.  
 In Phase 2 (1995-1999), the Dayton Peace Agreement changed the incentive 
structure to using armed force in Kosovo because the international community was seen 
to have endorsed a solution to ethnic conflict based on partition. The preparations for 
armed resistance gave a rallying point to mobilise funds and split Kosovo’s diaspora and 
domestic groups on the merits of non-violent resistance. In order to organise armed 
resistance, the KLA established its own financing structure which was based on – but not 
the same as – the system used for the parallel governance. The collapse of Albania 
lowered the barrier-to-entry for armed conflict by increasing the availability and 
decreasing the price of weapons. However, the KLA was unable to maintain the cost of 
competition and was nearly defeated. The KLA did not have the revenue sources to 
escalate the armed conflict though its own means. Ultimately, the cost of escalation was 
paid by NATO members. 
 Phase 3 (1999-2005) highlights that there was a surplus of revenue sources in 
Kosovo after the end of the armed conflict but conflict did not recur. The revenue sources 
derived from diaspora transfers, administrative corruption and the parallel economy. 
However, as Kosovo had won the war and support of the international community, it had 
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little incentive to renew armed conflict. Nevertheless, frustrations relating to the 
unresolved status of Kosovo, give rise to the question if Kosovo could maintain another 
“war of independence”.  
 The findings suggest that Kosovo could not maintain the cost of competition 
because the cost would be too high and the diaspora unwilling to pay for it. It is also 
unlikely that Kosovo would again receive international backing for a military strategy 
given the high levels of deployment of troop contributors in the Middle East and Central 
Asia and the potential repercussions for Europe. Nevertheless, there is a danger that 
spoilers use force as a tactically informed choice to perpetuate the in-limbo status of 
Kosovo, to derail the status negotiations or to fight over the control of the state.  
 The analysis of the three phases provides various insights into the relationship 
between conflict financing and recurrence in addition to those of the Angola and the 
Georgia-Abkhazia conflicts:   
 
• The availability of revenue sources is a necessary but not sufficient condition for 
conflict recurrence. In all three phases, Kosovo Albanian actors had sufficient 
revenue sources to start an armed conflict but only in Phase 2 they were used to 
finance armed conflict. In Phase 1, revenue sources were used to create the parallel 
governance system and, in Phase 3, to reconstruct Kosovo. This shows that the onset 
of conflict must be understood in its larger political context which informs the 
strategic choices of conflict entrepreneurs. 
• The risk of conflict recurrence increased with changes in the incentive structure to 
use armed force. Rather than the availability of conflict financing, it was the changing 
incentives to use armed force which preceded the conflict in 1998/1999. Conflict 
financing was a means to an end and thus followed the incentive change: Diaspora 
financing only transformed itself into a tool of conflict financing after a tactically 
informed decision to shift from non-violent to violent resistance. This highlights that 
conflict financing may need to be considered in conjunction with the motivation of 
groups to use armed force to develop a better understanding of conflict dynamics.  
• The centralised management of revenue sources is not necessarily a predictor of 
conflict recurrence. In Phase 1, resources from the diaspora were controlled centrally 
  
333
by the Government in Exile; however, they were not used to finance conflict due to 
the policy of non-violent resistance. Only when the incentive to use armed force 
changed – as well as the actors controlling diaspora resources – a new financing 
system was created based on the pre-existing network of diaspora financing. Thus, 
centralised financing increases the risk of conflict recurrence if the funds are 
controlled by actors who have the intention to organise armed conflict.  
• Different methods of conflict financing have different effects on the risk of conflict 
recurrence. In comparison to oil and diamonds in Angola, diaspora remittances were 
a less effective methods of conflict financing in Kosovo because their revenue stream 
was more difficult to control. Diaspora financing involved many individuals and 
layers of interaction. The Kosovo case study points out that a method of conflict 
financing increases the risk of conflict recurrence if its revenue stream can be easily 
centralised and if the value of revenue is high enough to finance the strategy needed 
to achieve the political, military or economic objectives of an organised armed group. 
• The maintenance of a high barrier-to-entry for armed conflict contributed to the 
prevention of high-intensity conflict recurrence in Kosovo. The cost to organise a 
high intensity conflict in Kosovo is high. Even though there are numerous revenue 
sources, it remains questionable if Kosovo could pay for a conventional military force 
without external support. However, the barrier-to entry for low-intensity conflict is 
lower which could be exploited by spoilers with an interest to perpetuate the current 
in-limbo status of Kosovo or to prevent or influence the status talks. 
 
In the final analysis, it is worth highlighting the conditions behind successful 
diaspora financing when considering the risk of conflict recurrence in Kosovo in relation 
to the final status negotiations. The financing of parallel governance before the war was 
based on the principles of solidarity, cohesion, voluntarism and legality. An additional 
requirement was that the Kosovo Albanian diaspora had a high level of savings and were 
not well integrated into their host societies. Nearly a decade after the war, these 
conditions have changed. The solidarity and cohesion of the population in Kosovo as well 
as its diaspora is no longer strong. With increasing integration into host states and fewer 
savings, it would be a challenge to draw on the Kosovo Albanian diaspora to finance a 
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“war of independence”. Diverting from the principle of voluntarism and forcing 
contributions is not viable in the long run as the conflict financing of the KLA has shown. 
Changes in the United States and Europe on terrorism financing would do the rest to 
frustrate efforts to recreate diaspora financing.  
 Ultimately, the potential of diaspora financing should be qualified in the sense 
that not even during the 1998 armed conflict did it generate enough revenue sources to 
maintain a high intensity conflict. Today the minimum threshold for maintaining such 
conflict would be at least USD 205 million. Under much less favourable conditions for 
conflict financing, it would be unlikely that any security actor in Kosovo could raise this 
amount from the diaspora. Pursuing a military strategy to achieve independence would 
therefore be nothing but self-defeating. 
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CHAPTER 6 
Analysis 
 
This thesis has so far reviewed the literature on the Political Economy of Conflict, 
explored the phenomena of conflict financing and the recurrence of conflict, developed a 
conceptual framework for the relationship between conflict financing and recurrence and 
applied this framework to three case studies: Angola, the Abkhazia conflict and Kosovo. 
This Chapter draws all previous Chapters together in its analysis of the case studies. The 
Chapter compares the case studies with each other, relates them to the literature reviewed 
in Chapter 1 and 2 and explores implications for peacebuilding. 
 The analysis shows that the availability of revenue sources is a necessary but not 
sufficient condition for armed conflict to occur and recur. In order to identify the role of 
conflict financing in conflict recurrence, conflict financing has to be placed within a 
broader political context of the conflict. The availability of revenue sources does not 
predict armed conflict because the risk of armed conflict depends on the ability of a 
conflict entrepreneur to translate revenue sources into military potential. In addition, the 
availability of revenue sources must be related to the cost of conflict. The availability of 
conflict financing increases the risk of conflict recurrence if the methods of conflict 
financing generate enough revenue to finance the type of conflict for the achievement of 
the political, military or economic objectives of an organised armed group.  
 The analysis is in dialogue with the work of Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler 
(2004), Ballentine and Sherman (2003), Arnson and Zartman (2005) and the literature on 
natural resources and conflict (Ross 2004a, Ross 2004b, Le Billon 2001, Le Billon 2005). 
It argues against the assumption that the availability of revenue sources is a predictor for 
the onset of civil war. While Collier and Hoeffler (2004, 588) argue that primary 
commodity exports increase the risk of conflict, Ross (2004a) and Hegre (2004, 246-247) 
identify oil as a predictor for armed conflict while gemstones and drugs are associated to 
conflict duration. But neither work specifies the conditions in which conflict financing 
increases the risk of conflict occurrence and recurrence. 
 The analysis echoes William Zartman’s assertion that the condition of need, creed 
and need are necessary but not sufficient for the emergence of conflict. Much rather, the 
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onset of conflict depends on a conflict organiser who crystallises subjective reactions into 
objective conditions favourable to the onset of conflict (Zartman 2005, 266). 
 The case studies also underline the importance of the relationship between the 
organisational structure of armed groups and conflict recurrence. In relation to the 
availability of revenue sources, the risk of conflict recurrence has been found to increase 
if revenues were captured by an armed group and managed centrally by a small, 
committed and unified leadership. In this way, the findings relate to the work of Jeremy 
Weinstein (2007) in linking the organisational characteristics of armed groups to initial 
endowments. Inferring patterns of recruitment and violence from initial endowments of 
armed groups does not adequately consider the potential of armed groups to influence 
over time their environment to change the availability of revenue sources.   
 This Chapter has five Parts. The first Part compares the three case studies of 
Angola, Georgia and Kosovo in view of exploring the link between revenue sources and 
conflict recurrence. The second Part looks at what determines the propensity of organised 
armed groups and the propensity to renew armed conflict. The third Part explores the 
changes over time to the propensity to use armed force. The fourth Part looks at how 
different propensities to renew armed conflict affect the risk of conflict recurrence. The 
final Part considers the implications of the analysis for the prevention of conflict 
recurrence and peacebuilding. 
 
6.1 Conflict financing and conflict recurrence 
 
This thesis set out to investigate the relationship between conflict financing and 
recurrence. Conflict recurrence is different from the onset of conflict in as much as it has 
been preceded by previous armed conflict. However, it bears many similarities with 
conflict initiation as it marks a transition from the absence to the use of armed force. 
Chapter 1 reviewed the role of revenue sources in increasing the risk of armed conflict. 
This Part compares the case studies in view of identifying the relationship between the 
availability of revenue sources and conflict recurrence. 
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6.1.1. Conflict financing and the feasibility and viability of rebellion 
 
The case studies highlighted that an armed conflict cannot be started or maintained 
without revenue sources. Conflict financing is therefore a necessary condition for armed 
conflict. For the 1992 conflict in Angola, revenue generated from diamonds was a 
precondition for UNITA to acquire a conventional capability and challenge MPLA over 
the control of the state. For MPLA, revenue from petrol was a precondition to restart and 
escalate the conflict in 1998. It also increased its conventional capability to challenge 
UNITA. In the 1992 Abkhazia conflict, Georgia suffered a shortage of revenue sources 
and could no longer maintain the conflict. In Kosovo, the KLA mobilised revenue 
sources through its diaspora for the 1998 armed conflict but lacked financing to maintain 
it. The shortage of revenue sources to escalate the conflict was bridged by the 
intervention of NATO.  
 The surplus of revenue sources is not a sufficient condition because there have 
been episodes in which armed groups had the resources to fight, but did not. During the 
1994-1998 Lusaka Peace Process in Angola, UNITA had its highest revenue from 
conflict diamonds but did not renew the armed conflict. Instead, both UNITA and MPLA 
participated in a political process which provided a framework for UNITA to 
commercialise diamond exploitation and MPLA to attract foreign investment into 
Angola’s petrol industry. In Georgia between 1994 and 2003, there was a potential 
surplus of revenue sources in Abkhazia and Georgia but conflict did not recur. Both 
parties benefited from the unresolved status of the conflicts by profiting from the parallel 
economy and as a political strategy to deflect attention from other political concerns. In 
Kosovo between 1989 and 1995, the Government in Exile created a system of diaspora 
financing. However, instead of using the revenue to fight, it was invested into a parallel 
system of governance and non-violent resistance.   
 The existence of situations in which armed groups had the revenue sources to 
fight, but did not, contradicts Collier and Hoeffler’s assumption that “it is the feasibility 
of predation which determines the risk of conflict” (Collier 2000b, 4). In other words, 
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“analysts often reason back from the political discourse during conflict and 
deduce that the war is a consequence of a particularly intense political conflict, 
based in turn upon particularly strong reasons for grievance. Yet the intensity of 
objective grievance does not predict civil war. Many societies sustain intense 
political conflict for many years without this developing into war. Political 
conflict is universal while civil war is rare. My argument is where rebellions 
happen to be financially viable, wars will occur” (Collier 2000b, 13).  
 
The case studies suggest that the financial viability of armed conflict is not a predictor of 
armed conflict. Particularly the Kosovo case study highlighted that the onset of armed 
conflict was the result of a tactically informed choice to shift from non-violent to armed 
resistance while revenue stayed constant. Moreover, the case studies pointed out that 
even if the onset or recurrence of an armed conflict was financially possible, high 
opportunity costs of using armed force can prevent governments and rebel groups to use 
armed force. In Georgia after the Rose Revolution, high levels of development and 
military assistance contributed to increasing the opportunity costs of the use of armed 
force and thus prevented conflict recurrence. 
 In addition, the feasibility of predation or the financial viability to start armed 
conflict needs to be put in the context of the cost of conflict. In doing so, the case studies 
highlight that the mere availability of revenue sources does not predict the onset of armed 
conflict. The risk of armed conflict only increases if revenue sources can cover the 
expenses for the type of armed conflict needed to achieve the political, military or 
economic objectives of an organised armed group. Thus, the assertions that the feasibility 
of predation and the financial viability to start an armed conflict increase the risk armed 
conflict should be nuanced and put in relation to the cost of conflict, the opportunity costs 
of the use of force and the tactical choices of organised armed groups when to fight. 
 This analysis also underlines the utility of the estimation tool for the cost of 
conflict as well as considering conflict financing in its political context. The estimation 
tool makes it possible to develop a better understanding of the feasibility of organising 
armed conflict by relating revenue sources to the cost of conflict. In addition, by 
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considering expected benefits and opportunity costs, the analysis is taken out of a purely 
material context and opened to include the political context of conflict financing. 
  
6.1.2. Understanding conflict financing 
 
The analysis of the case studies also opens a new perspective to understanding conflict 
financing. Even if revenue sources are available, they are not automatically used for the 
financing of armed conflict. In order to understand the relationship between revenue 
sources and conflict onset or recurrence, the case studies point to a number of conditions 
underlying to conflict financing which foster the recurrence of armed conflict. These 
conditions include:  
 
• The degree to which conflict entrepreneurs have captured revenue sources;  
• How conflict entrepreneurs manage revenue sources; 
• The financial potential of revenue sources. 
 
By specifying the conditions in which conflict financing is related to conflict recurrence, 
this thesis contributes to a better understanding of the role of conflict financing in conflict 
dynamics and the phenomenon of conflict financing.  
 
Revenue capture 
 
Revenue sources which are potentially available in a territory increase the risk of conflict 
recurrence if they are captured by conflict entrepreneurs. Diamonds and oil in Angola, 
state revenue in Georgia, and diaspora financing in Kosovo became only a means to 
finance conflict once the respective parties to the conflict had captured them. In Angola, 
diamond exploration has been known to occur since Portuguese rule. But only when 
UNITA diversified its sources of conflict financing after the Cold War and established 
control over and commercialised diamonds did the revenue generated from them increase 
the risk of conflict recurrence. In Georgia, only when the Government increased its 
capture of state revenue did it increase the risk of conflict recurrence. In Kosovo, the 
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capture by the KLA of the diaspora financing system created by the Government in Exile 
was a key element for conflict to start. 
 Thus, the availability of revenue sources only increases the risk of conflict 
recurrence if this revenue is actually controlled by an organised armed group.  
 
Revenue management 
 
The relationship between the availability of revenue sources and conflict recurrence must 
also be qualified by how revenue sources are managed. Overall, the effectiveness of a 
method of conflict financing depends on the degree to which resources can be managed 
centrally and controlled by few stakeholders. All methods involving the payment of rents 
are effective strategies to finance conflict because their revenue can be more easily 
centralised. This includes, for example, natural resources and taxation.  
 In Angola, revenues from oil and diamonds became only an asset for conflict 
financing when Savimbi established central control over diamond mines in 1992 and 
1996/1997 and Dos Santos over SONAGOL in the early 1990s. In Georgia, the risk of 
conflict recurrence only increased after the new government after the Rose Revolution 
had centralised state resources. Diaspora financing is more difficult to centralise due to 
the number of stakeholders involved. The Kosovo case study showed that the 
effectiveness of diaspora financing depended largely on the solidarity and cohesion of the 
community as well as the voluntary nature and legality of the fundraising system. Once 
the KLA broke with the two latter aspects, started coercing members of the diaspora and 
dealt with illicit sources of conflict financing, the KLA lost legitimacy within the 
diaspora and undermined its fundraising potential.  
 These examples show that the potential existence of a revenue source does not 
imply that it can be translated into a method of conflict financing. The existence of a 
diaspora, for example, does not automatically lead to the availability of conflict 
financing. Communities need to have a high level of solidarity and cohesion to contribute 
funds and perceive the actors who are raising funds as legitimate. Once these actors use 
coercion to raise funds, revenue may be obtained in the short term but tends to decline in 
the long term. The case study analysis therefore suggests that the management of revenue 
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sources matters for conflict recurrence, particularly if administered centrally and 
controlled by few stakeholders.  
 
The financial potential of a revenue source 
 
The case studies highlighted that the cost of armed conflict varies between different types 
of armed conflict. Low intensity guerrilla warfare is cheaper than high intensity 
conventional warfare. In terms of establishing the risk of conflict recurrence, it is 
important to consider if a method of conflict financing produces enough revenue in order 
to pay for the strategy which ensure the attainment of the political, military or economy 
objectives of an organised armed group. This suggests that what maters in conflict 
financing is not the total revenue available to a conflict organiser, but if the amount can 
pay for the kind of armed conflict required.  
 For conflict financing this means that methods of conflict financing which 
generate high returns are more linked to conflict recurrence than those which generate 
less. Revenues from oil, diamonds, drugs, third-party assistance, parallel economies and 
diaspora financing are effective sources of conflict financing because they have the 
potential to generate high returns. They may even have an additional advantage because 
their revenue can be centralised more easily. In contrast, revenue from taxation of 
humanitarian assistance, contributions of individuals, kidnapping, asset transfers from 
civilians, landing fees, or revenue from portfolio investments are less effective because 
they do not generate high enough returns to pay for an armed conflict on their own. They 
undoubtedly play a role in the economic agenda of belligerents where they are part of a 
conflict economy, but only marginally contribute to the overall financial needs to pay for 
an armed conflict. The exception is low intensity conflict which requires few financial 
resources to be organised.  
 What has so far been identified is that the risk of conflict recurrence increases if 
an organised armed group controls revenue sources, if few stakeholders manage revenue 
sources centrally and if the method of conflict financing generates the revenue required. 
What matters in conflict financing is therefore not the total availability of revenue sources 
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but if an organised armed group is able to transform revenue sources into effective 
methods of conflict financing and translate financial resources into military capability.  
 
6.1.3. Conflict financing and the cost of conflict 
 
The relationship between the availability of revenue sources and conflict recurrence must 
also be understood in terms of the cost of conflict. The case studies suggest that the cost 
of different types of conflict create different barriers-to-entry and cost of competition for 
the recurrence of armed conflict. Thus, in order for the availability of revenue sources to 
be significant for conflict recurrence, they must be put in context of the cost of, for 
example, low intensity guerrilla warfare or high intensity conventional warfare.  
 Overall, the case studies suggest that low intensity conflict is cheaper than a high 
intensity conflict. This is because more weapons and ammunitions are needed in intense 
conflict the more intense a conflict becomes and prices during armed conflict rise. The 
barriers-to-entry for a low intensity conflict is therefore lower than the barrier-to entry for 
a high intensity conflict. The same applies to the cost of maintaining different types of 
armed conflict. Price tags differ according to the kind of war. Figures from the three case 
studies on the cost of conflict indicate that the barrier to entry into high intensity conflict 
is between two to three times higher in comparison to low intensity conflict (see Tables 
6.3, 6.4, 6.5 and compare figures for low, medium and high maintenance cost) 
 In the 1992 war in Angola, the barrier-to-entry for UNITA was relatively low as 
MPLA had not modernised for years and was in fact demobilising. Control over the 
diamond fields in the early 1990s covered the cost to maintain armed conflict initially. 
However, the cost of maintaining a conventional force strained UNITA to the point that it 
was nearly defeated in 1994. The cost to maintain a conventional capability became a 
liability for UNITA towards the end of the 1990s when its revenue base was attacked and 
its transaction cost increased through sanctions and the loss of the DRC as an ally. At the 
same time, MPLA had increased the barrier-to-entry by escalating the conflict, raising the 
cost of conflict to a level which UNITA could not afford. 
 In Georgia, the start of the 1993 conflict illustrated that start-up costs can be very 
low: Weapons were acquired at discount prices and belligerents were motivated by a 
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mixture of nationalistic fervour and the prospect of looting. However, the entry of Russia 
on the side of Abkhazia changed the barrier-to-entry. During the conflict, Russian 
engagement changed the military balance in Abkhazia’s favour and increased the cost of 
maintaining the conflict for Georgia. Once the conflict was over, Russian support for 
Abkhazia effectively deterred the renewal of conflict as it raised the barrier-to-entry to a 
level Georgia could not afford.  
 In Kosovo, the barrier-to-entry was overcome through diaspora financing; 
however, the KLA had difficulty maintaining the conflict against a better equipped 
Serbian Army. NATO intervention escalated the conflict and increased the barrier-to-
entry which the Serbian Armed forces could not match. After war, NATO’s presence in 
Kosovo increased the barrier-to-entry for conventional armed conflict that neither party 
was able to challenge. Nevertheless, the crisis of 2004 evidenced that the barrier for low 
intensity conflict was low. 
 The analysis provides evidence against the claim that “rebel groups more than 
cover their costs during the conflict” (Collier and Hoeffler 2004, 564). On the contrary, in 
all cases, the belligerents could not keep up with the cost of maintaining armed conflict at 
one point during hostilities. In the case of Abkhazia, the intervention of Russia saved 
Abkhazia; in Kosovo, NATO escalated the conflict for the KLA. 
 Moreover, the consideration of barriers-to-entry and cost of competition 
highlights that conflict financing is a relative phenomenon. Just to consider the available 
revenue sources and cost of conflict of one party to a conflict is incomplete if not 
including the capacity of other parties to organise armed conflict. In doing so, the thesis 
provides evidence that a party which has the resources to build up a strong military 
deterrence can increase the barrier-to-entry into an armed conflict and thereby reduce the 
risk of conflict recurrence. This has implications for Security Sector Reform in post-
conflict situations. It indicates that the establishment of a functional military capacity can 
deter spoilers to take up arms and thus reduce the risk of conflict recurrence and invites 
reflection on the contribution of responsible security and police forces in peacebuilding. 
 In addition, considering conflict financing as a relative phenomenon highlights 
that conflict dynamics can be affected if the cost of competition is increased by one party 
while the other cannot follow. In Angola, MPLA increased the cost of competition 
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through escalation, while at the same time limiting the revenue sources of UNITA by 
recapturing diamond mines, closing its military sanctuary in the DRC and multilateral 
sanctions. This led to a reduction of revenue sources for UNITA from USD 500 million 
annually between 1995-1997 to below USD 100 million annually between 2000 and 
2002. As a result, UNITA was no longer able to pay for an estimated maintenance cost of 
low or high intensity conflict of USD 138 million and USD 254 million respectively 
(Table 6.3). The consideration of the cost of competition therefore opens a new 
perspective on the use of multilateral instruments and their capacity to increase the 
barrier-to-entry, limit conflict escalation, and increase asymmetry between belligerents.   
 In sum, understanding conflict financing as a relative phenomenon indicates that 
the cost of conflict – and the barriers-to-entry and cost of competition these costs create – 
must be understood in order to assess the relationship between conflict financing and 
recurrence. The next Section takes the analysis further by exploring the link between 
revenue sources and the incentives to use armed force.  
 
6.1.4. Revenue sources, incentives to use force and the propensity of conflict renewal 
  
The conceptual framework developed in Chapter 2 presented the analysis of conflict 
recurrence in two steps. The first step identified the propensity to renew armed conflict 
for each belligerent. The second step relates the propensity of each belligerent to each 
other in view of establishing the risk of conflict recurrence (see Table 2.1).  
 This Section looks at the propensity of belligerents to renew armed conflict. It 
provides further evidence that revenue sources are a necessary but not sufficient 
condition for conflict recurrence. It is the combination of revenue sources and an 
incentive to use armed force which defines the propensity of an armed group to renew 
armed conflict. A surplus of revenue sources – a situation in which the availability 
revenue sources exceed the cost of conflict – does not in itself define the inclination of an 
organised armed group to renew a conflict. Much rather it depends if an organised armed 
group is able to translated revenue sources into military capability; hence, the importance 
of resource capture, revenue management, and barriers-to-entry for different types of 
conflict discussed above. 
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 Armed groups are most inclined to renew armed conflict when they have a surplus 
of revenues sources and a high incentive to use armed force (Hypothesis 1; see Table 
6.1). The 1992 Angola war illustrates that UNITA had a surplus of revenue sources from 
diamonds as well as an incentive to start the war: Seeking to establish control over the 
state. The control over diamonds was a function of gaining state control because it was 
necessary to establish a conventional capability for the acquisition of which the revenue 
from diamonds was essential. In the 1998 Angola war, MPLA had the revenue sources 
and the incentive to impose itself on UNITA to force a military solution of the conflict. In 
Kosovo, the war started in 1998 with the KLA having a surplus of revenue sources and an 
incentive to establish an independent Kosovo. The Dayton Peace Accords were perceived 
as an endorsement by the international community of resolving ethnic conflicts through 
partition (see Tables 6.3, 6.4, 6.5) 
 The lowest risk exists when armed groups have a shortage of revenues sources 
and a low incentive to use armed force (Hypothesis 8). The case studies cover no explicit 
situation in which an armed group has no money and incentives to fight. The case coming 
closest is the period 1994 to 2003 in Georgia. While overall, Georgia had a surplus of 
revenue sources considering the potential revenue sources available, Georgian security 
actors had a low degree of revenue capture in order to modernise the army and challenge 
Abkhazia. Moreover, revenue sources may not have been high enough to fight a high 
intensity conflict involving Russia. In addition, Georgia had little incentive to use force 
because the unresolved status of the conflict provided economic and political benefits as 
well as regime security to Shevardnadze. Thus, with a shortage of revenue sources and no 
incentive to use armed force, there was a low propensity of conflict renewal.   
 These analyses illustrate that if an armed group has the money and motivation to 
start an armed conflict, it is likely to do so; if it has no money and no motivation, it is 
little likely it will. In these cases, “having the money” means that an armed group has 
captured the revenue, manages its revenue effectively to translate it into military capacity 
and enough revenue to cover the expenses for the type of conflict it requires. At the same 
time, “motivation” means that and armed group has weighed the expected benefits and 
opportunity costs and made a tactically informed decision to start an armed conflict. For 
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policy, this means that revenues and motivations should be addressed together to prevent 
conflict recurrence. 
 Whatever lies between these two combinations is more ambiguous. For the 1998 
Angola war, UNITA had a surplus of revenue sources based on its commercialisation of 
diamonds during the Lusaka Peace process. However, it had a low incentive to use force 
because the use of force would provide little extra benefit: UNITA already controlled 
diamond mines and had its highest revenue prior to the renewal of conflict. Thus, UNITA 
had little propensity to renew the conflict. However, UNITA’s disposition not to renew 
armed conflict did not matter much because MPLA had both the surplus of revenue 
sources and the incentive to use armed force to renew the conflict. Ultimately, MPLA 
restarted the war and escalated the conflict. The 1998 war in Angola therefore highlights 
the importance of conflict financing as a relative phenomenon. If one actor has the 
resources and will to restart fighting, armed conflict is likely to recur even if the other 
parties are less inclined to renew armed conflict. 
 The position of Serbia after the end of the Kosovo conflict could be characterised 
as a shortage of revenue sources to challenge NATO forces deployed in Kosovo with a 
high intensity conflict while they had a high expected benefit from regaining control over 
Kosovo. However, even if both Kosovo and Serbia had a surplus of revenue sources to 
fight a medium intensity conflict, the opportunity cost of doing so on both sides reduced 
the propensity of conflict renewal. Moreover, it is likely that both sides would not have 
the resources to escalate the conflict to a high intensive, conventional conflict without 
major third-party assistance.  
 Also in Abkhazia, the de-facto government had little interest in seeking the 
renewal of armed conflict. Even if it had a surplus of revenue sources to start a low 
intensity conflict, it had achieved what it could at the end of the war and therefore did not 
want to renew the conflict. The de-facto Government increased its defensive capability 
because Georgia was perceived to force the renewal of conflict upon Abkhazia.  
 In Georgia after the Rose Revolution, the opportunity cost of losing military and 
development assistance as well as the prospect of closer ties with NATO and the EU 
lowered the incentive to use force. Despite a surplus of revenue sources, the lower 
incentive to use force reduced the risk off conflict recurrence. In Kosovo, despite a 
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surplus of revenue sources to fight a medium intensity conflict, the consideration that 
armed force was counterproductive to achieving independence, and jeopardising 
Kosovo’s economic recovery and assistance all provided opportunity costs which 
lowered the propensity of conflict renewal. 
 This evidence suggests that even if an armed group has a surplus of revenue 
sources for a low intensity conflict, a low incentive reduces the propensity of renewed 
conflict (Hypothesis 4). However, this analysis must be qualified in the sense that – 
instead of the low incentives – also the barrier-to-entry for a high intensity conflict 
provided disincentives to use force and lowered the propensity of the respective armed 
groups to renew armed conflict. 
 
6.1.5. Changes in the propensity to renew armed conflict over time 
 
The case studies produced supporting evidence for Hypotheses 1, 4 and 8 and mixed 
results for the relationship between revenue sources, incentives to use force and the 
propensity to renew armed conflict in a given point in time. However, the case studies 
also produced insights into this relationship over time. Looking at the relationship 
between revenue sources, incentives to use force and the propensity to renew armed 
conflict over time gives rise to the question if the availability of revenue can change the 
incentive to use force from low to high over time, or vice versa, if a high incentive to use 
force can change the availability of revenue sources from low to high. The case studies 
provide evidence for the latter assertion.  
 In Angola, UNITA’s incentive to establish control over the state made it diversify 
its sources of revenue after the Cold War. As a function of this incentive, UNITA 
occupied Angola’s main diamond mines to pay for a conventional capacity. In Georgia 
after the Rose Revolution, the propensity of conflict renewal increased only after a new 
political elite had gained power and wanted to change the unresolved status of the Frozen 
Conflicts. As a function of this political change, the Georgian Government increase its 
capture of potentially available revenue sources by centralised state resources. The 
greatest part of the new resources in addition foreign military aid was then used to 
rehabilitate the armed forces. In Kosovo, the risk of conflict only increased with a 
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strategic shift from non-violent to violent resistance. As a function of this decision, the 
KLA increased its capture of diaspora financing. Only then did the surplus of revenue 
sources – which was previously used to organise non-violent resistance – become a 
means to finance armed conflict. 
 This evidence supports evidence for Hypothesis 5 that a shortage of revenue 
sources and a high incentive to use force increases the propensity of conflict renewal. A 
high incentive to use armed force can shift the availability of revenue sources from low to 
high over time. 
 In broader terms, this evidence suggests that even if an organised armed group 
faces a less favourable material environment for conflict financing at one point, over time 
a high inventive to use force can contribute to increasing revenue sources though 
innovation ad diversification.  Organised armed groups are not locked in an economic 
endowment to organise armed conflict and can change their economic situation by 
creating a permissive environment for conflict financing or exploiting opportunities 
brought about by exogenous change. The finding is important as it points to the resilience 
of armed groups. Moreover, it underlines the limitation of policy against conflict 
financing if it is not paralleled by initiatives addressing the motivation of an organised 
armed group to restart armed conflict. 
 
6.1.6. Hypotheses testing 
 
Based on the analysis of the previous Sections, the case studies support Hypothesis 1, 4, 5 
and 8 and refute Hypothesis 3. In summary, this leads to the following findings:  
 
(1) The propensity of conflict renewal is highest if an armed group has the money and 
motivation to fight (Hypothesis 1); 
(2) The propensity of conflict renewal is high if an armed group has no money but a 
motivation to fight (Hypothesis 5). 
(3) The propensity of conflict renewal is low if an armed group has money but no 
motivation to fight (Hypothesis 4); and 
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(4) The propensity of conflict renewal is lowest if an armed group has no money and 
motivation to fight (Hypothesis 8). 
 
For these hypotheses, “having the money” means that an armed group has captured the 
revenue, manages its revenue effectively to translate them into military capacity and 
sufficient resources to cover the expenses for the type of war it wants to fight. At the 
same time, “motivation” means that an armed group has weighed the expected benefits 
and opportunity costs to using armed force and made a decision to start an armed conflict.  
 The case studies refute the hypothesis that conflict recurrence is more likely if an 
armed group has money but no motivation to fight (Hypothesis 3) and found no evidence 
for Hypotheses 2, 5, 6 and 7.  
 
Table 6.1: Hypotheses on the propensity to renew armed conflict 
 
Material environment  
to organise armed conflict 
Incentive to use  
armed force 
Propensity  
to renew armed 
conflict 
Hypotheses 
test results 
1. Surplus of revenue sources (RS>C) High (EB>OC) High Supported 
2. Surplus of revenue sources (RS>C) High (EB>OC) Low No evidence 
3. Surplus of revenue sources (RS>C) Low (EB<OC) High Refuted 
4. Surplus of revenue sources (RS>C) Low (EB<OC) Low Supported 
5. Shortage of revenue sources (RS<C) High (EB>OC) High Supported 
6. Shortage of revenue sources (RS<C) High (EB>OC) Low No evidence 
7. Shortage of revenue sources (RS<C) Low (EB<OC) High No evidence 
8. Shortage of revenue sources (RS<C) Low (EB<OC) Low Supported 
  
In addition, the analysis finds that the risk of conflict recurrence is high if at least 
one belligerent has a high propensity to renew armed conflict (Hypotheses 11 and 13). In 
Angola, armed conflict recurred when UNITA had a high propensity to renew armed 
conflict in 1992 and MPLA in 1998. Additional evidence is that the risk of conflict 
recurrence increased in Georgia after the Rose Revolution (2003-2006). While during the 
Shevardnadze period (1994-2003) the risk of conflict recurrence remained low, the risk of 
conflict recurrence increased with a new government in Tbilisi and its aim of changing 
the status of the unresolved conflicts in its favour.  
 There has also been evidence that the risk of conflict recurrence is high if both 
parties have a high propensity to renew armed conflict (Hypothesis 9). The wars in 
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Kosovo and Abkhazia are evidence for conflict recurrence. While both cases are not 
conflict recurrence as such but rather evidence on conflict onset, the similarity in 
dynamics between conflict onset and conflict recurrence make them considered as 
evidence for conflict recurrence.  
 The case studies provide also evidence that if both parties have a low propensity 
to renew armed conflict, the risk of conflict recurrence is low (Hypothesis 16). Evidence 
is provided by the period of parallel governance in Kosovo (1989-1995) and of the 
Frozen Conflicts in Georgia (1994-2003).  
  
Table 6.2: Hypotheses on the risk of conflict recurrence 
 
 Actor A: Propensity  
to renew armed 
conflict 
Actor B: Propensity  
to renew armed 
conflict 
Risk 
of conflict 
recurrence  
Hypotheses test 
results 
9. High High High Supported 
10. High High Low No evidence 
11. High Low High Supported 
12. High Low Low No evidence 
13. Low High High Supported 
14. Low High Low No evidence 
15. Low  Low High No evidence 
16 Low Low Low Supported 
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Table 6.3: Angola: Propensity to renew armed conflict in the periods 1992-1994 and 1995-2002 
 
 1992-1994 1995-2002 
 UNITA MPLA UNITA MPLA 
MATERIAL 
ENVIRONMENT 
Surplus of revenue sources 
(RS>C) for an armed 
conflict of medium 
intensity 
Surplus of revenue sources 
(RS>C) for an armed conflict 
of high intensity 
Surplus of revenue sources (RS>C) 
for an armed conflict of high 
intensity in the period 1995-1997; 
in 1998 lack of revenue source 
(RS<C) for medium intensity 
conflict and after 1999 low 
intensity conflict 
Surplus of revenue sources 
(RS>C) for an armed conflict 
of high intensity 
Potential revenue sources 
(annual) 
USD 300 million from 
taxation and 
commercialisation of 
diamonds 
USD 1.5 billion from taxation 
of oil production and oil-
backed loans  
USD 500 million (1995-1997) 
USD 200 million (1998) 
USD 100 million (1999) 
Below USD 100 million (2000-
2002) 
USD 2,153 million (1995-
1997) 
USD 3,252 million (1998-
2002) 
 
Cost of conflict (annual)     
Start-up USD 1.5 million USD 2.2 million USD 1.3 million USD 2.7 million 
Maintenance low USD 180 million USD 265 million USD 138 million USD 207 million 
Maintenance medium USD 211 million USD 311 million USD 162 million USD 348 million 
Maintenance high USD 330 million USD 487 million USD 254 million USD 546 million 
INCENTIVE TO USE 
ARMED FORCE 
 
High 
 
Low 
 
 
Low 
 
High 
Expected benefit of using armed 
force 
Control diamond fields to 
acquire weapons to bolster 
conventional military 
capability.  
 
Military victory over UNITA 
by overwhelming force  
Re-establish control of 
diamond fields to cut 
resources from UNITA and 
allow MPLA troops to profit 
Defend diamond mines from 
MPLA attack 
Establish control over capital 
Luanda 
Crush UNITA as a military 
organisation; reign in 
domestic client network in 
Government controlled 
diamond areas 
Opportunity cost of using armed 
force 
Bicesse Accords 
represented no opportunity 
cost  
Better relations with USA to 
attract  foreign investment and 
financial assistance 
Losing framework conditions of 
Lusaka protocol which provided 
form profitable diamond extraction 
Breaking with the Lusaka 
Protocol had little opportunity 
cost because implementation 
did not few tangible results 
PROPENSITY TO RENEW 
ARMED CONFLICT 
 
High 
 
Low 
 
Low 
 
High 
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Table 6.4: The Abkhazia conflict: Propensity to renew armed conflict in the periods 1992-1994, 1994-2003 and 2003-2006 
 
 1992-1994 1994-2003 2003-2006 
 Georgia Abkhazia Georgia Abkhazia Georgia Abkhazia 
MATERIAL 
ENVIRONMENT 
Surplus of revenue 
sources (RS>C) in 1992.  
Lack of revenue sources 
during the war (RS<C) 
in 1993 and 1994. 
Surplus of revenue 
sources (RS>C) based 
on third-party support 
Surplus of revenue 
sources (RS>C) for 
armed conflict of 
high intensity 
Surplus of revenue 
sources (RS>C) for 
armed conflict of 
high intensity 
Surplus of revenue 
sources (RS>C) for 
armed conflict of 
high intensity 
Surplus of revenue 
sources (RS>C) for 
armed conflict of 
high intensity 
Potential revenue sources  Defence budget, parallel 
economy, looting 
Third-party assistance, 
looting  
 
USD 591 million 
from state budgets, 
foreign 
development and 
military assistance, 
smuggling 
USD 49 million 
from state budget, 
parallel budget, 
tourism, timber, 
fishing, humani-
tarian assistance, 
smuggling to 
Georgia and Russia, 
investment and 
bank loans, 
diaspora transfers 
USD 501 million 
from budgets, 
foreign 
development and 
military assistance, 
parallel funds with 
increased state 
capture 
At least USD 98 
million from 
budget, parallel 
budget, tourism, 
timber, fishing, 
humanitarian assi-
stance, smuggling 
to Georgia and 
Russia, foreign 
investment and 
bank loans, dia-
spora remittances 
Cost of conflict (annual)       
Start-up USD 1.6 million USD 1.1 million USD 18.4 million USD 3.7 million USD 6.7 million USD 2.2 million 
Maintenance low USD 33 million USD 23 million USD 71 million USD 15 million USD 69 million USD 24 million 
Maintenance medium USD 37 million USD 26 million USD 110 million USD 22 million USD 79 million USD 26 million 
Maintenance high USD 54 million USD 38 million USD 235 million USD 47 million USD 117 million USD 40 million 
INCENTIVE TO USE 
ARMED FORCE 
 
High 
 
High 
 
Low 
 
Low 
 
High 
 
Low 
Expected benefit of using 
armed force 
Territorial control and 
integrity, control of 
economic opportunities 
and transport routes to 
Russia 
Survival as an ethnic 
community, territorial 
control, independence  
 
Establishment of 
territorial control 
over Abkhazia 
Defence of 
territorial control 
and economic 
opportunities 
Establishment of 
territorial control 
over Abkhazia as 
adversary perceived 
weak 
Defence of 
territorial control 
and economic 
opportunities 
 
Opportunity cost of using 
armed force 
The loss of Abkhazia  Losing control of 
the parallel eco-
nomy, relative do-
mestic stability, the 
BTC-pipeline and 
military and deve-
lopment assistance. 
Losing control of 
the territory and 
economy or 
Abkhazia. 
 
Potential NATO 
membership 
Good image 
Foreign military 
and development 
assistance and 
political support.  
Losing control of 
the territory and 
economy or 
Abkhazia. 
 
PROPENSITY TO RENEW 
ARMED CONFLICT 
 
High 
 
High 
 
Low 
 
Low 
 
Low 
 
Low 
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Table 6.5: Kosovo: Propensity to renew armed conflict in the periods 1989-1995, 1995-1999 and 1999-2006 
 
 1989-1995 1995-1999 1999-2006 
 Kosovo Serbia Kosovo Serbia Kosovo Serbia 
MATERIAL 
ENVIRONMENT 
Surplus of revenue 
sources (RS>C) in 
1992 for medium 
intensity conflict 
Surplus of revenue 
sources (RS>C) for 
conflict of high 
intensity 
Surplus of revenue 
sources (RS>C) in 
1998 for medium 
intensity conflict 
Surplus of revenue 
sources (RS>C) 
for conflict of high 
intensity 
Surplus of revenue 
sources (RS>C) for 
high intensity 
conflict but 
depending on 
revenue capture 
Surplus of revenue 
sources (RS>C) for 
conflict of high 
intensity 
Potential revenue sources 
(annual) 
USD 48 million – 
USD 83 million based 
on diaspora funding 
USD 431 million 
based on defence 
budget 
USD 40 million – USD 
150 million based on 
diaspora funding and 
taxation of parallel 
economy  
USD 690 million 
based on defence 
budget 
USD 409 million 
based administrative 
corruption, business 
private bank 
deposits. Potential 
revenue of USD 56 
billion from lignite 
exploration.  
USD 787 million 
based on defence 
budget 
Cost of conflict (annual)       
Start-up USD 2.4 million USD 6.0 million USD  1.3 million USD 3,0 million USD  9.5 million USD 21.6 million 
Maintenance low USD 44 million USD 110 million USD 76 million USD 175million USD 115 million USD 262million 
Maintenance medium USD 54 million USD 132 million USD 93 million USD 213 million USD 133 million USD 305 million 
Maintenance high USD 92 million USD 231 million USD 158 million USD 361 million USD 205 million USD 453 million 
INCENTIVE TO USE 
ARMED FORCE 
 
Low 
 
Low 
 
High 
 
High 
 
Low 
 
Low 
Expected benefit of using 
armed force 
None – armed force 
considered 
counterproductive 
because it could 
potentially be used as 
a pretext for ethnic 
cleansing 
Control of territory 
of Kosovo 
Ethnic partition as in 
Bosnia, attrition of 
Serbian presence 
through guerrilla 
tactics, ultimately 
independence 
Maintenance of 
control over 
Kosovo  
Influence over final 
status negotiations 
Regain the territory 
of Kosovo 
Opportunity cost of using 
armed force 
Opportunity to garner 
international attention 
and legitimacy; 
preventing more 
suppression and 
potentially ethnic 
cleansing 
Overstretch of 
military capacity due 
to deployment in 
Bosnia, possible 
negative strategic 
consequences by 
opening a second 
front in Kosovo 
Risk of ethnic 
cleansing 
Facing NATO, 
damage to 
economy 
International political 
and economic 
support, 
independence, 
NATO or EU 
membership 
Quasi-statehood  
Profits derived from 
the in limbo situation 
of Kosovo 
Renewed political 
and economic 
isolation 
Economic recovery 
Future NATO and 
EU membership 
PROPENSITY TO 
RENEW ARMED 
CONFLICT 
 
Low 
 
Low 
 
High 
 
High 
 
Low 
 
Low 
 6.1.7. Summary of the findings 
 
The Political Economy of Conflict made important contributions to the understanding of 
the economic dimension of armed conflict. The literature developed a sophisticated 
understanding of natural resources in conflict dynamics, economic functions in civil war 
and the economic dimension of individual conflicts (see Chapter 1). Nevertheless, the 
literature kept an underlying assumption that the availability of revenue sources causes 
armed conflict because they make them feasible. The evidence collected in this thesis 
refutes this claim and shows that conflict financing is not automatically associated to the 
onset and recurrence of armed conflict.  
 Conflict financing is a necessary but not sufficient condition for conflict 
recurrence. The surplus of revenue sources is a necessary condition for conflict 
recurrence because without it armed conflict could not be started or maintained. The 
surplus of revenue sources is, however, not a sufficient condition because there have been 
episodes in which armed groups had the resources to fight, but did not. The explanation 
lies in the relative weighing of expected benefits and opportunity costs of using armed 
force which connects the analysis of conflict financing to its political context. 
 In order to establish a nuanced understanding of the relationship between conflict 
financing and recurrence, the analysis looked at the conditions under which conflict 
financing increases the risk of conflict recurrence (see also Table 7.1 in the Conclusion). 
These conditions are the following:  
 
• Conflict financing increases the risk of conflict recurrence if a conflict entrepreneur 
is able to translate revenue sources into military capability. Revenue sources increase 
the risk of conflict if they are (1) captured by a conflict entrepreneur, (2) managed 
centrally, and (3) controlled by few stakeholders. In this way, potential revenue 
sources become effective methods of conflict financing and increase in effectiveness 
by the degree to which they can be captured, centralised and controlled by few 
stakeholders. All methods involving the payment of rents are therefore effective 
strategies to finance conflict. Concerning natural resources, it is not the 
commercialisation of the conflict good which is a source of conflict financing but the 
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rents paid by third actors wanting to gain access to resources. In these circumstances, 
armed groups are gate keepers and collect taxes at the entrance. 
• Conflict financing increases the risk of conflict recurrence if the amount of revenue 
covers the expenses for the type of war required to achieve the objectives of the 
belligerents. The case studies suggest that the cost of different types of conflict 
creates different barriers-to-entry for conflict recurrence. In order for the availability 
of revenue sources to increase the risk of conflict recurrence, they must be put in 
context of different types of conflict. In this context, it is the value of revenue sources 
which determines the risk of armed conflict. Only if potential revenue sources are 
able to generate the revenues needed to start and maintain the type of armed conflict 
an organised armed group requires to achieve its objectives, they increase the risk of 
conflict recurrence. 
• A high incentive to use armed force can contribute to increasing the revenue sources 
of an organised armed group over time and thereby increase the risk of conflict 
recurrence. A high incentive to use force can shift revenue sources from low to high 
over time; thus, increasing the propensity of an armed group to renew armed conflict 
and the risk of conflict recurrence. Policy must therefore focus on both conflict 
financing and the incentives to use force to prevent the recurrence of armed conflict.  
• Conflict financing provides indications on the risk of conflict recurrence if considered 
as a relative phenomenon. Associating conflict financing to conflict recurrence only 
makes sense when comparing the revenue sources and military capabilities of all 
parties to a conflict. If two organised armed groups with equal resources and military 
capability are confronting each other, the success of a military strategy is 
compromised by the likelihood of a mutually hurting stalemate. However, if the 
revenue and capabilities of one armed group are superior to those of the other, 
conflict financing increases the risk of conflict recurrence. Just focusing on conflict 
financing of one belligerent, therefore, provides for an incomplete assessment of the 
risk of conflict recurrence.  
 
 The case studies also show that third-parties can play an important role in 
preventing the recurrence of armed conflict by increasing the opportunity costs of 
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organised armed groups to renew armed conflict. Opportunity costs have been the 
prospect of gaining membership or association status with the EU or NATO, 
development or military aid, the maintenance of a status quo, the toleration of 
opportunities for profit-making. In addition, third-parties can prevent the recurrence of 
armed conflict by supporting one side in a conflict and thereby increase the barrier-to-
entry and the cost of competition. 
 
6.2. Implications for peacebuilding  
 
The Introduction to this thesis underlined the importance of the relationship between 
conflict financing and recurrence in relation to post-conflict peacebuilding. By looking at 
peacebuilding from the perspective of conflict financing, this Part has the objective to 
explore the prospect of increasing the sustainability of peacebuilding. The rational of 
policy engagement is to deprive those groups with an interest in conflict recurrence from 
the means to do so. In this way, the following paragraphs connect to work of Greenhill 
and Major (2007) on spoilers in post-conflict situations. They emphasises that spoiling 
depends on the means available to spoilers and distinguish between the means and types 
of spoiling (Ibid., 36). In this way they contrast earlier categorisations of spoiling 
including limited, greed based and total spoilers (Stedman 1997).  
By looking at conflict financing in peacebuilding, this Part explores the prospect 
of targeting the capabilities of spoilers to prevent the undermining of peace agreements 
and peacebuilding. It is based on the findings of the relationship between conflict 
financing and recurrence and points out possible directions for policy. Overall, the 
analysis argues for a comprehensive strategy of conflict prevention in peacebuilding 
which pursues three parallel tracks:  
 
• To limit the availability of revenue sources to finance armed conflict; 
• To increase the cost of armed conflict; 
• To increase the opportunity cost the use of armed force. 
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The objective of a comprehensive strategy of conflict prevention in peacebuilding not 
only aims at deteriorating the material environment of a conflict organiser but also at 
reducing the motivation to use force. An exclusive focus on conflict financing in the short 
term is little helpful in the long run if the incentives of conflict organisers to use armed 
force do not change simultaneously. Section &.1.5. has shown that, in the long run, 
committed organised armed groups are likely to find the revenue sources to renew armed 
conflict. This is why policy should address the means and motivations of spoilers behind 
the renewal of armed conflict. 
 
6.2.1. Limiting the availability of revenue sources to finance armed conflict 
 
Cutting the revenue sources to finance armed conflict for potential spoilers wishing to 
undermine peacebuilding is a logical policy to pursue. The evidence from the case studies 
suggests that revenue sources are a necessary – alas not sufficient – condition for conflict 
recurrence. Thus, cutting the money should lead to the desired outcome of limiting the 
capabilities for spoilers to renew armed conflict: No money, no war.  
 However, the case studies indicate that there is a need to develop a more nuanced 
understanding of the relationship between conflict financing and recurrence. It was 
highlighted that the propensity of armed groups to renew armed conflict not merely 
depends on the availability of revenue sources but also on the way they are managed, the 
cost of armed conflict and the incentives to use armed force. Based on these 
considerations, the risk of conflict recurrence is highest if spoilers in a post-conflict 
setting have the following characteristics: 
 
• A small, committed and unified leadership;  
• A centralised structure of managing revenue sources;  
• A surplus of revenue sources to fight the type of war it requires; 
• A low barrier-to-entry into armed conflict and low cost of competition;  
• High expected benefits to use armed force; and  
• No opportunity cost to use armed force.  
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The policy task is to prevent situations in which potential spoilers have these 
characteristics. Limiting revenue sources to spoilers is part of preventing armed conflict, 
but only focusing on conflict financing and not the other characteristics is not enough.
 Policy against conflict financing should focus on the management of potential 
revenue sources available in post-conflict areas. Potential revenue sources must be 
managed in such a way that they do not constitute a source of conflict financing. When 
transforming a post-conflict economy it is therefore important to limit the availability of 
revenue sources to spoilers.  
 Liberia is an example of how a stronger emphasis on the management of the 
economy in the peacebuilding may have mitigated some of the adverse effects in the 
transition period. Liberia’s Comprehensive Peace Agreement of 18 August 2003 did not 
make reference to the management of the rubber plantations. In consequence, there was 
the increasing involvement of ex-combatants in the exploitation and commercialisation of 
rubber fostering corruption, crime and insecurity. After the Presidential elections of 
January 2006, the Government of Liberia and the United Nations Mission in Liberia re-
established control over the rubber plantations. With the greater reach of the Government, 
the networks of ex-LURD combatants shifted to other economic opportunities in Liberia 
and Côte d’Ivoire (UNSC 2006, paras. 11, 19). This example highlights the potential for 
disruption if the management of the economy is not included into peacebuilding. In a 
post-conflict context, it is the parallel economy which needs particular attention.110  
Parallel economies are a legacy of conflict economies and capture the persistence 
of a combat, shadow and coping economies after armed conflict (Pugh and Cooper 2004, 
8-9). Parallel economies affect peacebuilding by providing a space for illicit and illegal 
economic activities parallel to the state or transitional administrations. On the one hand, 
they weaken the welfare functions of the state including taxation systems and 
redistributive mechanism. However, on the other hand, they can be an important element 
in sustaining welfare in post-conflict situations when the state is so dysfunctional that its 
citizens must rely on the parallel economy to survive. 
 Policy against parallel economies after conflict has to confront three issues: (1) 
the right long-term balance between the promotion of order and a legitimate economy and 
                                                 
110 The following paragraphs are based on Wennmann 2005. 
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the short-term provision of reasonable economic satisfaction of the population (Keen 
2000, 22); (2) the right short-term balance between confrontation and cooptation (Yannis 
2003, 184); and (3) the management of non-state actors that through the control of 
parallel markets are more powerful than the state or the donor community (Wennmann 
2005, 488).  
 These issues are not easily tackled and there is no magic formula that applies to 
all places and times. However, one may explore two avenues for engaging with the 
parallel economy in a post-conflict setting: The first is to approach the parallel economy 
from a sector specific perspective; the second, to avoid the criminalisation of the parallel 
economy.  
 A parallel economy is never a monolithic block but rather a mixture of different 
sectors as every regular economy. Adopting a sector specific approach means to separate 
the parallel economy into the trade of multiple goods including, for example, drugs, 
weapons, human beings, counterfeits, natural resources, consumer goods or works of art. 
Moreover, it is important to map the control structure of the parallel economy.  
 When looking at the trade flows of the parallel economy, three different 
categories emerge based on the direction of trade: (1) Goods that enter and leave a 
territory between the area of production and the consumer market (transit goods), (2) 
goods that are produced locally for export (export goods), and (3) goods that are imported 
for local consumption (import goods). The separation of the parallel economies into 
sectors and the identification of trade flows help identifying which sector of the parallel 
economy is outside of the control of the government and which sector can be most easily 
co-opted into the regular economy (Wennmann 2005, 488-490).  
Concerning criminalisation, in a post-conflict setting, there is a fine line as to 
what constitutes a legal or illegal transaction (Pugh and Cooper 2004, 8). While activities 
such as the smuggling of drugs, nuclear material or human beings can be more easily 
labelled illegal due to multilateral treaties outlawing these practices, in cases where 
consumer goods or agricultural commodities are involved the label may be less 
appropriate.  No matter who controls the revenue from trade flows, the parallel economy 
is a substantial part of a country’s resource base. While criminalising the parallel 
economy may be part of a strategy to gain control over economic assets or fight political 
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contenders, it may lead to the loss of economic potential through capital flight and 
forgone investments (Wennmann 2005, 490).  
However, addressing the parallel economy after conflict implies politically 
sensitive decisions including the confrontation of individuals and groups which have 
become disproportionately influential and powerful by controling the parallel economy 
during war. Another layer of complexity is added if parallel economies are part of 
transnational organised crime networks. The first problem confronting parallel economies 
is to gather information on how they function (who controls what and how); the second is 
the availability of a security force and the political will to root out crime networks. Crime 
networks can be so powerful that regular police units do not have the capabilities to 
confront them. Thus, operations against the criminal parallel economy are often limited 
by the lack of a clear mandate as well as the appropriate capabilities for a confrontational 
strategy. 
Using armed force against crime networks is highly sensitive when the whole 
notion of peacebuilding is to reduce the use of armed force in a post-conflict area. The 
use of force is likely to invite reprisal attacks against the international community, may 
destabilise peacebuilding and also lead to political pressures in troop contributing 
countries. Nevertheless, in sectors which are not able to be co-opted into a regular 
economy, the peacebuilding authorities should have the capability to enforce the 
monopoly on the use of force and translate peacebuilding into meaningful statebuilding 
and the development of the state’s functions of providing security, welfare, representation 
and justice. 
 An additional perspective for policy emerges when combining conflict financing 
and the cost of conflict. Chapter 2 pointed out that the start-up cost per 1,000 soldiers can 
be as low as 67.500 USD for a low intensity conflict and USD 450,000 USD for a high 
intensity conflict (Table 2.16). These amounts are marginal and question the prospect of 
reducing the risk of low intensity conflict recurrence by targeting revenue sources. 
Approaching low intensity conflict from the perspective of conflict financing may, 
therefore, prove little effective to prevent conflict recurrence as well as for violence 
reduction after armed conflict. 
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 Moreover, policy against potential revenue sources is likely to remain ineffective 
if the incentives to use armed force are not addressed in parallel. The case study evidence 
suggests that committed organised armed groups tend to find the revenue sources over 
time which they need to start an armed conflict. An exclusive focus on conflict financing 
may have important short term outcomes, but may remain ineffective in reducing the use 
of armed force in the long run. Conflict prevention policy in peacebuilding should 
therefore target both the means and motivation of spoilers. 
 These observations have the following implications for policy against conflict 
financing: 
  
• Targeting the conflict financing of an organised armed group in a post-conflict setting 
has a greater likelihood of success to prevent the recurrence of high intensity armed 
conflicts than low intensity conflict. This is because high intensity conflict requires 
more revenues while in low intensity conflict costs can be marginal.  
• Targeting conflict financing in a post-conflict setting is not a solution to conflict 
recurrence if spoilers do not change their motivation to use force in the long run. 
Targeting the financing of an organised armed group may even increase the 
commitment of an armed group to finding alterative revenue sources or promote the 
unity of its leadership. 
 
 These policy implications are also important for terrorist financing. Terrorism is 
comparable to low intensity conflict in the sense that it needs few revenue sources to 
organise attacks. As terrorists operate with high levels of commitment, they are likely to 
find the resources necessary to execute attacks. Thus, attempts to root out terrorism by 
cutting off its financing bears few potentials of success if the terrorists’ incentives to use 
force are not addressed in parallel.  
 
6.2.2. Increasing the cost to organise armed conflict 
 
Chapter 2 has shown that the material environment of a conflict organiser is composed of 
the availability of revenue sources and the cost to organise armed conflict. Looking at the 
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cost of armed conflict thus complements initiatives which target conflict financing. The 
rationale of increasing the cost of conflict is to increase the barrier-to-entry and cost of 
competition for renewed armed conflict to such a level that it prevents the occurrence of 
conflict and fosters conflict termination. While a comprehensive analysis of policy tools 
to increase the cost of conflict goes beyond the scope of this thesis, the following 
sketches existing conflict management strategies from the perspective of the cost of 
conflict. 
  Initiatives to increase the cost of conflict can include sanctions. Particularly 
concerning the high intensity conventional conflict, sanctions are an important tool to 
limit or make it more difficult for conflict entrepreneurs to buy conventional equipment 
thus increasing transaction cost. This increase in cost occurs because arms dealers ask for 
a higher risk premium, weapons supply becomes more limited and travel more difficult. 
In this sense, sanctions do not make it impossible for an armed group acquire weapons, 
but more expensive. If an organised armed group has the revenue sources to pay for the 
increase in price brought about by sanctions, they do not limit the potential of an armed 
group to rearm. However, if sanctions increase the cost of armed conflict to such an 
extent that an organised armed group can no longer afford it, they have successfully 
created a barrier to entry and increased the cost of competition. In this way, sanctions 
could contribute to preventing the occurrence, escalation and recurrence of conflict.  
 The Angola, case study highlighted that sanctions were successful in limiting 
UNITA to escalate the armed conflict. They made it more difficult for UNITA to interact 
with the outside world and supply its forces. Travel bans, the naming and shaming of 
companies as well as the campaign against conflict diamonds increased the cost of 
organising armed conflict. Sanctions were particularly successful in Angola, because they 
were paralleled by a military offensive of MPLA which wrest control of UNITA from the 
diamond fields. Thus, the combination of policies to cut revenue sources and increase the 
cost of conflict affected the functioning of UNITA as a military organisation. In 
consequence UNITA was unable to follow the escalation of intensity of fighting in 1998 
which was driven by MPLA (see Chapter 3). 
 In the same way as sanctions, arms control policies could have the potential to 
increases the cost of conflict. Through small arms collection and destruction programmes, 
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arms control seeks to reduce the supply of weapons in post-conflict areas. However, the 
number of small arms available in post-conflict areas and practical limitation of weapons 
collections reduce the prospect of increase weapons prices through supply reduction.  
 Another strategy to increase the cost to organise armed conflict is to increase the 
capacity of existing security actors in post-conflict areas. An effective military force of a 
state increase the barrier-to-entry for the renewal of armed conflict and deter smaller 
armed groups to restart armed conflict. In addition, if a military and police force is used 
to establish greater effective control over territory and borders, security actors also 
increase the cost to organise conflict by increasing transaction costs. Building military 
and police capability therefore underlines the importance of security sector reform and an 
agenda of state building in which the state reasserts its monopoly on the use of force.  
 
6.2.3. Increasing the opportunity cost of using armed force 
 
The previous two Sections have indicated that much is to be gained for the prevention of 
conflict recurrence by targeting policy against the material environment of a conflict 
organiser. However, the case studies indicate that organised armed groups can make their 
material environment more amenable to conflict financing over time. This can occur 
partly through the diversification of revenue sources or by exogenous changes which 
reduce the cost to organise armed conflict. This is why it is important to target policy not 
only at the material environment of conflict organisers but also against the incentives to 
using armed force. This Section therefore explores the potential if increasing opportunity 
costs as a strategy of conflict prevention in peacebuilding. 
 The case studies on Georgia and Kosovo highlighted the importance of 
opportunity cost as a strategy to prevent conflict recurrence. In Georgia, high levels of 
military and development assistance increased the opportunity cost. Also in Kosovo, the 
use of armed force was found to have high opportunity costs in terms of receiving 
international support for independence and a prospect of joining the European Union. 
Opportunity cost have not been an isolated factor in preventing the recurrence of conflict, 
however, they contributed to lowering the incentives to using armed force.  
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 The consideration of opportunity costs opens various avenues of engagement for 
third parties into peacebuilding. The rationale for engagement on opportunity costs is to 
increase the benefits deriving from peace and reduce the expected benefits of using armed 
force. Peacebuilding must produce outcomes so that the absence of the use of force is 
more beneficial to potential spoilers than the continuation of armed conflict. 
Peacebuilding must therefore lead to tangible peace dividends which increase the 
opportunity cost to use armed force. Peace dividends are material benefits which occur to 
ex-combatants and a post-conflict society as a direct consequence of the end of an armed 
conflict.  
 Third-parties can foster peace dividends and increase the opportunity cost to use 
armed force through development assistance, investment and employment creation.111 
Development assistance can be used as an incentive by increasing the benefits associate 
to peace agreements. It involves a whole range of initiatives in areas such as 
infrastructure reconstruction, public sector reform or investment into social services. 
Overall, “pro-peace development” aims at the promotion of social and political cohesion 
for peace implementation and disburses funds to mitigate the effects of sectarianism and 
divisions. In order to provide incentives, development assistance can be construed in such 
a way that all parties and their constituencies benefit from disbursements, employment 
and development effects (Mac Ginty 2006, 135). Quick impact projects can be 
particularly useful to generate short term peace dividends and tangible outcomes before 
larger development initiative are initiated.  
 Development or peacebuilding projects can also be used to increase the value of 
territory in order to increase the opportunity cost of non-settlement. In Georgia, there was 
an initiative to create a special agricultural zone around the cease-fire line between 
Georgia and Abkhazia. Cooperation on agricultural development was supposed to foster 
trust and reduce poverty. However, Abkhazia feared that the initiative was an attempt by 
Georgia to increase its influence in the Abkhaz side of the cease-fire line which is still 
mainly inhabited by Georgians (Wennmann 2006).  
 Also investment increases peace dividends for peacebuilding. It differs from 
development assistance in as much as it emanates from the private sector. Provisions are 
                                                 
111 The following paragraphs are based on Wennmann 2007b. 
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no longer given at preferential rates but at market condition and issues of security and 
political risk must be considered. In order to overcome the hesitation of companies to 
invest in post-conflict areas, investment must be facilitated with the aim of spreading the 
risk through joint ventures, project financing, insurance, or export credit (Bray 2003, 321, 
346; Hildjard 2005, 235-240). Investment is particularly important to extract natural 
resources as it is capital and technology intensive and local capacity is often absent. 
However, investment as an incentive is sensitive in cases where foreign investment 
crowds out less efficient domestic producers. In this way, foreign investment may not be 
perceived as a benefit but rather a cost of a peace agreement. Instead, investment should 
support the development of local markets tough, for example, hiring locally and using 
domestically produced goods and services (Landow 2006, 9).  
 Investment is also important to foster the employment-intensive reconstruction of 
post-conflict areas. Armed conflicts often occur in areas which have a comparative 
advantage in labour. Creating new employment opportunities after conflict is essential to 
support DDR projects as well as the integration of marginalised or war-affected 
communities into peacebuilding. Investment and employment creation are therefore 
essential to transform post-conflict economies and deteriorate the conditions for rebel 
recruitment to renew armed conflict (Walter 2004, 374). 
 Investment in local and informal markets is particularly effective in stimulating 
employment. Informal markets have been found to recover quickest after armed conflict. 
Informal markets are based on activities of micro and small enterprises which provide 
goods and services at the local level and reflect the persistence of coping economies once 
an armed conflict is over. They emphasise people’s resilience in the face of crises and the 
need to go beyond an understanding of war-affected populations as victims but rather as 
agents for development (Fedi 2006, 24, 27, 29-30). Investment should therefore focus on 
enabling informal businesses as soon as possible after an armed conflict ends by 
reconstructing essential infrastructure and providing tools for the provision of goods and 
services at the local level (Landow 2006, 4).  
 Be it through development assistance, investment or employment generation, the 
emergence of tangible peace dividends is important for sustainable peacebuilding. Only if 
there is something to lose from reverting back to armed conflict, do peace dividends 
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increase the opportunity cost of conflict recurrence. This is why the creation of peace 
dividends should already be included into peace negotiations. In this way, the parties to 
the conflict could develop visions of a society and an understanding of how to use the 
economy for the generation of welfare benefits of the population rather than the 
prolongation of armed conflict.  
 While development assistance, investment and employment creation have a value 
in promoting the sustainability of post-conflict peacebuilding, they also have political 
value during a peace process:  Peace dividends make the future after armed conflict more 
tangible and therefore have the potential to foster the parties’ commitment to a peace 
process. Increasing opportunity costs goes beyond the economic sphere and has distinct 
political value: Trust in the peace process because a future without war is viable. In turn, 
political commitment of the parties to peace increases.  
 However, as much as the need for peace dividends in peace processes and 
peacebuilding to produce peace dividends is clearly understandable in theory, in reality 
peace dividends are often difficult to generate. This is exemplified by the limitations of 
including economic provisions in peace agreements. In Sudan and Guatemala, the hope 
that economic provisions would stabilise peacebuilding has been undermined by 
implementation problems: The lack of capacity and resources to implement the 
provisions, the existence of spoilers, the incapacity or unwillingness of third parties to 
deliver on promises for post-conflict assistance and a lack of commitment of the parties 
to deliver implementation of economic provisions (Wennmann 2007b, 43-49).  
 An addition problem is if spoilers control resources, such as drugs, which 
generate a high level of revenue sources. In these circumstances, it is nearly impossible to 
create peace dividends which are higher than those associated to the war economy. In 
Afghanistan, revenue sources from drugs are estimated to be higher than the available 
funds for peacebuilding. Warlords controlling these revenues have little incentive to 
support peacebuilding if it means establishing a functioning state that combats drugs. It is 
impossible to be all inclusive when influential groups derive their power from control 
over illegal revenue sources. Managing these situations may point to a two-pronged 
strategy of isolating negative spill-over effects and managing various power holders and 
overlapping levels of authority of various actors (Wennmann 2005, 486-487, 490-491). 
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 However, despite these limitations of post-conflict realities, however, the 
potential of increasing opportunity costs lies in creating economic peace dividends. The 
economy can provide tangible benefits to ex-combatants though economic opportunities 
including, for example, development projects, employment, ministerial positions or 
education. In this way, peace dividends support DDR programmes and the consolidation 
of peace after armed conflict. 
 
6.3. Conclusion 
 
This Chapter analysed the case studies of Angola, the Abkhazia conflict and Kosovo in 
order to establish the relationship between conflict financing and recurrence and its 
implication for policy. Based on the analysis of these three cases, the Chapter related the 
findings to the literature on the Political Economy of Conflict.  Overall, the analysis 
highlights the following findings:  
 
• The availability of revenue sources increases the risk of conflict recurrence if conflict 
entrepreneurs are able to translate revenue sources into military capabilities. Revenue 
sources increase the risk of conflict recurrence if captured by a conflict entrepreneur, 
managed centrally, and controlled by few stakeholders. In these conditions, revenue 
sources are effective strategies of conflict financing. 
• The availability of revenue sources increases the risk of conflict recurrence if the 
amount of revenue generated can pay for the type of armed conflict required to 
achieve the objectives of an organised armed group. The costs of different types of 
conflict create different barriers-to-entry and cost of competition which can prevent 
conflict recurrence or contribute to its termination. 
• Over time, a high incentive to use armed force can contribute to an organised armed 
group finding the revenue sources for the type of armed conflict it requires. By 
transforming a shortage into a surplus of revenue sources, a high incentive to using 
armed force can increase the risk of conflict recurrence.  
• Conflict financing must be considered a relative phenomenon to understand its role in 
conflict recurrence. The evidence suggests that conflict financing increases the risk of 
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conflict recurrence if one belligerent party has a superior level of revenue and 
military capabilities. In contrast if all parties have similar revenues and capabilities, a 
military strategy offers fewer prospects for success and may even reduce the risk of 
conflict recurrence. 
 
 These findings highlight the need to adopt a comprehensive approach against 
conflict financing in post-conflict settings. The comprehensive approach includes policies 
to limit the availability of revenue sources to finance armed conflict; increase the cost of 
armed conflict; and increase the opportunity cost of using armed force. This Chapter 
argued that a policy that exclusively focuses on conflict financing is unlikely to succeed 
reducing the capabilities of spoilers. Armed groups which want to spoil peace usually 
have the commitment and ingenuity to find revenue sources to pay for the type of conflict 
which fulfils their objectives. This is why policy against conflict financing must also 
increase the cost of conflict in a post conflict area.  
 But even if the availability of revenue sources and the cost of conflict are targeted, 
policy against conflict financing may be little effective if not embedded in a broader 
political strategy to increase the opportunity cost of using armed force. Strategies have a 
wide range and include fostering commitment to peace through peace dividends and 
viable economic futures. In order to be a viable tool against conflict recurrence, policy 
against conflict financing must be part of a policy which convinces conflict entrepreneurs 
that that use of armed force will not bring them closer to achieving their political, military 
or economic objectives. Ultimately, policy against conflict financing succeeds if conflict 
organisers realise that conflict recurrence has high opportunities costs and that they are 
better off when renouncing the use of force as a strategy to achieve their objectives. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
This thesis set out to develop a better understanding of the relationship between conflict 
financing and the recurrence of intra-state armed conflict. By analysing conflict 
recurrence from the perspective of conflict financing, it explored how peacebuilding 
could be made more sustainable and how conflict financing affects the organisation of 
armed conflict and conflict dynamics. 
 The relationship between conflict financing and recurrence is important because 
the material environment provides organised armed group with the means to rearm and 
use force in their quest to achieve political, military or economic objectives. It is also 
important because conflict recurrence is the failure of peacebuilding. It directs economic 
resources into armed conflict rather that towards supporting peacebuilding as a self-
sustained process. The stakes to prevent conflict recurrence are high as investments by 
bilateral or multilateral donors amount to billions of US Dollars. In addition, much 
political capital is used for in the promotion of economic prosperity and democratic 
governance the failure of which bears a high political price for donors. 
 Research for this thesis was accompanied by the development of a diverse 
literature which established an increasingly sophisticated understanding of the economic 
aspects of armed conflict. While the work of Tracy (1985), Rasler and Thompson (1989), 
Tilly (1992), and Kindleberger (1993) highlight the history of conflict financing, renewed 
interest in the economic dimension of armed conflict after the end of the Cold War 
emerged as a response to explanations of armed conflict based on ethnic or religious 
antagonisms. Early work of these contributions include Macrae and Zwi (1994), Jean and 
Rufin (1996) and Atkinson (1997).  
 Overall, the literature highlights the difference in understanding the use of force in 
armed conflict. The literature on ethnic or religious differences in armed conflict 
associates the use of force to inalienable human attributes rooted in the psyche of human 
beings. The literature on the economic dimensions of armed conflict considers it as an 
instrument to achieve political, military or economic objectives. Considered in this way, 
the literature on the economic dimensions of armed conflict highlights the strategy in 
which weapons are used to coerce rather than the effects of the use of weapons. It is the 
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former which needs financing and, hence, the emphasis on the functional and 
instrumental nature of the use of force in this thesis. 
 Since the mid-1990s, the literature on the economic dimensions of armed conflict 
has taken manifold forms including a radical shift from explaining the onset of armed 
conflict in terms of “greed” rather than “grievance”. Various contributions emerged as a 
response and exposed this literature while others provided an alternative perspective on 
the economic dimensions of armed conflict (see Chapter 1). This literature has come to be 
referred to as the Political Economy of Conflict. It studies the relationship between 
political and economic factors in affecting the dynamics of armed conflict as well as 
between the material environment and motivation of belligerents in the organisation of 
the use of force. The Political Economy of Conflict is a subfield of Security Studies and 
part of the trend to broaden and deepen this field (Buzan 1991).  
Inspired by the Political Economy of Conflict, this thesis developed a framework 
of analysis for the relationship between conflict financing and recurrence. The framework 
distinguished between the propensity of an organised armed group to renew armed 
conflict (the disposition of an actor to use force) and the risk of conflict recurrence (the 
likelihood of the event of conflict recurrence). In the former, the material environment to 
use armed force is connected with the incentives to use armed force, thus, bridging 
material and motivational factors. The latter relates the disposition to use armed force of 
various parties to a conflict with each other (see Table 2.1). 
The framework is a contribution to the study of the economic dimensions of 
armed conflict and conflict dynamics and a platform for case study analysis. It has been 
inspired by and developed in contrast to the Collier and Hoeffler Model on the Onset of 
Civil War (Collier and Hoeffler 2004). The framework goes beyond existing 
conceptualisations by including all forms of military organisations, applying a 
comprehensive approach of conflict financing, conceiving conflict financing as the 
combination of revenue sources, the cost of conflict, and considering conflict financing as 
a relative phenomenon. By including a perspective on the incentives to using armed force 
in the framework, the analysis of the role of conflict financing in conflict recurrence is 
also linked to the broader political context of the conflict. 
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Applying the conceptual framework to the conflicts of Angola, Abkhazia and 
Kosovo produced a series of findings on the relationship between conflict financing and 
recurrence. The case studies refute the claim that the availability of revenue sources is 
automatically associated to the onset and recurrence of armed conflict (Collier 2000b, 13) 
and that armed groups always have sufficient resources to maintain conflict once it has 
started (Collier 2000b, 4). The thesis finds that the surplus of revenue sources is a 
necessary but not sufficient condition for conflict recurrence. What matters for the 
relationship between conflict financing and recurrence is not simply the total revenue 
available to an organised armed group to finance conflict. Much rather, it is the 
conditions under which conflict financing increases the risk of conflict recurrence (see 
Table 7.1). These conditions include: 
 
• The capacity of an organised armed group to translate revenue sources into military 
capability in one point in time and over time: The degree to which revenue sources 
are captured, managed centrally and controlled by few stakeholders affects the risk of 
conflict recurrence.  
• The availability of sufficient revenue sources to pay for the type of armed conflict 
required to achieve objectives: Different types of armed conflict have different 
barriers to entry and cost of competition the level of which affects the risk of conflict 
recurrence. 
• Revenue sources and military capability superior to those of its adversaries: The 
relative material position of the belligerent parties prior and during armed conflict 
affect the risk of conflict recurrence and conflict dynamics.  
• A high incentive to use armed force increasing revenue sources over time: A high 
incentive to use force can lead organised armed groups to innovate and diversify 
revenue sources over time. This increases the risk of conflict recurrence by shifting a 
shortage to a surplus of revenue sources. 
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Table 7.1: 
Conditions under which conflict financing increases the risk of conflict recurrence 
 
  
The capacity to translate revenue 
sources into military capability: 
Resource capture 
Centralised revenue management 
Exclusive revenue control 
 
 
   
 ↓  
 
→ 
 
Conflict 
Recurrence 
 
 
←
 
 
 
Revenue sources and military 
capability superior  
to those of its adversaries 
 
 ↑  
 
 
 
Sufficient revenue sources  
to pay for the type of  
armed conflict required 
 
   
  
A high incentive to use armed force to 
increase revenue sources over time 
 
 
 
 These observations were derived from the analysis of three case studies and 
should not be considered as generalisations. Nevertheless, they invite reflection on how 
the analysis of three case studies contributes to a better understanding of the phenomenon 
of intra-state armed conflict. The following suggests that this thesis creates a better 
understanding of conflict dynamics and the financing of armed conflict.  
 The inclusion of the cost of conflict into the study of conflict financing, opens 
new perspectives on conflict dynamics. By creating an estimation tool for the cost of 
conflict, this thesis established data points for barriers-to-entry and the cost of 
competition. The utility of this tool lies in only needing four data points – the cost of 
weapons, the cost of ammunitions, the income per soldier and the number of soldiers – in 
order to perform an estimation which identifies the lowest threshold to start and maintain 
armed conflict. Table 2.16 summarises a thought experiment for a low, medium and high 
cost estimate for starting and maintaining an armed conflict for 1,000 soldiers per year. 
According to this thought experiment, the cost to start an armed conflict is between the 
bounds of 67,500 USD and 450,000 USD per 1,000 soldiers. The maintenance of a low 
intensity conflict is between the bounds of USD 2.1 million and USD 11.4 million, a 
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medium intensity conflict between USD 2.6 million and USD 16.2 million, and a high 
intensity conflict between USD 4.5 million and USD 34.8 million per 1,000 soldiers per 
year.112 The thought experiment also shows that ammunition is one of the key cost drivers 
during armed conflict. A three-fold increase in ammunition prices during armed conflict 
increases the total cost of conflict by about one-third. In addition, paying soldiers salaries 
is an important fix cost which raises the cost of competition. In low intensity conflicts, 
salaries account for about 90 percent and in high intensity conflict about 35 percent of the 
total cost of conflict. 
 Based on the insights of research on small arms and ammunition (SAS 2001; SAS 
2002; SAS 2005; Pézard and Anders 2006), these estimates reflect that it is much cheaper 
to start an armed conflict than to maintain it. The increase in the cost to maintain armed 
conflict derives from the greater amount of weapons and ammunition as well as the 
increase of their prices with rising levels of conflict intensity. 
 By creating data points on the costs of conflict, the estimation tool developed an 
understanding of barriers-to-entry and the cost of competition. Given the limited 
availability of data on military acquisitions of armed groups, the estimation tool is useful 
to understand the costs involved in the organisation of armed conflict. In this way, the 
thesis suggests that a high start-up and maintenance cost can prevent the occurrence and 
recurrence of armed conflict as well as limit the escalation of a pre-existing armed 
conflict. Considering the cost of conflict in relation to conflict financing proves the 
assumption wrong that “rebel groups more than cover their costs during the conflict” 
(Collier and Hoeffler 2004, 654).   
 These considerations also highlight that low intensity conflict as the predominant 
type of contemporary armed conflict may be explained in relation to the cost of armed 
conflict. Low intensity conflict occurs frequently because the barrier-to-entry into armed 
conflict and cost of competition is low; however, most organised armed groups cannot 
cover the cost of escalation. As low intensity conflicts become prolonged, the economic 
agendas in armed conflict generate the revenues needed to self-finance a low intensity 
conflict.  
                                                 
112 All figures include ranges for weapons prices between 40 USD and 250 USD, ammunition prices 
between 0.05 USD to 0.5 USD and income per soldier between 2,000 USD to 10,000 USD (see Table 
2.16). 
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 In addition to these points on conflict dynamics, the thesis also created a better 
understanding of conflict financing. Overall, it is underlined that what is important in 
conflict financing is not the total revenue available to an organised armed group, but if 
this is enough to cover the cost for the type of armed conflict needed to achieve its 
political, military or economic objectives. Thus, it is not the viability of armed conflict 
which predicts the onset and recurrence of armed conflict (Collier 2000b, 13), but rather 
if an organised armed group has sufficient means for the military strategy to achieve its 
objectives.  
 The case studies have also contributed to a better understanding on the qualities of 
different revenue sources as methods of conflict financing. In Angola, MPLA had a 
strategic advantage because oil revenues generated more revenue sources than diamonds. 
Moreover, its revenue base was less vulnerable to attack due to its off-shore location. 
UNITA was unable to maintain the armed conflict because diamonds did not generate 
enough revenue to escalate the conflict in 1993 and 1999. It was also unable to control 
alluvial diamond mines once attacked by MPLA. In Georgia, parallel economies were 
difficult to control centrally due to the number of stakeholders involved and were part of 
a governance system in which the control of economic opportunities was devolved to 
local strongmen in exchange for political support to the centre. After the Rose 
Revolution, the Government centralised state finances leading to 10-fold increase in the 
defence budget between 2002 and 2006. In Abkhazia, the de-facto state provided a 
structure to control economic resources centrally. In Kosovo, favourable conditions for 
diaspora financing provided sufficient revenue to start but not to maintain the conflict. 
The cost of the escalation was born by NATO members.  
 These insights inspired a typology of methods of conflict financing based on how 
effective they are to finance major armed conflict. This typology stands in contrast to 
associating the risk of armed conflict to the physical concentration of natural resources 
(Klare 201, 142, 215-217) and to dependence on primary commodity exports (Collier 
2000a, 96). Instead, the risk of conflict recurrence increases if the method of conflict 
financing is effective in generating the revenue to pay for the kind of armed conflict 
needed by an organised armed group to achieve its objectives.  
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 The thesis highlights that a method of conflict financing is effective when revenue 
sources are controlled centrally and have the potential to generate a high revenue stream 
to cover the costs of a military strategy. Oil, diamonds, drugs and third-party assistance 
are therefore effective methods of conflict financing because they are easy to centralise 
and generate high-value revenue streams. They are also effective methods because they 
generate a flow of immediate revenue.  
 Other methods of conflict financing such as taxation, parallel economies or 
diaspora financing are less effective because their revenue stream is more difficult to 
centralise due to the number of intermediaries involved as well as the potential value of 
revenue they generate to cover the cost of conflict. Nevertheless, they are important in the 
sense that they provide constant revenue over time and are therefore a useful strategy to 
cover the maintenance cost of an armed conflict.  
 Other methods of conflict financing such as taxation of humanitarian assistance, 
contributions of individuals, kidnapping, asset transfers from civilians, landing fees or 
revenue from portfolio investments are less effective strategies of conflict financing 
because on their own they are unlikely to finance a major armed conflict. However, they 
remain significant, not only in terms of their humanitarian impacts, but also by 
supplementing other revenue sources. In cases in which they contribute to the financing 
of a low intensity conflict they may even generate enough to keep the conflict going. 
Thus, they remain important for low intensity conflict as well as providing small groups 
with the capabilities to spoil peace processes or peacebuilding.  
 Table 7.2 provides and overview over various methods of conflict financing 
according to different levels of effectiveness.  
 This typology provides a better understanding of conflict financing by showing 
that methods of conflict financing vary in their effectiveness to provide the means for the 
conduct of armed conflict. Very effective strategies are those whose revenue can be 
centralised easily and is high enough to cover the cost of the military strategy required. In 
addition, the typology underlines the importance to adopt a comprehensive approach 
which considers conflict economies as a combination of various methods of conflict 
financing. In this way, it is possible to identify the financial vulnerability of an armed 
group and assess how many options it has to diversify revenue if its main sources are cut.   
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Table 7.2: Effectiveness of methods of conflict financing for major armed conflict 
 
Method of conflict financing Characteristics Effectiveness 
 
Oil 
Diamonds 
Drugs 
Third-party assistance 
 
Easy centralised control 
High level revenue stream 
Possibility of immediate revenue 
 
 
High 
 
Taxation 
Parallel economies 
Diaspora financing 
 
More difficult centralised control 
Lower level of revenue stream 
Possibility of constant revenue  
 
 
Medium 
 
Taxation of humanitarian assistance 
Contributions of individuals 
Kidnapping 
Asset transfers from civilians 
Landing fees 
Revenue from portfolio investments 
 
Centralised control possible 
Low level of revenue stream 
Possibility to supplement larger 
sources of revenue 
Possibility to maintain low 
intensity conflict 
 
 
 
Low 
 
 The typology is in dialogue with the existing literature on the relationship 
between natural resources and armed conflict presented in Chapter 1 (Le Billon 2001a, 
Renner 2002, Ross 2003, Ross 2004a). This literature highlights the importance of the 
natural characteristics of natural sources (lootable, obstratuctable, concentrated, diffuse) 
or its geographical location of occurrence (proximate or distant to the capital). This thesis 
complements this literature by highlighting that different natural resources vary in their 
effectiveness to finance conflict. It also advocates a comprehensive approach of conflict 
financing which goes beyond natural resources and a focus on individual methods of 
conflict financing. 
 The typology also complements the work on the mobilisation of organised armed 
groups. Weinstein argues that “patterns of violence are a direct consequence of 
endowments leaders have at their disposal as they organise” (Weinstein 2007, 20). 
Resource rich groups recruit opportunity-minded soldiers with coercive strategies; 
resource poor groups recruit more activist-minded soldiers with participatory strategies. 
Resource rich groups can mobilise more quickly than resource poor groups (Ibid., 171-
172, 328-329). The typology adds two other dimensions to the availability of resources: 
Resource management and the cost of conflict. It suggests that the control of revenue 
sources is only one aspect in creating a military organisation. However, how it is formed 
depends on the capacity of a leadership to translate revenue into achieving political, 
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military, social or economic objectives. Thus, the available endowment may compromise 
the choices of organised armed groups as they organise in one point in time, however, 
over time, their leaderships may have the ability to change their endowments though 
innovation and exploiting opportunities deriving from exogenous change. 
 What remains to be addressed is what can be done to prevent the recurrence of 
intra-state armed conflict from the perspective of conflict financing. This thesis suggests 
that the perspective of conflict financing has a lot of potential to prevent the recurrence of 
high intensity conflict but less for low intensity conflict. This is because high intensity 
conflicts need more financing and materiel which can be targeted more effectively. Due 
to the higher cost, high intensity conflicts are more sensitive to changes in the barrier-to-
entry and the cost of competition. In low intensity conflicts, conflict financing can be 
marginal and is therefore more difficult – if not impossible – to cut off though external 
policies. In these conflicts, the policy focus should therefore be on increasing the 
opportunity cost and lower the expected benefits from using force.  
 The thesis also highlights that only targeting revenue sources and the cost of 
conflict – thus, the material aspects of organising armed conflict – is unlikely to foster the 
long term prevention of conflict recurrence. The thesis underlined that armed groups 
which are committed to their goals and have a high incentive to use force can change 
their material environment over time and exploit opportunities which temporarily reduce 
the cost of armed conflict or provide higher revenues.  
 These two aspects underline the importance of a comprehensive approach against 
conflict financing in post-conflict settings. A comprehensive approach reduces the 
availability of revenue sources and at the same time increases the cost of armed conflict 
and opportunity costs of using armed force. Adopting this approach opens a new 
perspective on existing conflict management policies. For example, the management of 
post-conflict parallel economies is as much an initiative to provide for economic recovery 
after armed conflict as well as to limit the resource base for spoilers. Commodity 
sanctions and travel bans target at the same time revenue sources and the cost of conflict. 
Arms control and security sector reform increase the cost of conflict by limiting the 
availability of arms and increasing the barrier-to-entry into armed conflict. Post-conflict 
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development assistance, investment and employment create peace dividends and thereby 
increase opportunity costs.  
 Thus, there is room for action by targeting the material environment in which 
conflict entrepreneurs organise the recurrence of armed conflict. However, when looking 
at the potentials of policy against conflict financing one should bear in mind that the cost 
of spoiling is low. If spoilers maintain a small and committed leadership, have a 
centralised structure of managing revenue sources, have a surplus of revenue sources to 
renew the type of conflict they want, have high expected benefits from using force and 
few opportunity costs, the prospects for a successful policy against conflict financing is 
limited. In this case, policy should focus on the motivation behind the use of force. 
 The limits of policy against conflict financing is particularly limited if armed 
groups operate in an environment which facilitates conflict financing. Armed groups do 
not operate in a vacuum but within a social, economic and political context. For example, 
weak states facilitate the financing of conflict by their lack of effective control over 
territory and military capability to check insurgents. Competing commercial actors in 
conflict zones act as willing collaborators and provide access to international arms, 
commodity and financial markets. Parallel economies facilitate conflict financing because 
economic activity is parallel to the state and thus more easily exploited by rebel groups or 
spoilers. Porous borders facilitate the flow of goods and people and provide organized 
armed groups with opportunities for money making.  
Cutting the material base of conflict entrepreneurs is easier said than done and not 
the magic policy which prevents conflict recurrence in all times and places. If spoilers are 
sensitive to the opportunity costs of using armed force, an emphasis should be put on co-
opting them into peacebuilding; if they are committed to a low intensity conflict, 
targeting their material environment by limiting their revenue sources and increasing the 
cost to organise armed conflict may make their endeavour more complicated, but not 
impossible. The prevention of high intensity conflict through a policy against conflict 
financing has better prospects given the higher cost of conflict. In order to prevent the 
recurrence of intra-state armed conflict, policy should address the financing and 
incentives of organised armed groups in view of undermining their resilience and 
changing their rationale for using force in the long term. 
 379
 
APPENDIX 
 
Appendix 1: List of interviews 
 
A. Georgia 
 
Interviews in Georgia were conducted as part of to project The Political Economy of the 
Frozen Conflicts in Georgia supported by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Switzerland. 
Interviews prior to March 2005 were held during visits of the author in the framework of 
the project Capacity Building in International Relations supported by the Swiss Agency 
for Development and Cooperation.  
 
Geneva, 31 March 2006 
 
1. Edouard Brunner, Former Special Envoy for Georgia of the Secretary General of the 
United Nations 
 
Tbilisi, 24 February – 2 March 2006 
 
2. Irakli, Alessania, Special Representative for Abkhazia of the President of Georgia 
3. Levan Alexidze, Director, Institute of European Law and International Law of 
Human Rights, Tbilisi State University  
4. David Bakradze, Member of Parliament, Chairman Committee on European 
Integration, Parliament of Georgia 
5. Mitchell Carlson, Chief Technical Advisor, Abkhazia Livelihood and Recovery 
Programme, United Nations Development Programme Georgia 
6. Martin Christensson, Programme Analyst, United Nations Development Programme 
Georgia 
7. Sabine Freizer, Caucasus Project Director, International Crisis Group 
8. Archil Gegeshidze, Senior Research Fellow, Georgian Foundation for Strategic and 
International Studies 
9. Giorgi Gogia, Analyst, International Crisis Group 
10. Niculin Jäger, Deputy Head of Mission, Embassy of Switzerland to Armenia, 
Azerbaijan and Georgia 
11. Tinatin Kindersheli, Tbilisi District Representative, Republican Party 
12. Ketevan Kheladze, New Approach Support Unit Coordinator, United Nations 
Development Programme Georgia 
13. John Lewis, Programme Manager for the Abkhazia Livelihood Improvement and 
Recovery Programme, United Nations Development Programme Georgia 
14. David Losaberidze, Programme Director, Caucasus Institute for Peace Democracy 
and Development 
15. David Melua, President, Civitas Georgicas 
16. Ekatrine Metreveli, Research Fellow, Georgian Foundation for Strategic and 
International Studies 
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17. Levan Mikeladze, Ambassador of Georgia to Switzerland, Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs of Georgia 
18. Mikheil Patashuri, Third Secretary, Department of Energy Security, Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs of Georgia 
19. Alexander Rondeli, President, Georgian Foundation for Strategic and International 
Studies 
20. Marian Staszewski, Senior Political Advisor, United Nations Observer Mission in 
Georgia 
 
London, 20-23 February 2006 
 
21. Oksana Antonenko, Senior Fellow, Programme Director Russia and Eurasia, 
International Institute for Strategic Studies 
22. Rachel Clogg, Caucasus Programme Co-Manager, Conciliation Resources 
23. Stacy Closson, Doctoral Candidate, London School of Economics 
24. Jonathan Cohen, Caucasus Programme Manager, Conciliation Resources 
25. Dennis Corboy, Director, Caucasus Policy Institute, King’s College London; Former 
European Union Representative in the South Caucasus. 
26. Amiran Kavadze, Ambassador of Georgia to the United Kingdom and Ireland 
27. Diana Klein, Eurasia Senior Program Officer, Business & Conflict, International 
Alert 
28. Anna Matveeva, Independent Expert on the Caucasus and Central Asia 
29. Oskari Pentikainen, Project Coordinator, International Alert 
30. Domitilla Sagromosa, Lecturer, Department of War Studies, King’s College London 
 
Yerevan, 15 March 2005 
 
31. Mr. Alexander Iskanderov, Director, Caucasus Media Institute, Yerevan 
 
Sukhumi and Gali, 6-11 March 2005 
 
32. Anton Widmer, Police Advisor, Chief of Staff, Civilian Police, United Nations 
Observer Mission in Georgia 
33. Vitali Turnava, Deputy Chairman, Committee on Budget and Economic Policy, 
Parliament of Abkhazia 
34. Ilja Gamisonija, Chairman, Committee on Budget and Economic Policy, Parliament 
of Abkhazia 
35. Sergej Shamba, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Abkhazia 
36. Laurent Van Reeth, Project Coordinator, Première Urgence 
37. Inal Khashig, Co-editor, Panorama Newspaper 
38. Julia Gumba, Lecturer in Economics, University of Sukhum, and Chairman, Abkhaz 
Union of Business Women 
39. Vladen Stefanov, Head, Human Rights Office in Abkhazia, United Nations Observer 
Mission in Georgia 
40. Christian Castelli, Trust Fund Programme Officer, United Nations Observer Mission 
in Georgia, Sukhumi 
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41. Boguslaw Romantowsky, Deputy Chief Military Observer, United Nations Observer 
Mission in Georgia 
 
Tbilisi, 28 February – 4 March 2005 
 
42. Archil Gegeshidze, Senior Research Fellow, Georgian Foundation for Strategic and 
International Studies 
43. Volker Jacoby, Former Coordinator of Political and Military Affairs, Mission to 
Georgia, Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe  
44. John Lewis, Project Manager, United Nations Development Programme 
45. Niculin Jäger, Deputy Head of Mission, Embassy of Switzerland to Armenia, 
Azerbaijan and Georgia 
46. Alexander Kukhianidze, Director, Transnational Crime and Corruption Centre, 
Georgia Office 
47. Stan Veitsman, Special Assistant to the Special Representative of the Secretary 
General, United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia 
48. Ekatrine Metreveli, Research Fellow, Georgian Foundation for Strategic and 
International Studies 
49. Alexander Rondeli, President, Georgian Foundation for Strategic and International 
Studies 
50. Giorgi Gogia, Analyst, International Crisis Group  
51. Sabine Freizer, Caucasus Project Director, International Crisis Group 
52. Roman Gotsiridze, Chairman, Budget Committee, Parliament of Georgia 
53. Stefan Speck, Ambassador of Switzerland to Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia 
 
Paris, 27 January 2005 
 
54. Dov Lynch, Senior Research Fellow, European Union Institute for Security Studies 
 
Other interviews before 2005 
 
55. Neil MacFarlane, Lester B. Pearson Professor of International Relations, University 
of Cambridge 
56. Pierre-André Campiche, Police Advisor-Liaison Officer, United Nations Observer 
Mission in Georgia 
57. George Gatskaradze, National Security Council of Georgia 
58. Vladimir Papava, Senior Fellow Georgian Foundation for Strategic and International 
Studies 
59. Srdjan Stojaninovic, Deputy Head, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian 
Affairs 
60. Nana Gibradze, Coordinator, United Nations Development Programme  
61. Levan Lomidze, Head, Department Trade and Economy, Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
of Georgia 
62. Markus Dürst, Coordinator for the South Caucasus, Swiss Agency for Development 
and Cooperation 
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B. Kosovo 
 
1. Mr. Levent Koro, National Programme Analyst, United Nations Development 
Programme, Pristina, 1 August 2005. 
2. Mr. Albin Kurti, Activist, Movement “Vetëvendosje!” (Selfdetermination), Pristina, 1 
August 2005.  
3. Mr. Andrew Kirkwood, Deputy Head, Department of Crime, Kosovo Police Service, 
United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo, Pristina, 31 July 2005.  
4. Mr. Konrad Wudtke, Director, Independent Commission for Mines and Minerals, 
European Union Pillar IV, United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo, 
Pristina, 29 July 2005.  
5. Mr. Nikolai Burcham, Chief Geologist, Independent Commission for Mines and 
Minerals, European Union Pillar IV, United Nations Interim Administration Mission 
in Kosovo, Pristina, 29 July 2005. 
6. Dr. Bujar Bukoshi, Chairman, New Party of Kosovo, Former Prime Minister of 
Kosovo in Exile, Pristina, 29 July 2005. 
7. Prof. Enver Hasani, Professor of International Law and International Relations, 
University of Pristina, Pristina, 29 July 2005. 
8. Dr. Alexander Anderson, Kosovo Project Director, International Crisis Group, 
Pristina, 28 July 2005.  
9. Liridon Latifi, Researcher, International Crisis Group, Pristina, 28 July 2005.  
10. Mr. Naip Zeka, Former Administrator of Financing the Parallel System of 
Governance in Kosovo, Pristina, 28 July 2005.  
11. Mr. Neeraj Singh, Spokesperson, Division of Public Information, United Nations 
Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo, Pristina, 28 July 2005.  
12. Mrs. Mechthild Henneke, Spokeswoman, Office for News and Communication, 
European Union Pillar IV, United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo, 
Pristina, 28 July 2005. 
13. Col. Kersabiec, Chief, Public Information Office, Kosovo Force, Pristina, 28 July 
2005. 
14. Mr. Iain Smailes, Head, Advisory Unit on Security, Office of the Special 
Representative of the Secretary General, United Nations Interim Administration 
Mission in Kosovo, Pristina, 27 July 2005. 
15. Mr. Bayram Rexhepi, Member of Parliament of Kosovo, Former Prime Minister of 
Kosovo, Pristina, 27 July 2005. 
16. Mr. Midjen Kilmendi, Editor, Java Newspaper, Pristina, 27 July 2005. 
17. Prof. Isa Mustafa, Vice President, Institute for Development Research, Former 
Minister of Finance in Exile, Pristina, 27 July 2005. 
18. Prof. Lulzim Peci, Director, Kosovo Institute for Policy Research and Development, 
Pristina, 26 July 2005. 
19. Mr. Illir Deda, Head, Special Research Projects, Kosovo Institute for Policy Research 
and Development, Pristina, 26 July 2005. 
20. Mr. Illir Dugolli, Researcher, Kosovo Institute for Policy Research and Development, 
Yale World Fellow, Pristina, 26 July 2005. 
21. Amb. Yvana Enzler, Head of Mission, Swiss Liaison Office in Kosovo, Federal 
Department of Foreign Affairs of Switzerland, Pristina, 26 July 2005. 
 383
 
Appendix 2: Maps 
 
Map 1: Angola 
 
 
  Source: http://www.un.org/Depts/Cartographic/map/profile/angola.pdf [15.03.2007]. 
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Map 2: MPLA and UNITA territorial control, mid-1996 
 
 
 
 
       Source: Balencie and La Grange 1996, 513 
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Map 3: MPLA and UNITA territorial control, mid-November 1998 
 
 
 
 
      Source: Balencie and La Grange 1999, 621. 
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Map 4: MPLA and UNITA territorial control, 2000 
 
 
 
 
   Source: Balencie and La Grange, 2001, 1080. 
 
 
 
 
 387
 
Map 5: Areas of highest diamond concentration in Angola 
 
 
Source: Dietrich 2000, 143. 
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Map 6: Georgia 
 
 
  Source: http://www.un.org/Depts/Cartographic/map/profile/georgia.pdf [15.03.2007]. 
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Map 7: Soviet Georgia 
 
 
 
Source: http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/commonwealth/georgia_pol_1991.pdf [15.03.2007]. 
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Map 8: Russia military capability in the North Caucasus 
 
 
 
Source: Trifanov 2006, 35. 
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Map 9: The Kosovo Region 
 
 
Source: http://www.un.org/Depts/Cartographic/map/profile/kosovo.pdf [15.03.2007]. 
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Map 10: The Kosovo lignite basin 
 
 
       
Source: Vattenfall Europe presentation on “The Prospects of the Kosovo Lignite  
             Basin” in ICMM 2005. 
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